論一帶一路做為跨區域主義的新典範之可能性 - 政大學術集成

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(1) . 國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-‐Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University . 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis . ‧ 國. 學. 政治大 One Belt, One Road, and a New Paradigm of 立 Interregionalism? . y. sit. io. n. er. Nat. a. . ‧. 論一帶一路做為跨區域主義的新典範之可能性 . v. l C ni Student: rik E piscopo U hE en hi. gc. . Adviser: Dr. Yuan I . 中華民國 105 年 09 月 September 2016. .

(2) . One Belt, One Road, and a New Paradigm of Interregionalism? 論一帶一路做為跨區域主義的新典範之可能性研究生： Student: Erik Episcopo 指導教授: Advisor: Dr. Yuan I . 國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程治. 大. 碩士論文. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 政. ‧. A Thesis. y. Nat. sit. al. er. io. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies n. iv n C h e n g c h University National Chengchi i U. In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 2016 年 09 月 September 2016 . .

(3) . Acknowledgements I would like to first thank my adviser, Professor Yuan, for patiently guiding me throughout the writing of my thesis. I chose Professor Yuan to be my adviser because of his enthusiastic reaction to my proposed thesis topic. His assessments and critiques of my work were immensely helpful in challenging me to view my topic from a multitude of perspectives. I am also grateful for the other members of my committee, Professor Chang Teng-‐Chi of National Taiwan University, and Professor Kuan Ping-‐Yin from National Chengchi University. They offered valuable advice that allowed me to fine-‐tune my thesis into the polished paper that you will find below. Lastly, this thesis would not have been 治 without the support of my wife 政completed . 大. and parents. They kept me sane 立 when times were tough and pushed me to continue . ‧ 國. y. sit. er. al. n. . io. . Nat. . ‧. . 學. to challenge myself. . Ch. engchi. i Un. v. . iii .

(4) . Abstract For quite some time now interregionalism scholars have been hinting that the paradigm of ‘New Regionalism’ is losing its relevance in explaining today’s interregional environment. Therefore, researchers believe that a new interregional paradigm is upon us. Enter China’s One Belt One Road, an initiative whose scope and multidimensionality go well beyond any past or current interregional agreement before it. This study seeks to examine the One Belt, One Road initiative to discover whether or not it has the makings of an interregional paradigm shift that will shape the future of interregional dialogues. In order to do so, this paper reviews the literature on Jurgen Ruland’s theory of the Functions of Interregionalism and Heinner Hanggi’s Interregional Typologies to construct a comparative analysis. Using Ruland’s functions – Balancing, Institution-‐Building, Rationalizing, Agenda-‐Setting, Collective-‐Identity Building, and . 政治大 two megaregions that are both archetypal examples of ‘New Regionalism’. This paper finds 立. Promotion of Development – as the variables, OBOR is compared with APEC and the TPP, . ‧ 國. 學. that OBOR does indeed possess distinctive functional qualities that set it apart from the cases of New Regionalism. However, it must be acknowledged that having the ingredients of . ‧. a paradigm shift does not guarantee that one will take place. Other countries must ‘buy in’ . sit. y. Nat. to the new approaches that OBOR presents to interregional integration, which is far from a . er. io. sure thing. Therefore, this paper also assesses several of the challenges that OBOR is . n. al v overcome the early political, currently facing with its early projects. If China fails ito . C. Un. h esecurity economic, technical, environmental, and n g c h i challenges, it is unlikely that future interregional agreements will embrace the new functional concepts of OBOR. A major limit to this research is that it is still too early tell if the interregional dialogues will adopt the new functions and concepts set forth by OBOR. Over the next five years it will be essential to monitor the developments along the belt and road. It is imperative that China achieves some early success in order to galvanize the trust of OBOR members to fully engage in the initiative. Therefore, we must continue to update the OBOR’s ‘functional scorecard’ to keep track of whether China’s initiative has fulfilled the functions that it set out to do. While the proclamation of an impending ‘New Classical Regionalism’ is tentative, this thesis provides us with a starting point to build upon and further refine the characteristics of a new interregionalism paradigm. . . . iv .

