新瓶舊酒：中國文化與中共政權正當性之研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文. 立. Master’s 政治Thesis. 大. ‧ 國. 學. 新瓶舊酒：中國文化與中共政權正當性之研究 Old Wine in a New Bottle? The Role of Confucianism in. ‧. the Legitimacy Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. i n U. Ch. v. i 范德銘 101926022 e n gder c hMeer Student: Alexander van Advisor: Professor Chien-Min Chao 趙建民. 中華民國 2014 年七月 July 2014.

(2) 新瓶舊酒：中國文化與中共政權正當性之研究 Old Wine in a New Bottle? The Role of Confucianism in the Legitimacy Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party 研究生：. Student: Alexander van der Meer 范德銘 Advisor: Professor Chien-Min Chao 趙建民. 指導教授：. 治政國立政治大學大碩士論文. 學. ‧ 國. 立亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. sit. y. ‧. Nat. A Thesis. er. io. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. n. aNational iv l C Chengchi University n h e n g c of h itheURequirement In partial fulfillment For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 2014 年七月 July 2014. II.

(3) Abstract Over the last few decades, the Chinese Communist Party’s attitude towards the most profound determinant of the traditional Chinese culture – Confucianism – changed significantly. Not even 40 years ago, Confucius was represented as an anti-revolutionary enemy of the state, while the party tried to root out every sprout of Confucianism amongst the population. Contrarily, nowadays, the party seems to have re-instated Confucius to the position of ‘great Chinese sage’, for which it organizes his annual birthday parties, raises statues for him and praises his contributions to humanity. This leads some observers to the bold conclusion that the party might even be prepared to. 治政大 and argue that the party is just population anyways – to Confucianism. Others disagree, widening its legitimacy立 basis in a populist way by using all kinds of means, amongst change its ideological basis from Marxism – which lost its resonance amongst the. ‧ 國. 學. which Confucianism. Thus, how should we assess the party’s dance with the former devil? What is actually the party’s plan with Confucianism? Giving an answer to the latter. ‧. question is the main purpose of this research.. First of all, as most authors relate this phenomenon to the party’s quest for. Nat. sit. y. political legitimacy, a basic theoretical overview will be given, showing possible. io. er. causality between Confucianism and political legitimacy. Secondly, the most essential historical background will be provided in order to explain why the party was initially so. al. n. iv n C h ebenargued analysis of primary sources, it will the party, after witnessing a popular i U g c hthat malicious towards Confucianism. Subsequently, based on literature, and based on an. revival of Confucianism in the 1980s, on the one hand sought consensus with the population by co-opting this revival – a revival which led to national pride, enabling the party to capitalize on its nationalist legacy as unifier of the country – while it on the other hand tried to channel this development into a meticulously constructed form of Confucianism – by selecting some elements and discarding others – that would benefit the party. The latter refers to a fragmented version of Confucianism which supports authoritarian rule, enhances social stability, shows a gentler face of China to the outside world, presents an attractive cultural alternative to Westernization, but - most importantly - doesn’t present an ideological alternative to Marxism. The latter refutes the claim that the CCP is preparing to depart from its current ideological base towards Confucianism.. III.

(4) Concluding, despite the fact that the party previously vigorously blamed Confucianism for having facilitated the subjugation of the population, it now more or less uses Confucianism in a similar manner. The pot seems to have called the kettle black. Therefore, the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy is old wine – symbolizing the way in which dynastical China has used a selection of Confucian teachings to enhance its authoritarian rule for two millennia – in a new socialist bottle.. 摘要數十年來，中國共產黨對於儒家主義的文化價值產生巨變。不似四十年前的革命，當時共產黨欲拔除儒道深植的價值，孔夫子成為國家反革命的代表形象。相反的，近年來黨內開始重塑孔夫子的地位，藉由每年慶祝孔子誕辰，立孔子像以彰顯他的貢獻，塑造成中國偉大的聖人。這大膽假設過去以馬克思主義的基本意識形態可能在改變，產生共鳴的對象從馬克思主義蛻變成儒家主義。另外一說：中國共產黨意圖採用普世的儒家價值來合理化其作為。因此我們應如何看待這個黨與過去其眼中的「魔」共舞？黨對於儒家主義的真正意圖為合？本文研究重點將解釋以上問題。首先，本文將透過理論去探討儒家主義如何合理化政治行為。接著將透過重要的歷史背景因素證明一開始的中國共產黨對儒家主義的深惡痛絕。其後將透過第一手的文件和歷史文獻佐證在 1980 年代儒家主義復甦以後，黨轉變為尋找與大眾價值的共識──與儒家主義共存的立場。儒家主義的再次興起帶來了民族尊嚴，進而使黨更容易透過國家主義統一整個國家。另一方面，中國共產黨也試著傳播精心塑造的儒家主義，去蕪存菁的挑選出最利於黨的儒家元素架構。後段將提到中國共產黨如何選擇性的篩選儒家主義元素來支持獨裁統治，向國際營造中國穩定社會的形象；而非摒棄過去基本意識形態──馬克思主義卻選擇西化。最後駁斥某些立場：如中國共產黨正準備脫離現下的基本意識進而靠攏儒家主義。因此，儘管過去中國共產黨批評儒家主義是製造階級化的淵藪，但現在卻一步步採用同樣思想，合理化獨裁統治。這種五十步笑百步的行為，挑選了利於黨的儒家元素，將存在中國兩千年的儒家主義的這甕舊酒，裝到中國共產黨統治下的這個新瓶裡。. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. IV. i n U. v.

(5) 1. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Daniel A. Bell, “The Chinese Confucian Party,” The Globe and Mail, February 19, 2010, accessed January 5, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/the-chinese-confucianparty/article1365495/. 1. V.

(6) Acknowledgements I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to professor Chien-Min Chao, as well as to professor Chung-Min Tsai and professor I Yuan. Without their extremely useful advice, this thesis could never have been materialized.. “Real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance.” The Analects.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. VI. i n U. v.

(7) Table of Contents Abstract ..............................................................................................................................III 摘要................................................................................................................................... IV Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... VI Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. VII List of Charts and Figures ................................................................................................. XI List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... XII 1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................1. 治政 1.1.1. Purpose of Research & Research Question大 ....................................................... 8 立 ............................................................................................ 8 1.1.2. Outline of Chapters. 1.1. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 8. ‧ 國. 學. 1.1.3. Subquestions .................................................................................................... 11 1.1.4. Analytical Framework ..................................................................................... 11. ‧. 1.1.5. Chronology ...................................................................................................... 13 1.1.6. Research Relevancy ......................................................................................... 15. sit. y. Nat. 1.1.7. Research Limitations ....................................................................................... 16 1.2. TERMINOLOGY................................................................................................... 18. io. er. 1.2.1. Culture ............................................................................................................. 19. al. n. iv n C hengchi U 1.2.3. Confucianism ................................................................................................... 22 1.2.2. Chinese Culture ............................................................................................... 20. 1.2.4. Legitimacy ....................................................................................................... 27 1.2.5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 27 2. THEORETICAL CONTEXT ........................................................................................28 2.1. TRADITIONAL ..................................................................................................... 29 2.2. CONSENSUS ........................................................................................................ 30 2.3. CONFLICT ............................................................................................................ 30 2.4. MIX ........................................................................................................................ 31 2.5. INSTITUTIONALISM .......................................................................................... 31 2.6. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 32. VII.

