安全、全球化與中國的技術民族主義 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 安全、全球化與中國的技術民族主義 Open and Closed: Security, Globalization and Techno-Nationalism in. ‧. the People’s Republic of China (PRC). n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Conor Salcetti 康納爾 Advisor: Professor I Yuan 袁易教授. 中華民國. 106 年 12 月. December 2017.

(2) 安全、全球化與中國的技術民族主義 Open and Closed: Security, Globalization and Techno-Nationalism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 研究生：康納爾. Student: Conor Salcetti. 指導教授：袁易教授. Advisor: Professor I Yuan. 立. 政治國立政治大學. 大. 碩士論文. 學. ‧ 國. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧ er. io. al. sit. y. Nat. A Thesis. n. v i n Submitted to International in Asia-Pacific Studies C hMaster’s Program engchi U National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 106. 年 12 月. December 2017 .

(3) Abstract. How does the Chinese state conceptualize strategic technology in the age of globalization? This question is of tremendous importance in the context of China’s growing international clout. This thesis seeks to provide an answer by examining Chinese technology policy through the framework of “techno-nationalism.” It does so by examining the historical foundations and underlying drivers of techno-nationalist ideology: proving applicability to the Chinese context. In doing so it makes the case that techno-nationalist ideology is a salient factor in understanding how China’s political elite think about the development and regulation of strategic technology. It makes the case that, in spite of. 政治大. substantial international integration and domestic changes, core ideas about security,. 立. sovereignty and the role of the state drive China’s policy-making in a techno-nationalist. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. direction.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. I . i n U. v.

(4) 摘要. 中國如何在全球化時代將戰略科技概念化？在中國日益強大的國際影響力的背景下，這個問題尤其重要。本文試圖通過“科技民族主義”框架來研究中國的科技政策並提供一個答案，通過考察科技民族主義意識形態的歷史基礎和根本驅動因素藉以證明適用於中國的情況。準此，藉由通過科技民族主義思想來理解中國政治精英如何看待戰略技術發展和調控此一因素。在此情況下，儘管全球化和國內因素，安全、主權和國家角色思想仍是推動中國科技民族主義決策的核心要素。. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. II . i n U. v.

(5) Acknowledgements. Building up some level of understanding on a topic as consequential as the intersection of Chinese politics and strategic technology has been an immensely challenging and illuminating experience. In preparing this thesis, I benefitted from an excellent committee of advisors who played an invaluable role in enhancing the quality of my scholarship.. Firstly, I would like to sincerely thank Professor I Yuan for his role as my primary thesis advisor. Professor Yuan encouraged my initial interest in this complex topic, focused my thinking, and provided important. 政治大 covered in this thesis. His IMAS course on Cross-Strait relations built up my appreciation of IR theory and, 立 critiques which ultimately played an integral role in improving my overall conclusions regarding the issues. ‧ 國. 學. by extension, improved my analytical abilities. I benefitted immensely from my interactions with him during the thesis writing process and appreciated his attentiveness to my questions and concerns.. ‧. sit. y. Nat. I must express my heartfelt thanks to Professor Alex Tan for his substantial input during the proposal and. io. er. final defense processes. His course on Asia-Pacific Political Economy was a highlight of my time in the IMAS program and gave me a deeper appreciation of the role politics plays in shaping economic outcomes.. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. I would also like to thank Professor Hans Tung of NTU for his help throughout the course of this process. Professor Tung’s input improved my thinking on both my topic specifically and the process of academic research and inquiry more generally.. In stepping in to help at the last minute, I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Wei. Not only did her assistance allow my defense to go forward on time but her feedback improved the quality of my final draft. For that I am grateful. Finally, I must thank my family back in the United States and my loving girlfriend here in Taiwan for their patience, support, and generosity over the course of this process. III .

(6) Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction................................................................................................................................................ 1 Purpose of the Study .................................................................................................................................. 4 Structure of the Thesis ............................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter 2: Literature Review............................................................................................................................. 7 2.1 Understanding Techno-nationalism ..................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Techno-nationalism in East Asia........................................................................................................ 11 2.3 Techno-nationalism and Globalization: Techno-Globalism, Competition, and the Nation-state ...... 16 Chapter 3: Techno-nationalism in China ......................................................................................................... 24 3.1 Understanding China’s Techno-nationalism ...................................................................................... 24 3.2 Sovereignty, Power, and Regime Security ......................................................................................... 27 3.3 Globalization and Great Power Competition ..................................................................................... 31 3.4 Technology, National Development and the State ............................................................................. 38 3.5 Technology and Nationalism/National Identity ................................................................................. 41 3.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 45 Chapter 4: Techno-nationalism and Techno-Industrial Policy ......................................................................... 47 4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 47 4.2 Chinese Techno-nationalism in Historical Context ........................................................................... 48 4.3 China’s Technology Policy under “Reform and Opening” ................................................................ 53 4.4 Techno-Industrial Policy Under Hu and Xi ....................................................................................... 59 4.5 The MLP and SEI .............................................................................................................................. 60 4.6 Made in China 2025........................................................................................................................... 65 4.7 The 13th Five Year Plan (FYP) and “Innovation-Driven Development” ........................................... 68 4.8 Military Modernization, National Security and Informatization ....................................................... 69 Chapter 5: Case Studies ................................................................................................................................... 73 5.1 Integrated Circuits (IC) ...................................................................................................................... 74 5.2 Industrial Robotics and Automation .................................................................................................. 79 5.3 Artificial Intelligence (AI) ................................................................................................................. 83 5.4 Conclusions........................................................................................................................................ 87 Chapter 6: Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 91 References...................................................................................................................................................... 105. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. IV . i n U. v.

