2007 臺非進步夥伴論壇：繁榮進步與永續發展

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2007 臺非進步夥伴論壇：繁榮進步與永續發展

2007 Taiwan-African Progressive Partnership Forum:

Toward Prosperity and Sustainable Development

分組座談：資訊科技與數位機會 - Digital Technology and Opportunities

講者：梁隆星中華電信研究所所長

Dr. Lung-Shin Liang, President, Telecommunication Laboratories, Chunghwa Telecom

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很榮幸參加本場次的分組座談

中華電信是我國主要電信業者

中華電信去年營業額、員工人數、研究團隊人數

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數位落差：新資通科技之不平均分配及使用

消弭數位落差

數位落差也代表收入、發展、資訊素養（ information literacy）之落差

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從電信業者角度看數位落差

基礎建設及電信服務之提供

台灣擁有先進的資通訊科技及網路環境之高度整備（ Network readiness）

行動電話普及率逾百分之一百

但台灣仍存有數位落差

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民國 91 年 5 月 31 日：行政院核定「數位台灣計畫」為「挑戰 2008 國家發展重點計畫」之一部分

「數位台灣計畫」內容分為「寬頻到家」、「 e 化生活」、「 e 化商務」、「 e 化

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政府」、「縮減數位落差」五大架構

行政院研考會調查顯示「數位台灣計畫」達到具體成效

個人電腦使用率、上網率均明顯增加

原住民、年長者電腦使用率、上網率也明顯增加

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中華電信是我國主要電信業者

有義務促成普及近用 (universal access)

應盡企業社會責任 (corporate social responsibility)

提供寬頻服務、便民服務

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中華電信致力於消弭數位落差

WiFi 解決方案

電子校園服務（ e-school service）

衛星電視服務

視障資訊系統的相關應用

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資通科技快速發展

寬頻、語音影像、資料傳輸已成為日常生活之一部分

數位落差依然存在

中華電信將繼續致力於消弭數位落差

關鍵詞：

資訊素養（ information literacy）企業社會責任 (corporate social responsibility) 網路整備 (Network readiness) 普及近用 (universal access)

挑戰 2008 國家發展重點計畫行政院研考會

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SI-2102 Lessons from a global retailer: An interview with the president of Carrefour China

Carrefour, founded in 1959, is the largest retailer in Europe and the second largest in the world.

Since opening its first store in 1995, Carrefour has opened 101 supermarkets in China to become the largest foreign retailer in China.

More than 100 million customers shopped at the 101 Carrefour supermarkets in China last year, bringing a sales volume of 23.8 billion yuan.

The retail industry in China has witnessed great changes during the past decade with an annual growth of more than 50 percent, much high than the growth of GDP.

Among the goods in the Chinese Carrefour supermarkets, 95 percent are produced in the country. Carrefour has also set up purchasing centers in 15 major Chinese centers. Chinese nationals accounted for 80 percent of the managers of the 101 supermarkets and held half of the posts of regional managers.

 In this interview, Jean-Luc Chéreau, the head of Carrefour China, discusses the French retailer’s experience since opening its first Chinese store, in 1995.

Before coming to mainland China, Chéreau spent seven years in Taiwan. He credits that experience with teaching him much about Chinese consumers and ways of doing business.

Chéreau says that when multinational companies explore the Chinese market, their failures often teach them more than their successes.

The Carrefour executive attributed the success of the French retailer in China to its localization strategy. He discusses the importance of adapting to local tastes and—particularly as markets spread out from the biggest cities—to local budgets.

Networks of Chinese partners and their knowledge of mainland consumers are crucial as well.

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Lessons From A Global Retailer: An interview with the President of Careefour China

Jean-Luc Chéreau discusses the French company's experiences as its hypermarkets spread out from China's biggest cities to the vast hinterland.

The McKinsey Quarterly, McKinsey & Co.

July 19, 2006

Carrefour's hypermarkets in China are the Bosporus of retailing—commercial centers where East and West splash against each other. Tanks of live fish, eels, bullfrogs, and turtles dominate the fresh-food sections, while vacuum-packed strips of bacon and slices of pepperoni lie in refrigerated cases a short distance away. Modern formats mix with local tastes in the French retailer's stores:

shoppers stroll down wide, brightly lit aisles, past displays of dried pork snouts and whole ducks hanging limply by the neck, as "Hotel California" plays on the speakers overhead.