(8) 3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND...................................................................................33 3.1. THE CCP’S STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY ................................................... 33 3.1.1. CCP Illegitimacy ............................................................................................. 33 3.1.1.1. Democratic Thesis .................................................................................... 34 3.1.1.2. Performance Failures ................................................................................ 35 3.1.2. CCP Legitimacy: 1949-1989 ........................................................................... 36 3.1.2.1. Mobilization Mode of Legitimacy ............................................................ 36 3.1.2.2. Nationalism ............................................................................................... 36 3.1.2.3. Legitimacy Overview................................................................................ 37 3.1.3. CCP Legitimacy: Post-1989 ............................................................................ 38. 政治大 3.1.3.2. Institutionalization 立 .................................................................................... 40 3.1.3.1. Performance .............................................................................................. 38. 3.1.3.3. Reconfiguration......................................................................................... 41. ‧ 國. 學. 3.2. THE CCP AND CONFUCIANISM: A DARK ROMANCE ................................ 42 3.2.1. Humiliating Confrontation with the West ....................................................... 44. ‧. 3.2.2. Historical Continuity during the Mao-Era ....................................................... 46. y. Nat. 3.2.3. Reform Era: Two Opposing Currents .............................................................. 48. sit. 3.2.3.1. River Elegy: Westernization ..................................................................... 49. er. io. 3.2.3.2. Asian Dragons: Confucianism Revisited .................................................. 50. al. iv n C 3.3. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 53 hengchi U 4. CONFUCIANISM AND THE CCP LEGITIMACY STRATEGY SINCE 1989 .........55 n. 3.2.4. CCP Attitude during Reform Era .................................................................... 51. 4.1 UNOFFICIAL DISCOURSE .................................................................................. 56 4.1.1. Society ............................................................................................................. 56 4.1.1.1. CCP & Society .......................................................................................... 59 4.1.2. Intelligentsia .................................................................................................... 61 4.1.2.1. New Confucianism.................................................................................... 61 4.1.2.2. Categorization of Confucian Scholars: Socialist, Liberal and Confucian 64 4.1.2.3. Confucians ................................................................................................ 66 4.1.2.4. CCP & the Intelligentsia ........................................................................... 68. VIII.

(9) 4.2. OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ....................................................................................... 69 4.2.1. CCP Officials ................................................................................................... 69 4.2.1.1. Officials 1989-2000 .................................................................................. 69 4.2.1.2. Officials 2000 – Now ................................................................................ 70 4.2.2. CCP Documents .............................................................................................. 72 4.2.2.1. CCP Cadres’ Discussion ........................................................................... 73 4.2.2.2. Content Analysis of The People’s Daily 2000-2009 ................................ 74 4.2.3. CCP Policy ...................................................................................................... 74 4.2.3.1. Morality Campaign & Education .............................................................. 75 4.2.3.2. Public Holidays ......................................................................................... 75. 政治大 4.2.3.4. CCP Ideology 立 ............................................................................................ 76 4.2.3.3. Propaganda ................................................................................................ 76. Three Represents ...................................................................................... 77. ‧ 國. 學. Harmonious Socialist Society .................................................................. 78. 4.2.4. CCP Policy: Culture as Soft Power ................................................................. 79. ‧. 4.2.4.1. Confucius Institutes .................................................................................. 82. y. Nat. Methodology ............................................................................................ 83. sit. Research Findings .................................................................................... 85. er. io. Research Analysis .................................................................................... 86. al. iv n C 5. CONFUCIANISM AND THE CCP LEGITIMACY U STRATEGY SINCE 1989: AN h i e h n c g EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................................89 n. 4.3. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 86. 5.1. CCP NATIONAL CONGRESSES ........................................................................ 89 5.1.1. Methodology.................................................................................................... 90 5.1.2. Quantitative Analysis ...................................................................................... 93 5.1.3. Quantitative Analysis Research Findings ........................................................ 95 5.1.4. Qualitative Analysis Research Findings .......................................................... 96 5.2 FIVE-YEAR PLANS .............................................................................................. 97 5.2.1. Methodology.................................................................................................... 97 5.2.2. Quantitative Analysis ...................................................................................... 98 5.2.3. Quantitative Analysis Research Findings ........................................................ 99. IX.

(10) 5.2.4. Qualitative Analysis Research Findings ........................................................ 100 6. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................102 Further Research ..............................................................................................................104 Sources .............................................................................................................................105. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. X. i n U. v.

(11) List of Charts and Figures Figure 1.1.. Zheng He’s Explorations. 2. Figure 1.2.. The Silk Road. 2. Figure 1.3.. Confucius’ 3000 Disciples. 3. Figure 3.1.. River Elegy. 50. Figure 4.1.. Confucius’ Statue on Tiananmen Square. 71. Figure 4.2.. Jia unveiling a Confucius statue at the Confucius Institute in London. 82. Table 4.1.. Confucius Institutes Variables. 84. Table 4.2.. Confucius Institutes Research Findings. 85. 政治大 Ancient as Search Word 立 Civilization as Search Word. Table 5.6.. Analyzed Five-Year-Plans Five-Year-Plans Results Five-Year-Plans Processed Results. 94. 98. 97. 98. er. io. Table 5.8.. 93. Party Congress Speeches Percentages. Nat. Table 5.7.. Party Congress Speeches Results. 92. ‧. Table 5.5.. Analyzed Party Congress Speeches. y. Table 5.4.. 90. 學. Table 5.3.. ‧ 國. Table 5.2.. 90. sit. Table 5.1.. 98. Graph 4.1.. n U i e n gGovernment ch Confucius Institutes Budget. 85. Graph 4.2.. Confucius Institutes Enrolled Students. 85. Graph 4.3.. Number of Confucius Institutes. 86. Graph 5.1.. Party Congress Speeches Absolute Number of Hits. 93. Graph 5.2.. Party Congress Speeches Percentages. 94. Graph 5.3.. Five-Year-Plans Absolute Number of Hits. 98. Graph 5.4.. Five-Year-Plans Percentages. 99. al. Five-Year-Plans Percentages. n. Table 5.9.. Ch. XI. iv.

(12) List of Abbreviations CCP. Chinese Communist Party. PRC. People’s Republic of China. KMT. Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party). USD. United States Dollar. RMB. Renminbi. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. XII. i n U. v.