(7) Chapter 1: Introduction. 1.1 Introduction. Technology is often depicted as an essential variable informing our study on a range of related fields within the social sciences. As Geoffrey L. Herrera puts it, “technology looms across disciplines as a source of social, economic, and/or political change. It is often the master variable that explains everything.”1 Accordingly, “technology must be considered an important, transformative element of the international political system.”2 These observations, made over a decade ago, seem prescient in light of the current. 政治大. moment. Several recent commentaries convey an acute sense of crisis regarding the existing structure of. 立. “international order;” a crisis induced in no small part by the rapidity of technological change.3. ‧ 國. 學. One of the seminal areas of interest to scholars of both international relations (IR) and international political. ‧. economy (IPE) concerns the place of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Whereas only a few decades. Nat. sit. y. ago China was an economic and technological backwater effectively walled off from the outside world,. n. al. er. io. today China is a burgeoning superpower whose “rise” is, in no small part, closely tied up in an aptitude for. v. harnessing new forms of technology in service of both economic development and military modernization.4. Ch. engchi. i n U. China’s emergence as a technology power attracts a considerable volume of attention both within the country and without. From semiconductors, AI and ICT software to aerospace, robotics, biotech and sensory technology, growing prowess elicits an array of reactions from a large and diverse array of stakeholders.5 That China draws keen interest and close scrutiny reflects its massive scale: it is the world’s second largest.                                                         1. Geoffrey Herrera, Technology and International Transformation: The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Change,3. 2 Ibid 3 A prominent example of this argument can be found in Richard Haas, World in Disarray, 2017 4 See Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell. China’s Search for Security, 2012. 5 Jane Perlez, Paul Mozur and Jonathan Ansfield. “China’s Technology Ambitions Could Upset the Global Trade Order.” New York Times. November, 7, 2017. 1 .

(8) economy, largest overall exporter, and a leading producer, assembler and consumer of an array of high-tech products and services.. In this light, it can be argued that China is a major stakeholder in the existing liberal trading order; a system of rules and norms widely seen as essential to this period of economic globalization.6 Recent statements and initiatives taken by the Chinese government emphasize the ways in which China’s economic expansion represents a positive-sum or “win-win” for global development and prosperity.7 In one notable example, Chinese President Xi Jinping, speaking at the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, laid out the case as such:. 政治大. Economic globalization has powered global growth and facilitated movement of goods and capital,. 立. advances in science, technology and civilization, and interactions among peoples…it is true that. ‧ 國. 學. economic globalization has created new problems, but this is no justification to write economic globalization off completely. Rather, we should adapt to and guide economic globalization, cushion its. ‧. negative impact, and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations.8. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. And yet, despite reassurances that it remains a stalwart of the open trading system, there exists substantial. i n U. v. concern over China’s utilization of an array of policy tools seen as favoring domestic firms operating in key. Ch. engchi. industries at the expense of foreign alternatives.9 Over the past few years there has been a growing backlash against “unfair” policies often seen as coming at the expense of foreign technology providers.10 This decade-plus long emphasis on promoting domestic technology finds support in state planning initiatives such as Made in China 2025 (MIC) and the 12th and 13th Five Year Plans (FYPs), as well as in important national security and cybersecurity legislation..                                                         6. “China supports globalization, free trade: Premier Li.” Reuters. March 15, 2017. “China contributes win-win solutions against counter-globalization. People’s Daily Online. September 26, 2017. < http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/09/26/content_281475885630178.htm> 8 Xi Jinping, Speech at 2017 WEF, Translation from CGTN America < https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xijinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum> 9 Michael Martina. “U.S. lobby says China protectionism fueling foreign business pessimism.” Reuters. January 18, 2017. 10 Keith Bradsher. “Trump’s Trade Pick Could Put China in a Difficult Spot.” New York Times, January 13, 2017 2 7.

(9) Looking at developments in the country more broadly, it can be argued the past decade upended the belief that China - by virtue of its heightened degree of exposure to foreign ideas, institutions, technologies and people - would move in the direction of greater convergence with an array of Western political and economic norms11; becoming what American official Bob Zoellick famously described as a “responsible stakeholder.”12 With that in mind, the need for a nuanced understanding of the PRC’s technology landscape has arguably never been more important given the confluence of two major developments: the increasing size, complexity, competitiveness and level of international connectivity within China’s technology market and growing contentiousness in China’s security and commercial relations with an array of external powers, principally the United States.. 立. 政治大. The rapid ascension of China as a major player in the globalized high-tech market comes at a time of. ‧ 國. 學. heightened debate and potential strategic re-calibration in terms of how a number of foreign capitals approach their relationships with Beijing.13 Evan Feigenbaum, writing recently in The National Interest,. ‧. argues that, “China’s rapid military buildup, its unprecedentedly quick industrial and economic development,. Nat. sit. y. an increasingly assertive Chinese foreign policy, and new competitive pressures on the United States’. n. al. er. io. economy and fiscal health” are undermining the belief within Washington D.C. that a “successful” China is. i n U. v. in the national interest. He goes on to state that, “among Washington foreign-policy elites and a growing. Ch. engchi. number of U.S. companies, China is viewed as a strategic competitor, a military threat in Asia and, ultimately, a possible adversary.”14. Chinese technology policy largely feeds into this debate, as evidenced by recent international headlines such as the New York Times’ “Political Backlash Grows in Washington to Chinese Takeovers”15 and the FT’s.                                                         11. David Shambaugh, China’s Future, 2016 Robert Zoellick. “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Transcript from U.S. Department of State Archive < https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm> 13 See Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley Tellis. Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China. CFR. April, 2015. 14 Evan Feigenbaum, Not Since Nixon Has a U.S. President Faced Such a Tough China Challenge.”The National Interest, 2017. 15 Keith Brasher and Paul Mozur. “Political Backlash Grows in Washington to Chinese Takeovers.” New York Times. February 16, 2016 3 12.