(5) . Table of Contents Chapter 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..1 1.1 Purpose of the Study……………………………………………………………………….....2 Chapter 2. Theoretical Approaches to Interregionalism……………………………………...6 . 2.1 Functions of Interregionalism…………………………………………………………....8 2.2 Types of Interregionalism………………………………………………………………...15 . . 2.3 Methodology and Analytical Framework…………………………………………..18 . . 2.4 Data Collection………………………………………………………………………………...21 . Chapter 3. Historical Overview: Asian Regionalism…………………………………………..24 . 3.1 Regionalism in Asia and China’s Role………………………………………………..26 . Chapter 4. The Features of the New Land and Maritime Silk Roads…………………...33 . 4.1 Motivations Behind the One Belt, O ne Road………………………………………35 治政. 大. 4.2 Bank Rolling OBOR…………………………………………………………………………..39 立. . 4.3 One Belt, One Road from a Theoretical Perspective…………………………...42 . ‧ 國. 學. . Chapter 5. Comparative Analysis of APEC, TPP, and OBOR……………………………......54 . ‧. 5.1 Realism: Balancing………………………………………………………………………......54 . . 5.2 Liberal Institutional Functions………………………………………………………....56 . . 5.3 Social Constructivism: Collective Identity Building……………………………70 . n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. . iv. Chapter 6. The Long Road Ahead: TC he of nOBOR……………………………….75 hChallenges i U. engch. Chapter 7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...81 References……………………………………………………………………………………………………...86 . . . v .

(6) . Figures Figure 1.1 Possible Progression of Regionalism Paradigms…………………………………5 Figure 2.1 The Theories and Functions of Interregionalism………………………………...9 Figure 3. Old Regionalism vs. New Regionalism………………………………………………..24 Figure 4. Six Corridors of OBOR……………………………………………………………………….34 Figure 4.1 Motivations Behind OBOR……………………………………………………………….36 Figure 5.1.The Balancing Functions of OBOR, APEC, and the TPP…………………..…..54 Figure 5.2.1 Institution-‐Building Functions of OBOR, APEC, and TPP………………....56 . 政治大. Figure 5.2.2 Agenda-‐Setting Functions 立 of OBOR, APEC, and the TPP…………………..59 . ‧ 國. 學. Figure 5.2.3 Rationalizing Functions of OBOR, APEC, and the TPP……………………...62 . ‧. Figure 5.2.4 Promotion of Development Function of OBOR, APEC, and the TPP…..66 . sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Figure 5.3 Collective-‐Identity Building Functions of OBOR, APEC, and the TPP…...70 . Ch. i Un. v. Figure 7. Prospective Characteristics of ea n‘New g c hCilassical Regionalism’ Paradigm...84 . . vi .

(7) . Tables Table 2.2 Hanggi’s Typology of Interregionalism……………………………………………….17 Table 2.3 Methodological Framework – Comparative Analysis…………………………...21 Table 4.3 The Six Functions of OBOR………………………………………………………………... 42 Table 5.3 Comparative Table: Six Functions of OBOR, APEC, and the TPP………….. .74 . List of Abbreviations ADB: Asia Development Bank AIIB: Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank APEC: Asian-‐Pacific Economic Cooperation . 政治大 CPEC: China-‐Pakistan Economic Corridor 立 ASEM: Asia-‐Europe Meeting . ‧ 國. EC: European Community . 學. CUFTA: Canada-‐United States Free Trade Agreement . y. sit. er. io. FTA: Free Trade Agreement . Nat. EU: European Union . ‧. ECOTECH: Economic and Technical Cooperation program . IMF: International Monetary Fund a. n. iv l C n ITA: Information Technology Agreement h e n g c h i U NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement NDB: New Development Bank OBOR: One Belt, One Road PTA: Preferential Trade Agreement SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization TPP: Trans Pacific Partnership TTIP: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership WTO: World Trade Organization . . . vii .

