4. CONFUCIANISM AND THE CCP LEGITIMACY STRATEGY SINCE 1989
4.2. OFFICIAL DISCOURSE
4.2.3. CCP Policy
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This general and professor Wang seem to have quite different opinions. Billioud concludes from these and similar sources, that apparently there is a debate going on within the CCP. He concludes his analysis by stating that CCP cadres’ opinion of the role of Confucianism is located between the following two poles:
1. Caution, because of its potential danger.
2. Critical re-appropriation, but only to stress elements which can be used for stability.76 4.2.2.2. Content Analysis of The People’s Daily 2000-2009
In her analysis, Wu looked into how Confucianism is viewed by The People’s Daily newspaper during the first decade of this millennium. The newspaper openly acknowledges that the party strives to keep its hegemony in the cultural field and wishes to stimulate the resurrection of a certain version of Confucianism. A version which can be used to support socialist morality, loyalty to the party, and can help to stave off Westernization. Wu thus identifies exactly the same reasons as has been mentioned before. She assesses the CCP’s attitude towards Confucianism as one of great opportunism and pragmatism, and even argues that the CCP will probably discard Confucianism completely when it’s not of any use anymore, or when its negative side-effects grow too large.77
4.2.3. CCP Policy
This section consists of a few parts. First, in some fields of policy – morality campaign, education, public holidays and propaganda – the party (increasingly) uses references to Confucianism.78 Its use in these fields betrays the CCP’s true motivation to do so, as these areas are especially suitable to implant a certain version of Confucianism in people’s minds, and moreover enable national cohesion and social stability to be easily enhanced.79 Subsequently, the use of Confucian notions in the CCP’s ideology will be investigated, whereby it will be made clear that these are used for roughly the same reasons. Finally, China’s cultural soft power, which greatly benefits from a traditional
76 Ibid, 62.
77 Wu, “The Revival of Confucianism,” 1-3, 11-12, 19 -21.
78 The sections ‘Morality Campaign’, ‘Education’ and ‘Public Holidays’ are based on: Billioud,
“Confucianism”, 55-60.
79 Billioud, “Confucianism,” 54-55.
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revival, will be discussed in detail. An analysis of the Confucius Institutes – which present Chinese language and culture abroad – is added to the latter subject.
4.2.3.1. Morality Campaign & Education
Billioud sees evidence of Confucianism being put to use in the party’s public morality campaign and in education. With regards to the former, many billboards have been put up all over the country, emphasizing such values as ‘the rule of law’ and ‘the rule of virtue’.
Billioud interprets these slogans as a mix between references to socialism and to the traditions. Moreover, these texts seem to communicate the idea that adjustments to the needs of the time – or Zietgeist – is a merit. Billioud distills three key elements in these slogans which all bear a heavy Confucian scent:
1. The importance of raising the ‘moral level of the people’.
2. Public ‘honor and shame’.
3. ‘Moral and patriotic indoctrination of the youth’.80
Billioud mentions that although nowadays individuals have much more autonomy, the conviction that people need to be morally indoctrinated was, is, and probably will be perceived as an important governmental task. Billioud argues that the Chinese – Confucian – mind is convinced that a system which can explain reality is available. 81 Therefore, the state has the job to help people see the ‘truth’, which legitimizes a certain indoctrination.82 Billioud mentions that this notion is also put into practice in Chinese education. Thus, these distinctively Confucian notions, which during Maoist times were a form of ‘Confucian Marxism’, now seem to undergo re-Confucianization’.83 4.2.3.2. Public Holidays
The third area where Billioud notices cultural policy is with regards to holidays, rituals and festivals, which according to him have the task to enhance social cohesion. Because many traditional festivals, rituals and holidays are linked to folk religion, the communists initially viewed them as ‘superstition’ and therefore banned these practices. Contrarily, next to restoring some traditional holidays, the party nowadays even facilitates
80 Ibid, 56.
81 Billioud borrows this idea from Thomas Metzger.
82 Thomas Metzger, A Cloud Across the Pacific: Essays on the Clash between Chinese and Western Political Theories Today (Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press, 2005), 21-31.
