股東代表訴訟制度之研究：由公司治理與董事責任觀點出發

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(1)A Study on Shareholder Derivative Suit From Corporate Governance and Directors'Liabilty Prespective. 101.

(2) 2012/7/25.

(3) ;.

(4) ......................................................................................................... 1 ..........................................1 ..........................................1 ........................................................................................... 3 .............................................3 .................................................3 .......................................4 .......................................6 OECD ............................................7 .................................................7 1999 OECD .............................8 2003 ...........................10 2004 OECD ............................12 ............................................21 ..................................21 ....................................22 ............................................23 ....................................24 ..........................24 ..........................................26 ....................................26 ................................28 ....................................................29 ................................................................................ 31 ................................................31 ..................................31 ..............................33 ..............................................36 ....................................36 ....................................37 ......................................38 ..........................................39 ............................................39 ....................................39 ....................................40 ............................................41 ........................................41.

(5) ..............................49 ..................................55 ......................................55 ......................................56 ............................................57 ........................................................................ 59 ......................................59 ......................................59 ......................................59 ................................................59 ......................................60 ..........................................60 ..............................................60 ..................................61 ..................................62 ......................................................................................... 65 ....................................................65 ......................................65 ............................................65 Foss .......................................65 Foss .................................67 2006 ...........................68 ............................................71 ................................71 ....................................72 ............................................73 ............................................73 25 (1950 ..........................73 25 ...................................74 ..................................75 ............................................79 ............................................79 ........................................79 ......................................80 ......................................81 ..........................................82 ............................................82 ............................................82.

(6) ..........................................83 ............................................83 ............................................84 ..........................................84 ............................................84 ............................................85 ................................................85 ..................................86 ............................86 ....................89 ....................................90 ................................90 ....................91 ..................................92 ....................................93 ........................................95 ........................................95 ........................................97 ........................................99 .........................................100 ...............101 ...............102 .................................103 .............................103 ...........................................103 .......................................104 .......................................105 .......................................107 ...............................111 .......................111 .................................111 .......................................113 .....................114 ...................................114 .............................115 ...................116 ...............................118 .....................120.

(7) .............................................120 369 4 .............................120 227 .................................121 ...........122 ...........................................122 .............................123 10 ........................124 .....................127 .....................................127 ...................................130 88 2714 ...130 93 59 ...132 96 91 97 914 .........................132 96 1320 ...134 ...............................................135 ............................................................................................137 ..................................................137 ..................................................138.

(8) 2001 30 2004. 214. 1.

(9) 214. 2.

(10) 1. 1930. Berle. Means. 2. 3. 1. 4. Corporate Governance Corporate Governance. 2. 3. 78 Enron Corp.. energy trading 29 3.

(11) 5. :. 2001 2000. 10. 12. 2001. 90 :. 113. ; 67 4. WorldCom 64.5 38. 2002. 25. 28 20 5000. 21-23 5. 31 4. 28-29.

(12) 6. 7. 9. 10. ). Shleifer. Vishny. 11. ). Ira Millstein. 6 7 8 9. 104. 105. 63 33. 34 26 11 Andrei Shleifer and Rober Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 1997, at 737-783 5 10.

(13) 12. ). Keasey. Wright. 13. Monks. Minow 14. 15. 12 13. 17 Robert A. G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, 2001, at 1 15 http://www.sfi.org.tw/E/Plate.aspx?ID=332 21 6 14. 2012. 3.

(14) OECD. OECD OECD Principles of Corporation Governance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ,OECD 1998. OECD OECD OECD 1999. 2004. OECD. 16. 17. Financial Stability Forum World Bank IMF Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes,ROSC 16. 17. 18. 10. 18 19 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ( here in after referred to as” OECD Principles”), 3, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (last visited May, 10, 2009). See also generally Survey of Corporate Governance in OECD Countries, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/27/21755678.pdf (last 7. 18.