(8) . Chapter 1 Introduction Since 1945, the phenomenon of regionalism has taken on a greater role in the international system. Regions are interacting with one another in ways that we have never seen before. Furthermore, these interactions continue to evolve with the dynamic goals of the countries that take part. However, this evolution is not new. With the ebb and flow of the times, regionalism has experienced waves through which the concept has expanded in terms of scope and complexity. Presently, the international system is defined by the 2nd wave of regionalism – ‘new regionalism’ – that came to the forefront near the end of the Cold War. New regionalism has brought about the emergence of new multilateral institutions and interregional organizations, which countries have come to rely upon as solutions to 政治. 大. multifaceted, geopolitical issues. 立 Just as the phenomenon witnessed a transition . ‧ 國. 學. from the old wave to the new wave of regionalism, there are new ripples in the international system that may suggest that the tide is changing and that a new wave . ‧. io. sit. Nat. look toward the source of these ripples – China. . y. of regionalism is upon us. To discover what this new wave might bring, we must . n. al. er. Faced with an ominous economic downturn, Xi Jinping is feeling the pressure . iv. to accelerate China’s participation C on U n in search of new avenues of h the global i stage . engch. collaboration with its neighbors. However instead of relying upon the existing channels of cooperation, China is on the verge of offering an entirely new mechanism for regional and interregional cooperation that is distinct from any of its predecessors. Enter the One Belt, One Road initiative. In 2013, Xi announced his plans to build the 一帶一路（ One Belt, One Road), a new megaregional project that capitalizes on and combines the worldwide trends toward infrastructure building and regional trade agreements. At the heart of Xi’s project is the revival of the ancient Silk Road that once connected some of the greatest civilizations in history. The ultimate aim of the project is to connect China and over 60 other countries across four continents via numerous land and sea routes. Overall, the project will . . 1 .

(9) cover 63% of the global population (4.4 billion) and 29% of the aggregate GDP ($2.1 trillion).1 Like the Great Wall, the One Belt, One Road plan is grandiose, bewildering, and most of all unprecedented in the modern era. The scope and the multidimensionality of OBOR go well beyond any past or current regional agreements. This must lead us to consider the potential of OBOR to spark a shift in the current paradigm of regional integration. . 1.1 Purpose of the Study For quite some time now, regionalism scholars have been calling for a new approach to the field. There is a growing consensus that it is time to adopt a comparative method to the study of regionalism. “All is not well with the study of regionalism,” explains Fredrik Soderbaum, “and 治 it remains necessary to deepen the . 政. 大. 2 Soderbaum builds on his thought by comparative element of regionalism”. 立. ‧ 國. 學. adding that, “regions can and should be compared in time as well as within and across different spaces and forms of organization.”3 Amitav Acharya asks, “Is . ‧. comparative regionalism a field whose time has come? While the temporary interest . Nat. sit. y. in comparing regions and regionalism may not be completely new, it is different . er. io. from older approaches. In keeping with the rapid growth and development of . n. a. v. i including in regions which l Cnon-‐Western world, regionalism and institutions in the Un. hengchi. were relatively late starters, such as Asia, there have emerged new ways of looking at regional cooperation, including claims about distinctive approaches and even models that are not only different from those identified with the EU, but also supposedly more appropriate and thus workable for non-‐Western regions than the EU straightjacket.”4 Not only is the approach to the study changing, but also the phenomenon of regionalism itself, is evolving. . 1 Flynt Leverett, Hilary Leverett, & Wu Bingbing. “China Looks West: What Is at Stake in Beijing’s . ‘New Silk Road’ Project”, The World Financial Review, January 25, 2015. 2 Fredrik Soderbaum, “Early, Old, New and Comparative Regionlism: The Scholarly Development of the Field,” KFG Working Paper Series, No. 64, 2015, 22. 3 Ibid., 23. 4 Amitav Acharya, “Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time has Come?” The International Spectator 47, no. 1, (2012): 14.. . 2 .

(10) Scholars are hinting that New Regionalism’s relevance in explaining today’s regional environment appears to be waning. They believe that a new regional paradigm is upon us. Researchers point to the fact that regions are taking a larger role in the global world order than they ever have. Bjorn Hettne explains that “regions are deepening, widening, and expanding like never before;” while Robert Katzenstein emphasizes that “we are living in a regional world order.”5 Lastly, Soderbaum sums up the current regional paradigm shift best, as he explains that, “current regionalism is shaped by a world order characterized by many diverse and also contradictory trends and processes, such as the war on terror, a multi-‐layered or “multiplex” world order, recurrent financial crises across the world, the persistent pattern of overlapping and criss-‐crossing regional and interregional projects and processes in most parts of the world.”6 . 政治大 The purpose of this study is to continue down the path set out by the 立 ‧ 國. 學. scholars above and to explore whether or not a new paradigm of regionalism truly . exists. This paper will delve deep and examine the One Belt, One Road initiative in . ‧. order to answer the following questions: . How does OBOR compare with the current paradigm of new regionalism? . •. Is OBOR unique in its functionality as an interregional dialogue when . er. io. sit. y. Nat. •. n. a. v. i regionalism’ paradigm? compared to interregional lagreements of the n‘new C •. hengchi U. Is OBOR just one of many new megaregional agreements – like the Trans Pacific Partnership – or does it posses distinctive qualities from its counterparts? . Finally, the questions above should help us to answer the crux of this paper, which is to discover whether or not the One Belt, One Road initiative signals a paradigm shift in regionalism and how regional agreements will be shaped in the future. This paper hypothesizes that the One Belt, One Road initiative is indeed a new case of interregionalism, and will likely shape the beginning of what this paper terms as a ‘New Classical’ regionalism paradigm. We use the name ‘New Classical’ because of 5 Soderbaum, “Early, Old, New and Comparative Regionlism: The Scholarly Development of the Field”, 22. 6 Ibid., 21. . 3 .