Carrefour, whose name means "crossroads," wasn't the first foreign retailer in mainland China to open a hypermarket—a giant outlet that offers "everything under one roof," from consumer electronics to groceries. But since the company opened its first store, in 1995, it has become the largest. Today it operates 73 hypermarkets in 29 cities, (Chains whose stores are typically 5,000 square meters or more.) from Urumqi (in the western reaches of the Middle Kingdom) to Harbin (near the Russian border) to Kunming (in the south). Carrefour also operates the Champion supermarkets and Dia convenience stores. Its 2005 turnover was about $2 billion (including value-added tax), making China Carrefour's fifth-largest market. The company expects its sales in China to go on growing by 25 to 30 percent annually over the next five years.

Jean-Luc Chéreau, who came to the mainland after running the company's business in Taiwan for seven years, has led Carrefour China since 1999. He recently met with Peter Child, a director in McKinsey's Paris office, in his 25th-floor office in the Shanghai Stock Exchange building and discussed Carrefour's hits and misses as it expanded beyond China's largest cities.

The Quarterly:

What were your first experiences in China when you took over Carrefour's mainland operations?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

When I arrived here, in 1999, the market was just beginning to open. We were in the main cities—Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen—but not much in the others. I had only 17 stores, in 6 cities. Step by step we increased the number of stores, and today we have 73

hypermarkets in 29 cities. We learned about the Chinese consumer by starting with the main cities

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on the coast and continuing into the rest of China.

In reality, though, we began our experience in China 18 years ago, in Taiwan. For the hypermarkets in the big mainland cities, we have exactly the same hypermarket style as in Taiwan. But as you enter middle and western China, there is a much less mature market. For example, 50 percent of the televisions offered in a store in Shanghai would be flat-screen TVs. When you go into the middle of China, it's only 20 percent because today flat screens are too advanced and too expensive for those areas. For mp3 players, digital cameras, and so on, it's the same. The people are not able to buy, at least not enough for us.

The Quarterly:

How did your experience in Taiwan influence your activities in mainland China?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

We discovered Chinese culture and the way to work with the Chinese in Taiwan when the retail sector in mainland China was totally closed. International companies that decided to enter

Taiwan—not Hong Kong—15 or 20 years ago have a fantastic advantage in China, and that was the case for Carrefour.

For example, you learn how to adapt. When Carrefour arrived in Taiwan, we had a very clear picture of what we wanted to do—open a 10,000-square-meter store on the ground floor, with a big parking lot in front, just as in France. But it was impossible to do that kind of store. Then we tried something different: we opened a 3,500-square-meter store in a basement in Kaohsiung, Taiwan's

second-largest city, with 250 parking spaces for motorcycles. That was the beginning of Carrefour in Taiwan.

Another aspect was Chinese business dealing. When I arrived in Taiwan, my former boss told me I was lucky: I was set for the first year because he had already signed five contracts for five new stores. Then I started talking with one of our Chinese partners who had signed those contracts, and nothing seemed to be happening. Finally, my assistant told me, "Just because he signed a 20-year contract two years ago with your former boss—a person who is not you—does not mean he will respect the contract." That was a big shock to me; the contract was notarized and everything. But we started to renegotiate article by article. Five years later, during the Asian crisis, I invited this same partner to my office and said, "Just because I signed a contract with you does not mean I will respect it. We are in a crisis." So he said, "Fine," and we started to renegotiate, to reduce the rent.

It was these very interesting experiences that showed me that we are in another world. If you come to China with preconceived ideas after having been successful in Europe or the United States, you make mistake after mistake.

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The Quarterly:

How has Carrefour had to adapt to Chinese tastes?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

Take the example of fish. When I am in San Francisco and I visit a store, the fish is filleted and packed; it's dead. When I am in France, the fish is dead but it's whole; it's on ice. I can see its eyes and see if it's fresh or not. Each place has its own way of selling fish.