(15) 1999. OECD. 1999 Principles of Corporate Governance 1999. The rights of shareholders. OECD. 19. The equitable treatment of shareholders. 20. : The role of stakeholders. in corporate governance. 21. visited May, 10, 2009 ).. OECD. 2004. 65. 19. residual profit. market for corporate control. recourse See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 0ECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999 available at http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAssetManagement/oecd/governance/oecdprinciplesofcorp orategovernance_9789264173705en 2012 14 20. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 0ECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999 available at http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAssetManagement/oecd/governance/oecdprinciplesofcorp orategovernance_9789264173705en 2012 14 21. 8.

(16) Disclosure and transparency. 22. The responsibilities of board. 1999. 23. :. 24. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 0ECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999 available at http://www.ifac.org/Credibility/ViewPoints_Category.php?CatID=002 2012 14 22 :. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 0ECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999 available at http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAssetManagement/oecd/governance/oecdprinciplesofcorp orategovernance_9789264173705en 2012 14 23. nonexecutive board member. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 0ECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999 available at http://www.keepeek.com/DigitalAssetManagement/oecd/governance/oecdprinciplesofcorp orategovernance_9789264173705en 2012 14 24 34 9.

(17) 2003 1997 1999 10.

(18) OECD. 2003. 25. 2003. 25. http://www.sfb.gov.tw/Layout/main_ch/MultiMedia_FileDownload.ashx?guid=fb9cb0926d0 64efbbe7b3e973625db71; http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/55/25778905.pdf , 2012 11.

(19) 2004. 26. OECD. 1999. 1999. OECD. 2002. OECD. OECD 1999 OECD. OECD OECD. BIS. IMF. IOSCO. 1999. OECD. OECD. OECD OECD OECD. OECD 1999. OECD. 1999. OECD OECD. OECD OECD. 2004. 1999. Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance Framework The right of shareholders and key ownership functions 26. See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ( here in after referred to as” OECD Principles”), 3, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf , 2012 02 15 12.

(20) The equitable treatment of shareholders The role of stakeholders in corporate governance (Disclosure and transparency) The responsibilities of the board. Effective. Ensuring the Basis for an Corporate Governance Framework. supervisory. regulatory. enforcement 1 27. private contractual relations. 28. 27. :. Principle I of the OECD Principles provides: “The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient market, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.” 26 OECD Principles 17 28 Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 26 OECD Principles 29 13.

(21) The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 2 29. 30. OECD 2004 31. : ;. 29. Principle II of the OECD Principles provides: “The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights.” 26 OECD Principles 18 30 Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 26 OECD Principles 32 31 23 14.

(22) 32. ; ;. :. 33. ;. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 3. 32. 2004. See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance2004,. 26, 18 19. 33. 2004. See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance2004, 15. 26, 19.

(23) 34. exante expost. safe harbours 35. 1999. 34. OECD. Principle III of the OECD Principles provides: “ The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.” 26 OECD Principles 20 35 Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 26 OECD Principles 40 41 16.

(24) 36. 37. 2004. OECD. : 38. 39. ;. Inside trading abusive selfdealing. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 4. 40. 36. 29. 37. 38. 39. 30 25. 157. 2004 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance2004, 26, 20 Principle IV of the OECD Principles provides:” The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the ustainability of financially sound enterprises.” 26 OECD Principles 21 17. 40.

(25) 41. :. 42. ). Disclosure & Transparency 5 43. 41. OECD. Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 26 OECD Principles 46 42 2004 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance2004, 26, 21 43 Principle V of the OECD Principles provides:” The corporate governance framework should ensure that timelyand accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financialsituation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.” 26 OECD Principles 22 18.

(26) OECD. materiality. 44. :. 45. 44. Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 26 OECD Principles 49 50 45 2004 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance2004, 26 22 19.

(27) (analysts. brokers. rating agencies. 46. The Responsibilities of the Board 6 47. OECD. OECD twotierboards supervisory board management board unitary boards. 48. groups. 46. :. shareholder fairly. 2004 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance2004, 26 23 Principle VI of the OECD Principles provides:” The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategicguidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’saccountability to the company and the shareholders. ” 26 OECD Principles 24 48 Annotations to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 26 OECD Principles 58 20 47.

(28) (divestiture). 1970. 49. 49. 106 21.