(11) the inspiration behind OBOR is the ancient Silk Road, which operated during the height of Chinese civilization between third century B.C. and the fifteenth century A.D. The idea of the Silk Road fits into Xi’s “China Dream” and the continued rise of the nation because it arouses memories of a time when China’s international status was at an all-‐time high.7 The first time the idea of OBOR was introduced to the world was during a speech at the Nazarayev University in Kazakhstan on September 7th, 2013. At this speech entitled, “Promote People-‐to-‐People Friendship and Create a Better Future,” President Xi Jinping made references to the significance of the old trade routes in his plan to build OBOR. In one of these references, President Xi stated: . ‧ 國. 學. “The over 2,000-‐year history of exchanges demonstrates that on the basis of solidarity, mutual trust, equality, inclusiveness, mutual learning and win-‐win cooperation, countries of different races, beliefs and cultural backgrounds are fully 政治大 capable of sharing peace and development. This is the valuable inspiration we have 立 8 drawn from the ancient Silk Road.” Xi hopes to evoke romanticism and the spirit of the Silk Road as it represents a . ‧. golden age in Chinese history. Documents released by the Chinese Communist Party . y. Nat. io. sit. in 2015 emphasize the “Silk Road Spirit,” which is described as a “historic and . n. al. er. cultural heritage shared by all countries around the world.”9 Therefore, OBOR can . iv. n be seen as a twist or revision of Cthe h routes that i U linked the east and west both . engch. commercially and culturally for almost 2,000 years. . 7 Theresa Fallon, “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,” American Foreign Policy Interests 37, no 3, (2015): 141. 8 David Cheung, “One Belt, One Road: Collaboration Begins on the New Silk Road Trade Route,” Aconex, May 21, 2016. 9 Theresa Fallon, “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,” 141. . 4 .

(12) Figure 1.1 Possible Progression of Regionalism Paradigms . Source: Created by the author . To begin, chapter two lays out the groundwork for the paper by examining the literature on interregionalism. In this chapter, we examine the six functions of . 政治. 大 interregionalism as well as the different forms interregional dialogues can take. We . 立. ‧ 國. 學. also look into the different theoretical perspectives – realism, neoliberalism, functionalism, and social constructivism – and how they attempt to explain the . ‧. phenomena of interregionalism. Chapter two concludes by explaining the . sit. y. Nat. framework that is used in the study to compare OBOR with the TPP and APEC. . er. io. Chapter three offers a brief historical overview of the shift from the old wave of . a. n. v l Cnew regionalism. regionalism to the current wave, n i This chapter also sets the . he. i U. h understand China’s role in shaping n gus cto backdrop of Asian regionalism and helps regional dialogues in Asia since the 1990s. Chapter four provides a comprehensive background on OBOR and looks at the initiative from the theoretical perspective of the six functions of regionalism. In chapter five, the paper performs a comparative analysis between APEC, OBOR, and the TPP across the six functions of interregionalism to discover the distinctive qualities of OBOR that separates it from the past paradigm of regionalism. Chapter six examines the challenges already being faced by China in five of OBOR’s first projects. If China does not properly address these challenges now, they are likely to continue on and threaten the success of OBOR and its ability to shift the interregional paradigm. Lastly, chapter seven concludes this paper by assessing the findings of chapter fiver and addressing whether or not OBOR truly signals a paradigm shift in interregionalism. . 5 .