(10) “China’s push to become a tech superpower triggers alarms abroad.”16 The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF), an ICT industry group, states that “China’s aggressive and unrelenting innovation-mercantilist policies pose a serious and growing threat to both the U.S. and global economy as well as to advanced technology enterprises from the United States and other nations competing on rules- and market-based terms.”17 As Scott Kennedy notes in a recent CSIS report on Chinese innovation, “the most problematic issue in the U.S.-China economic relationship is China’s unprecedented drive to become a technology powerhouse.”18. 1.2 Purpose of the Study. 政治大. Techno-nationalist ideology, industrial policy, and state planning figure prominently in the academic. 立. literature describing East Asian development over the course of the post-World War II period. At various. ‧ 國. 學. times and to varying extents, every state in the region has been categorized as pursuing a “technonationalist” strategy of development.19 This was the case with China, where the combination of extensive. ‧. central planning and extreme fear over the nature of the Cold War international security environment drove. Nat. sit. y. early PRC industrial policy in the direction of a relatively autarkic form of self-sufficiency principally. n. al. er. io. oriented around indigenous defense production capability.20. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. However, the reform and opening period commencing in the late 1970s called into question the resiliency of the role of the Chinese state in managing processes of industrial transformation. With the end of the Cold War and the onset of the current phase of ICT-enabled globalization, there emerged a growing belief that the nation-state was losing its saliency as the principal driver of economic and technological development.21 Residual attitudes and institutions of Mao-era central planning and communist governance were perceived                                                         16. Louise Lucas and Emily Feng, “China’s Push to Become a Tech Superpower is Triggering Alarm Bells Abroad.” Financial Times. March 20, 2017. 17 Robert Atkinson, Nigel Cory and Stephen Ezell. Stopping China’s Mercantilism. ITIF. March, 2017. 18 Scott Kennedy and Christopher Johnson. Perfecting China, Inc. CSIS. May, 2016. 19 Tai Ming Cheung. “Economics, security, and technology in Northeast Asia: Maneuvering between nationalist and globalist forces.” The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia, 2013. 20 Ibid 21 A proponent of this view is Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World, 1990. 4 .

(11) by reformist voices as outdated remnants of a bygone era, likely to be eventually swept away as China further consolidated its transition from socialism to capitalism.22 Yet several decades into the reform and opening period, economic nationalism and techno-industrial policy remain very much in vogue; in China, around the Asia-Pacific, and increasingly in parts of the Western world.23. This thesis seeks to provide insight into the political rationale underlying China’s continuing usage of an extensive techno-industrial policy architecture; a system that, while substantially overhauled and reformulated over the course of multiple decades, persists in the face of comprehensive marketization processes and substantial international integration. In explaining this persistence, the proceeding research focuses primarily on technology at the ideational level - situating technology policy into a broader context of. 政治大. ideas, strategies, and objectives pertinent to central issues of security, power, competition and development.. 立. At its core, this thesis suggests that, in the age of globalization, techno-nationalism remains a highly salient. ‧ 國. 學. framework for understanding how China’s political and bureaucratic elite conceptualize strategic technology and develop techno-industrial policy.. ‧. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. 1.3 Structure of the Thesis. i n U. v. Chapter 1 provides the introduction; addressing the purpose and relevancy of the research and the principal research questions to be addressed.. Ch. engchi. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the relevant literature on techno-nationalism and the underlying set of beliefs undergirding it. It specifically examines techno-nationalism within the context of East Asian development. Finally, it examines the phenomenon of globalization and techno-globalism; exploring how the role of the state in technological development is in constant evolution..                                                         22 23. . One prominent critic of this idea is James Mann. The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism will not bring democracy to China, 2006 Anthony D’Costa, Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia, 2012. 5 .

(12) Chapter 3 provides an in-depth analysis of the ideational foundations of China’s approach to strategic technology. It examines a number of both systemic and contemporary aspects Chinese politics; seeking to provide insight into why successive generations of Chinese leadership have gravitated toward technonationalist strategic thinking and why this thinking will likely persist.. Chapter 4 looks at Chinese industrial and techno-industrial policy from the ROC period through to the present. It seeks to establish that throughout modern history the Chinese state has been deeply involved in both protecting and promoting strategically important domestic industries, managing processes of technological development and transformation, and creating institutional structures geared toward bolstering domestic innovation and R&D capacity. Over the course of this overview, the thesis links industrial and. 政治大. techno-industrial policy formation with core techno-nationalist ideas about the nature of security and international economic competition.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter 5 shifts the emphasis of the research from a focus on ideation and policy formation into the realm of. ‧. implementation and policy interaction. It does so by way of case study; looking at three strategically. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. important sectors: semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics.. i n U. v. Chapter 6 provides the conclusion. It summarizes and attempts to define China’s contemporary techno-. Ch. engchi. nationalism in practice and briefly explores possible ramifications of China’s techno-industrial policy.. 6 .

(13) Chapter 2: Literature Review. 2.1 Understanding Techno-nationalism. Techno-nationalism describes and conceptualizes the relationship between the nation-state and technology as it pertains to security, development, power, and sovereignty. In this sense, techno-nationalism refers to an ideational framework or guiding ideology rather than a specific set of policies. According to Richard Samuels, author of “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” “Technonationalism is an ideology, and like all ideologies it is a force that precedes and informs the institutions of an entire national economy as well as strategies for. 政治大 much of the subsequent research and commentary focuses on industrial policies carried out by East 立. national security.”24 Although the term first appeared in a 1987 article in The Atlantic by economist Robert Reich,25. ‧ 國. 學. Asian states over the course of the Cold War and post-Cold War period. It is important to note that technonationalism belies easy quantification; there is a variation of focus and emphasis within the academic. ‧. literature. Techno-nationalist strategies of development differ considerably over time, place, and sector.. sit. y. Nat. io. er. Despite lacking a uniform definition, Andrew B. Kennedy notes, “there are some common threads in the literature. First, whether the focus is defensive or developmental, there is broad agreement that techno-. al. n. v i n nationalists see nation-states as engaged inCa h competitive struggle e n g c h i Uin which technological prowess is crucial” and that “techno-nationalism can be understood as a belief that technology is a crucial national asset in a. highly competitive world.” He goes on to argue that a distinction must be made between “ideological” and “instrumental” techno-nationalist regimes, stating that “pragmatic variants of techno-nationalism are not uncommon, and these embrace a mix of liberal and nationalistic policies in pursuit of national technology goals.”26.                                                         24 25 26. . Richard Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army.” 1994, 31. Robert Reich. “The Rise of Techno-Nationalism.” The Atlantic Monthly. May, 1987. Andrew Kennedy. “China’s Search for Renewable Energy: Pragmatic Technonationalism. Asian Survey. 2013. 7 .