(13) 1. INTRODUCTION During the 19th and early 20th century, China – once proud and self-confident – was confronted by technologically and militarily superior Western powers, which resulted in humiliation and national trauma. Foreign domination made Chinese intellectuals and nationalists look for the sources of their country’s apparent weakness. Subsequently, some of them identified the traditional Chinese culture – supposedly superstitious, antimodern, backward and feudal – to be one of them. This resulted in a paradoxical mix of nationalism and iconoclasm. On the one hand, there was the desire to make China reemerge in its former glory, and to end all foreign domination. But on the other hand, an. 治政 – was identified as an undermining force that should大 be destroyed. This curious cocktail, 立quite poisonous, was adopted by amongst others the Chinese which later proved to be essential part of being Chinese – and arguably an essential part of China’s previous glory. ‧ 國. 學. communists.12. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the. ‧. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) put this anti-traditionalist nationalism into practice, which reached its apocalyptic climax with the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During. sit. y. Nat. this catastrophic decade, in which approximately three million people died, the ‘four olds’. io. er. – old thought, old culture, old tradition and old custom - were to be eradicated.3 A total cultural and mental reorientation was to be enforced amongst the population. Buddhist,. n. al. i n U. v. Daoist and Confucian temples burned, as well as their books, statues, inscriptions and. Ch. engchi. Tu Wei-ming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center”, Daedalus 120, no 2. (1991): 1-2. Why did China adopt this mix of iconoclasm and nationalism? By comparing the societal reactions of China and India with each other, after both facing foreign humiliation and domination, Tu concludes that Indian intellectuals drew strength from their cultural heritage, while Chinese intellectuals were uprooted from their cultural ground. He fails to give a satisfactory explanation why this difference existed. The different ways in which cultures react to foreign domination has been described by many scholars. Covell uses the ‘traditionally resistant people’s theory’ to explain why Christianity was adopted by some Chinese minorities, while others resisted this foreign religion, and instead even took more pride in their own traditions. This theory describes many factors that make a culture resistant, or prone to abandon its own. Cultures that have self-respect and don’t see the dominator’s culture as superior will less likely adopt (elements of) a foreign culture. Contrarily, when a culture feels insecure, inferior and weak, it more often expresses the wish to abandon its own culture. Tu, “Cultural China,” 2. Ralph R. Covell, “Christianity and China’s Minority Nationalities, Faith and Unbelief,” in China and Christianity: Burdened Past, Hopeful Future, ed. Stephen Uhalley and Xiaoxin Wu (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 271-282. 3 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: the Unknown Story (London: Random House, 2005), 569. 1 2. 1.

(14) works of art. In this revolution’s narrative, Confucius became the great villain of history. By having propagated values such as filial piety and devotion to authority, he has supposedly manipulated the population into willingly submitting to feudalism and slavery for centuries. Even saying the name of this ‘ardent defender of slavery’ and ‘counterrevolutionary’ could be seen as a crime.4 If a person who lived in 1976 could travel through time and flash forward to 2008, he or she would enter a completely different country in so many respects, not the least with regards to the subject of this thesis. If this person would have attended the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games in 2008, he or she probably would have been flabbergasted. Seemingly completely opposite to a few decades ago, this. 政治大 civilization. Western 立. person would have seen the CCP’s apparent claim to represent the cultural core of the ancient Chinese. 學. ‧ 國. media praised the quality of the opening. ceremonies, and remarked that it was a celebration of the Chinese history and meant. to. stress. ‧. culture,. continuity. between the greatness of ancient times. y. Nat. and now. 5 The ceremonies prominently. sit. Figure 1.1. Zheng He's Explorations. ‘four. al. great. er. China’s. n. as. io. featured historical accomplishments, such inventions’. Ch. (fireworks, paper, print and the compass).. engchi. Amongst the historical episodes shown. i n U. v. was for example that of Admiral Zheng He, emphasizing the peaceful nature of his explorations. 6 7 8 Very interestingly, The Figure 1.2. Silk Road. Guardian newspaper noticed that in the. Tong Zhang and Barry Schwartz, “Confucius and the Cultural Revolution: A Study in Collective Memory,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 11, no. 2 (1997): 197-202. 5 John Ruwitch, “World Media Hails Beijing’s Perfect Night,” Reuters, August 8, 2008, accessed June 6, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/09/industry-olympics-opening-reaction-dc idUSSP12531420080809. 6 Figure 1.1. Raymond Zhou, “Beijing Games Kicks Off,” China Daily, August 9, 2008, accessed June 6, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-08/09/content_6918190_3.htm. 4. 2.

(15) depiction of Chinese history, the whole communist revolutionary and Maoist era were completely absent.9 The chronology of the ceremonies skipped from the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) to the late 1970s. However remarkable this fact in itself may be, the ceremonies went beyond arguably superficial expressions of China’s past. In this feast of international sports, with the entire world flocked to the Chinese capital, a representation of 3000 disciples of Confucius collectively chanted their master’s words:. Figure 1.3. 3000 Disciples of Confucius. 政治大 can be considered our brothers.” In an article published by the People’s Daily Online 立 “friends come from afar, how happy we are”, as well as: “all those within the four seas 1011. in 2008 titled ‘Confucius Back in Style in Modern China’, this remarkable historical turn. ‧ 國. 學. was apparently acknowledged by saying: “Confucius is not only being celebrated at the Olympic Games (…..) having been repudiated for decades as representative of the feudal. ‧. system, the philosophy and teachings of Confucianism – a moral and ethical code of conduct for all human relationships which would result in an ideal and harmonious. y. Nat. sit. social structure – can now be found in books, movies and television.”12 Despite the fact. n. al. er. io. that the Chinese media enjoys more autonomy in recent times, one can be quite certain. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 1.2. “Live Coverage of the Opening Ceremonies,” accessed June 6, 2014, http://en.beijing2008.cn/ceremonies/headlines/openingceremony/s214516087/. 8 Zheng He (1371-1435) was an admiral during the Ming dynasty. In 1405, he commanded a fleet of approximately 150 ships, containing an army of around 28.000 men, and sailed towards modern-day Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and South-India. In later expeditions he sailed towards the Persian Gulf, Mekka, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya and Mozambique. The suggestion that his explorations were entirely peaceful does not correspond with the historical reality. In his quest to collect treasures and make states pay tribute to the emperor, he seemed to favor diplomacy and trade to violence. However, he used his large army as leverage in negotiations, and also to overawe his targets into submission. Moreover, if diplomacy didn’t do the job, he didn’t shun violence. 9 Richard Williams, “Patriot Games: China Makes Its Point with Greatest Show,” The Guardian, August 9, 2008, accessed June 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2008/aug/09/olympics2008.openingceremony. 10 “Cultural Icons in Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony,” Chinaview, August 8, 2008, accessed May 5, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/08/content_9053273.htm. 11 Figure 1.3. “Live Coverage of the Opening Ceremonies,” accessed June 6, 2014, http://en.beijing2008.cn/ceremonies/headlines/openingceremony/s214516087/. 12 “Confucius Back in Style in Modern China,” People’s Daily Online, August 9, 2008, accessed May 5, 2014, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/90873/6470242.html. 7. 3.

