中國2008年企業所得稅改革對上市公司權益資金成本與融資決策之影響 - 政大學術集成

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(1)2008. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. The influences of China’s Enterprise Income Tax Law reform in 2008 on listed companies’ cost of capital and financing policy n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(3) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(4) 2008. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(5) Abstract This paper investigates how China’s Enterprise Income Tax Law reform in 2008 influences listed companies’ cost of capital and financing policy. The empirical results show that: for the cost of capital, the reform declines the listed companies’ cost of capital, and the degree of decline is positively correlated with their effective tax rate. For the financing policy, although the reform declines the listed companies’ debt ratio, this condition is unrelated with their effective tax rate.. 政治大 Keywords: Enterprise Income Tax Law, cost of capital, financing policy 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

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(7) 3-1. MM. 3-2. MM. .................................. 18. .............................................. 19. 3-3. ....................................................................... 22. 3-4. ....................................................................... 23. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. ii. i n U. v.

(8) 2-1. ................................................. 7. 3-1. 2004. ....................... 12. 4-1. ........................................................................................... 37. 4-2. ............................................................................................... 44. 5-1. ....................................................................... 46. 5-2. ....................................................... 47. 5-3. ....................................................................... 49. 5-4. ....................................................................... 49. 1. 立. 5-6. 5-13. ................................................... 54. y. sit. ..................................................................... 58 ..................................................................... 59. al. n. 5-12. 2. io. 5-11. ................................... 53. Nat. 5-10. ................................... 52. ‧. 5-9. ‧ 國. 5-8. ........................................... 52. 學. 5-7. 政治 ................................................... 50 大. er. 5-5. Ch. i n U. v. ..................................................................... 60. e n..................................................................... 65 gchi. 5-14. ..................................................................... 66. 5-15. ..................................................................... 67. iii.

(9) 2008. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 100% 2008. 1. i n U. v.

(10) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 2. i n U. v.

(11) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 3. i n U. v.

(12) 2007. 3. 16 2008. 1. 1. 1980. 立. ‧ 國. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat 1990. 1991. 1. 學. 1980. 政治大. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 4. 1993. 1. 12. 例如：1984 年 11 月 15 日，國務院頒布《中華人民共和國國務院關於經濟特區和沿海十四港口城市減徵、免徵企業所得稅和工商統一稅的暫行規定》；1986 年 10 月 15 日，國務院頒布《關於鼓勵外商投資的規定》；1988 年 6 月，財政部公布《關於沿海經濟開放區鼓勵外商投資減徵、免徵企業所得稅和工商統一稅的暫行規定》；1990 年 9 月 7 日。國務院批准《財政部關於上海浦東新區鼓勵外商減徵、免徵企業所得稅和工商統一稅的規定》，該規定自 10 月 1 日起施行。參見丁雅寧，2006，中國企業所得稅法改革之研究—兼論對臺商之影響，頁 38-39。 4.

(13) 90. WTO. 1.. 立. 1994. 政治大 2. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 2.. Ch. WTO 2001. engchi. i n U. v. WTO. WTO WTO. 2. WTO. 參見中華人民共和國稅政司史耀斌等：《統一企業所得稅制度是完善社會主義市場經濟體制的客觀需要》，摘自財政部網站。 5.

(14) 3.. 33%. 立. ‧ 國. ‧. n. al. 5. 6. Ch. engchi. er. io. sit. y. Nat. (1). 3. 學. 4. 政治大. i n U. v. 15% 24% 10% 7. 80% 33%. 3. 4 5 6. 7. 2-1. 參見宋萍，高度認識我國內外資企業所得稅稅負差異對內資企業的影響，現代會計，2007，第 5 期，頁 38-41。參見中國註冊會計師協會，2007，註冊會計師全國統一考試輔導教材－稅法。例如：經濟特區、沿海經濟開放區、經濟技術開發區等。依《外商投資企業和外國企業所得稅法實施細則》第 69 條規定，經濟特區是指依法設立或者經國務院批准設立的深圳、珠海、汕頭、廈門和海南經濟特區。例如：從事能源、交通、港口、碼頭等重要建設項目等。 6.

(15) 2-1. 15% 15%. 15%. 8. 15%. 政治大 9. 立. 24%. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. (2). 2001. 2010. 15%. 8. 10. 依《外商投資企業和外國企業所得稅法實施細則》第 69 條規定，經濟技術開發區是指經國務院批准在沿海港口城市設立的經濟技術開發區。 9 沿海經濟開放區是指國務院批准為沿海經濟開放區的市、縣、區。 10 外資企業也適用此規定。 7.

(16) 15% 11. 4.. 2006. 2006. 政治大 2005. 2007 39,343.62. 立. 24.3%. 3920.24. 2006 7694.33. 12. ‖. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 ―. 2007. Ch 3. engchi 16. i n U. v. 2008. 1. 1 ―. ‖. 1.. 11 12. 外資企業也適用此規定。參見劉劍文，新企業所得稅法十八講，中國法制出版社，2007，頁 9。 8.