(14) Denis-Fred Simon, defining techno-nationalism in 1997, writes that it “is the practice of using technology as a tool of national power in global economic competition, either by trying to withhold technological knowledge from other states or by wielding it aggressively as an economic weapon.”27 For Simon, technonationalist patterns of state behavior emerged, to varying degrees, not only in East Asia but also in the United States and Western Europe in response to concerns over economic and military security.. According to the definition provided by David Edgerton, techno-nationalism sees the nation-state as the core unit of analysis for understanding patterns of technological development. Processes of technological innovation, absorption, and diffusion derive from underlying conditions of the nation-state.28 The development and utilization of new forms of technology is deemed essential to welfare and security. Put. 政治大. another way, the success of technological innovation and development is largely contingent on the state. 立. while, in turn, the security and material well-being of the state is largely contingent on its technological. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. sophistication.. This framework for conceptualizing techno-nationalism builds upon the work of Christopher Freeman, who. Nat. sit. y. emphasized the role of “national systems of innovation” in determining the level of technological and. n. al. er. io. economic development within a given nation-state. Freeman writes that the “national environment can have. i n U. v. a considerable influence in stimulating, facilitating, hindering or preventing the innovation activities of. Ch. engchi. firms.”29 In this line of thinking, the structure and orientation of state institutions serves as a key determinant of how a given nation-state utilizes technology and bear heavily upon overall developmental outcomes.. Freeman, in turn, draws on the earlier work of Friedrich List, who advocated an array of interventionist state policies designated to facilitate industrial development, technological upgrading, and innovation. For Freeman and List, the role of the state in market coordination, capital mobilization, and providing support                                                         27. Denis-Fred Simon. Techno-Security in the Age of Globalization, 1997, 8. David Edgerton. “The Contradictions of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A Historical Perspective.” New Global Studies. 2007. 29 Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation, 1997. 8 28.

(15) and protection for infant industry in the face of international competition was seen as critical in facilitating technological “catch-up” and overall national development.30 Whereas liberal orthodoxy emphasized the importance of consumer well-being, List shifted the focus of economics toward incentivizing national production in advanced industries. List saw politically-defined “national” boundaries as highly relevant to understanding patterns and processes of economic activity; rejecting the “cosmopolitanism” of free trade in favor of the logic of industrial competition between national economies.31 In his view, the state played a critically important role in driving processes of economic/technological development. James Fallows, in summarizing List, writes that, “he argued, a society’s well-being and its overall wealth were determined not by what it could buy but what it could make…in strategic terms, nations ended up being dependent or independent based on their ability to make things for themselves…In material terms, a society’s long-run. 政治大. wealth was greater if it controlled more advanced activities.”32. 立. ‧ 國. 學. List diverged considerably from his intellectual counterpart Adam Smith in doubting the capacity for free trade to facilitate peace amongst inherently competitive and insecure nation-states. Taking a realist approach. ‧. to questions of trade and development, he emphasized the need for state investment in domestic defense. Nat. sit. y. production as a safeguard against external coercion. While such investments in domestic industry may come. n. al. er. io. at expense to individual welfare or overall economic efficiency, they were, in List’s mind, warranted in. v. preserving the vitality of the nation-state and protecting national welfare.33 Unlike Smith’s emphasis on. Ch. engchi. i n U. individual sovereignty and rationality, List, according to Richard Samuels, “appreciated that the economic interest of individuals and the economic interest of the nation might diverge” and, accordingly, “there is a national purpose larger than individual utility.”34. According to Cheng Li, techno-nationalists see technology as playing an essential role in dictating both economic development and in shaping the distribution of power among nation-states in the international                                                         30 31 32 33 34. . Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, 1841. Ibid James Fallows, Looking at the Sun, 184. Ibid Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 6. 9 .

(16) system. Implicit to ideational techno-nationalism is the realist view that technology enhances national power in a manner best safeguarding national security within the context of an anarchic and conflict prone international environment. For Li, “techno-nationalism emphasizes the competitiveness among nation-states as the result of scientific discovery” wherein “technological strength is seen as one of the most important determinants of the rise and fall of major power.”35 Tai-Ming Cheung expands on the definition of technonationalism, finding a deep intertwining of regime attitudes toward technology and national security. He writes:. Techno-nationalists believe that only a state controlled and closed-door approach to technological innovation can safeguard national security, economic competitiveness, and international status.. 政治大. Emphasis is placed on nurturing indigenous capabilities through the adoption of highly regulated. 立. protectionist regimes that sharply restrict foreign direct investment but encourage the one-way. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. importation of advanced technology and knowledge.36. In summarizing the techno-nationalist worldview, technological capabilities are seen, first and foremost, not. Nat. sit. y. as instruments for the improvement of individual welfare but rather as tools for protecting the well-being of. n. al. er. io. the collective “nation” as embodied and organized by the institutions of the Westphalian nation-state. In the. i n U. v. techno-nationalist view, technology is a core facet of comprehensive national power and comprehensive. Ch. engchi. national power is the key determinant of national survival. How a national economy develops and utilizes new forms of technology is therefore seen as an integral component of overall development, sovereignty, and, most critically, national strength.. Political economist Robert Gilpin expounds on the relationship between power, security, and technology, pointing out that “historically there has been a high correlation among technological, economic and political leadership. The rise of particular nations to preeminence – for example Great Britain, the United States,                                                         35. Cheng Li. “Techno-Nationalism vs. Techno-Globalism: East Asia in Search of a New Vision for the 21st Century.” Institute of Current World Affairs, 1994. 36 Cheung, The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia, 66. 10 .