(29) 50. 1970 1970 Penn. Central Compnay Watergate Enron. Tyco ImClone. 2001. WorldCom Adephia Merck. Global Crossing Xerox 51. 52. 2002 2002. (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, PCAOB). 53. 54. 50. Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control, The brookings Institution (1995), at 23. 2002 213 -223 52 Paul S. Sarbanes Michael G. Oxley The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 53 George Dallas, Governance and Risk, McGrawHill(2004), at 309 51. 54. 22.

(30) Public Agency. 55. 56. 20 Securities and Exchange Commission ,SEC Audit Committee Managerial Board 57 Board. Monitoring. 55. 42. 56. 43 2. 57. 95 23.

(31) 1950 58. 1899. 1950. 1974 1989 59. 1991. 1993. 1993 2001 2002 60. 58. 244. 59. 1.. 2.. 3.. 4. 584-585 9. 60. 188. 7 24.

(32) 61. ). 62. 63 64. 2006. 65. 66 67. 68. 61. 12. 62. 47. 63. 43. 64. 2005. 29. 26. 2006 45. 65. 25. 66. 12 326. 67. 2006 200. 44 68. 44 25.

(33) 69. 70. 71. 69 70. 327. :1.. 2.. 3.. ;. 402 415. ; 420 797 818 821. 822 71. 229 26.

(34) 72. 1998 2000 2003. 11 11. 73. 74. 75. ( 388. (. 21. 20 195 10. ). 217. 76. 72. ) 092002 : http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/3596. 2012. 73. http://www.cepd.gov.tw/dn.aspx?uid=844 64. 2012. 74 75. 76. 108-117 27. 20. 20.

(35) 22 38 23 56 36 ). 77. 213 214 78. 245. 79. 202 218. 1. 2005 12 80. 81. 77. 120-125 118 119. 78 79. 129 130. 80 81. 14. 14 14. 28.

(36) 82. 82. 73 29.

(37) 30.

(38) Adolf Berle Gardiner Means Berle and Means 1932 Modern Corporation and Private Property 83. Berle. 84. Means. Berle and Means Berle. 83. Means. 85-88 control through almost complete ownership. 84. majority control control through a legal device pyramiding minority control. 20% management. control 5% 71-92 31.

(39) 1960 1970. (3). ;(. ;(. monitoring costs. 85. bonding costs. ;. ;. 85. 12 32.

(40) 86. 23. 87 88. 89. :. 46. 86 87. Jensen and Ruback (1983). Entrenchment Hypothesis antitakeover behavior. tender off. 16 88. La Porta et al. (1999). Claessens et al. (2000) Berle and Means (1932) La. Porta. Claessens. 16 89. 169. 170 33.

(41) 90. 91. 92 93. 94. 95. 96. 90. 394-395. 91. 72. 92. 157 144. 93 94. 59. 95. 73. 96. 158 34.

(42) 19. 97. 2001 2001. 193 ;. 202 2001 79. 06. 07. 209394. 2001. 202. 193 202. 97. 202. 126 35.

(43) 98. 2001. 2001 2005. 99. 98. 74 192. 99. 193 ). 157 36.

(44) 100. ;. 101 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 100. 89. 101 102 103. 92. 341 342 242 30. 126. 74 94 104. 2522 68. 348. 105. 100. 106. 37.

(45) 107. 108. : ). 228 148 30. 107. 103 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims , 26 J.L & Econ. 327 (1983). 38. 108.

(46) 202. 109. 110. 13. 15 16 23. 167 251 259. 276 193 44 45. 109 110. 51 39. 52.

(47) 23. 251. 111. 369 23. 112. 23. 28. 23. 28 28 113. 114 115. 23. 28 23 15 23 15. 111. 52. 112. 174-182. 57. 113. 55 114. 84. 76. 56. 1532. 2474 23. 73. 90. 382. 3. 115. 110 40. 95 125. 4345. 1953 197. :.

(48) 369. 21 125. 15. 192 23 :. 2001. 23. 1. 116 117. (fiduciary duty of loyalty) fiduciarius fiduciary. 118. 116. 90. 51. 2001. 11. 117. 118. 128 41. 159. fiduciary.

(49) 119. 192 2001 193. 2001. 23. 120. 23. 206 ; 178 180 206. 101. 95. 16 121. 119 120 121. 39. 100 101. 101 16. 42.