(13) . Chapter 2 Theoretical Approaches to Interregionalism Before we delve too deep into the theories and practices of regionalism we must clarify what we mean when we use the terms regionalism, interregionalism, megaregionalism, and paradigm. This can be difficult at times due to the fact that that the field of regionalism is theoretically and conceptually lagging, and fragmented.10 Regionalism: Regionalism can be seen both as a phenomenon and an ideology that “connotes a political movement based on awareness of and loyalty to a region, combined with dedication to a region-‐wide agenda of some kind”. 11 As a phenomenon, the empirical process of takes place. Regionalization 治政regionalization . 大. “refers to those processes that 立 actually build concrete patterns of economic . ‧ 國. 學. transactions within an identified geographical space.”12 These processes are largely privately led and develop spontaneously from the bottom up. Occurring in a specific . ‧. geographic area, these autonomous economic processes – including trade, . y. Nat. io. sit. investment, mergers, and acquisitions – begin to lead to regional economic . n. al. er. interdependence. Being that these economic transactions are empirical, they can . iv. n observe regionalization as a Ch also be tracked and measured. Therefore, we can i U. engch. process of increasing levels of regionness and integration. On the other hand, regionalism can also be recognized as an ideology in a narrower sense. In this sense, regionalism is a movement based on a set of ideas or vision for a regionalist order. Accordingly, regionalism is more of a top down development that is coordinated by a political will to achieve some level of regional integration. In sum, regionalism covers both an ideology and an empirical process that comprises a variety of different levels and forms of regional integration. . 10 Philippe Lombaerde, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Jens-‐Uwe Wunderlich, “Interregionalism” in Knud . Erik Jorgensen ed., The SAGE handbook of European foreign policy, (London: Sage, 2015), 754. 11 Ellen Frost, Asia's New Regionalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 15. 12 Manuela Spindler, “New Regionalism and the Construction of Global Order,” Center for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, Working Paper No. 93/02, March 2002, 6. . . 6 .

(14) Interregionalism: The study of interregionalism falls under the umbrella of the field of regionalism. However, when it comes to creating a holistic definition of what constitutes interregional dialogue, there is little consensus.13 For instance, Lay Hwee Yeo defines interregionalism as “institutionalizing relations between two regions”, while Chen Zhimen labels it as “institutions or organizations, which promote dialogue and cooperation between countries in different regions.”14 For the purposes of this paper, the phenomenon of interregionalism can be generally defined as a situation whereby at least two regions interact with one another as actors, simply put, region-‐to-‐region interaction.15 Still, this definition only scratches the surface of the multifaceted phenomenon that is often ‘nested’ within other forms of international cooperation, namely, bilateralism, regionalism, and multilateralism.16 . 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Megaregionalism: As we will discuss in more detail later in this chapter, Heiner Hanggi breaks interregionalism into five categories – the fifth being . ‧. megaregionalism.17 Megaregionalism is defined as an interregional dialogue that is . sit. y. Nat. comprised of groups of states from more than two regions. Examples of . er. io. megaregional agreements include APEC, ARF, and EAPC. 18 The megaregional . a. n. v l C category is not seen as ‘pure’ interregionalism because it is not built on a dialogue ni. he. hi U. ngc between two coordinated regional organizations such as an agreement between ASEAN and MERCOSUR.19 . 13 Mario Telo, European Union and New Regionalism: Regional actors and global governance in a . post-‐hegemonic era, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 107. 14 Suet Yi Lai, “Inter-‐regionalism of nation-‐states: Asia-‐Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a case-‐ study”, (master's thesis, University of Canterbury, 2012), 15. 15 Francis Baert, Tiziana Scaramagli, and Fredrik Soderbaum, Intersecting Interregionalism: Regions Global Governance and the EU, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 4. 16 Ibid., 2. 17 Heiner Hanggi,“Interregionalism as a Multifaceted Phenomenon: In Search of a Typology,” in Heiner Hänggi ed., Interregionalism and International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2006), 42. 18 Ibid., 51. 19 Ibid., 42. . . 7 .