If you are in China, you have two ways of selling fish. The first is to display live fish. When we entered Taiwan, we went to the fresh markets in Taipei and Kaohsiung to see what kind of products they had, how they were displayed, and how customers bought those products. Carrefour decided to adopt this fresh-market style and to display the same products at lower prices in a better, cleaner environment. And we were very, very successful. Now, on the mainland, the first image customers get when they enter a Carrefour store is fresh products. When customers are in the fresh area, they recognize the fresh market they're accustomed to. And now most of our competitors are following Carrefour in this way.

But there is another method we neglected when we moved away from the coast: frozen fish. Why would frozen fish be important in China? Because the distance between the area where they have fresh fish and the stores in middle and western China is so vast that customers are more confident of frozen fish than of unfrozen dead fish, even if fresh. So we changed our product offering and we saw a 30 to 40 percent increase in fish sales throughout China.

The Quarterly:

What about products that aren't familiar to Chinese consumers?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

At Carrefour we say that we try to be a quarter-hour ahead of the customer. Not too far ahead, because if your products are too advanced, you don't sell anything. But if you're too late, then the people don't come.

When I arrived here we tried some tests in Shanghai, which is a more modern market than Beijing.

We tried to bring new products in and explain them. Take wine, for example. In China it's not customary to buy wine to drink at home. So when we arrived here, we tried some wine fairs, where Carrefour explained to customers what kind of wine we have and which wine to drink with which meal. We kept it simple, like which wine to have with fish or with noodles. Then, when the tax on imported wine was lowered, two years ago, we used the opportunity to tell customers they could buy French or Californian or Australian wine much more cheaply than before. Step by step, the people discovered that they like wine very much.

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The Quarterly:

Chinese retailers still dominate the domestic market. What can you learn from these domestic rivals?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

We learn a lot, and we are constantly following the top five Chinese retailers. They copy quite well, and in some specifically Chinese areas they have a lot of imagination. So I push my merchandise and marketing people to visit new competitors or new cities to check things out. In food products, for example, we were the first ones to say that a bakery is very important. We started with croissants, baguettes, Taiwanese bread, cheesecake, and so on, and everybody followed the Carrefour way. But we completely forgot Chinese desserts. Domestic retailers didn't, and they offered items like

Chinese fresh-milk cake. So we chose the best suppliers of Chinese baked goods and invited them to set up stands on consignment inside Carrefour stores. Now sales generated by the Chinese desserts are roughly the same as those of the official bakery.

The Quarterly:

There is increased excitement among global retailers about China's potential. How has this affected your strategy?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

Everyone is dreaming about China. It's the new El Dorado. But it's a difficult market and will stay a difficult market. Just because it officially entered the World Trade Organization, that will not change everything. When our main competitors arrive they will learn and they will make mistakes. And they will move faster than we did a decade ago, when we entered the market. We take all this into

consideration.

To stay competitive, we update our strategy for Carrefour China every three years to respond to new conditions. For example, three or four years ago we wondered whether we should introduce a loyalty card, which would offer discounts and other benefits to frequent customers. At the time, we decided it was too early. Today, we feel we have to do this. Maybe we are already six months late, but loyalty cards are a new phenomenon that others are offering and we have to be there.

Consumer credit is another example of an evolving strategy. It's a huge potential market, especially for appliances and consumer electronics, and it will open to foreign companies in January 2007. We are dealing today with a Chinese bank to see what's the best way to approach this. We constantly have to adapt Carrefour China to an environment that's changing so fast.

The Quarterly:

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How do you compete for talent?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

This is a strong point for us today in China. Let's go back to Taiwan. Five years before we entered the mainland Chinese market, we invited 25 good people already trained in the Carrefour way in Taiwan to start developing the business for mainland China. I chose them myself. They speak Chinese, they are Chinese, they eat Chinese food, and so on. It was a good, smart advantage that our main multinational competitors didn't have.

Maybe because I am a former human-resources manager, from day one in China I decided to invest a lot in human resources. We created the Carrefour China Institute in 2000 in order to train mainland Chinese staff to take positions of responsibility. And thanks to that, we have a lot of very good Chinese people today.

How do we retain them? It's a totally different way compared with Europe or the United States. We take care of their training and their future, but they have to sign a three- or five-year contract: if you go to work with a competitor, that's OK, but you have to give me back the money we spent training you. That's a huge amount of money. But it's a deal in two parts. If people stay for five years, I give them a super bonus—two, three, or five months' salary. In the end, we have a very low turnover of executive staff. Today 50 of the 73 hypermarkets are managed by Chinese managers, who are very good.