(17) 13. 14. 2.. 25% 25% 33% 15%. 立. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 3.. ‧. ‧ 國. 24%. 8% 政治大. 13 14. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 參見《中華人民共和國企業所得稅法》第 2 條。參見劉劍文，新企業所得稅法十八講，中國法制出版社，2007，頁 168。 9.

(18) 4.. 44. 45. 立. 46. 政治大. 學 ‧. ‧ 國 io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 41. Ch. engchi. 10. i n U. v.

(19) PE PE. 立. PE. 政治大. 1978. 1956. 1974. Nat. n. er. io. 1. Cho. 1994. Ch. 3. sit. 1. al. 2. y. 1. 2 3. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Beaver and Morse. engchi. i n U. v. 50%. Tobin 1987. 2004. 1990. 2003. Fama and French 11. 1988.

(20) 1. 2. Fama and French Beta. 3. 4. 2000. y. sit. 3-1. n. al. er. io 3-1. 2001. ‧. 8. Nat. Model. 2004. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. Ch. e2004 ngchi. B/M. 12. i n U. v. 1,019 GLS 11.

(21) 1. 2 3. 4. B/M B/M 5. 立. B/M. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 6. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 2006. 1999. C h2002 engchi. i n U. v. earning to price ratio. 13.

(22) 2006. 1990. 1. 2004. 政治大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 3. 2. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 4. Fama. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. French 1993 Botosan 1997 Easton 2004. Fama. and French 1993 Botosan 1997 Gebhardt Lee and Swaminathan 2001 Easton 2004. Fama and French. 2003 Easton 2004 1958 Easton. 1993. Botosan. 1997. Gode and Mohanram. Fama and French 1992 Modigliani and Miller. 2004. 14.

(23) PE EPS. Chen Elliot. 2011. EPS. 1980 E/P 1996 PE 政治大. 立. Ohlson and Juettner 2005. 學 ‧. ‧ 國. Easton 2004. sit. n. al. er. io. earnings. y. Nat. expected abnormal growth in accounting. 2.1. 1. Easton. C dps hengchi 2004. 2.1. 15. i n U. v.

(24) Easton. 16. 2.3. 2. 2.2. 3. PEG. 2.1. Chen et al.. 2011. 立. PEG. PE. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 17. PE. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 16. 17. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 為了使估算之期望報酬率的解為一個合理的結果（即非負），Easton 限制研究樣本為：。 Easton（2004）認為使用 PEG 模型估計權益資金成本的效果優於使用 PE 模型。 16.

(25) 1958. Modigliani and Miller. MM Modigliani and Miller 1963. MM. 1977 MM. 立. ‧ 國. ‧. -. y. 1958. io. sit. Nat. Modigliani and Miller. n. al. er. MM. 學. 1.. 政治大. (1). Ch. engchi. (2) (3). (4) (5). (6). 17. i n U. v. Miller.

(26) (1). WACC. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. (2). 政治大. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. aMM l C h. 3-1. eMMn g c h i. i n U. v. (. ). ( R. +. ). %. ( (. ). / 3-1. MM 1993. -. p.398. 18. ).

(27) MM. -. 1963. Modigliani and Miller. 1958. MM. MM. (1). 立. 學 ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. (2). 政治大. ‧ 國. 2.. Ch. engchi. 3-2. i n U MM. / 3-2. MM 2002 p.527 19. v. 100%.

(28) 3.. Miller. 100%. 1977. Miller. MM. Miller MM. 立. 政治大. n. er. io. al. MM. (3). sit. Nat. (2). 1958. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. (1). Ch. 1963. engchi. i n U. MM. v. 18. (1) 0. 18. 謝劍帄，2002，財務管理：新觀念與本土化，全新三版，台北：智勝文化事業有限公司，頁 534。 20.

(29) (2). 4. DeAngelo and Masulis. 1980. 政治大. 立. 5.. ‧ 國. 學. Kim 1978. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 1. 3. Ch. n U engchi. 21. iv. 2.

(30) 3-3. /. 政治大. D* 3-3 1999. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. p.306. 6.. D*. Jensen and Meckling 1976. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Jensen and Meckling 1976. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 19 20. 19. 20. 管理者與股東之間之代理問題（權益代理問題）可能為：管理者將公司資源公器私用、從事個人消費行為；未擁有公司所有權的管理者，須與股東共享利益，故可能使管理者缺少誘因追求公司價值最大化。股東與債權人之間的代理問題（負債代理問題）可能為：管理者舉債後，將所得資金用來發放股利；管理者將舉債而來的資金投資於風險較高的投資方案，欲為股東創造更高的利潤，但卻增加了債權人的投資風險。 22.

(31) 3-4. *. 0. 1. *＝. 3-4 Jessen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling., 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial. 政治大. behavior, agency cost and capital structure. Journal Financial Economics. 立. 3(Octorber) (p.344). *:. 3 (Octorber): 305-360.. 1961. n. al. Donaldson. Myers and Majluf. Myers. 1984. Ch. 1961. engchi. 1984. 23. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Donaldson. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 7.. i n U. v.