(15) Paradigm: In his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn popularized the meaning of “paradigm” as a new thought-‐pattern and a philosophic-‐theoretical framework.”20 Kuhn also popularized the phrase, “paradigm shift,” which refers to “a fundamental change of assumptions in the model or theory of science for explaining nature and the physical sciences.”21 In Kuhn’s work on paradigms, the concept was only applied to the field of natural sciences – without consideration of the social sciences. However over time, the social sciences began to adopt the idea of the paradigm and paradigm shifts within their own fields of study. Arend Lijphart was one of the first scholars to adopt the “paradigm” in international relations. 22 Kijphart argued that the pattern of development in international relations theory in many ways parallels Kuhn’s version of theoretical progress in the natural sciences. . 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1 Functions of Interregionalism . Within the literature, there is some consensus as to the functions of . ‧. interregional dialogues first set out by Jurgen Ruland. 23 The six functions are . Nat. sit. y. balancing, rationalizing, collective-‐identity building, agenda setting, . n. a. er. io. institution building and the promotion of development. There is no one . v. i international relations theory l C alone that can h e n g c h i U n fully explain or evaluate interregionalism. Therefore, Ruland uses a combination of the three main schools of thought – realism/neorealism, liberal Institutionalism, and social constructivism – to construct his functions of interregionalism. Ruland admits that while not all these functions are fully empirically supported yet, they are all theoretically plausible. Below is a diagram of each function and its corresponding school of thought. . 20 Karim Crow, “The Use and Abuse of ‘Paradigm’ –From Kuhn to Küng,” International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, July, 2010, 5. 21 Ibid., 6. 22 Martin Griffiths, Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics, (London: Routledge, 2013), 458. 23 Jurgen Rüland, “Interregionalism: an unfinished agenda”, in Heiner Hänggi ed., Interregionalism and International Relations, (London: Routledge, 2006), 297. . . 8 .

(16) Figure 2.1 The Theories and Functions of Interregionalism . 立. 政治大. . ‧ 國. ‧. . 學. Source: Jurgen Rüland, “Interregionalism: an unfinished agenda”, Interregionalism and International Relations. . Realist Function: Balancing . y. Nat. io. sit. Realists see interregionalism as a means of balancing major powers or . er. alliances. For realists, international relations is a zero-‐sum game in which states are . al. n. iv. n Ch more concerned with their gains relative to others than they are with any absolute i U e. ngch. gains. Under this mindset, realists view cooperation between regions as an extremely difficult task. Based on the Balance of Power theory, states may decide to participate in cooperative agreements or international organizations in order to balance against a regional power or global hegemon.24 Essentially, for those in the neorealist camp, regionalism becomes a bargaining process through which states can realize their own self-‐interests. Since a major feature of interregional relations is that they are often asymmetric, regional powers are continually pursuing ways to find a balance.25 Realists focus on the rivalry between regions and the balancing that goes on 24 Valeria Valle, “Interregionalism: A Case Study of the European Union and Mercosur,” Global Applied Research Network, Working Paper No: 51/08, (2008), 13. 25 Rüland, “Interregionalism: an unfinished agenda,” 300. . 9 .

(17) amongst one another. Therefore, Ruland’s interregional function of balancing is greatly influenced by the realist school of thought. ‘Balancing’ refers to the fact that, under a global triadic context, the three major regions of power – North America, Europe, and East Asia – are continually engaging in interregional dialogues to maintain equilibrium either militarily (power balancing) or politically and economically (institutional balancing).26 As an example of institutional balancing, APEC was seen as way to for the East Asian region to balance “against the negative effects of the completion of the European Single Market and the creation of NAFTA.”27 Bandwagoning is also a feature of the balancing function whereas weaker states with little to no leverage in interregional forums latch on to an interregional dialogue so as not to be isolated from the system and obtain the benefits of participation. Bandwagoning countries are often weaker states that don’t take a . 政治大 leading role in the interregional dialogue and contribute little in their participation. 立 ‧ 國. 學. Additionally, balancing can be seen as a way for individual states to . counteract a major power or alliance. In an increasingly globalized world, power . ‧. balancing has been more focused on economic power rather than military power. . sit. y. Nat. For instance, some scholars argue that the motivation for Europe and East Asia to . er. io. form ASEM was to balance the power of the U.S.28 Specifically for Europe, it was . a. n. 29 Ai v l C driven to ‘bandwagon’ and not be left out of Asia. n SEM helped to prevent the US . he. hi U. ngc from dominating Asia through APEC. Meanwhile, East Asia was worried about the . transatlantic relationship between the EU and the US and used ASEM to calm those fears. Although realism offers the balancing function as a powerful motivation behind interregionalism, it is not enough to fully explain the phenomenon. 26 Krishnan Venkata, “Quasi-‐ Interregionalism: A Case Study of EU -‐ India Relations”, Paper presented . at the Young Researchers’ Conference, Jawaharlal Nehru University, (2012), 9. 27 Heiner Hänggi, “Regionalism through Interregionalism: East Asia and ASEM,” in Liu Fu-‐Kuo and Philippe Régnier eds., Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting?, (London: Routledge, 2000), 203. 28 Suet Yi Lai, “Inter-‐regionalism of nation-‐states: Asia-‐Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a case-‐ study”, (master's thesis, University of Canterbury, 2012), 41-‐42. 29 Manfred Elsig, “The EU’s Choice of Regulatory Venues for Trade Negotiations: A Tale of Agency Power?” Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 4 (2007): 929. . . 10 .