The Quarterly:

Carrefour operates three different formats in China: Carrefour hypermarkets, Champion supermarkets, and Dia convenience stores. How do you see this mix evolving?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

In China, we have two formats that are very successful and will be more and more successful in the future: hypermarkets and convenience stores. We are just beginning with convenience stores in China, and we've opened 150 Dia stores in Shanghai and 100 in Beijing. We want to learn, but we also can follow: 7-Eleven convenience stores have just started in China and will have a very successful future. On the other hand, I don't see any future for supermarkets—American- or French-style supermarkets of 1,000 to 2,500 square meters.

We opened eight Champion supermarkets in Beijing because the Beijing government asked us to do something to modernize the small retail business there. But they haven't been what we expected.2 When Beijing consumers have three or four hypermarkets close to their homes, they use a

hypermarket several times a week as a supermarket. They are very happy to go there and buy. But today they also have a wet market close to their homes and tomorrow a 7-Eleven or a Dia, which

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will be very successful with customers who just want two or three items. A small supermarket will have a smaller assortment than a hypermarket and less volume, so freshness will always be better in the hypermarket than the supermarket. Or customers will choose the wet market because they like to talk to the lady who sells the fruits and vegetables. I see a very difficult future for supermarkets.

(For ways to tailor stores to the market, see "Getting the right format," at the end of this article.) The Quarterly:

Now that foreign companies can own their retail outlets in China, will you keep your local partners?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

Legal considerations are not the primary reason we have local partners. We felt that to enter so difficult and complex a market—a huge market—we would need a local partner to understand the market and to move faster. In Taiwan I had the fantastic opportunity to work with someone at the Uni-President Group. He was a great mentor for me. Whenever I was about to make a mistake, he would say, "No, Jean-Luc, don't do that."

China is not a totally centralized country. The rule is to have a Shanghainese partner in Shanghai, a Cantonese partner in Guangzhou, and a Beijing partner in Beijing. I can tell you that if you don't respect this rule, you can be in trouble. Our partners have networks within the community and know the good producers and good suppliers. Some competitors say, "No, no, no. Two or three big and strong partners are enough."

With our partners, we try to adapt to local conditions, sometimes with a very successful outcome, sometimes with some difficulties. For example, in Shanghai I have a very good partner, Lianhua Supermarket Company. They helped us a lot with the local government—to introduce us and to explain what Carrefour is. But in Beijing we made a mistake: we did not choose the right partner.

The partner went into bankruptcy, was not very active, and the network wasn't very good. But in the end, I would say that we might have learned much more from our experience in Beijing than from Shanghai.

Today we can do business entirely as Carrefour, with no local partner. But I think that of the 30 partners we had last year, we will keep about 20—the best ones, the active ones.

The Quarterly:

In 2001 the central government stopped your expansion, saying that you didn't have the correct approvals from Beijing and, under the rules of the day, had too large a stake in some of your stores.

How did that affect your strategy?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

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Carrefour was successful from day one in China because some people had great confidence in us.

The local governments pushed us to come and to open stores everywhere. When we opened the 17th store, with the approval of the local government but not the central government, suddenly the central government said, "We have to establish some rules." So together, the central government and

Carrefour solved the problem because if you operated 100 percent by the official rules at that time, you couldn't do business. It was a difficult period because we stopped Carrefour's expansion and development operations for 18 months. But it was also a very interesting period to learn, to stabilize the existing stores because we were moving so fast, and to consolidate our base and start again. We learned more from the difficulties than we did from the good things.

The Quarterly:

Despite your 18-month hiatus, Carrefour is still the biggest foreign retailer in mainland China, and sales last year were up 25 percent. How do you plan to sustain this?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

We are expecting a 25 to 30 percent increase in sales every year for the next five years or so, depending on the success of our development strategy. Our strategy is very clear: we want to be the leader in the top five cities, and we want to be the leader or challenger in the 25 second-tier cities.