(32) Bradley, Jerrell and Kim 1984. 25%. 2. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 54%. 851. 政治大. 立. 1. 25. io. y. sit. 1980. n. al. er. Masulis. Nat. 3. Mackie-Mason. 1990. Titman and Wessels. Ch. Graham. i n U. 1999. engchi. 1988. 1972. v. 1982. 1. 2 Myers and Miller 1984 24. Myers 1984. 469. DeAngelo and.

(33) 3. 4. Mackie-Mason. 1990. 1977. 1986. 1747. 1 Graham. 1996. 2. 政治大. Dhaliwal, Trezevant, and Wang 1992. 立. Gropp 1997. 1979. 1991. 929. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Ch. 3. iv. n. al. 2. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 1. nMackie-Mason U engchi. 1990. 1998. 1992. 1 2. 25. 35.

(34) 1999. 1994. 1998. 1986. 1992. 2000. 立. 政治大 84. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 2. n. al. Ch 4. engchi. 5 2000. 1992. 1998. 26. 80. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 1. i n 3 U. v. 87.

(35) 1 MacKie-Mason 1990. Graham 1996. 2 Bradley, Jarrel and Kim. 1984 3. 4. 2002. Logit. 政治大. ‧ 國. 7. ‧. Logit. io. n. al. er. 2. sit. y. Nat. 1. 87. 學. 10. 立. 80. n Ch 4 U engchi. iv. 3. 2002 1998. 117 1. 2 2005. 1996 t-test. 2001. 403. Mann-Whitney U-test. 27. 396.

(36) 1. 2. 2007. 75. 立. 94. 214. 18. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 3. n. al. er. io 4. sit. y. Nat. 2. Ch. engchi. 28. i n U. v. 1.

(37) Givoly, Hahn, Ofer and Sarig 1992 1987. 立. 政治大. 學. 1986. n. al. er. io. sit. Nat. Rajan and Zingales 1995. 2004. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 1984. 1986. Ch. engchi U. v ni. 1994. 2002. 1 2 3. 4. 29.

(38) 2006 2001. 2002 2003. 464. 2001. Dhaliwal et al.. 2007 2003. Claus and Thomas 2001. Gode and Mohanram. 2003. ‧. Fama and French 1997. 1. n. al. 2010. 2. er. io. sit. y. Nat 1.02%. 學. 2001. Gebhardt et al.. ‧ 國. 立. 12 2004 9 政治大. 2001. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2008 2003. 2008. T 30.

(39) 1 2 3 4. 2010 2008 2006 211 39. 250. 140 政治大 25. 71 14. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. io. sit. y. Nat. 2. n. al. er. 1. 立. 2008. Ch. engchi. 31. i n U. v.

(40) 2008. 2008. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. H1 33%. 32. 25%.

(41) H2. H3. 政治MM 大. Modigliani and Miller 1963. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. H4. Ch. engchi. H5. 33. i n U. v.

(42) H6. 21. 22. 23. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 21. 22. 23. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 一般私營企業以追求公司利益與價值最大化為目標，因此往往會從事租稅規劃以極大化其稅後淨利，而由於中國特殊的制度環境，使得大多數的上市公司皆為國有企業（Huang and Song， 2006），其較無進行租稅規劃的誘因，這是因為國有企業背負著協助政府達成社會目標（例如：社會穩定和經濟發展）的使命，此與一般追求公司利益最大化的私有企業不同，且國有企業無論是在所得稅階段，或是盈餘分派階段，其營業利潤最終還是歸屬於國家所有，又國有企業的管理當局通常為國家所指派，對其而言，只擁有經營權而沒有剩餘利益分配權，故國有企業的管理者較缺乏租稅規劃的動機，學者（鄭紅霞與韓梅芳，2008）從財務報告成本的角度分析，認為相較於民營上市公司，國有上市公司會採取較保守的租稅規劃行為。學者研究發現，相較於非國有控股企業，國有控股企業具有較高的負債比率及較長的債務期限。參見方軍雄，2007，所有制、制度環境與信貸資金配置，經濟研究，第 12 期，頁 82-92。學者研究發現，相較於非國有企業，終極控制人性質為國有控制的公司，其權益資本成本較低。參見黃登仕與劉海雁，2010，終極所有權結構對權益資本成本的影響，統計與決策，第 16 期，頁 144-147。 34.

(43) 2006 2006 1. 2008 24. 2008 2008. 2. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 24. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2006 年之當年度變化量為 2005 年與 2006 年之差額；2008 年之當年度變化量為 2006 年與 2008 年之差額。而排除 2007 年是由於新企業所得稅於 2007 年 3 月 16 日宣布將於 2008 年 1 月 1 日起實施，因此 2007 年有可能包含了稅制改革的影響因素。 35.

(44) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. *. 4-1. Ch. engchi. 36. i n U. v.