(16) that the above quotation represents a message which the CCP’s wishes to convey to the public, as all Chinese media are regulated by the CCP’s Central Publicity Department. 13 Quite obviously, the CCP’s attitude towards Confucianism changed over time. But why? And how could it ever justify this, given its anti-traditional roots? Most authors link this development to the party’s continuous struggle for political legitimacy. Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, traditional sources of legitimacy waned. His successors could not even closely match his charisma, and the previously dominant ideology had been discredited by almost three decades of failures. The market reforms and ‘opening up’ policies of Deng Xiaoping since 1978 were meant to re-legitimize the CCP, by offering economic progress to the population in return for the continued acceptance of one-party. 政治大 radically altered the expectations of the population. Economic reforms were enacted and 立 rule. But these reforms simultaneously led to profound societal transformations that. economic rights were granted, which however more and more contrasted with the. ‧ 國. 學. absence of political reforms. The resulting Tiananmen Square Movement in 1989 – embodying a wish for democracy and political rights – continues to serve the party as a. ‧. fearful reminder of what could happen if it suffers a prolonged legitimacy deficit. With its democratic demands, this movement represented a frontal attack on the party’s main. y. Nat. sit. wish: to remain in power. Therefore, it is critical to understand the party’s drive to. al. er. io. continuously re-legitimize itself. The leaders since Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992) – Jiang. n. Zemin (1992-2002), Hu Jintao (2002-2012) and Xi Jinping (2012-) – all presided over policy to do so.. 14. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Some authors argue that this legitimacy struggle at some point made it expedient for the party to change its relationship with Confucianism. After the death of Mao, the party first tentatively allowed elements of the traditional Chinese culture to re-enter the public realm, while it later more and more facilitated, embraced, co-opted and utilized a popular Confucian revival amongst the population.15 Jonathan Hassid, “Controlling the Chinese Media, An Uncertain Business,” Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (2008): 415-416. Hassid argues that next to repression and band-wagoning, the Central Publicity Department uses uncertainty as control mechanism, by which the Chinese media is pushed into more conservative coverage. 14 Robert Weatherly, Politics in China since 1949, Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 1-14. 15 Sebastien Billioud, “Confucianism, Cultural Tradition and Official Discourses in China at the Start of the New Century,” China Perspectives 3 (2007): 50-55. 13. 4.

(17) One of the authors who describes – and comments on – this development is the Canadian scholar Daniel. A. Bell. He teaches political philosophy at the Tsinghua University in Beijing, and styles himself as a ‘Confucian scholar’. His arguments triggered the author of this thesis.16 In his book China’s new Confucianism, Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society, he notices the same change regarding the traditional Chinese culture – and in particular regarding Confucianism – in both society and in the ruling class. 17 He argues that the moral foundation of China’s political system is slowly shifting from a Marxist to a more Confucian basis.18 He even predicts that: “it is not entirely fanciful to surmise that the Chinese Communist Party will be relabeled the Chinese Confucian Party in the next couple of decades.” 19 As his ideas formed the. 政治大. starting point for this thesis, his main argument is briefly explained in the following. 立. paragraphs.. Officially, Marxism still provides the legitimacy basis for the ruling party. The. ‧ 國. 學. past 35 years, characterized by economic liberalization – which seems contradictory from a Marxist perspective – are ideologically justified by stating that China is in the ‘primary. ‧. stage of socialism’. In other words, capitalism just provides the abundance which is needed to create a socialist society. However, what should happen after this phase? Bell. y. Nat. sit. argues that this rarely seems to be discussed, neither amongst China’s ruling elite nor in. al. er. io. society at large, let alone that communism is mentioned as ideological guide for the. n. future. Contemporary concerns, aspirations and needs dominate societal discussion,. Ch. i n U. v. letting future panoramas rest on the ideological heaps of similar utopian visions from the. engchi. Maoist era. Bell concludes that the main reason a communist future is not discussed, is because nobody really believes that Marxism will be the guide for the future. It has been discredited to the degree that it has lost all its legitimacy. Moreover, he mentions that the CCP doesn’t want to be confined by this ideology, since any confinement could endanger its primary objective: to remain in power. The continued stability and social order – pivotal for the perpetuation of CCP rule – cannot rest on an anachronistic ideology.20 Daniel. A. Bell’s personal website, Accessed June 6, 2014, http://danielabell.com/about/. Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism, Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 18 Bell, China’s New Confucianism, 8. 19 Ibid, 12. 20 Ibid, 1-8. 16 17. 5.

(18) That’s why, Bell argues, the CCP started to encourage the revival of China’s own traditions; in particular one tradition which provided stability for millennia, and still continues to be a cultural layer that informs many aspects of its citizens’ lives: Confucianism. Bell argues that this tradition is seemingly being prepared to provide for the country’s ideological future, which is quite a bold claim. What are the signs the CCP is actually doing, or preparing to do this? In the section where he makes the abovementioned claim, Bell lists the following evidence: 1. Confucian doctrines supporting social stability and autocratic rule. Meritocratic – which others might term as ‘autocratic’ – elements justify the continuation of oneparty rule, while the Confucian emphasis on harmony confirms the exit of ‘class. 政治大 Confucianism. Bell suggests. struggle’ as leitmotif, and pictures the party to be concerned with all classes.. 立. 2. A popular revival of. that a CCP shift towards. Confucianism would thus run parallel with a societal Confucian revival.. ‧ 國. 學. 3. Intellectual circles turn to Confucianism to deal with China’s contemporary societal ills, with the CCP doing the same.. ‧. 4. High party officials such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao who mention the Chinese tradition - and recently even Confucius as individual - in a positive manner.. y. Nat. sit. 5. Other references to Confucianism, such as the policy of promoting language and. al. er. io. culture abroad through institutes bearing Confucius’ name, and developments such as. n. the fact that CCP cadres seem to be more and more assessed on the basis of. Ch. i n U. v. Confucian values such as filial piety and family responsibility.21. engchi. However, all these arguments don’t convincingly point towards the CCP shifting its legitimacy basis towards Confucianism, but could just as well indicate: potential benefits of populism, appeals to non-iconoclastic nationalism, the justification of current policy with vague references to traditions, a popular societal revival of the traditional culture in general etc. By no means do these developments necessarily point towards a heartfelt wish of the party to shift to Confucianism. One could think of many other – less ‘totalizing’ – conclusions. For example, the CCP might be diversifying its legitimacy basis in a pragmatic and populist way, but not make a complete departure from its Marxist roots. 21. Ibid, 8-13.. 6.