(18) Liberal Institutionalist Functions: Institution Building, Rationalizing, Agenda-‐ Setting. Promotion of Development According to liberal institutionalism, regional formations are “intermediary bodies, erected by member states primarily to solve collective action problems.”30 Neoliberals believe that institutions help to “regulate state behavior and promote cooperation by reducing transaction costs, facilitating information-‐sharing, preventing cheating and providing avenues for peaceful resolution of conflicts,” thereby making it easier for states to cooperate. 31 Compared to realists, neo-‐liberal institutionalists place more emphasis on the cooperation between states. While they agree with realists that the international system is anarchic, they are more optimistic about the chance for states to cooperate with one another and the role of international institutions in doing so. . 政治大 Liberal institutionalists approach interregionalism by highlighting the need 立 ‧ 國. 學. for cooperation in order to manage complex interdependence between different regions. In this regard, globalization is a major driver for interregionalism. . ‧. Globalization increases the demand for the systemization of transnationalized . sit. y. Nat. activities, cross-‐border exchanges and the settlement of trade issues. As . er. io. interregional dialogues become more formalized they also find themselves as a part . a. n. v l C of the foreign policy of the participating countries. n i This results in a “stable . he. hi U. n gdcialogue on policy matters.”32 Therefore, framework that facilitates cooperation and . institutionalists argue that states use interregional cooperation in order to adapt to the complexities of the globalized world. Interregionalism can be viewed as a driver of global governance through which states can mange the changing aspects of globalization. Deeply rooted in liberal institutionlism, Ruland’s institution building relates to the function of interregional dialogues to establish a new level of 30 Mindaugas Norkevicius, “Regional Institutionalism in Southeast Asia,” Societal Studies 6, no. 1 . (2014): 100. 31 Amitav Acharya, “Theoretical Perspectives of International Relations in Asia,” in David Schambaugh ed., International Relations of Asia, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 57. 32 Mathais Knepper, The Interregional Relations Between the European Union and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), (Wilhems-‐Universitat, Munster, 2012), 21.. . 11 .

(19) institutions based on the need for better coordination among regional players. According to Ruland, institution-‐building is “the creation of a new level of policy-‐ making in a multi-‐layered international system and the creation of subsidiary institutions such as regular summits, ministerial and senior officials’ rounds, business dialogues, forums of non-‐governmental organizations and track two processes.”33 Essentially interregionalism escalates the amount of communication between regions which inevitably creates an increased demand for stronger coordination and unified positions. Greater levels of institutionalization also help to increase the transparency of international relations. Ruland however, holds doubts on how far interregionalism can catalyze hard forms of institutionalization. High levels of institutionalization, like what we witness with EU interregional cooperation, are never certain. Instead, we are more likely to observe softer versions of institutionalization, . 立. 政治大 similar to what . we observe with Asian . ‧ 國. 學. interregionalism. One reason for this is likely the fear that the governance costs will far outweigh the opportunity costs of higher levels of integration. In this case, . ‧. ‘power balancing’ likely holds interregional institutionalization back. . sit. y. Nat. Another function rooted in liberal institutionalism, rationalizing, points out . er. io. the fact that global multilateral forums can get bogged down with the ever-‐growing . a. n. v l C amount of actors and issues. Therefore, interregional n i dialogues help to streamline . he. hi U. n gissues c the decision-‐making process and tackle that global forums have trouble solving. According to Jorg Faust, interregional dialogues can be considered as “second better solutions” in times of multilateral gridlock. . 34. Interregional . institutions can help break up broad negotiations into smaller more manageable consultations and remove the bottleneck in the global system. Once these smaller consultations are completed in an interregional dialogue, the idea is that the participating countries can then take their consensus to the multilateral forum and make negotiations much easier. In this sense, regional negotiations are seen as more efficient than those between multitudes of states. As applied to creation of APEC, . 33 Rüland, “Interregionalism: an unfinished agenda,” 302. 34 Ibid., 307. . . 12 .