83 Ibid, 57.
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ceremonies and celebrations all over the country, which are extensively covered by the media. Despite claiming in official texts that these traditions need to be integrated with the socialist heritage, it seems that previously important holidays such as those celebrating labor and the party, are now of secondary importance.84
4.2.3.3. Propaganda
Dotson argues that official propaganda presents Confucian values as an antidote for corruption, and as enabling the construction of a harmonious society. Moreover, CCP officials who follow Confucian ethics are presented as moral examples, which illustrates the role of ‘public honor and shame’. The reason CCP propaganda has been
‘Confucianized’ to some degree, is because there is widespread public cynicism with regards to the relevancy of communist ideology. Therefore, the party started to utilize Confucian elements, but only those elements which do not contradict with Marxism too much. The values stressed in propaganda are the same values which are mentioned before:
loyalty to the existing order, self-discipline - which includes fighting corruption - and a selection of Confucian elements which serve authoritarian politics. The CCP’s propaganda simultaneously strives to enshrine these elements amongst the population as criteria to evaluate the CCP’s performance. 85
4.2.3.4. CCP Ideology
Holbig argues that the CCP continuously adjusts its official ideology to new circumstances. It has become tradition that every leadership generation puts forth its own ideological innovation, and at the same time upholds and reiterates the ideological additions of their predecessors. However, they are allowed to give a new interpretation to these preceding slogans. This happened from Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Representation’, Hu Jintao’s ‘Scientific Development Perspective’ to Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’.86 Authors state different reasons for the party to continuously adjust its ideology, which is also described as progressively incorporating traditional notions:
84 Billioud, “Confucianism,” 59-60.
85 Dotson, “The Confucian Revival,” 5.
86 Heike Holbig, “Ideological Reform and Political Legitimacy in China, Challenges in the Post-Jiang Era,”
in Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China, Institutional Change and Stability, ed. Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 13-34.
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1. Ideology is a way to manage social expectations and frame information. By adjusting the official ideology the CCP hopes to change the social expectations of the population, simultaneously changing the way its performance is measured.
2. By re-interpreting and inventing official ideology the CCP shows it can pragmatically adapt to the changing needs of a changing society. Thus, it tries to make pragmatism a merit in the eyes of the population, and thus a performance criterion.87
3. Following Weberian traditional legitimacy, Guo mentions that 'following the ways of the ancestors' is regarded as a vice in the Chinese collective mindset. References to the traditions are therefore a source of legitimacy in itself.88
Below, two ideological slogans will be discussed to illustrate the constant ideological innovation, re-interpretation, and the incorporation of traditional notions.
Three Represents
Jiang Zemin’s main ideological contribution was the theory of ‘Three Represents’, which are:
1. Advanced social productive forces.
2. Advanced culture.
3. Fundamental interest of the majority.
Jiang Zemin’s main purpose was to reform the party into an inclusive party, which truly represents the whole Chinese society. He pursued this amongst others by lessening the emphasis on class struggle further by allowing capitalists to become CCP members. With regards to the incorporation of the traditional culture, Wu argues that in a definition Jiang Zemin himself gave in 2001, he predominantly stressed that Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s theory and Deng Xiaoping’s theory should be followed in the construction of a Socialist Advanced Culture. There was never any reference to Confucianism, nor to traditional culture.89
According to Holbig, Hu Jintao’s administration gave a populist reinterpretation of Jiang’s slogan. In official speeches, Hu Jintao shifted the emphasis towards the
‘fundamental interest of the majority’. Moreover, Hu also reinterpreted ‘socialist
87 Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert, Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China, Institutional Change and Stability, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 1-5.