(17) Germany, and Japan – resulted from their ability to take advantage of the first and second Industrial Revolutions.”37. 2.2 Techno-nationalism in East Asia. As Samuels describes the Japanese context: “for more than a century, the struggle to be equal with and independent from the West has animated Japanese technology and security thinking, thinking that posits Japan in a hostile, Hobbesian world in which interdependence inevitably leads to dependence, and dependence eventually results in domination.”38 If techno-nationalism is largely derivative of state perceptions of vulnerability in the face of external threats, the key question becomes one of finding the. 政治大. optimal strategy for achieving technological primacy and autonomy as a means of bettering the prospects for. 立. national survival.. ‧ 國. 學. Crisis and the specter of external threat were essential causal factors explaining the overall approach taken. ‧. by Korea, Taiwan and Japan regarding their economic development strategies. Meredith Woo-Cummings. Nat. sit. y. writes that the regional experience of colonization, war, and foreign exploitation played an important role in. n. al. er. io. explaining national development strategies geared toward the end goals of both overall growth and. v. technological self-sufficiency.39 The need to build up substantial war-fighting capacity against the tense. Ch. engchi. i n U. backdrop of the Cold War security system blended with the domestic imperative of national development in driving all the major state actors in the region toward developmental state models predicated in large part on techno-nationalist principals.. The relationship between nationalism and state security emerges as a recurring theme in examining the governing ideologies taken by East Asian regimes in the aftermath of the Second World War. According to Ming Wan, “the rise of East Asian nationalism was in part a direct response to Western imperialism” wherein                                                         37. Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy, 2001. Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 43. 39 Meredith Woo-Cummings. “Back to Basics: Ideology, Nationalism, and Asian Values in East Asia.” Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World. 2005. 11 38.

(18) “the early modernization drive in East Asia had a clear nationalist basis. Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans recognized the technological superiority of the West, and all sought to borrow Western technologies while maintaining traditional values.”40 In this sense, East Asian states internalized the lesson that nation-states compete with one another in the international arena and only through technological mastery could a state best ensure development and preserve its sovereignty and security. In this regard, the ideas of Friedrich List – not Adam Smith – were widely embraced throughout East Asia.41. Richard Stubbs further reinforces this linkage between external threat and nationalistic state interventionism, arguing that the Cold War security dynamic engendered high levels of regime insecurity, which, in turn, prompted the development of strong state capacity and mass-scale capital mobilization in a manner. 政治大. conducive to rapid industrialization. Stubbs writes that “economic growth was not seen as an end in itself but. 立. rather as a means of building the state and increasing the security of the community.”42 This cultural and. ‧ 國. 學. historical context accounts for what some see as a fundamental differences between the Anglo-Saxon and East Asia view of economic activity. James Fallows, writing in Looking at the Sun, summarizes these. ‧. differences as such:. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. In the Anglo-American model, the basic reason to have an economy is to raise the individual. i n U. v. consumer’s standard of living. In the Asian model, it is to increase the collective national strength.. Ch. engchi. Ideally, the goal is to make the nation independent and self-sufficient, so it does not rely on outsiders for its survival. The Anglo-American goal is basically materialistic; the Asian-style goal is basically political, and it comes from the long experience of being oppressed by people with stronger economies and technologies.43. Fallows follows up this insight with several other observations regarding the Asian approach to economic activity. According to him, in pursuing purposeful development strategies, the Asian approach is more                                                         40 41 42 43. . Ming Wan, The Political Economy of East Asia: Striving for Wealth and Power, 2008. Evidence of this can be found in James Fallows, Looking at the Sun, 1994 and in Joe Studwell, How Asia Works, 2013 Richard Stubbs. Rethinking Asia’s Economic Miracle, 2005. James Fallows, Looking at the Sun, 1994. 12 .

(19) comfortable with hierarchy and the concentration of power in the hands of the government than in the Anglo model. In this worldview, government sets the overall direction of the economy and mediates between different stakeholders. Asian states, while more trusting of government power than their Western counterparts, tend to also be more skeptical of market forces; seeing the role of the state as crucial to reigning in excesses and correcting market failures.44 The neoliberal assumption that the market “knows best” is not a commonly held view in East Asia. Rather, East Asian governments hew closely to the idea of purposeful state action as a catalyst for technological change and national development.45. Finally, the Asian model of economics places an “enduring emphasis on national borders” wherein there is a clear-cut conception of a “national” economic interest transcending the individual citizenry.46 The. 政治大. heightened salience of national boundaries holds within it a competitive conception of economic activity:. 立. nation-states compete with one another for wealth and power. As Fallows describes it:. ‧ 國. 學. Anglo-American theory instructs Westerners that economics is by nature a “positive-sum game” from. ‧. which all can emerge winners. Asian history instructs many Koreans, Chinese, Japanese, and others that. Nat. sit. y. economic competition is a form of war in which some win and others lose. To be strong is much better. n. al. er. io. than to be weak; to give orders is better than to take them. By this logic, the way to be strong, to give. v. orders, to have independence and control, is to keep in mind the differences between “us” and “them.”47. Ch. engchi. i n U. To that end, empowered national development bureaucracies carried out activist intervention in the domestic economy, often taking what Wan categorizes as a “paternalistic” approach toward the management and regulation of private enterprise. Nationalist driven ideologies, emerging largely in response to historical legacies of external predation, permeated throughout East Asia, shaping attitudes toward technology and national development. Within this framework of conceptualizing development, security, and state competition, the role of “national” high-technology features prominently.                                                         44 45 46 47. Ibid Ibid Ibid James Fallows, Looking at the Sun, 231. 13 . .

(20) The reasoning for this is fairly straightforward: development is essential to national strength and survival and technology is integral to national development. As James M. Cypher and James Dietz put it, “it can be said that economic development is indistinguishable from the ongoing application of technological knowledge to production.”48 Accordingly, change in technology flows from a combination of importation, innovation and discovery processes which can then be applied to systems of production. As they see it:. The successful introduction of technology into the domestic production process in any country, what we call domestic innovation, requires a domestic scientific establishment capable, first, of understanding, processing, adopting, and adapting foreign produced technological knowledge, including machines and. 政治大. tools, to local conditions and, later, of conducting its own research, designing its own experiments, and. 立. recognizing the potential, and sometimes, dangers of its own discoveries when applied to the domestic. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. economy.49. Building off of List, East Asian states subscribed to the idea that the not all forms of economic activity were. Nat. sit. y. equal: some industries were more valuable and/or “strategic” than others for reasons of overall national. n. al. er. io. development and/or national security. Such industries were, from the standpoint of the state, inherently more. i n U. v. worthy of targeted interventions. According to Mark Beeson, this led to the conclusion that, “some forms of. Ch. engchi. economic activity are intrinsically more valuable” and that “governments have an interest seeing them occur within their national jurisdictions. The key question then becomes one of whether such activities occur ‘naturally’ as a consequence of market forces, or whether they can be actively encouraged through government incentives or policies.”50. Realizing the development, adaptation, usage and dissemination of productivity-enhancing technology was key to long term development and comprehensive industrialization, Japanese planners, as Beeson puts it,                                                         48 49 50. . James Cypher and James Dietz. The Process of Economic Development, 380. Ibid, 380 Mark Beeson, Regionalism and Globalism in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development, 146 14 .