(50) 122. 123 124. 92 131. 125. 14 122. 1776 89. 123 124 125. 91. 12. 319 16 131. 460 09102287950. 35 43. 1122.

(51) 91 16. 12. 09102287950 99. 10. 22 178. 09902145220. :. 206. 178. 206. 126. 101. 206. 206. 223. 126. 80 105 44. 106. 2.

(52) 127. 223 128. 223. 15. 213. 213. 202. 129. 130. 91. 09102132160 …. 91. 11. 16. 09102287950. 127 128. 75 294. 129 130. 31 77 78 45.

(53) 131. 223. 218. 91 09102132160. 80. 28. 220732. 223 132. 74. 2014. 92 26 131 132. 78 296 46. 5451.

(54) 223. 209. 1966 108. 3. 209. 133. 18. 90. 134. 133 134. 95. 10. 12. 09500626690 326. ;. 282 47.

(55) 135. 136 137. 32 ( interlocking directorate) 138 139. 140. 141. 209. 142. 135. 136. 86. 282 86216978. 20. 137. 413. 138. 122. 139. 92. 140. 204. 280. 141. 226. 142. 282 21. ;. 124. 09002095350 48. 90.

(56) 143. 144. 157 145. 146. 23. 147. 148. 143. 283. 144. 232 124 125. 145 146. 157. 10%. 30 …… 147 148. 43-45 40 49.

(57) 149. 150. : 98. 1307. 93 American Bar Association, Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of Business Law 2007 Corporate Director's Guidebook Duty of Care Duty of Loyalty Business Judgment Rule Duty of Disclosure Confidentiality Riskand Compliance Oversight. 149 150. 25 47 50.

(58) 23. 2 193. 194 194. 193 151. 90. 218. 218. 194 194. 218. 152. 193. 23. 153. 151. 19 152. 315. 316. 153. …. 51.

(59) 194 167 154. 155. ? law as sanction. law as price. 156. 194. 189 157. 189 158. 19 154. 315 24. 346. 155. 266 83 84 207 156. 159 157 158. 54 28. 480 1911. 63. 965 52. 276. 277.

(60) 191. 193. 159. 218. 29. 160. 218. 159. 72. 160. 199 53.

(61) 161. 162. 30. 14 18. 4. 163. 161. 247. 162. 201 163. 14 54.

(62) ? 193. 214. 164. 266 280. 423. 13. 165. 266. 166. 267 847 167. 164. 58 59. 360. 300 ;. 614 ; 219. 165. 322. 166. 232 348. 167. 60 55.

(63) 168. 169 170. 266. 280. 13. 25. 168. 266. 169 170. 102. .. 248 56. 249.

(64) 847 120. 212. 285 423 120 52. 53. 486. 424 465. 462 462. 55. 486 171. 21. 2009 172. 212. 214. 171. 61 65. 172. 57. )3. 10. 464. 465.

(65) 58.

(66) 214. 173. 174. 173. 23. 174. 59.

(67) 175. 176. 214. 177. 175 176 177. 386 159 158. 343 60. 344.

(68) 242 178. 179. ,. 180. shareholder activism. 181. 178 179. 313. 138 200. 180. 37. 181. 61.

(69) 2004. 182. (OECD) 2004 3. 182. 199 120. ;. 384. 107 62.

(70) 194. 2004. OECD. 63.

(71) 64.

(72) 1843. FOSS v.Harbattle 1882. 1855. 183. 25. 55. 213. 214. 184. Foss. 183. See Foss v.Harbattle 67 Eng. Rep 189 (ch 1843);George W Dent Jr. : The Power of Directors to terminate shareholder litigation: The death of the derivative suit?75N.W.U.L.R.96, note2(1980). 184 290 65.