As for the others—the 600 or so smaller cities—for those, we always choose to go to the capital of the province, but we are not going everywhere. Another part of the strategy is mergers and

acquisitions, which are new.3 Until now, our expansion has been organic, since that is where we have expertise.

Some competitors have a different strategy. They feel that they have to start with the smallest cities, where in general theirs might be the only hypermarket, and take the lead in these cities, and then gradually expand to the bigger cities. It's another strategy.

The Quarterly:

How have you had to adapt as you've expanded into the smaller cities?

Jean-Luc Chéreau: First, you cannot invest as much money in the smaller cities, like Harbin, as you invested in Beijing and Shanghai, where you have sophisticated stores with a nice environment.

Investment in stores outside the big cities is about 20 to 25 percent lower because of differences in size or amenities, for instance. We give the local managers a budget and let them propose something that will generate a profit in two or three years.

We also adapt the assortment. You cannot imagine the importance of local products. To give you an example, take beer. Everybody knows Tsingtao beer, but when you go to Beijing, which is only one hour by plane from Qingdao, where they brew Tsingtao beer, the number-one beer in market share is

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not Tsingtao; it's Beijing beer. The same goes for electrical appliances. In Nanjing, Panda is an old and famous brand, and it has 35 percent of the market share for televisions there. If you promote Panda televisions in Nanjing, you will do well.

The Quarterly:

Given China's size, how have you handled distribution with your suppliers?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

There is really no network yet for logistics systems in China. The highways, the railways, and so on are not very well developed. To receive or to send merchandise from Beijing to Urumqi takes seven days by truck, and it takes four days from Shanghai to Kunming, close to Vietnam. You have to work with local distributors, and the power in this case belongs to them.

So we decided from day one to use local networks. Some competitors have said, "No, we want to be advanced and construct our own platform and systems." Some of those networks are on sale today.

There might not be a direct correlation, but maybe the companies that built them made a mistake and the cost to deliver that kind of platform was too high.

I don't think a national network is the best way to do business. But we are thinking that maybe tomorrow we'll want to organize a platform and a network for large cities like Shanghai, with 10 or 15 stores, but only for those stores. Stores that are 100 or 200 kilometers away would not be connected to a central network.

The Quarterly:

Have the challenges of doing business in China been worthwhile?

Jean-Luc Chéreau:

In the beginning, my wife and I were asked to come to Asia for three years, and we said, "OK, three years and no more." We have now been here for a dozen years, and I don't want to go back to Europe.

Of all the world, this is the country where we are doing the best things and moving the fastest. It's a fantastic opportunity to learn a lot of things. If you come here saying you will explain to the Asians what they have to do, you will be making a big mistake. The difference between Chinese culture and European culture is something exceptional.

Getting The Right Format

Retail sales in China are growing by about 640 billion renminbi ($80 billion) annually—the rough equivalent of adding a new Argentina to the global marketplace each year. By 2008 we expect annual sales to reach 6 trillion renminbi. Although these revenues are impressive, competition is intense and margins are thin for most retail formats. But the success of some early movers has

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revealed the market's profit potential. Strict cost controls and a robust understanding of the consumer's needs are especially vital in this merciless environment.

Only 7 of the world's 20 largest retail chains have opened shop in China; the rest hesitated because of rules that required them to take local partners, as well as uncertainty about their ability to make acceptable returns. The restrictions ended in December 2004, so multinational retailers not yet in the country have shown a renewed interest in entering it. But our experience indicates that in the rush to claim a share of the market, foreign and domestic retailers alike are falling into traps that add unnecessary costs. Here are three common pitfalls.

Too Flashy:

Given the intense competition in China, some retailers try to differentiate themselves with posh environments. Often consumers just don't care. One retailer targeting mainstream shoppers tried to create a more enticing store by installing high-end flooring, unusually wide aisles, and finished (instead of open) ceilings. These features not only almost doubled the investment per square meter of selling space but also misled price-sensitive Chinese consumers into believing that the retailer had high prices. The same investment would have had a greater impact if it had been spent, for example, on in-house demonstrations of new products or extra cashiers at the checkout lines.