(21) “set out to create a comparative advantage in industrial production in defiance of Western economic ‘laws’ and orthodoxy.”51 The imperative placed on doing so was a matter of virtually existential importance, where “a failure to industrialize and adopt productivity-enhancing technology threatened an equally path-dependent vicious circle of declining returns and living standards.”52 In this sense, Japan rejected the concept that development and convergence were pre-ordained through free-markets; governments must instead create or “construct” the conditions necessary for modernization through the development of an indigenous innovation and production capacity.. In this regard, the various states of East Asia set about attempting to modernize their economies and safeguard their security through strategies geared toward the achievement of “technological autonomy.” The. 政治大. achievement of such autonomy, according to Cypher and Dietz, required first the development of an. 立. “independent technological learning capacity” (ITLC) and, eventually the development of an “independent. ‧ 國. 學. technology creating capacity” (ITCC).53 According to them: “Creating an ITLC and achieving technological autonomy is the first step toward greater self-sufficiency, a higher level of domestic efficiency and the. ‧. creation of an internal dynamic for the economy. It is an ITLC that undergirded the Japanese, Korean, and. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Taiwanese development successes.”54. i n U. v. Samuels, writing on the interplay between the desire for technological autonomy, national security and. Ch. engchi. development in modern Japan, states, “technology, then, was a matter of national security, and a bundle of beliefs and practices that constitute this view can be called “techno-nationalism.””55 In spite of drastically overhauling its structure of governance in the wake of defeat during World War II, many of the technonationalist assumptions from the previous era perpetuated themselves in the post-war period. For Japanese state planners both before and after World War II, technological self-reliance represented the preferred means of mitigating against an array of external security concerns. Specifically, in order to meet the overarching                                                         51 52 53 54 55. Ibid, 147 Ibid Cypher and Dietz, 380 Ibid Samuels, “Rich Nation, Strong Army,” 33. 15 . .

(22) national imperative placed on convergence and autonomy as a strategy for catalyzing national development and enhancing national security, Japan’s prioritized three component parts in its approach to technology: indigenization of foreign technology and foreign knowledge, diffusion of new technologies throughout the broader national economy, and nurturance of Japanese technology firms as well as the broader national system of innovation.56. Again it warrants mentioning there is no uniform manifestation of techno-nationalism in practice among the early-industrializing East Asian states. Post-war Japan developed a formidable domestic high-tech industry based on protocols carried over from the Meiji period while largely forgoing the production of defensive armaments and deferring to the United States for the provision of external security. In turn, political elites. 政治大. from China, Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea all embraced some variation of techno-nationalist. 立. ideology in the immediate aftermath of World War II despite myriad differences in history, culture,. ‧ 國. 學. geography and economic structure.57 While differing in form and application, core ideas about the relationship between the possession of indigenous technology, development, independence, and state. ‧. security drove policy in a techno-nationalist direction throughout East Asia.. sit. y. Nat. al. n. Nation-state. er. io. 2.3 Techno-nationalism and Globalization: Techno-Globalism, Competition, and the. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Globalization, the “ongoing, contested process of international economic integration through which flows of trade, investment, technology, and people expansively and intensely interconnect national economies,”58 raises questions about the efficacy of the existing developmental state/techno-nationalism paradigm in East Asia. As Beeson writes, “some commentators believe that the state’s capacity to influence economic activity has been profoundly and irrevocably undermined by changes in the international political economy.”59.                                                         56 57 58 59. Ibid Cheung, The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia. D’Acosta, 3 Beeson, 179 16 . .

(23) Alternative ideas about the relationship between international trade and technological development gained traction in the wake of the Cold-War. Standing in contrast to the state-centric approach to technology embodied in techno-nationalism stands the techno-globalist paradigm. Techno-globalism arose largely in response to fundamental changes in the nature of the international political economy (IPE) over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s and emphasizes the role of bottom up forces and international connections between firms, states, institutions and individuals in the process of technological innovation and development. Describing the techno-globalist approach, Cheng Li writes that, “from the techno-globalist’s point of view, technological development is an international endeavor, a joint product of multinational institutions, universities, research laboratories, and business firms the link scientists and engineers from all corners of the globe through telecommunication.”60. 立. 政治大. Relative to techno-nationalism, innovation is viewed as comparatively positive-sum and collaborative;. ‧ 國. 學. particular emphasis is placed on the role of technology in breaking down barriers to commerce, communication and innovation. Techno-globalists emphasize technological innovation in positively. ‧. addressing transnational issues incapable of resolution at the level of individual nation-states. According to. Nat. sit. y. Simon, techno-globalism promotes cooperation on R&D and the sharing of technological products across. n. al. er. io. national boundaries out of two distinctive sets of considerations: finding collective solutions to transnational. i n U. v. issues of security and development and out of belief that transnational cooperation enhances the potential for. Ch. engchi. innovation, production efficiencies and scale economies.61. According to the logic of the techno-globalist, technology enables processes of globalization. Extending this positive-sum logic, globalization processes brought about via technological innovation facilitate conditions conducive to international collaboration and further technological innovation. Edgerton argues technoglobalists see technology, particularly in the fields of communication and transportation, as displacing the centrality of the state as a core unit of analysis when thinking about both processes of technological.                                                         60 61. . Li, ““Techno-Nationalism vs. Techno-Globalism: East Asia in Search of a New Vision for the 21st Century.” Denis-Fred Simon, Techno-Security in the Age of Globalization, 1997. 17 .