(73) 1307. 1413 (Statute 2) (chancery) 1558 (Chancellor) 185. 1743. The Charitable Corporation v.Sutton 186 1810 Adley v. the. Whitstable Co. 187. 188. 1828 Hichens v.Cingreve 1840 Prenston v.The Grand Collier Dock CO. 1841 189 Wallworth v. Holt 1843 Foss v.Harbottle (the majority rule). (the proper plaintiff. rule) 190 191. 185. Prunty, The Shareholder’s Derivative Suit :Notes on Its Derivation , 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at1981(1957). 186 2 Atk.400, 26 Eng. Rep. at 642 (Ch. 1742). 187 Prunty,supra note 185, at 1982. 188 Id. 189 S.C.4 Russ., 562;39 Eng. Rep.58(Ch.1828) 11 Sim.327, 59 Eng. Rep.900(ViceCh.1840) 4My.&Cr.619, 41 Eng. Rep.at 238(Ch.1841), 23 190 (1843)2 Hare 461,at494 495. 191 See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No2)Ch 204,at 210(1982). 66.

(74) 192. Foss v.Harbottle. Foss. 193. 192. See Gray v Lewis(1873) 8 Ch App 1035 ,1051, per Sir W M James LJ on the risk of multiple actions, quoting Law Commissiom Report No.142, at 27 28. 193 See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No2)Ch204,210211(1982), where the Court of Appeal ,quoting the judgment of Jenkins L.J. in Edwards v. Halliwell l2 All E.R.1064(1950), said“(1)The proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a corporation is ,prima facie , the corporation .(2)Where the alleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on the corporation and on all its members by a simple majority of the member , no individual member of the corporation is allowed to maintain an action in respect of the matte because , if the majority confirms the transaction , cadit quaestio ;or, if the majority challenges the transaction there is no valid reason why the company should not sue.(3)There is no room 67.

(75) (ultra vires) Foss v.Harbottle 194. 1 2. 3. Foss v.Harbottle. 2006. 2006 2006 260 (1) (a). 11. 195. (b). for the operation of the rule if the alleged wrong is ultra vires the corporation because the majority of members cannot confirm the transaction.(4)There is also no room for the operation of the rule if the transaction complained of could be validly done or sanctioned only by a special resolution or the like , because a simply majority cannot confirm a transaction which requires the concurrence of a greater majority .(5)There is an exception to the rule where what has been done amounts to fraud and the wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company .In this case the rule is relaxed in favour of the aggrieved minority , who are allowed to bring a minority shareholders action on behalf of themselves and all others . The reason for this is that , if they were denied that right , their grievance could never reach the court because the wrongdoers themselves , being in control, would not allow the company to use ” 194 th Gower, Modern Company Law , at 648 653(4 ed 1979). 195 §260269(Part 11) 2007 10 §206264 §265 §269 95 68.

(76) (2) (a). (b). 994. (3) (4) (5). (a). (b). (c). 261 (1). (. ). 196. (2) (a). (b). (3). (2). (a). (b) (4). (a) (b). 262 (1). (c). (. ) (a). (b). (2) (a). (b) (c). (3) (a). (b). (4). (3). (a). (b) (5). (a) (b). 196. (c). permission. leave 69.

(77) 263 (1) (2) (a). 261. 262 (§172). (b) (c) (3) (a). ;(b) (§172). (c). ;(d) ; (e). (f). (4) (5) (a). (2). (b) (3). (6) (7) 264 (1). (. ) (a). (b). (c) (2). (a) (b). (c). (3) (a). (b). (4). (3). (a). (b) (5). (a) (b). (c). 70.

(78) 1817 Co.. Attorney General v. Utica Ins.. 197. 1831. Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co.. 198. Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co. 1832 Robinson v. Smith. 199. Robinson 19. 1856. Ddfodge v.Woolsey 10. 200. 197. Prunty,supra note 185, at 933 934. 5 Ohio 162 (1831) 199 59 U.S. (18 How), at 331 (1856) . 198. 200. U.S.450,26L.Ed.827 (1881). Hawes v. Oakland (104 Comment, The Dilemma of the Double Derivative 71.

(79) 1882. 23. (equity rule). 1966. 94. :. 201. 23.1. :. 1 2. ;. (Model Business Corporation Act) (FederalRules ofCivil Procedure) (American Law Institue, ALI). 23.1 (Fairly) 202. (Adequately). ). 203. 204. Suit , 83 Nw.U.L.Rev.,at 729(1989). 28 U.S.C.A FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 23 1,at 101(Pocket Part 1967). 202 7.41(2) fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation. 203 7.41 23.1 (ALI 7.02(a)(1) 201. 204. 7.42. 90 23.1. ; ; ALI. 7.3(a) 72.