(19) Indeed, there is another group of authors which assesses this phenomenon in exactly this ‘less totalizing’ way. And as the reader maybe already suspects, Bell’s ideas are subjected to criticism. Below the two poles in this discussion are described, between which naturally many middle positions are possible. 1. One group of authors argues that during the last 30 years, the CCP pragmatically sought to widen and improve its legitimacy basis, and that embracing Confucianism is only a small part of this effort. Holbig and Gilley for example, state that the party: 1. created performance legitimacy by realizing economic growth and by utilizing nationalism; 2. enhanced rational-legal legitimacy by drastically improving its governance, government bureaucracy, internal security, and stability; 3. improved. 政治大 the co-optation of new elites; 4. strengthened immaterial sources of legitimacy such 立. institutional sources of legitimacy by party discipline, control of the media, and by as ideology and collective social values.22 These authors describe a phenomenon in. ‧ 國. 學. the last category – to which the utilization of Confucianism by the CCP belongs – as ‘culturalism’, which they define as “an alternative strategy to legitimize the party’s. ‧. rule (….) by claiming to represent the legacy of the cultural tradition(s) of society, and, with it, its cultural identity.” 23 But Holbig and Gilley make clear that. y. Nat. sit. ‘culturalism’ is only a (small) part of a broad effort to legitimize power by all kinds. al. er. io. of means. This group of authors doesn’t see any signs that the CCP is prepared to. n. shift its ideological base from Marxism towards Confucianism – since this would. Ch. i n U. v. mean a loss of power for the party – and criticizes authors like Bell for making such. engchi. an assertion. Most authors belong to this group.. 2. Another group of authors give this development a more prominent place, and see the traditional Chinese culture as being – in varying degrees, in differing ways, and using different time-paths – essential for the party’s legitimacy base. Guo for example, states that the Chinese population’s performance criteria for the government are to a large degree determined by the Chinese culture and history. That’s why re-embracing China’s traditions, as well as re-enacting traditional ways. Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics & Policy 38, no. 3 (2010): 396. 23 Holbig and Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy,” 408. 22. 7.

(20) of governing, are a strong source of legitimacy. 24 Others, like Bell, ascribe it a similar pivotal role.. 1.1. METHODOLOGY 1.1.1. Purpose of Research & Research Question By now it should have become clear that the CCP changed its attitude towards Confucianism over the last few decades, but that authors assess this development in different ways. This is somewhat confusing. Which interpretation is more credible? But let’s zoom out a little bit and look at the bigger picture: what is actually the party’s plan. 治政 thesis. Hence, the main research question is: 大立 in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy since 1989? What is the role of Confucianism. with Confucianism? Giving an answer to the latter question is the main purpose of this. ‧ 國. 學. 1.1.2. Outline of Chapters. ‧. Before this question can be answered, for a meaningful discussion to commence, it is first of all necessary to authoritatively define some terms that have already been extensively. Nat. sit. y. used, and that might already have confused some readers. What is meant with (traditional) (Chinese) culture, Confucianism and legitimacy? These terms will be discussed under. io. n. al. er. ‘terminology’ (1.2), in the second part of this introductory chapter. For those readers who. i n U. v. are already familiar with these subjects, be advised to skip this part and continue to read from chapter two.. Ch. engchi. In this terminology section, it is made clear that Confucianism has profoundly shaped the (traditional) Chinese culture, and therefore both terms show considerable overlap. Mainly because of this reason, they are often used interchangeably. Consequently, this thesis does the same. Secondly, it is shown that Confucianism has been subjected to many interpretations and had many forms throughout its history, because it was often adapted to the particular needs of the time and/or ruler. This led to an eternal discussion as to what is ‘true’ Confucianism. Once Confucianism got elevated to state doctrine and state religion by the Han dynasty around 220 B.C., it was reBaogang Guo, China’s Quest for Political Legitimacy, the New Equity-Enhancing Politics (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010), 1-19. 24. 8.

(21) interpreted in line with state interests, to support authoritarian rule and to enhance social stability. As such, it served to justify a stern hierarchy in society. This created a fertile ground for later denunciations of Confucianism as being a tool in the hands of those conservative powers which have exploited the masses for centuries. Next, in order to understand how Confucianism can function in the CCP’s contemporary quest for legitimacy, it is imperative to first of all show possible causality between both. Therefore, chapter two summarizes theories of political legitimacy which show how culture in general can create political legitimacy. However, this is not meant to be a theoretical framework, but instead is meant to just provide a theoretical context with which to understand the assertions made in later chapters.. 政治大 consists of two parts. The first part elaborates on the CCP’s aforementioned continuous 立. Chapter three is devoted to provide the essential historical background, and. struggle for political legitimacy. Indeed, it is in this wider context that a government-. ‧ 國. 學. authorized/condoned revival of Confucianism happened during the 1980s, which thus can give valuable insight into the particular reasons why this took place around that time.. ‧. This first part can be seen as the Status Quaestionis – or state of research in the wider field of study – and is devoted to thematically list the sources of legitimacy and. y. Nat. sit. illegitimacy for the CCP since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.. al. er. io. Subsequently, the second part of this chapter provides more of a historical. n. background in the strict sense, and takes the wider historical context into account. It tries. Ch. i n U. v. to explain why the CCP was initially so malicious towards Confucianism, and what made. engchi. it change later. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida used the term ‘specter of the past’ to describe how historical experiences continue to live on, and by doing so, influence the paradigms of a society which determine how reality is interpreted and define the boundaries of the ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’. Thus, history continues to spook around in the present. As such, this phenomenon is related to terms like ‘collective memory’.25 Therefore, China’s traumatic experiences in the 19th and 20th century, which led to a changing relation with its own culture, continues to influence the present-day Chinese society. In order to understand the contemporary attitudes towards Confucianism, it is therefore imperative to describe this history briefly. Next to understanding these 25. Harry Jansen, Triptiek van de Tijd: Geschiedenis in Drievoud (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2010), 55-62.. 9.

(22) ‘specters of the past’, there is one more reason that this historical background is important: this thesis assumes a historical ‘turn’ with regards to the CCP’s attitude towards Confucianism around 1989. Therefore, it is necessary to understand from what position this turn actually happened. Most importantly, by doing so, the CCP’s motivation to make this turn will become clear, which helps to discern what place Confucianism has in the CCP’s strategy to legitimize its rule. In attaching such importance to the historical context, I believe my background as a historian makes itself painfully obvious. This chapter concludes that the party – after initially trying to enact a total mental reorientation during the Mao-era – had a rather ambiguous attitude towards Confucianism in the 1980s, but after the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 started to. 政治大 around that time, and to enforce its rule. 立. embrace (a selection of) Confucianism to counter the threat which Westernization posed. It should be mentioned however, that there is a group of authors who view these. ‧ 國. 學. historical ‘turns’ as an erroneous interpretation of history, and focus instead on historical continuity. Related to this point, some readers might wonder why 1989 is treated as. ‧. ‘turning point’, and consequently as chronological starting point of the main research question. These issues will be discussed under ‘Chronology’, paragraph 1.1.5.. y. Nat. sit. In chapter four, the main research question will be answered based on academic. al. er. io. literature. What is the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy since 1989?. n. Chapter five is devoted to the same question, but based on a quantitative and qualitative. Ch. i n U. v. analysis of primary sources. The methodology of these two chapters will be explained in paragraph 1.1.4.. engchi. Chapter four and five conclude that the CCP, after witnessing a popular revival of Confucianism in the 1980s, on the one hand sought consensus with the population by coopting this revival – a revival which led to national pride, which enabled the party to capitalize on its nationalist legacy as unifier of the country – while it on the other hand tried to meticulously re-construct a certain version of Confucianism – by selecting some elements and discarding others – which best serves its purpose. The latter resulted in a fragmented version of Confucianism which supports authoritarian rule, enhances social stability, shows a gentler face of China to the outside world, presents an attractive. 10.