(24) development if not international relations more broadly.62 We can argue one of the key features of the techno-globalist worldview is an opposition to the idea of the nation-state as the key unit of analysis in explaining technological development.. While globalization throws up challenges to the traditional role of the state in new and profound ways, there is reason to believe the nation-state will remain the primary unit of analysis when conceptualizing issues of both security and economic development. Ripsman and Paul, examining the ways in which globalization impacts the national security state, argue that globalization “has not yet deeply reshaped the security environment or swept away the state as the principal security actor.”63 Gilpin, a political realist, echoes this viewpoint in the context of an increasingly integrated global economy, arguing that the nation-state remains. 政治大. the dominant actor in both domestic and international economics. For Gilpin, if states remain dominant. 立. actors then their concerns regarding security, power and independence will continually exert considerable. ‧ 國. 學. influence over both domestic and international patterns of economic activity. While states must co-exist with an array of sub-national actors, principally Multinational Corporations (MNCs), the interests of the state as a. ‧. unit of analysis remain preeminent.64. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. This correlation continually informs present-day behavior: states compete with one another for technological. i n U. v. leadership as a means of both facilitating national development and enhancing national security. As Gilpin puts it:. Ch. engchi. At the close of the twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty-first century, the battleground has been located among the high-tech industries of the computer and information economies. This has produced an intensifying competition among the great economic powers for global supremacy in these technologies and, consequently, for dominant political power in the future.65.                                                         62 63 64 65. . Edgerton, “The Contradictions of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A Historical Perspective.” Norrin Ripsman and T.V. Paul, Globalization and the National Security State, 2010. Gilpin, Global Political Economy Ibid, 140 18 .

(25) Political realism and economic nationalism therefore remain useful analytical lenses for interpreting state responses to globalization. Notably in East Asia, forces of globalization and regional integration are reshaping (but not necessarily reducing) the impetus for nationalistic policies. As Anthony D’Costa argues, globalization is - somewhat counterintuitively - unfolding largely in tandem with a renewed economic nationalism; state actors remain compelled to involve themselves in disputes over trade, investment, technology and intellectual property rights. While the methods and strategies evolve over time and across sector, underlying belief in the need for policy activism as a means of protecting, nurturing and promoting domestic enterprises and overall “national innovation systems” remains largely intact.66. As D’Costa puts it, “states are therefore not static institutions; through ongoing intervention they learn. 政治大. institutionally how to manage their economic affairs under changing contexts of economic globalization.”67. 立. Contrary to liberal conceptions of economic globalization, which see globalization as synonymous with a. ‧ 國. 學. rollback of statism, in the East Asian context the maintenance of a strong state role is a fundamental enabling condition for national economies moving toward greater international integration. In re-evaluating economic. ‧. nationalism in the face systemic changes in the structure of the international political economy (IPE), a. Nat. sit. y. variety of new theories have gained prominence as a riposte to neoliberalism. These new approaches largely. n. al. er. io. reflect a growing awareness of the centrality of technological innovation as the driving force behind. i n U. v. economic growth and national development. However, rather than relying on core neoclassical assumptions,. Ch. engchi. the new theories largely emphasize the means through which concerted state action enables and facilitates technological upgrading and innovation.. Chief among the new theories is Endogenous Growth Theory (EGT) which rejects the idea of inevitable convergence and stresses the importance of technology and human capital formation as determinative of development outcomes. EGT posits that technology is a separate factor of production from land, labor and capital; staking out a stronger role for national governments in promoting technological development.                                                         66 67. D’Costa, Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia, 3 Ibid, 247. 19 . .

(26) through investments in education and R&D. As Gilpin puts it, one key take-away from this new theory “is that political, economic, and other institutions – from governments to universities to corporations – can hinder or facilitate technical advance and hence long-term economic growth.”68. A second prominent theory, New Economic Geography (NEG), stresses the clustering of economic activity particularly high-tech industries - in specific cities, urban areas or broader regions. NEG demonstrates that path dependency often leads to a physical agglomeration of “core” industries. Following the logic of the theory, nation-states compete to build up regional cores capable of ensuring national primacy in valuable industries. Nations hosting regional cores in strategically valuable industries therefore find themselves well positioned to maintain their technological and competitive superiority vis a vis national rivals.. 立. 政治大. As Gilpin points out, the natural centralization and clustering effects of certain industries often leads to a. ‧ 國. 學. core/periphery structure within the high-tech economy. This inequitable distribution of production inevitably causes friction among competitive nation-states. Gilpin writes that:. ‧. Nat. sit. y. In an increasingly integrated world economy in which core/periphery structures spread across. n. al. er. io. national boundaries, the presence of core regions exclusively controlled by a single nation, and of a. i n U. v. periphery composed of other nations, will necessarily lead to economic tensions and even political. Ch. engchi. conflict between the dominant core economy and dependent peripheral economies. Escaping economic dependence and achieving political independence is an objective of every society. Core economies wish to maintain their dominant position, and peripheral economies wish to become core economies in their own right.69. Another potentially useful theoretical perspective capturing the East Asian approach to trade, technology and industrial policy under conditions of globalization is Strategic Trade Theory (STT). According to Gilpin,.                                                         68 69. Gilpin, 116. Ibid, 122 20 . .

(27) “the theory of strategic trade theory provides a rationale for nations to use protectionist measures, for subsidies to particular industries, and for other forms of industrial policy to provide domestic firms with a decisive advantage in both home and world markets.” The underlying logic behind STT holds that high-tech markets are often categorized by oligopolistic competition; without state support, new, small-scale firms lack the resources to effectively compete with entrenched technology giants. The theory suggests that both in terms of national development and national security, high-tech sectors should be prioritized for development over more traditional industry.. While debate around the merits of STT as a strategy for development abounds within the academic community, it retains considerable ideological appeal for political actors where, according to Gilpin,. 政治大. “governments around the world certainly believe that support for high-tech industries produces a high. 立. economic return over the long term.”70 Despite intensive economic integration and trans-national. ‧ 國. 學. collaboration, nation-states remain actively competitive with one another in calibrating industrial policies capable of best harnessing and developing an array of promising technology sectors. In summarizing the. ‧. interplay between public policy, technological development, competitive pressure, globalization and growth. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. performance through the prism of the new economic theories, Gilpin finds:. i n U. v. The new growth, location, and trade theories assume, to the contrary, that technology can be and is. Ch. engchi. being, at least temporarily, appropriated and monopolized by its innovators. Private firms and national governments can and do attempt to slow down the international diffusion of the most advanced technologies at the moment when achieving and maintaining control of technology and knowledge have become more and more important factors in economic growth and international competitiveness…These new technologies are so central to economic competitiveness and national power that the struggle to determine which nations will lead and which will follow in development and exploitation of these revolutionary technologies has been intensifying.71.                                                         70 71. Ibid, 127 Ibid, 139 21 . .