(80) 23. (1948. 189. 60. 205. 25. 25 23 23. (1950. (1890. 32. (1899 206. (1890. 228. 229 ;. 32. (1899. 207. 178. 185 44. 205. 355. 206 207. 329 32. 32. 16 73.

(81) 208. (1911. 177 178. 13. 209. (1938 44. 245. 245. 268. 267. 25. 25. 25. GHQ. (EES) 210. 211. GHQ 212. GHQ. 208. 25. 44 13. 209. 44 10. 210 211. 44. (1938 220. GHQ. 267 1. 2. 212. 267. 74.

(82) 26. 213. (1993 14. 95 470. 268. 13. (2001 30 268. 17 213. 60. (2005 2-27 75.

(83) : 847 189. 214. 423. 120 212. 285 215 ). 60 60. 214. 423. 215. 120 212 :1. 2. 199 285 1. 2.. 238. 238 3. 236 76. 282. 209.

(84) 848. 849. 850 267. 77.

(85) 55. 120 462. 424 464. 486 465. 851 849. 852. 849 853. 78.

(86) 29 (1904 21 29 12 StockCorporation Act. 12 216. 1856 1862. Joint. Corporation Act. 217. 34. (1908. 55. 55 34. (1908 160 :. 161. 216 217. Chun Li 209. 59 The KungssuLu of 1904 and the Modernization of ChineseCompany Law 79.

(87) 34. (1908. 218. 18 150. 151. 55 48 49. 55 219. 19. 214 72 10 90 11. 214. 12. :. 218 219. 214. 19 55. 214. 80.

(88) 215. :. 10. (3) 55 30. 55. 7. 19. 220 221. 220. 354. 338. 23 221. 152 81.

(89) 423 222. 223. 25. GHQ. (EES) (derivative suits) 224 (direct suits). 222 223. 239. 310 311 229- 240 — 22 224 See American Law Institute (ALI), “Priciples of Corporate :Analysis and Recommendations ” volume2, at 17 (1994). 82.

(90) 225. derivative suits. class action 226. 227. 225. 13. 226 227. 237 61 83. 238.

(91) 228. 267 229. 19 derivative suit (class action (derivative suit. class action. derivative suit. 228. 609-611 229. 607 26. 27 84.

(92) 230. 231. 232. 230. 154. 231. 13 24. 232. Georage W. Dent, Jr, The Power ofDirectors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation:the Death of theDerivative Suit , 75 Northwestern University Law Review,at 123 1980 . 85.

(93) 214. 214. 213. 214. 213 214. 214 233. 847. : 233. 95 86.

(94) 90. 161. 162. (1). 162. (2). 176 164 214 162. 162. 164 165 ) 87. ?.

(95) 234. 235. 164. 236. 176. 237. 214. ? 238. 165. 239. 234 235. 56. 236 237 238. 180 12297. 15. 337 15. 56 60. 239. 15 74. 12297 01630 21 02877. …… ……. …… …… 56. 15. 12297 88.

(96) 240. 847 241. 242. 243. 214 172 244. 240 241. 289 243. 242. 257. 243 244. 98 441. 229 89.

(97) 3. 3. 168. 169 173. (Contemporaneous Ownership Rule) 245 1882 Hawes vs. Oakland 23 246 41. 247. 245. Hawes vs. Oakland ,104 U.S. 450 ,26 L. Ed.827 1882. 246. 83 82 83. 247. 90.

(98) 248. (operation of law). ;. 248. See American Law Institute (ALI), “Priciples of Corporate :Analysis and Recommendations ” volume2, at 37 (1994). 91.

(99) (Disclosure Test). 249. Law Institute AL I Principles of Corporate Governance 250 Recommendations. The American — Analysis and. 251. 252. 249. See American Law Institute (ALI), “Priciples of Corporate :Analysis and Recommendations ” volume2, at 45 46 (1994). ALI 02 a 1. 2. 1. 250 126 251 358 252. 303 92.