88 Guo, China’s Quest, 1-19.
89 Wu, “The Revival of Confucianism,” 2.
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advanced culture’, giving it a broader meaning to also include the traditional Chinese culture.90
Harmonious Socialist Society
Hu Jintao’s ‘Harmonious Socialist Society’, which is part of the ‘Scientific Development Perspective’, has been a much-publicized ideological innovation, especially well-received under advocates of a Confucian revival who rejoiced at the use of the word ‘harmony’.
For these authors, harmony is a clear reference to the Confucian notion of ‘great harmony’
(大同).Thus, Guo for example, argues that the party adopts Confucian elements in its official ideology, which he interprets as a revolutionary development.91 However, other authors disagree with this assessment, notably Holbig, Gilley and Billioud.
Holbig and Gilley state that although recent slogans such as ‘Harmonious Socialist Society’, as well as ‘Putting The People First’, vaguely refer to Confucian teachings, they are merely “sterile clichés representing an amorphous imaginaire of historical achievements and future greatness that is referred to as Chinese culture.”92 These two authors argue that the party doesn’t truly wish to promote Confucianism, but just opts for ‘Confucian populism’ to tap into national pride.
Moreover, in another article, Holbig quotes Hu Jintao’s worries about “people’s growing and increasingly diverse material and cultural needs (…) the increasingly complex interests in different social sectors (…) the appearance of all sorts of thoughts and cultures (….) people’s mental activities have become noticeably more independent, selective, changeable and different (…) people’s heightening awareness of democracy and the law and growing enthusiasm for political participation”.93 According to Holbig this is a quite radical change in rhetoric, as the party previously mostly emphasized the need to maintain party-state control in all kinds of fields. Instead, now, the party just notices – and implicitly accepts – the fact that society has gotten much more pluriform, for which it uses ‘harmony’ to ameliorate the negative side-effects.94 Thus, according to
90 Guo, China’s Quest, 32-34.
91 Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, ed., China in Search of a Harmonious Society (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), 4.
92 Holbig and Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy,” 410.
93 Heike Holbig, “Remaking the CCP’s Ideology: Determinants, Progress and Limits under Hu Jintao,”
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 38, no. 3 (2009): 50-51.
94 Holbig, “Remaking the CCP’s Ideology,” 51.
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Holbig, there is no true desire to promote Confucianism, but only to use ‘sterile clichés’
to counter societal contradictions, tensions, and possible subversive forces.
Billioud has a slightly different point of view, and uses a speech by Hu Jintao in 2005 in which the party leader elaborated on what is meant with ‘Harmonious Socialist Society’. In this speech Hu provided a history of the idea of harmony – including China’s ancient history – and quoted many great thinkers. Hu argued that many ancients talked about harmony, but even though their ideas were right and just, these ideas could not be put into practice because they lived in a (terrible) feudal society. By doing so, Hu thus applied the New Confucians’ differentiation of ‘core Confucianism’ and ‘dynastical Confucianism’. Hu continued his historical account by arguing that harmony was also essential in socialist history, and that Marx’ historical materialism was meant to counter the disharmony created by uncontrolled capitalism.95 However, he cryptically admits that class struggle does present a contradiction in this regard. He didn’t directly criticize Mao, and also summarized the contributions of the Maoist era to harmony. However, by praising the second generation of leadership - Deng Xiaoping - for steering away from attributing a pivotal role to class struggle, he implicitly still criticized Mao. He defined harmony in the contemporary society as “not resisting the existence of contradictions within society, but one of resolving them in appropriate fashion”.96
Billioud interprets this speech as an evolution of Marxist theory, whereby class struggle is dropped in favor of harmony. Billioud thus concludes that this is a pragmatic shift, an ideological innovation within the borders of Marxism, which can help the CCP to cultivate the image that it’s concerned with the interests of all citizens. One could conclude therefore, that this version of harmony doesn’t – or only very remotely – refers to the Confucian philosophical meaning of harmony.97