Too Big:

As retailers move their stores beyond China's largest cities, some of them have taken along

inflexible ideas about the "right" store format. But the lower population densities and lower incomes of the smaller cities call for smaller, less-expensively outfitted stores. In our experience, the

productivity of most big-box retailers (as of May 1, 2006) in second-tier cities can be 50 percent lower than it is in the largest ones. Yet consumers in smaller cities expect a wide range of products—even in relatively small stores—and could be frustrated if the local choices fall short.

Regional warehouses that could restock stores quickly might be an answer, but this approach may be too expensive unless companies spread their fixed costs over a large number of stores. They could deal with the distribution challenges by improving their coordination with suppliers and their demand-forecasting capabilities. In-store catalogs coupled with at-home delivery of bulky or other selected items could also increase the product range of a store without increasing its size, though we have yet to see a retailer try this tactic in China.

Too Much Like Downtown:

Retailers have also stumbled when they expanded to the suburbs from the centers of cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, where most of them opened their first outlets in China. Overlooking important differences, some retailers have mistakenly tried to transplant to the city's outskirts the same formats that worked downtown. But fewer kinds of retail formats have opened in the suburbs,

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so the competitive environment is different. In particular, the distinctive demographics of the suburbs argue against a move away from downtown by the high-end department stores, with their broad assortments of household goods and clothing.

China's suburbanites generally fall into one of two categories: poorer people who can't afford to live in the city center and affluent people who moved from it to get more living space but still work downtown and shop there for high-end products. A dearth of suburban department stores suggests that supermarkets and hypermarkets should devote a bigger share of their floor space in the suburbs to nonfood items such as clothing, housewares, and home decorations than they would in the city center. For example, a chain might have a 50/50 split in space devoted to food and nonfood items in the city center but shift to 35/65 in favor of nonfood items in the suburbs. To adjust for the

demographic shift, they should put less emphasis on higher-priced items.

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SI-2194 從流通變革看生活革命 主講人：統一超商總經理徐重仁

徐重仁：流通業變革滿足顧客需求

徐重仁指出變革的目的是為了消費者需求的滿足，企業要能融入顧客的情境，充分了解顧客的需求，因為消費者的不滿足就是商機。變革也是為了提昇商業水準和國民生活品質，以統一超商來說，歷經的變革就包含了組織的變革、人才的變革、IT 技術的變革、物流的變革、行銷的變革、IT 結合物流、公益的變革、推出複合式商場 New Business Model 等多項重大變革，才能使統一超商在連鎖業立於不敗之地。

組織變革讓統一超商不但擁有大企業的體力，結合小企業的創業精神，才能讓企業永續經營。垂直與水平企業運作，讓統一次流通集團得以靈活運作，不斷創新潮流。在垂直發展方面，為了企業體大量專業化、系統化的需求，所以將部份企業內的部門獨立出來，成立專業且具發展前景的公司。

例如：統一資訊、首阜企業等，一方面讓組織不致太過龐大而有所侷限；另一方面，也希望在服務層面上能更加寬廣，透過這樣的整合與專業分工，讓企業體的水準和管理能力達到更進一步的提昇。水平發展方面則延伸出許多相關企業，如星巴克、統一速達、

統一型錄、統一生活等，目的就是為了能將服務觸角延伸至生活中各個層面，以徹底融入消費者的日常需求。

便利性商品的研發、推出便當和傳統美食的鮮食革命、以及結合地方美食和地方旅

遊的在地行銷，都是統一超商幾項非常重要的行銷變革。為了提供更貼近顧客需求的便

捷服務，統一超商陸續推出各式各樣的服務性商品，「代收服務」的推出，整合了顧客各種繁瑣的公共服務繳費單據，結合了金融、服務、資訊功能透過全省遍及各地的門市，

將許多人們的日常生活中的例行事務過程化繁為簡，發展出消費者代收服務、宅急便服務、電子商務服務及預購服務等多項便利性商品。

在地行銷又是令一項驚艷的行銷變革，結合地方旅遊推廣地方美食，以奮起湖便當為例，在民國 50 幾年的年代裡，奮起湖鐵路便當的名氣響亮，一天可以賣一千多個，

但自從民國 71 年阿里山公路通車後，依賴鐵路過客維生的便當生意一落千丈，業績甚至衰退到一天不到 20 個的銷售量。

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自從統一超商推出奮起湖便當之後，也掀起一股觀光潮，再度提昇奮起湖的知名度，將遊客帶回奮起湖，創造出一天賣出十萬個便當的佳績，讓奮起湖便當更加聲名遠播，連帶的當地還多出好幾家奮起湖便當店。