(100) ) 253 254. Corporate Governance 13. 255. 13. 2001. 14. 256. 189 189. 253. 166 :. 254. 255. 73 224. 256. 61 61 1989. 33 36 44 93. 29. 225 1194 1188 1332.

(101) 56 257. 245. 258. 259. 257. 73. 595. 258. 80 376 259. 166 94.

(102) 23.1 260. ;. 7.42 261. 90 7.03(a). 262. ALI. 263. (1) (2) (3) 7.42. ALI. 7.03. 260. …3 state with particularity:(A)any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and ,if necessary , from the shareholders or members ;and (B)the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the effort 261 …The complaint shall also allege with particularity the effort , if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort… . 262 No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until(1)a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action ; and(2)90 days have expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90days period . 263. 132 ;Dennis J. Block ,Stephen A. Radin & James P. Rosenzweig , The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. Law .469, 471,472(1990). 95.

(103) 264. 23.1. ALI 265. (Demand Futility) ALI 7.03 (a) Demand Requirement) ). 7.42 (Universal. Aronson v. Lewis (TwoProng Test). ). ALI. 264. ALI. 7.04. a. 265. 263-265 96. 7.03.

(104) 266. 847. 267. 1. 2 3. 4. 60 60 267. 30. 30 30 268. 60. 90 60. 13. 30. 17. 60. 60. 266. — .2. 267. 102 251. 42 268. 257 97. 41.

(105) 60 ). ? 60 269. 270. 271. 60 ). 60 ? 272. 60. 60. 273. 60 60 60 60 269. ,. ;. 270. 24 252. .2. 253. 361. .2. 271. , 272. , .2. ; 41. , 12. 16. 17. 11 12. ;. 252-253 412 349 1237. 275 273. .2. 253. 413 ; 144. 98.

(106) 847. 60. 214 30 )). 30 90 60. 7.42 13. 30. 60. 30. 30. 218 30. 214. 30 99.

(107) 30 274. 30 30. 275. 276. 30 30 249. 274. 145 146 58 146 147. 275 276. 100.

(108) 212 213. 277. 278. 23.1. —. fairly and adequately. represent. (vigorously) (conscientiously). 279. 280. 281. 282. 277. 7.41 fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporationin enforcing the right of the corporation. 278 260 279 Wright & Miller, 7A Federal Practice and Procedure , §1833, at 394(1972). 280 325 281 Harry G. Henn, Law of Corporates , at 769, §363. 223 282 Rule 23.1does not require that derivative action plaintiffs have the support of a majority of the shareholders or even that they be supported by all the minority shareholders ”;” The true measure of adequacy of representation under Rule 23.1 is 101.

(109) 847. 283. :. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. not how many shareholders plaintiff represents. Rather it is how well does this representative plaintiff advance the interest of other similarity situated shareholders. , Schupack v. Covelli, 512 F. Supp. 1310,at 1312(W.D.Pa.1981) 88 283 325 284 30 285 1188 36 286 26 139 208 28 1537 167 287 26 143 42 ; 27 143 149 288 31 137 209 289 326 102.

(110) 214. 290. 1944 Wood Report 25. 1950 291. 214. 30. 290. 163. 291. 103.

(111) 1929 Wood 292. 800. (c) 293. ALI. 7.04 (. 294. 295. ;(. ). 296. 292. 147 Cal. Corp Code §800(c). 294 See Note, Security for Expense in Shareholders Derivative Suits :23 years Experience, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc .Pros. 50 (1968). 293. 295. 296. 148 104.

(112) 297. 1982. 25 26 298. 299. 847. 300. 709 81 77. 297. Ralph C. Ferrara, Kevin T. Abikoff, &Laura Leedy Gansler , Shareholder Derivative Litigation :Besieging the Board , NLP IP Company Law Journal Press , New Tork (2005), S4.06. 298 366 299 , ; , 55 300 300 105.

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(148) ) 2006. 1. 2. 3.. 2007 2003. 4. 2002 5. 6. 7. 8.. 2010 1999 2003. 10. 2006 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.. 2009 1984 1991 1976 2010 2007. 11 2003. 16. 17. 18.. 2006 78 1981. 8. 19.. 2008. 20.. 12. 2007. 10. 21. 2002 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.. 11 84. 10. 2010 1999 5 1995 2009 2007 141. 1.