(45) 4-1. COE. EPS1/ P0. COE. N/A. /. Leverage. N/A /. ETR. 政 0治大. Reform. 立 Ln. sit. /. n. al. er. io. BM Growth. /. DSEC. Ch. U i en h c g + / +. NDTS. N/A. y. 5. Nat. Beta. 0. ‧. Size. 1. 1. 學. ‧ 國. DETR2006. v ni. N/A N/A. N/A. /. N/A. /. ROA. /. Risk *. FIN. 2. N/A. 5. 2006. COE 2005. 2006. 3 2008. 2008. 37. 2008. 2006. 6 COE. 2006.

(46) 1.. Leverage. Leverage = 2.. /. COE. PE 政治大 EPS 立 26. PE. Chen et al. 2011. y. sit. n. al. er. ETR. io. 26. EPS1/ P0. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. COE =. Nat. 1.. EPS. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 因中國新的企業所得稅於 2008 年 1 月 1 日起施行，礙於本文撰寫時，上市公司 2010 年的財務資料還無法獲得，因此本文選擇只需要未來一期盈餘的估計值即可推估出公司權益資金成本的 PE 模型。故本文只可取得以 2009 年之財務資料推估出的 2008 年公司權益資金成本。 38.

(47) 2.. Reform Reform. Reform. 2008. Reform. 3.. 1. 0 2008. DETR2006 DETR2006. DETR2006. 1. DETR2006. 立. 0. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 1.. Leverage. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Richardson and Welker 2001. 2.. COE PE PE 39.

(48) EPS Chen et al. 2011. 2000. 3.. EPS. 2001. Size. 立. Weston. 政治大 1963. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. 2004. Ch. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. n U engchi. iv. 2004. Titman and Wessels. 1988. Myers and Majluf 1984. 4.. Beta. 40.

(49) Fama and French. 5.. 1993. BM. 政治大 Fama and French 1992 立 Botosan 1997. Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan 2001. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 1992. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 6.. Growth. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2001. Brigham. Fama and French. 1985. Chang and Rhee 1990 2001. 41. 2004.

(50) 7.. DSEC Titman and Wessels. 1988. Jensen and Meckling 1976. Scott. NDTS. 立. DeAngelo and Masulis. 1980. ‧ y. sit. Bowen, Daley and Huber. n. al. 1982. er. io ROA. 1978. 政治大. Nat. 9.. Kim. 學. ‧ 國. 8.. 1976. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. ROA Myers and Majluf 1984. Kester 1986. 42. Titman and Wessels 1988.

(51) 10.. Risk. Titman and Wessels. 11.. 1988. IND. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 43. i n U. v.

(52) A 2003. 2009. 2006. 2008. TEJ. 2006 2007. A. ‧ 國. 8. 0. 2006. 2008. sit. al. n. 177. io. 547. ST. Nat. 99%. 1615. ‧. 0. 立. 學. 2009. 2007 治政大. 1 2007. 2009. 8. 4-2. C 4-2 hengchi. i n U. 0 0 1% 2006. 28. 99% 2008. 1%. 370. v. 1,615. 27. ST. 27. 16. y. 1. 3. er. 2008. 2007. 2008. 28. 30 175 116 88 388 74 197 547. ST 股為英文名稱 Special Treatment 的縮寫，針對財務或是其他狀況異常的上市公司，其交易需進行特別處理。由於該類公司之財務狀況異常，故予以排除。參考過去學者的研究（Chen et al.，2011），排除權益資金成本小於 1%或大於 99%之公司。 44.

(53) 政治大. 立. ‧ 國. 學 1. y. ‧. Nat. sit. n. al. 5-1. Panel A. 1. er. io. 2. 2. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 0.081 0.487. 22% 5-2 5%. 1%. H1. H4. 45.

(54) 5-1 Panel A. Panel B Q1. Q3. 0.055. 0.041. 0.105. Leverage. 0.487. 0.502. 0.175. 0.360. 0.621. ETR. 0.220. 0.201. 0.126. 0.136. Size. 14.829. 14.743. 1.006. 14.127. Beta. 1.084. 1.105. 0.152. BM. 0.561. 0.524. 0.280. Growth. 0.214. 0.148. 0.458. DSEC. 0.549. 0.527. 0.237. NDTS. 0.032. 0.028. 0.020. ROA. 0.059. 0.048. 0.042. Risk. 0.392. 0.329. 1.205. 0.056. 0.043. 0.105. 0.078. 0.066. 0.053. 0.038. 0.105. 0.490. 0.509. 0.175. 0.367. 0.621. 0.484. 0.492. 0.175. 0.352. 0.621. 0.284. 0.235. 0.212. 0.134. 0.141. 0.322. 0.204. 0.187. 0.116. 0.132. 0.256. 15.428. 14.632. 14.555. 0.959. 13.967. 15.247. 15.025. 14.891. 1.015. 14.301. 15.638. 1.003. 1.183. 1.072. 1.082. 0.167. 0.973. 1.178. 1.096. 1.122. 0.134. 1.032. 1.183. 0.340. 0.746. 0.496. 0.476. 0.250. 0.299. 0.655. 0.626. 0.574. 0.293. 0.401. 0.821. 0.020. 0.304. 0.233. 0.160. 0.439. 0.029. 0.328. 0.195. 0.137. 0.476. 0.007. 0.284. 0.382. 0.693. 0.574. 0.560. 0.228. 0.421. 0.708. 0.524. 0.500. 0.244. 0.349. 0.680. 0.017. 0.043. 0.033. 0.030. 0.020. 0.018. 0.044. 0.030. 0.025. 0.020. 0.016. 0.043. 0.030. 0.076. 0.058. 0.047. 0.039. 0.029. 0.076. 0.060. 0.048. 0.045. 0.031. 0.075. 0.189. 0.541. 0.331. 0.286. 1.610. 0.160. 0.490. 0.453. 0.372. 0.556. 0.221. 0.596. al. 547. Ch. n engchi U. 46. sit. ‧ 國. 立. 學. 4-1. 0.068. n. *. 0.084. 政治大. io. 1094. Q3. y. 0.068. Q1. ‧. 0.081. Q3. Nat. COE. Q1. er. *. Panel C. iv. 547.

