1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. METHODOLOGY
1.1.2. Outline of Chapters
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of governing, are a strong source of legitimacy.24 Others, like Bell, ascribe it a similar pivotal role.
1.1. METHODOLOGY
1.1.1. Purpose of Research & Research Question
By now it should have become clear that the CCP changed its attitude towards Confucianism over the last few decades, but that authors assess this development in different ways. This is somewhat confusing. Which interpretation is more credible? But let’s zoom out a little bit and look at the bigger picture: what is actually the party’s plan with Confucianism? Giving an answer to the latter question is the main purpose of this thesis. Hence, the main research question is:
What is the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy since 1989?
1.1.2. Outline of Chapters
Before this question can be answered, for a meaningful discussion to commence, it is first of all necessary to authoritatively define some terms that have already been extensively used, and that might already have confused some readers. What is meant with (traditional) (Chinese) culture, Confucianism and legitimacy? These terms will be discussed under
‘terminology’ (1.2), in the second part of this introductory chapter. For those readers who are already familiar with these subjects, be advised to skip this part and continue to read from chapter two.
In this terminology section, it is made clear that Confucianism has profoundly shaped the (traditional) Chinese culture, and therefore both terms show considerable overlap. Mainly because of this reason, they are often used interchangeably.
Consequently, this thesis does the same. Secondly, it is shown that Confucianism has been subjected to many interpretations and had many forms throughout its history, because it was often adapted to the particular needs of the time and/or ruler. This led to an eternal discussion as to what is ‘true’ Confucianism. Once Confucianism got elevated to state doctrine and state religion by the Han dynasty around 220 B.C., it was
24 Baogang Guo, China’s Quest for Political Legitimacy, the New Equity-Enhancing Politics (Plymouth:
Lexington Books, 2010), 1-19.
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interpreted in line with state interests, to support authoritarian rule and to enhance social stability. As such, it served to justify a stern hierarchy in society. This created a fertile ground for later denunciations of Confucianism as being a tool in the hands of those conservative powers which have exploited the masses for centuries.
Next, in order to understand how Confucianism can function in the CCP’s contemporary quest for legitimacy, it is imperative to first of all show possible causality between both. Therefore, chapter two summarizes theories of political legitimacy which show how culture in general can create political legitimacy. However, this is not meant to be a theoretical framework, but instead is meant to just provide a theoretical context with which to understand the assertions made in later chapters.
Chapter three is devoted to provide the essential historical background, and consists of two parts. The first part elaborates on the CCP’s aforementioned continuous struggle for political legitimacy. Indeed, it is in this wider context that a government-authorized/condoned revival of Confucianism happened during the 1980s, which thus can give valuable insight into the particular reasons why this took place around that time.
This first part can be seen as the Status Quaestionis – or state of research in the wider field of study – and is devoted to thematically list the sources of legitimacy and illegitimacy for the CCP since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.
Subsequently, the second part of this chapter provides more of a historical background in the strict sense, and takes the wider historical context into account. It tries to explain why the CCP was initially so malicious towards Confucianism, and what made it change later. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida used the term ‘specter of the past’
to describe how historical experiences continue to live on, and by doing so, influence the paradigms of a society which determine how reality is interpreted and define the boundaries of the ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’. Thus, history continues to spook around in the present. As such, this phenomenon is related to terms like ‘collective memory’.25 Therefore, China’s traumatic experiences in the 19th and 20th century, which led to a changing relation with its own culture, continues to influence the present-day Chinese society. In order to understand the contemporary attitudes towards Confucianism, it is therefore imperative to describe this history briefly. Next to understanding these
25 Harry Jansen, Triptiek van de Tijd: Geschiedenis in Drievoud (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2010), 55-62.
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‘specters of the past’, there is one more reason that this historical background is important: this thesis assumes a historical ‘turn’ with regards to the CCP’s attitude towards Confucianism around 1989. Therefore, it is necessary to understand from what position this turn actually happened. Most importantly, by doing so, the CCP’s motivation to make this turn will become clear, which helps to discern what place Confucianism has in the CCP’s strategy to legitimize its rule. In attaching such importance to the historical context, I believe my background as a historian makes itself painfully obvious. This chapter concludes that the party – after initially trying to enact a total mental reorientation during the Mao-era – had a rather ambiguous attitude towards Confucianism in the 1980s, but after the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 started to embrace (a selection of) Confucianism to counter the threat which Westernization posed around that time, and to enforce its rule.
It should be mentioned however, that there is a group of authors who view these historical ‘turns’ as an erroneous interpretation of history, and focus instead on historical continuity. Related to this point, some readers might wonder why 1989 is treated as
‘turning point’, and consequently as chronological starting point of the main research question. These issues will be discussed under ‘Chronology’, paragraph 1.1.5.
In chapter four, the main research question will be answered based on academic literature. What is the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy since 1989?
Chapter five is devoted to the same question, but based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of primary sources. The methodology of these two chapters will be explained in paragraph 1.1.4.
Chapter four and five conclude that the CCP, after witnessing a popular revival of Confucianism in the 1980s, on the one hand sought consensus with the population by co-opting this revival – a revival which led to national pride, which enabled the party to capitalize on its nationalist legacy as unifier of the country – while it on the other hand tried to meticulously re-construct a certain version of Confucianism – by selecting some elements and discarding others – which best serves its purpose. The latter resulted in a fragmented version of Confucianism which supports authoritarian rule, enhances social stability, shows a gentler face of China to the outside world, presents an attractive