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(150) The KungssuLu of 1904 and the Modernization of 10. Chun Li ChineseCompany Law 10 63 11. 115 99 12. 27 2010 12 13. 35 2006 14. 327 2002 15. 1 2003 9 16. 73 2001 17. 159 2008 18. 1994 7 19. 2007 20. 17 21.. OCED. 2006 (2004). 32. 2004. 12 22. 1. 2007. 5. 23. 94. 2006. 12. 24. 91. 6. 25. 15 26.. 2009. 10 72. 27. 143.

(151) 2007 28. 24. 4. 2006. 4. 29. 94. 2007. 30. 184. 2010. 31. 134. 2005. 1. 32. 2003 33. 159. 2010. 34. 2007 35.. — 86 6. 36.. 97 2003. 6. 37. 142. 2007. 3. 38. 13. 2004. 12. 39. 10. 11. 2005. 11. 40.. 20 2002. 41. 37. 2006. 42. 32. 2011. 43. 84. 2009. 10. 44.. 18 2004. 4. 45. 2007 144.

(152) 46. 2007 70. 47.. 2001. 3. 1. 12 2.. 30. 3. 1994. 16. 4. 12 ,. 5.. 15 : 25. 6. 7.. 42 .2. 57. 10 8. 9.. 1967. 10 57. 10. 11. 65. 11. 12.. 18. (2006. 13. 2006 14. 15.. 26 14. 29. 16. 17.. 8 ,. ;. , 145. 6. 20. 1.

(153) 1994 18. 18 19. 2006 20. 12 21. 1. 1431. 1996. 2. NBL532. 1993. 11. 3. 1996. 15. 4. 1494. 1994. 5. .. 2010. 2. 6. 1050. 1994. 7. 1358 8.. 40 3.4. (1991. 9. 1368. 1994. 10. 10 11. 1993. 11. 1. Andrei Shleifer and Rober Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 1997 146.

(154) 2. Comment, The Dilemma of the Double Derivative Suit , 83 Nw.U.L.(1989). 3. Dennis J. Block ,Stephen A. Radin & James P. Rosenzweig , The Role of the Business Judgment R ule in Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. Law (1990) 4. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims , 26 J.L & Econ. (1983) 5. Georage W. Dent, Jr, The Power ofDirectors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation:the De th of theDerivative Suit , 75 Northwestern University Law Review 1980 George Dallas, Governance and Risk, McGrawHill(2004) 6. George W Dent Jr. :The Power of Directors to terminate shareholder litigation: The death of the derivative suit? 75N.W.U.L.R.96 (1980). th 7. Gower, Modern Company Law (4 ed 1979). 8. Gray v Lewis(1873) 8 Ch App 1035 ,1051, per Sir W M James LJ on the risk of multiple actions, quoting Law Commissiom Report No.142 9. Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control, The brookings Institution (1995) 10. Prunty, The Shareholder’s Derivative Suit :Notes on Its Derivation , 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1981(1957) 11. Ralph C. Ferrara, Kevin T. Abikoff, &Laura Leedy Gansler , Shareholder Derivative Litigation :Besieging th e Board , NLP IP Company Law Journal Press , New Tork (2005) 12. Robert A. G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, 2001 13. Security for Expense in Shareholders Derivative Suits :23 years Experience, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc .Pros. (1968). 14. Wright & Miller, 7A Federal Practice and Procedure (1972).. 1. OECD http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf 2. http://law.egov.go.jp/announce/H17HO086.html 3. : http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm 4. http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/ 147.

(155) onlinepublications/mbca2002.pdf 5. 2006 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/part/11 6. http://www.cepd.gov.tw/dn.aspx?uid=844 7. http://www.cepd.gov.tw/m1.aspx?sNo=0004516 8. http://www.sfb.gov.tw/Layout/main_ch/ MultiMedia_FileDownload.ashx?guid =fb9cb0926d064efbbe7b3e973625db71; http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/55/25778905.pdf 9. http://www.sfi.org.tw/E/Plate.aspx?ID=332 10. : http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/3596. 148.

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