(23) cultural alternative to Westernization, but – most importantly – doesn’t present an ideological alternative to Marxism. That’s why, this thesis concludes, the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy is old wine – symbolizing the way in which dynastical China has used a selection of Confucian teachings to enhance its rule for two millennia – in a new socialist bottle. There is no evidence to back up Bell’s claim that the CCP is prepared to let Confucianism fundamentally re-organize Chinese society and politics.. 1.1.3. Subquestions After the introduction, the body of this thesis thus contains four chapters which are. 政治大 How can there be causality between Confucianism and political legitimacy? (Chapter 立. devoted to the following sub-questions: 1.. two). ‧ 國. 學. 2. How did the CCP legitimize its rule since 1949? (Chapter three) 3. Why was the CCP initially hostile towards Confucianism, and why did it change?. ‧. (Chapter three). y. Nat. 4. Based on literature, what is the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy. sit. strategy since 1989? (Chapter four). al. er. io. 5. Based on primary sources, what is the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy. n. strategy since 1989? (Chapter five). Ch. 1.1.4. Analytical Framework. engchi. i n U. v. Interestingly, a relatively small amount of authors is truly devoted to understand the CCP’s attitude towards Confucianism.26 Instead, a relatively big group of authors focuses. Why has there been relatively little written on this subject? The scope of this paper doesn’t allow elaborating on this question extensively. For authors within China, this probably has to do with the ambiguous attitude of the CCP towards Confucianism. The party identified that some forms of Confucianism present a threat to the party by presenting an alternative political system in China. Therefore, authors within China might be shunned away from discussing its political aspects, and instead dive into an academic discussion of Confucian classics, and/or focus on its spiritual side. The latter doesn’t pose a threat to the party, and thus can be conducted freely. However, the author of this thesis also suspects that: 1. The party has been deliberately very vague about its true intentions: it never gave a clear impression of its goals with Confucianism. Therefore, authors have to speculate and interpret based on a relatively small amount of facts, which is a hurdle to deal with this subject.. 26. 11.

(24) on the revival of Confucianism in society and amongst the intelligentsia, and keep largely silent about the CCP in this regard.27 Wu, who belongs to the former group, noticed the same in an article in 2014.28 Related to the above, regarding chapter four, for those few authors who try to answer the question ‘how does the CCP ruling elite view Confucianism?’, often they don’t only point towards CCP sources - such as official speeches, documents and policy - but usually they also take society in general as well as academic circles into account. Taking a look at Bell’s arguments, he does the same without clarifying why. Why do authors do this? Billioud argues that “the relationship the authorities have with tradition seems intimately tied to the complex and changing relationship that. 政治大 many authors refer to a similar mechanism with the term ‘performance legitimacy’, 立. society and intellectuals have with tradition.”29 In chapter three it will become clear that. which sees the party, population and intelligentsia as constantly interacting in a. ‧ 國. 學. legitimacy-determining system.. Chevrier ascribes a similar importance to the role of society and intellectuals, for. ‧. which he fathered the theory ‘distended communism’. He argues that the government to some degree controls certain groups – such as intellectuals – but since a few decades also. y. Nat. sit. allows them considerable autonomy. Therefore – by loosening its grip – the party creates. al. er. io. the pre-conditions for certain spontaneous societal developments to happen. Subsequently,. n. when some developments happen, the party might find it expedient to re-establish a. Ch. i n U. v. certain amount of control, and also to adjust itself to the newly created situation. Thus,. engchi. ‘communism’ – meaning party control over certain developments – distends in all kinds of directions, such as Confucianism, because society and intellectuals lead it there.30 To conclude, many authors use a distinction between ‘official’ discourse and ‘unofficial’ discourse. The former refers to CCP sources, such as official speeches, documents and This subject is probably not ‘sexy’ compared to some other subjects. China’s current socio-economic ascend, its geopolitical consequences, inflamed by the ‘China threat school’, are probably more gripping stories. Money and fear sells better. The suggestion that Confucianism, with such values as ‘moderation’ and ‘harmony’, might play a (future) role sound less exiting. 27 See for example: Ruiping Fan, ed., The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China (New York: Springer, 2011). 28 Shufang Wu, “The Revival of Confucianism and the CCP’s Struggle for Cultural Leadership: A Content Analysis of the People’s Daily, 2000-2009,” Journal of Contemporary China (2014): 1. 29 Billioud, “Confucianism,” 51. 30 Explanation of Chevrier’s theory by: Billioud, “Confucianism,” 51. 2.. 12.

(25) policy. The latter refers to society in general as well as academic circles. Both serve to understand the CCP’s attitude towards Confucianism. Therefore, this thesis will do the same. Chapter five is based on an analysis of primary sources, namely the speeches at the CCP’s National Party Congresses from 1956 until 2012, as well as the last four fiveyear plans. It was hoped that by analyzing the party’s use of language in these documents, it would be possible to distill how the party’s attitude towards Confucianism has changed, and what role it envisages for the latter. However, during these speeches, no references were made to Confucius nor to Confucianism. The same goes for other official documents and speeches. Therefore, the author of this thesis decided to investigate the. 政治大 In order to do that, first of all a quantitative analysis was made. Every document 立. party’s attitude towards the related subject of ‘traditional Chinese culture’.. was analyzed by using search words such as ‘culture’ and ‘traditional’. Subsequently, the. ‧ 國. 學. contexts of all these words were evaluated, to see what kind of references were made: to ‘socialist’ culture, to ‘traditional’ culture, or to culture in general? This has been. ‧. quantified, which enabled the historical development of the party’s use of the word ‘culture’ to be painted. Simultaneously, a qualitative analysis was made, by analyzing. y. Nat. sit. every reference to the traditional culture, as well as references to other search words.. n. al. er. io. What message does the party want to bring across regarding China’s traditions?. 1.1.5. Chronology. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The chronology of this analysis might seem rather arbitrary to some readers. Why start the main analysis in 1989, and why treat this year as an absolute turning point? To some degree, this is indeed arbitrary and artificial, as there is considerable continuity between the period before and after 1989. That’s why the reader will find that this ‘starting date’ is not very strictly upheld in this research, which for example includes an extensive historical background (chapter three). However, many authors do consider the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 to be a pivotal event, which impacted the CCP’s quest for the hearts and minds of its people considerably. That’s why chapter four and five mainly focuses on the post-1989 era.. 13.