(55) 5-2. ***. 0.0130. 0.303 0.117*** 0.0390 0.0726* 0.208*** -0.138*** -0.369***. -0.0603 -0.0340 0.0844** -0.0256 0.103*** -0.0496 -0.268***. 0.0543. 立. 0.0180 **. 10%. 1 -0.106*** 0.278*** 0.0544 0.223*** 0.0886** 0.105***. Nat. Risk. *. 0.0194. 1 0.234*** -0.0128 -0.0667* -0.106*** -0.264*** 0.0386. EPS1/ P0 / /. 1 -0.0776* 0.0259 0.0542 -0.411*** 0.00067 ***. al. n. PE ratio=. DSEC. NDTS. 1 0.354*** 0.0629*. 1 0.230***. ROA. Risk. 政治大. 5%. io. COE Leverage ETR Size Beta BM. Growth. 1 0.279*** 0.112*** 0.186***. ‧. 0.217 -0.00103 0.265*** 0.0456 0.0850** 0.0955** 0.0672*. 1. BM. **. y. ***. Beta. -0.0820. sit. 1 0.180***. Size. 1%. -0.0110. -0.0251. 1 0.0166. er. 1 0.128*** 0.0975**. ETR. 學. Size Beta BM Growth DSEC NDTS ROA. Leverage. ‧ 國. COE Leverage ETR. COE. Ch. engchi. 5 /. 47. i n U. v. Growth DSEC NDTS ROA Risk. / + +. / / / /. 1.

(56) 1 5-1. Panel B. Panel C 20.4%. 23.5%. 2008. 0.078 0.084. 0.484. H5. 政治大. 立. 學 ‧ sit. n. al. er. io. Reform. y. Nat 5-5. H2. 5-4. ‧ 國. 5-3. 0.490. 1. Ch. 5%. engchi H2. 48. i n U. v. H5 Reform.

(57) 5-3 Panel A. Panel B. *. Q1. COE Leverage ETR. 0.071 0.502 0.207. 0.056 0.174 0.123. 0.046 0.366 0.142. 立. 0.309. 0.206. 370. 0.066 0.525 0.226. 0.058 0.178 0.153. 0.040 0.382 0.138. Q1. Q3. 0.042 0.339 0.123. 0.113 0.590 0.259. -0.009* 0.008 -0.020*. -0.007 0.007 -0.018. y. v ni. Q3. C h0.101 0.083 U0.071 e h i 0.464 0.623n g c 0.463 0.343. 0.199. 177. *. 0.101 0.629 0.255. 370. er. al. n. 0.082 0.498 0.255. 0.038 0.355 0.136. Panel B. Q1. COE Leverage ETR. Q3. sit. 5-4. io. *. 0.189. Q1. ‧. Nat. Panel A. 0.051 0.175 0.118. 學. ‧ 國. 0.085 0.486 0.226. 治政 0.108 0.076 0.064 大 0.611 0.494 0.509 Q3. 0.186. 0.055 0.174 0.113 177. 4-1. 49. 0.001 -0.036 -0.055***. 0.005 -0.061** -0.040***.

(58) 5-5 ∆COE. 1 0.0599*. 0.114. -0.0898. ∆DSEC. ∆NDTS. ∆ROA. ∆Risk. -0.142. *** *. 0.0761 -0.0617. -0.0445. *. -0.0658*. ***. -0.645. ***. 0.113***. 0.186. ***. -0.00369. -0.0352. 0.203. ***. -0.0408. -0.0430. 0.0752. 0.0291. 0.0194. 0.00584. **. 0.0439. 0.283 -0.219. 0.0910. -0.0781. 0.0331. 0.600. -0.0425. *. 0.0428. **. 0.0318. -0.153. ***. -0.153. ***. -0.110. 1 PE ratio=. ***. 0.406. EPS1/ P0. al. Ch. 0. -0.121. *. ***. engchi. 1. 2008. 2006. -0.0707 -0.275. 0.00171. 5. COE. 1. -0.0271. ***. /. Size Beta. **. ***. 0.0678. / Reform. 1. n. 5%. 1. 0.0811. -0.0182. io. **. COE Leverage ETR. 立. -0.360***. 0.00094. ***. ***. 1. **. 2006. 2005. 50. 1. ‧. -0.0876. ***. 0.116. -0.0128. ***. -0.0926. ***. -0.0321 **. -0.141. -0.0310 -0.127. 政治大. 1. 學. -0.363. ***. **. 0.268***. *. 0.194. ***. y. ***. 10%. 2. ∆Growth. 0.247. sit. 0.0437. Nat. ∆ROA ∆Risk. ∆BM. 1. -0.0474. ∆Size ∆Beta ∆BM ∆Growth ∆DSEC ∆NDTS. ∆Beta. -0.0652. 1%. *. 1. ***. 0.396***. ***. **. 0.0309. 0.0867. 1. -0.0104. 0.109***. 1. 0.0170. 0.0526 1. er. Reform. ∆Size. Reform. ‧ 國. ∆COE ∆Leverage ∆ETR. ∆Leverage ∆ETR. 1. i n U. v. BM Growth DSEC NDTS ROA Risk. / / + +. / / / /.