(28) One final perspective on the interplay between technology, development and national security can be found in the writing of Denis Fred Simon. Simon, writing twenty years ago, argues that “techno-security” must be broken down across three interrelated layers of analysis: at the international systems level defined by globalization and regionalization, at the nation-state level defined by states with typical notions of national welfare and security, and finally at the level of the firm wherein national boundaries are no longer so crucial in dictating the scale and scope of market activity.. In fact, Simon argues that because of the prevalent belief among state actors that the benefits of globalization are not equitably distributed across different states and firms participating in transnational patterns of trade,. 政治大. investment, production, and R&D, “the same forces that are producing cooperation and collaboration at one. 立. level may in fact be the root cause of conflict and neomercantilism at another.”72 As the preceding section. ‧ 國. 學. makes clear, processes of globalization are dynamically affecting both the existing system of international order and the strategies and behaviors of an immeasurable number of firm-level actors. Globalization is also. ‧. challenging and re-shaping how national political actors approach issues of security and development.. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. In spite of this, many aspects of state behavior remain unchanged; ideas, concerns, and policies undertaken. i n U. v. by national governments, whether in the name of pursuing “national” development or preserving “national”. Ch. engchi. security, matter considerably. States have not been displaced by globalization and, in most cases, fight tooth and nail to retain their status of place in an environment described by IR scholar Joseph Nye as being simultaneously defined by a “power transition” from US-led unipolarity to multipolarity and “power diffusion” from state to non-state actors.73. Sandro Montesor, examining the impact of globalization on national processes of S&T development, ultimately finds that techno-sovereignty “still matters in those sectors that are more related to the security.                                                         72 73. . Denis-Fred Simon, Techno-Security in the Age of Globalization, 1997. Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, 2011 22 .

(29) and competitiveness of one country” and that “‘techno-national’ systems of innovation therefore still matter.”74 Both ideationally and institutionally, techno-nationalism is widely seen as still relevant in East Asia today despite systemic changes in the nature of the global economy.75. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.                                                         74. Sandro Montesor. “Techno-globalism, techno-nationalism and technological systems:organizing the evidence.”Technovation. 2000. 75 For an argument in favor of techno-nationalism and the developmental state remaining highly salient to understanding East Asian political economy please see William Keller and Richard Samuels, “Continuity and China in Asian Innovation.” Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology, 2003. Also see Andreas Pickel, “Recontextualizing Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World.” Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World, 2005. And, finally, in Anthony D’Acosta, Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia, 2013. 23 .

(30) Chapter 3: Techno-nationalism in China. 3.1 Understanding China’s Techno-nationalism. As documented in the preceding section, over the course of the 20th century through to the present day, East Asian states have, in various ways, embraced a techno-nationalist worldview prioritizing the development of indigenous capabilities while protecting strategic sectors of the economy from foreign ownership, influence, and control. This worldview, rooted in a desire for achieving technological independence as a means of ensuring the development, sovereignty and security of the collective “nation,” appears throughout the. 政治大 place, and sector, such core ideas remain deeply entrenched through to the present day. 立. analysis of East Asian development. While the specific policy contours evolved considerably over time,. ‧ 國. 學. In defining techno-nationalism for the duration of this thesis, we can see it as being composed of several. sit. y. Nat. The idea there is a “national interest’ - synonymous with the nation-state - transcending the. io. specified interests of the individual or the firm.. al. v i n C hwith one another (both The idea that nation-states compete e n g c h i U commercially and geo-strategically) in n. . er. . ‧. related components:. a conflict prone international system and that only through power maximization can an individual state best safeguard its national/regime security. . The idea that technology is a crucial driver of national power and, by extension, national security and sovereignty. As such, not all economic activities are equal: some are more “strategic” than others. For the nation-state, some sectors must be prioritized for reasons of national security and/or the benefits they confer to the broader “national” economy.. . The idea that state action facilitates technological/economic development; state interventionism can “construct” comparative advantage in strategically important industries. As such, the 24 . .

(31) development of high tech industry shouldn’t be left strictly to market forces. . Accordingly, states should strive for technological autonomy and indigenous aptitude in “strategic” industries as such objectives comport with the overall “national” interest as it pertains to both development and security.. There is evidence suggesting these techno-nationalist attitudes continually exert significant influence over the maintenance, construction, and execution of public policy in China today. An array of existing academic literature utilizes techno-nationalism as an analytical categorization for making sense of China’s approach to technological development. For example, Segal and Naughton argue, “notions of technonationalism are still relevant in China, even as it moves toward reduced government steerage of the economy.”76 Cheung,. 政治大. writing in the context of China’s defense industry, argues that “a techno-nationalist perspective that views. 立. technological development as central to the country’s national security and economic prosperity shapes the. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese approach to technological catching up in the defense and strategic sectors of its economy.”77. However, what also comes across in holistically assessing the relationship between the Chinese state and. Nat. sit. y. technological development is a system with no regional or international analog; China retains an extensive. n. al. er. io. yet ever-evolving techno-industrial policy infrastructure while simultaneously differentiating itself from its. v. East Asian peers in distinctive ways.78 While China is undoubtedly becoming a global epicenter of. Ch. engchi. i n U. technological innovation, the academic literature regarding the role of the state in promoting high-tech development remains contested. Despite ongoing debate over the efficacy of China’s overall technoindustrial policy approach, this structure – embodied most closely in programs like the 2006 MLP, Made in China 2025 and conceptions of “cyber sovereignty” – enjoys high level political buy-in, most notably from President Xi Jinping.79.                                                         76 Barry Naughton and Adam Segal. “China in Search of a Workable Model: Technology Development in the New Milennium.”Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology. 2003. 53. 77 Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy, 2009. 78 Andrea Boltho and Maria Weber. “Did China Follow the Developmental State?.” The European Journal of Comparative Economics. 2009. 79 See Xi Jinping, Governance of China, 2014 25 .