(26) During the 1980s, the previously mentioned mix of iconoclasm and nationalism was still very much present amongst a part of the CCP members and population. This group still paradoxically viewed China’s traditional culture to be undermining their country’s strength.31 Contrarily to Maoist policy which strived to crush Chinese traditions with force, in the 1980s these people hoped that by ‘opening up’ China’s floodgates to the outside world, the powerful Western culture could wash away China’s cultural weakness. However, the Tiananmen Square movement’s ‘Western demands’ of democracy and human rights, proved to be a mortal threat to the party, since it attacked the CCP’s main goal: to remain in power. This made the Western culture clearly unfit to continue its function as iconoclastic tool. Instead, in what can be considered a ‘historical. 政治大 Concluding, the previous object of iconoclastic destruction now got 立. turn’, Confucianism was identified as strategy to act as an attractive cultural alternative to ‘Westernization’.32. reinstated to counter a bigger threat. The above provides the rational to use 1989 as. ‧ 國. 學. starting point for the main analysis. Nonetheless, to be fair, another reason to use this date is to confine the scope of this research.. ‧. Next, it is imperative to touch upon the issue of historical continuity/discontinuity. The introductory narrative - where Confucius is first repudiated and then reinstated with. y. Nat. sit. all honors by the CCP - will be criticized as too dichotomous by some. A group of. al. er. io. authors instead focuses on continuity to describe developments in the cultural field. An. n. example is Yu, who argues that with regards to religion “there has never been a period in. Ch. i n U. v. China’s historical past in which the government of the state, in imperial and post-. engchi. imperial form, has pursued a neutral policy towards religion.” He points towards the emperors, who pursued stability by choosing Confucianism as state religion. Subsequently, the Kuomintang (KMT) – Chinese Nationalist Party – supported the freedom of religion, but actually preferred to reinstate Confucianism as state religion because they despised Daoism and Buddhism as either superstitious or foreign. In this light, the communist policy stands in a firm historical tradition. Yu: “The PRC is using. 31 32. Tu, “Cultural China,” 5-6. Billioud, “Confucianism,” 50-65.. 14.

(27) state power to police and regulate religion just as the imperial state had done for more than two millennia.”33 However interesting, whether there is continuity or discontinuity is a dichotomy itself, and might blur a meaningful discussion. Yu states that PRC citizens nowadays have much more religious freedom than before, which is consistent with other observers who argue that the CCP did change its attitude towards Confucianism. I wish to discover why and how?. 1.1.6. Research Relevancy Based on the above, an engaged reader might ask: “what is the added-value of this. 政治大 ascribe a (future) pivotal role to Confucianism as legitimacy doctrine, already have their 立. research?” This is a very essential question. Indeed, Bell, as well as other authors who critics.3435 So what is ‘new’ about this research?. ‧ 國. 學. 1. The author of this thesis found that the field of study regarding ‘Confucianism as source of legitimacy for the CCP’s rule’ is quite fragmentized and archaic. Different. ‧. authors focus on different aspects, and more surprisingly use different theories of. y. Nat. political legitimacy to back their arguments up. Some of them don’t even use a theory. io. sit. at all, or suffice with a vague reference to one. This is confusing, sometimes. er. contradicting, and blurring an effective discussion. Being confronted with this. al. n. iv n C ‘Confucianism and the CCP’s U of this thesis took it upon him h legitimacy’, e n g c hthei author ‘chaotic field of research’, and since this thesis tries to paint the panorama of. to give a comprehensive overview of the theories of political legitimacy which are used, or which can be used for those authors who make an argument without. theoretical foundation. This is presented in chapter two. Moreover, a broad overview of the actual arguments made by authors is presented in chapter four. 33. Anthony C. Yu, State and Religion in China, Historical and Textual Perspectives (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2005), 135-147. 34 Mark Mackinnon, “Meet the Canadian Prof Making Waves for Praising China as a Meritocracy,” The Globe and Mail, November 24, 2012, accessed June 14, 2014, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canadian-iconoclast-daniel-a-bell-praises-chinas-one-partysystem-as-a-meritocracy/article5633364/. 35 Christian Rickens, “Ökonomen-Konferenz in Hongkong: Ich glaube nicht das Demokratie der beste Weg ist,“ April 4, 2013, accessed June 4, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/oekonomen-undsozialwissenschaftler-zweifeln-an-der-demokratie-a-892991.html.. 15.

(28) 2. Based on academic literature, this thesis cannot create an entirely new perspective on this subject. However, by quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing some primary sources in chapter five, this thesis can still add relevant new arguments. To conclude, by defragmenting the broader field of study in chapter two and four, and by quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing certain primary sources in chapter five, which both hasn’t been done before, the author of this thesis hopes to contribute to the scholarly debate in this field of study.. 1.1.7. Research Limitations. 政治大. The above is the proposed research design of this thesis. However, next to the aforementioned limited body of literature and the confined scholarly scope, there are. 立. some other limitations and restrictions which the reader should keep in mind. When. ‧ 國. 學. describing the terminology, it will become clear that it’s hard to authoritatively define and confine terms like culture, Confucianism, and legitimacy, which sometimes moreover show considerable overlap. Furthermore, what these terms encompass is often. ‧. in the eye of the beholder, whereby outsiders and insiders are in danger to consciously 36. Moreover, different academic. y. Nat. and/or subconsciously suffer from ethnocentrism.. sit. disciplines and different scholars often use certain definitions, only to make them fit into. er. io. a particular analysis.37 The author of this thesis has undoubtedly suffered from all of the. al. n. iv n C A lot of interesting subjects h eborder i Uupon the main theme of this thesis, n g corhtouch. abovementioned phenomena.. and would have been relevant to include as they could have provided new perspectives. Most importantly, as authors like Bell assess that Confucianism might replace Marxism as legitimacy doctrine in the future, it would have been very relevant to analyze the CCP’s attitude towards its nominal ideology. However, doing justice to this topic would require too much time and space. Therefore, the author of this thesis chose not do this.. Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001), 20-52. 37 William H. Sewell jr., “The Concepts of Culture,” in: Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, ed. Victoria E. Bonnel and Lynn Hunt, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 35-37. 36. 16.

(29) Yet, an assessment of the firmness of the position of Marxism within the CCP - as ‘competitor’ of Confucianism - would be very relevant to include in future research. Another limitation of this research is that chapter three will only provide a brief overview of the most essential historical episodes. Some might argue that a broad overview of the Chinese culture, Confucianism, and Chinese legitimacy processes would be necessary to be able to fully grasp these phenomena, which are all relevant to the main subject of this thesis. However, in order to make this research confined and feasible, this analysis will only briefly look into some episodes of the 19th and 20th century that will help explain to the CCP’s attitude towards Confucianism. Next to these historical overviews, it would be interesting to make an. 政治大 the same Confucian culture, but not the same recent history. In a sense, this would border 立. international comparison between Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, which all share. upon the untranslatable German term ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’, which means the. ‧ 國. 學. way in which ethical-historical dilemmas have been collectively mentally processed by society, which subsequently shape the borders of contemporary acceptable/preferred. ‧. thinking and acting.38 The above German term is related to the enormity of inhumanities committed by Nazi-Germany, which made the subjects that touched upon the sanctity of. y. Nat. sit. human life in post-war West-Germany, such as family policy – but also eugenics,. al. er. io. euthanasia and abortion – in differing degrees controversial or taboo. The public. n. distrusted the state to handle such affairs, and politicians consequently feared for their. Ch. i n U. v. political lives if they would break these taboos, which all stood in the way of rational. engchi. policy.39 This phenomenon was partly unearthed by historians who made international comparisons with other European countries like Sweden and France, where these subjects are dealt with without a historical burden, leading to a more rational family policy. The contemporary low German birth rate can partly be blamed upon this phenomenon.40 Moreover, an analysis of written sources from the media could have been very useful. These and other subjects however, could not – or only briefly – be included 38 Eckhard Jesse, "Vergangenheitsbewältigung nach totalitärer Herrschaft in Deutschland,“ German Studies Review 17, no. 1 (1994): 157-171. 39 Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood, Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 109-141. 40 Olivier Thévenon, “Family Policies in Europe: Available Databases and Initial Comparisons,” Vienna Yearbook of Population Research (2008): 165-177.. 17.