(59) 2 5-6 5-6 24.2%. 33.7% DETR2006 0.082. 0.091 H3. DETR2006. 0.500. 5-7. 5-8. 立. 0.508 H6 政治大 DETR 2006. 5-7. 5-8. ‧ 國. 學 y. sit. n. al. er. io 5-9. DETR2006. ‧. DETR2006. Nat. DETR2006. H3. DETR2006. C2 h. engchi. H6. 51. i n U. v. DETR2006.

(60) 5-6 Panel A. Panel B. *. Q1. COE Leverage ETR. 0.074 0.520 0.320. 0.059 0.176 0.108. 0.048 0.380 0.262. 立. 0.644 0.368. 0.500 0.242. 278. 0.093 0.500 0.324. 0.077 0.508 0.309. 0.059 0.173 0.095. 0.119 0.637 0.274. Q1. Q3. 0.038 0.366 0.179. 0.114 0.649 0.272. -0.009 -0.008 -0.096***. -0.006 -0.016 -0.082***. -0.011 0.006 -0.078. -0.010 0.006 -0.067***. y. sit. aQ1l. 0.050 0.380 0.258. v ni. Q3. C h0.123 0.082 U 0.067 e n c h i 0.514 0.629 g 0.506 0.356. 0.247. 182 *. 0.038 0.375 0.174. Panel B. n. COE Leverage ETR. Q3. 278. er. io. *. 0.504 0.238. Q1. ‧. Nat. 5-7 Panel A. 0.056 0.176 0.109. 學. ‧ 國. 0.091 0.508 0.337. 治政 0.122 0.082 大 0.068 Q3. 0.242. 0.057 0.181 0.112 182. 4-1. 52.

(61) 5-8 Panel A. `. Panel B. *. Q1 0.072 0.548 0.334. 0.059 0.181 0.125. 0.042 0.377 0.269. 立. ‧ 國. 0.088 0.522 0.361. 0.653 0.407. 0.487 0.232. 0.495 0.234. 學. COE Leverage ETR. Q3 治政0.114 0.082 大0.068. 96. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 4-1. ‧. *. 0.054 0.165 0.101. Ch. engchi. 53. i n U. v. 96. Q1. Q3. 0.040 0.388 0.156. 0.120 0.605 0.284. -0.006 -0.035 -0.129. -0.004 -0.053* -0.100***.

(62) 1 -0.0171. -0.351 -0.135** 0.0339 -0.0409 -0.0203 -0.00803 -0.000639. -0.124 -0.0195 -0.0472 0.164*** 0.213*** -0.0500 -0.242***. 0.00834 0.0253 -0.0210 -0.0130 -0.0214 -0.0505 0.127**. 0.00586. 0.0105. 0.0238 **. 10%. 0.0258. io EPS1/ P0 /. 1 -0.0155 0.104* 0.0242 -0.367***. -0.0109. 0.0118. ***. al. Ch. 1. DETR2006 Size Beta BM. 1 0.144*** -0.0282 -0.0304 -0.0237 -0.165***. 1%. n. PE ratio=. COE Leverage. ∆DSEC. ∆NDTS. ∆ROA. 1 0.300*** 0.242*** 0.221***. 1 0.380*** 0.0622. 1 0.136**. 1. 0.0103. 0.0438. 0.0638. -0.0367. e n g0c h i U. v ni. Growth DSEC NDTS ROA Risk. / + +. COE. 54. 2006. / /. / 2008. / /. 5 2006. ∆Risk. 政治大. 5%. 1. 2. 立. Nat. ∆Risk. 1 -0.129** -0.533*** 0.214*** 0.148*** 0.0317 0.482***. ∆Growth. 學. ∆Size ∆Beta ∆BM ∆Growth ∆DSEC ∆NDTS ∆ROA. 1. **. ∆BM. er. ***. ∆Beta. sit. 1 0.0245 -0.0556. ∆Size. DETR2006. ‧ 國. DETR2006. ∆Leverage. ‧. ∆COE ∆Leverage. ∆COE. 2. y. 5-9. 2008. 1.