而究竟變革方法該如何應用呢？徐重仁提出在於融入消費者情境的思考，從消費者需求的考量，找出顧客的利益，開發符合消費者需求的產品及服務，用心努力滿足消費者需求。另一方面則是透過變革來提昇企業競爭力，人才是變革的核心，勇敢面對競爭，

可刺激企業成長與轉型，未來台灣消費市場仍有潛力，企業更應為提升台灣消費環境水準而努力。

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SI-2105 主題：領導、決策、執行力

主講人：丁渝洲

成為軍人是丁渝洲一生不悔的選擇，服務公職長達三十年的他，體會出「領導用心，決策用腦，執行力靠意志力！」唯有如此，才能貫徹信念，達成任務！

談到領導，領導是單位的靈魂，領導可以決定一切的成敗，就第二次世界大戰來講，當整個西歐幾乎淪陷，頂住德國攻勢的勇者，是邱吉爾，他堅強的決心與毅力，奠定了最後反攻的契機。

回頭看看今天的社會，王永慶的經營才華，創造了台塑王國；張忠謀的才識與遠見，創造了台積電輝煌的成就；證嚴法師的大愛與慈悲，讓今天的慈濟成為人道的代名詞；領導人可以決定歷史的進展，領導人也可以決定國家的興衰、一個企業的成敗。

我自己概略把領導分成三類，第一類的人是天生就不平凡，能夠主動創造情勢，這種情況是百年難得一見的。第二類的人是時勢所造就的英雄，沒有戰爭，不可能有英雄，另外也包括在被殖民時代，為了爭取獨立的領袖人物。第三類的領導人則是經過長期耕耘，而終於有成果、成就，絕大多數人都屬於第三類，也就是說，領導可以經過學習而成。

我認為一個成功領導者有五個因素：第一，領導的前提為健全自己；第二，領導的核心重視人的因素；第三，領導的基礎在為部屬提供良好的環境；第四，領導的品質取決於單位的風氣、領導者的誠信與職業道德；第五，領導最重要的工作就是善於做決策。

一、領導用心

1. 健全自己

（ 1）確立明確的遠景與目標

人因為有理想而願意去奮鬥，人因為奮鬥才有所成就，人因為有所成就，人生才有意義與價值。

舉個最好的例子，二十世紀最有名、影響力最大的一篇演講，就是 1964 年金恩博士在林肯紀念堂前講的「我有一個夢」。這個夢驅使他不怕任何艱難，最後以三十九歲的年齡付出他的生命；這個夢造就了多少黑人得以提升人權，這個夢也把他送上諾貝爾和平獎，讓他成為了一代偉人。

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（ 2）提升所需的專業素養

健全自己的另一個要點，就是提升自己的專業。我認為學識就是力量，專業就是權威，學識加上專業就是你信心主要的來源。

有些人認為軍人大概都不願讀書，其實不然，沒有一位成功的將領不是飽讀兵書，精研戰史，長期研究軍學。以形象勇猛威武的巴頓來講，他有自己的圖書館，有次在北非作戰，大雨夜裡他睡不著，隨手一拿的是什麼？是當前對手隆美爾所寫的《步兵戰士》。

（ 3）培養所需的領導特質

健全自己的第三個要點，我認為是要培養自己的領導特質，一個領導者要有強烈的使命感與責任心，才能在工作中激發獻身的精神；再者，領導者要有忠誠無私的正義感與熱情，以及培養自我克制的能力與修養，讓自己永遠保持非常冷靜、理性，來帶領部隊及做決策。

樂觀、開朗、主動、積極，才能為單位帶來活力。最後要學習良好的思惟與表達能力。每次看到邱吉爾的慷慨激昂激動人心；聽到麥克阿瑟的演講，也能讓每個人淚溼手帕。

（ 4）成為屬下的楷模

人家問林肯，你認為身為領導者最重要的是什麼？他說我的雄心壯志只有一個：不要讓追隨、尊敬我的人失望；麥克阿瑟也講，領導者不論在言行、生活、起居、飲食，包括品德都應成為部屬的表率。

