• 沒有找到結果。

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1. THE CCP’S STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY

3.1.1. CCP Illegitimacy

立 政 治 大 學

N a

tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

33

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter consists of two parts. First, as the CCP’s changing attitude towards Confucianism is often related to – and explained by – its struggle for political legitimacy, section 3.1. chronicles this continuous struggle since the establishment of the PRC in 1949 until now. Indeed, it was in this context that the party changed its attitude towards Confucianism during the 1980s. This part thematically summarizes the factors that made up the CCP’s legitimacy and illegitimacy over the last 75 years.

The second part of this chapter (3.2.) is more a historical background in the strict sense, and explains why the CCP was initially hostile towards China’s own traditions, and subsequently explains why and how this changed during the 1980s. This part thus takes the wider historical context into account. This chapter will make clear that the party changed its attitude towards Confucianism, especially after the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, as part of a much broader effort to widen its legitimacy base by all kinds of means.

3.1. THE CCP’S STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY

How did the CCP legitimize its rule since 1949?

This section first lists factors which are described by some authors to be chronic sources of illegitimacy for the CCP: non-democratic rule and performance failures. Secondly, it is explained how the CCP nonetheless managed to legitimize its rule from 1949 to 1989, which can help to explain why Confucianism got included in this strategy during the 1980s. Thirdly, the CCP’s struggle for legitimacy since 1989 is narrated.1

3.1.1. CCP Illegitimacy

Since the CCP rose to power in China, (Western) observers have predicted its downfall.

They often based their arguments on the delegitimizing effects of failed CCP policy,

1 Heike Holbig and Bruce Gilley, “Reclaiming Legitimacy in China,” Politics & Policy 38, no. 3 (2010):

396.

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a

tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

34

whereas some authors combine this with the assumption that a non-democratic government’s struggle for legitimacy will always be an uphill battle.2

3.1.1.1. Democratic Thesis

By saying that “democratic authorization is necessary for political legitimacy”, Buchanan voices the opinion of a group of authors according to whom a non-democratic regime always suffers from a legitimacy-deficit.3 He summarizes a body of literature which provides him with two main reasons, which are:

1. Democratic procedures lead to the best results.

2. Equal regards and rights for persons require democratic institutions.

He states that the protection of basic individual rights is the core of justice, and therefore the core of legitimacy. A democracy ensures those rights best. A non-democratic entity which protects those rights can still be legitimate, but only if the institutional framework to make a democracy work is lacking.4

Weatherly uses the term ‘electoral mode legitimacy’ to make the same kind of argument as Buchanan, but sees the expression of discontent to be the main legitimizing factor of a democracy. In a democratic system, by having the possibility to vote an administration out of power every few years, discontent can be channeled in a peaceful way. Thus, a democratic system’s legitimacy is ensured by its facilitation of elections, and not fully dependent on a certain administration’s popularity. Contrarily, in a single-party system there are no procedures to remove an unpopular administration from power.

The party and the system are moreover synonyms, through which the illegitimacy of the party’s governance consequently leads to the illegitimacy of the whole system. In a one-party system, when the current administration is deemed illegitimate, people can only take to the street to enforce a system change. In a democracy, people can simply vote an illegitimate administration out of power, without the need to change the system.5

2Baogang Guo, “Political Legitimacy in China’s Transition toward a Market Economy,” in China’s Deep Reform, Domestic Politics in Transition, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 146-148.

3 Guo, “Political Legitimacy in China’s Transition,” 147.

4 Allen Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” Ethics 112, no.4 (2002): 718-719.

5 Robert Weatherly, Politics in China since 1949, Legitimizing Authoritarian Rule (New York: Taylor &

Francis, 2007), 1-3.

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a

tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

35

The Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 was naturally seen as support for this

‘democracy argument’, and there has been a body of literature predicting the

‘democratization of China’ since. Gilley is one of those, and notices a ‘tentative democratization’. According to him, most countries in the world start to turn into a democracy once the Gross Domestic Product per capita surpasses a certain level. He predicts that the same will happen in China in the near future.6 However, there seems to be a historical precedent that predictors of democratization in China turn out to be wrong.

3.1.1.2. Performance Failures

Scholars also points towards the regime’s performance as a source of illegitimacy.

During Mao’s rule (1949-1976), when disastrous policies from the ‘Great Leap Forward’

to the ‘Cultural Revolution’ ravaged the country, some observers saw the bankruptcy of the ruling class. The party progressively enacted profound changes after Mao’s death in 1976 – transformation towards a market economy, as well as tentatively allowing more political and individual rights – which were successful, but simultaneously paradoxically planted the seeds for future illegitimacy.7 The open-door policy and economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin lifted untold millions out of poverty, which attributed to performance-based legitimacy, but also created huge side-effects: income inequality, inequality between regions, uneven wealth distribution, rampant corruption, environmental pollution, unemployment and unequal access to health care, education and housing.8 Next to these environmental and socio-economic effects, Ai also mentions a spiritual/moral crisis: years of neglect and disinterest in spiritual and moral themes, and the mindless pursuit of money and wealth led to a sense of common human distrust, indecency and the idea that everything is justified to make money.9 All these factors thus undermine the party’s legitimacy. If this is really the case, how did the regime survive?

6 Bruce Gilley, “Legitimacy and Institutional Change,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 3 (2008):

273-278.

7 Guo, “Political Legitimacy in China’s Transition,” 147-176.

8 Weatherly, Politics in China, 10.

9 Ai Guo Han, “Building a Harmonious Society and Achieving Individual Harmony,” in China in Search of a Harmonious Society, ed. Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2008), 13-17.

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a

tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

36