(63) 2006. 2008. 1. 2006. 2008. 立. ‧ 國. 學 ‧ y. sit. n. al. er. io. 1. H1. 5-10. 2. 2008. Nat. H1. 政治大. Ch. engchi. i n U. 1%. v. H1. 2. 5-10. 1%. 1%. 55.

(64) 1%. H2 1. H2. 5-11. 立. 1%. 政治大 H2. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. 2. 5-11. 5%. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 5-11. Ch. engchi. 1%. 56. i n U. v. 1%.

(65) H3 1. H3. 5-12. DETR2006 5%. 5-12. 立. H3. 政治大. DETR2006. 5%. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. DETR2006. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 2. 5-12. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1%. 1%. 1%. 57.

(66) 5-10. -0.027 0.682. Leverage. 0.061*** 0.000. 0.059*** 0.000. 0.060*** 0.007. -0.000 0.944. -0.000 0.836. 0.001 0.901. 政治大 -0.012 -0.025. *. 0.071. 0.014 0.496. ‧ 國. 立. BM. 0.073 0.000. ***. 0.071*** 0.000. 0.074*** 0.000. ROA. 0.386*** 0.000. 0.417*** 0.000. 0.266*** 0.005. IND. YES. YES. 1094 0.176. 740 0.197. 0.268. /. e n g c h 5i. ETR. i n U. ROA **. sit. y. YES. er. n. Ch. EPS1/ P0. ‧. io. PE ratio=. 學. Nat. al. Beta. 10%. -0.006 0.892. 0.016 0.505. Leverage. /. 0.034 0.366. 0.043*** 0.009. COE /. COE. 0.038*** 0.005. Beta. adj. R. COE. ETR. Size. 2. COE. v. Size. BM /. ***. 5%. 58. 1%. 354 0.136.

(67) 5-11. Intercept. 0.066** 0.038. 0.066** 0.026. 0.025 0.498. Reform. -0.016*** 0.001. -0.014** 0.013. -0.024** 0.023. 0.026* 0.057. 0.033* 0.051. 0.018 0.469. 政治 0.005 大 0.826. -0.005 0.784. Leverage. -0.085*** 0.000. -0.075*** 0.000. Beta. -0.085*** 0.000. -0.092*** 0.000. -0.079** 0.025. BM. -0.046*** 0.000. -0.056*** 0.000. 0.088 0.119. 0.116* 0.081. y. YES. YES. io. al. n. IND 2. adj. R. 2008 COE. 2007. 1. 2006 EPS1/ P0. ETR. 2005. Reform Leverage. Size 5. Beta. BM. /. / 10%. **. 0.032 0.766 354 0.148. /. /. -0.013 0.609. YES. v i 1094 740 n Ch e n g c h i U0.240 0.213. PE ratio= 0. sit. Nat. ROA. er. ‧ 國. Size. 學. -0.083*** 0.000. ‧. 立. 0.003 0.927. ***. 5%. 59. 1%. ROA.

(68) 5-12. DETR2006. -0.012** 0.041. -0.014** 0.039. -0.011 0.405. 0.012 0.653. -0.032 0.528. Size. -0.081*** 0.000. -0.083*** 0.000. Beta. ***. ***. 0.001. 0.000 ***. -0.058*** 0.000. -0.028 0.459. 0.295*** 0.001. 0.338*** 0.001. 0.249 0.127. 學. -0.051 0.000. io. 547 0.204. 370 0.262. n. 2006. 2008. i n U. C h EPS / P DETR i e1 n g c0 hLeverage. PE ratio=. YES. y. YES. er. Nat. YES. ‧. ‧ 國. -0.033 0.440. sit. 立. al. -0.076*** 0.000. 政治大 -0.072 -0.096. IND. COE. 0.062 0.280. -0.011 0.645. ROA. adj. R. -0.039 0.358. Leverage. BM. 2. -0.043 0.355. 1. 0. v. 2006. Size. /. Beta. BM. /. 5 ROA. / 10%. **. ***. 5%. 60. 177 0.097. 1%.

(69) H4 1. H4. 5-13 5%. H4. MM. 1963. 2. 5-13. 立. 1%. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 1%. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 1%. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1%. 5%. 2000. 2001 1%. Myers and Majluf 61. 1984.

(70) 5%. H5 1. H5. 5-14 5%. H5. 5-14 1%. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2. 5-14 1% 1%. 1%. 62.

(71) 1%. 10%. Myers 1977. H6 1. H6. 立. DETR2006 H6. 學. ‧ 國. 5-15. 政治大. ‧ sit. y. Nat. H5. io. er. 5-15. n. a lDETR v i n DETR Ch engchi U 2006. 2006. 2. 5-15 1% 1%. 63.

(72) 1%. 1% 10%. Myers 1977. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 64. i n U. v.