(30) because most Chinese media don’t have an extensive English-language online archive, due to time constraints, and also due to the need to confine the scope of this research. The author of this thesis is moreover considerably handicapped by a poor mandarin skill, making it impossible to use Chinese-language sources. This could partly be ameliorated by relying on authors who provide overviews of mandarin sources, but nonetheless has proven to be a considerable restraint.41 The analysis of primary sources in chapter five is therefore based upon English translations. Regarding chapter five, the methodology that is used – using certain search words, subsequently interpreting the context of these words in order to distill if the party’s use of language betrays it’s changing attitude towards the traditional Chinese culture – might. 政治大 subjective. However, the scholar can try to make it as little subjective as possible, which 立 seem very subjective to some readers. Indeed, an analysis of written sources is always. was tried in chapter five.. ‧ 國. 學. Finally, it is prudent for the reader to realize that Bell is a controversial figure, both within and outside of academic circles. Why then use his arguments as starting point. ‧. of this thesis? To be honest, opportunism and pragmatism are the main motivational factors: exactly because of the controversy he creates, exactly because he is provocative,. y. Nat. sit. and exactly because a lot of counterarguments can be made. Moreover, his sharp rhetoric. n. a. er. io. made his works a pleasure to read, as well as a challenging stimulus for the mind.. l 1.2. TERMINOLOGY. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. This section describes a number of terms: culture, (traditional) Chinese culture, Confucianism, and legitimacy. For a reader who is already familiar with these subjects, an elaboration on (some of) these terms might seem rudimentary. Such a reader is advised to skip this section to chapter two. Indeed, this section is meant for those readers who are not familiar with such subjects as ‘Confucianism’ or ‘Chinese culture’. To put these two terms in the right context, it is imperative to first of all define ‘culture’.. 41. Example. A broad overview of CCP sources, CCP-related journals and authors with regards to soft power is provided by: Li Mingjiang, “China Debates Soft Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 2 (2008): 287308.. 18.

(31) 1.2.1. Culture What is culture? First of all, as Fan states “culture is complex and multidimensional. It is in fact too complex to define in simple terms.”42 Sewell Jr. provides an intellectual history of the social sciences and humanities’ use of the term culture, of which an elaborate description here would be extraneous. 43 Important to keep in mind is the fact that, according to Sewell Jr., culture is defined by different academic disciplines and by different scholars in different ways, often just in order to fit into a particular analysis. 44 A keen observation, which the reader best keep in mind. This thesis’ intepretation of culture is based on Hofstede’s definition.45 He argues. 政治大. that “culture is the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or society from those of another.”46 Hofstede goes on to argue that this. 立. ‘collective programming of the mind’ is passed on between people, and defines the. ‧ 國. 學. paradigm with which people interpret reality. As such, culture influences criteria of good and evil, perceptions of people’s role in society and the government’s role in society.. ‧. This explains how Confucianism – as cornerstone of the Chinese culture – affects people’s subjective views of political legitimacy. Moreover, important for this thesis is. Nat. y. sit. n. al. er. 43. io. Ying Fan, “A Classification of Chinese Culture,” Cross Cultural Management 7, no. 2 (2000): 1. William H. Sewell Jr., “The Concepts of Culture,” in: Beyond the cultural turn: new directions in the study of society and culture Victoria, ed. E. Bonnel and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 35-37. 44 Sewell identified many different usages of the word ‘culture’ in the social sciences and humanities, which in the end come down to a dichotomy between seeing culture as a system or as practice. The former refers to seeing the ‘cultural system’ apart from other systems such as the ‘social system’ or ‘economic system’. The latter refers to a broader interpretation, whereby culture becomes evident when it is put into practice and guides behavior. Sewell proposes to unite these interpretations, and argues that culture “should be understood as a system and practice, as a dimension of social life autonomous from other such dimensions both in its logic and in its spatial configuration, and as a system of symbols that is continually put into practice and therefore subject to transformation.” Sewell, “The Concepts of Culture,” 52. 45 Hofstede, a well-known social scientist, came up with the cultural dimensions theory in 1984, whereby he uses four dimensions - individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and masculinity - to construct archetypes of national cultural values. He has been very influential in this field of study. His book Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Vvalues, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Ccross Nations has received over 20.000 citations, and its national archetypes were subsequently applied on a wide variety of subjects, trying to explain cultural differences between countries. Even his critics, like Jones, acknowledge that he is by far the most cited author in this field of study. Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001). M. L. Jones, “Hofstede – Culturally Questionable?,” (Paper presented at the Oxford Business & Economic Conference, Oxford, June 24-26, 2007): 2. 46 Geert Hofstede, “Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 1, no. 2 (1984): 82. 42. Ch. engchi. 19. i n U. v.

(32) Hofstede’s assertion that cultural interaction goes both ways: rulers influence their citizens; and citizens their leaders. This explains why it is imperative to include society as a whole to understand the CCP’s relation to Confucianism.47. 1.2.2. Chinese Culture First of all, as Fan describes, the contemporary culture in the PRC consists of three elements: traditional culture, communist ideology, and (recently) Western cultural influences. 48 This section will only look into the last category: ‘traditional Chinese culture’, used interchangeably with ‘Chinese culture’. What is Chineseness? As stated before, it is impossible to give a final answer to. 政治大 not. The ancient Chinese did the same, and described those outsiders who did not follow 立 this question. As is often the case, it is easier to describe something in terms of what it is. their ways as ‘barbarian’.49 But this is still rather vague. Tu states that the Chinese culture. ‧ 國. 學. is “the generic term symbolizing the vicissitudes of the material and spiritual accomplishments of the Chinese people.”5051 Starting around four millennia ago, from the. ‧. area between and around the Yellow and Yangtze River - which can be described as the. y. Nat. cultural core area - a bourgeoning civilization rose into being, and over time expanded to. sit. the south, west and north. From early on, the people living there felt that their style of. al. er. io. living is profoundly different from other ‘barbarian’ styles of living, and saw proof of. v. n. their superiority in the fact that bordering people adopted their ways and Sinicized over. Ch. i n U. time. Amongst practical characteristics often mentioned is the system of writing, which. engchi. can be traced back to around four millennia ago.. Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism have profoundly shaped the system of thought, social values and traditions of this vast area. Amongst those, Confucianism has been most influential. It structured and ordered Chinese society, from the social to the political realm, and will be explained in the next section. What follows is a short overview of the other two.52 Hofstede, “Cultural Dimensions,” 82. Fan, “A Classification of Chinese Culture,” 4. 49 Tu, “Cultural China,” 3. 50 Ibid, 1. 51 Vicissitudes: ‘Quality or state of being changeable’. 52 Ibid, 2. 47 48. 20.