(73) 5-13. Leverage. Leverage. Leverage. -0.312*** 0.001. -0.216** 0.036. -0.528*** 0.000. ETR. 0.091** 0.013. 0.078 0.101. 0.150** 0.014. Size. 0.047*** 0.000. 0.042*** 0.000. 0.066*** 0.000. Growth. 0.026*** 0.008. 0.037** 0.010. 0.026* 0.061. 政治大 0.155 0.097 ***. 0.000. -1.353** 0.012 0.118 0.372. ROA. -1.341*** 0.000. -1.466*** 0.000. Risk. 0.008** 0.031. io. n. al. Ch. 0.006 0.170. YES. 2. adj. R. engchi. 0.010* 0.071. i n U. YES. v. YES. 1094. 740. 354. 0.381. 0.371. 0.449. Leverage. /. ETR. Size. Growth /. DSEC. NDTS. +. /. EPS1/ P0 ROA. /. + COE. **. Risk. ***. 5%. 65. / PE ratio=. / 10%. -1.159*** 0.000. y. 0.226** 0.029. er. 0.200** 0.014. Nat. COE. ‧. ‧ 國. -0.879*** 0.007. 學. -1.088 0.000. IND. 0.275*** 0.000. 0.000. ***. NDTS. /. ***. sit. 立. DSEC. 1%.

(74) 5-14. Leverage. Leverage. 0.000 0.995. 0.007 0.886. 0.061 0.245. -0.017** 0.012. -0.006 0.464. -0.003 0.897. 立. 0.013 0.627. 政治 0.005 大 0.625. -0.007 0.353. -0.023 0.105. 0.018** 0.021. DSEC. 0.152*** 0.000. 0.145*** 0.000. NDTS. -0.913*** 0.002. -1.196*** 0.000. ‧ 國. n. Ch. Risk. -0.762*** 0.000. U e n g c h i 0.003. YES. YES. YES. 1092. 739. 353. 0.168. 0.162. 0.164. adj. R. 2006. *. 2006. 0.002 0.470. 2005. / 1. -0.621*** 0.000. 0.072. 2. Leverage. 0.232 0.727. 0.002* 0.092. IND. 2008. v ni. -0.723*** 0.000. 0.160*** 0.000. 0.019 0.809. er. io. al. ‧. Nat. ROA. 0.094* 0.090. 0.048 0.280. COE. 0.027*** 0.001. 學. 0.022*** 0.000. Growth. 0. -0.039 0.280. y. Size. -0.036*** 0.007. sit. Refom. Leverage. Reform. ETR. /. Size. Growth. /. DSEC +. + /. COE /. 10%. / PE ratio=. NDTS EPS1/ P0. Risk. / **. ***. 5%. 66. 1%. ROA.

(75) 5-15. -0.011 0.884. 0.084 0.278. -0.069 0.406. 0.005 0.653. 0.010 0.426. -0.001 0.979. -0.019 0.136. 0.001 0.928. -0.047** 0.035. DETR2006 Size. 政治大 0.024 0.044. 0.038*** 0.000. 立. COE. -0.012 0.871. 0.046 0.632. -0.767*** 0.000. al. n. IND adj. R. v ni. 0.001 0.913. 0.004 0.328. e n g c h i U YES. Leverage. YES. 547. 370. 177. 0.169. 0.146. 0.137. 2006. 2008. /. DETR2006. 1. 0 Size. Growth. / NDTS. DSEC. +. ROA. /. /. 10%. -0.022 0.865. YES. 2. P0. -1.739* 0.073. -0.490* 0.055. 0.003 0.302. Ch. 0.172*** 0.000. -0.901*** 0.000. sit. io Risk. -1.099** 0.021. er. ROA. 0.120*** 0.000. ‧. -1.305*** 0.002. Nat. NDTS. 0.052*** 0.000. 學. 0.128*** 0.000. ‧ 國. DSEC. **. y. Growth. **. +. COE. PE ratio=. Risk. /. ***. 5%. 67. 1%. / EPS1/.

(76) 2006. 2008. 2008. 1.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 2.. 立. 政治大. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 3.. 4.. Ch. engchi. 1.. 68. i n U. v.

(77) 2.. 3. 4.. 2008. 1.. 治 1 政大學. 2.. ‧ 國. 立. 1. PE. y. sit. n. al. er. io. 1.. ‧. PEG. Nat. 3.. GLS. Ch. engchi. i n U. 2. GLS. PEG. 3.. 4.. 69. v.

(78) —. 2006. 2007 2007. 12. : 82-92. 2005 1 2010 立. : 122-136. 學 y. Nat. 11. n. al. : 111-127. er. io. 2001 5. : 26-29 2007 5. ‧. —. 2006. sit. 2007. ‧ 國. 9. 政治大. : 93-120. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. : 38-41. 2004. 7. 2002 (8): 39-44 2001. 2006. 70. : 107-114.

(79) 2005. 2000 8. : 23-26 1993. -. 1999 2002 53. 1. 3. : 171-194. 2000. 立. 1998. ‧ 國. 學. 8. 政治大. : 34-37. : 12-20. ‧. 2001. y. Nat : 17-28. n 2010 16. : 144-147. Ch. engchi —. 1999. 2004 5. : 127-131 2004. 2007 2000 71. er. io. al. 8. sit. 2010. i n U. v. 11.

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