2. 重視人的因素

領導的第二個要素，是重視人的因素。我常常問一些和我們國際合作的情治首長最困難的事為何？基本上都是人的問題；如何把人的資產做最大的發揮？我是覺得要建立一套制度，不論是晉用、升遷、考核、獎懲都有所依據。除此以外，領導者本身也要有識人之明、容人之量，才能把適當的人擺在最適當的位置上。

談到用人，相信大家對林肯的印象很深刻，有個朋友見林肯後，希望林肯能寫一封信給國防部長，後來這個朋友就帶了林肯的信去見國防部長，國防部長把信一甩，說林肯低能、蠢蛋，林肯知道後，卻說這個國防部長平常講話都是對的，依然支持他的部屬。(See also:

Supreme Court Chief Justice Salmon Chase)

當林肯被刺殺身亡時，真正最痛心、最悲傷的可能不是他的家人，而是這個國防部長，

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他流著眼淚痛哭說：「躺在這裡的人，可能是有史以來最完美的領導者！」這就是領導最高的境界。

3. 為部屬提供良好的環境

領導的基礎在為部屬提供良好的環境，這個環境我常常講，包括工作的環境、生活的環境、學習的環境以及休閒的環境。我到法國看到當年拿破崙留下的兵舍，感慨萬千，因為一百多年以前他留下來的兵舍，都比我們一些二十多年前的房舍好。沙漠戰爭時，美國的官兵都可以吃到後方送來的熱狗，所以領導的基礎是為部屬提供良好的環境。

4. 領導的品質取決於風氣、誠信與職業道德

我所談的風氣包括了三項：開誠布公、務本務實、協調合作的風氣；只有優良的風氣，單位才能可大可久。

第二個就是誠信、領導的品德，有一本書叫《模範領導》，書內做了民意調查，高達 80％的人認為領導者最重要的是誠信。再來談到職業道德，艾森豪曾說過形容職業道德的兩句話，「成功歸於部屬；失敗自己承擔。」

後來我研究三國時發現，中國歷史上最精采的舞台就在三國，三國最精采的人物，一個是曹操，一個是諸葛亮。

自古以來，中國人以「立功、立言、立德」評論一個人，我們以這三個要素來評論這兩個人。

論立功兩人不相上下。

論立言，諸葛亮的出師表讀了讓人掉淚，曹操的詩詞流傳千古。兩人差的就在武德而已，曹操對敵人趕盡殺絕，對自己的部屬疑心重重；而諸葛亮明知阿斗扶不起，依然鞠躬盡瘁，所以領導者的差別就在於誠信、道德而已。

領導者的第五個要素就是善於做決策，這個部分留到下個主題再來談。

總而言之，我覺得每個人的成長環境不同，性格也有差異，領導的風格也不盡相同，就像美國在第二次世界大戰所講的四大名將：

以巴頓來說，他有過人的膽識，勇猛善戰，是第三軍團有史以來犧牲最少，進展最快，俘虜敵人最多，獲得戰功最大的領導者。再看麥克阿瑟，他決心從仁川登陸，創立了自古

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以來最佳的典範。談到馬歇爾，在諾曼第登陸時，史達林、邱吉爾一直到美國重要的將領都認為最理想的領導者是馬歇爾。羅斯福當時講了一句話，如果他離開，我一天都睡不著覺，馬歇爾的細膩、冷靜，讓他成為一代名將。

艾森豪又和這幾個人不同，艾森豪對部屬相當包容，像對蒙哥馬利這些將領的容忍，以及面對危機時的鎮定，讓他足以成功領導由十幾個國家、兩百八十多萬大軍所組成的軍隊，最後也把他送上了總統的寶座。

以上所講的值得我們學習、效法，但我們也要發揮自己人格的特長，「運用之妙，存乎一心」，我曾經思考這八字長達十年。我覺得運用是屬於科學的範疇，而運用之妙則是屬於藝術的領域，到存乎一心則是一種哲學的修養，優秀的領導者要能夠涵蓋科學、藝術及哲學範疇。

二、決策用腦

什麼是決策？我認為決策就是能夠在複雜或危機的狀況下做出正確的決定。所以決策的本質就是一個認知，決策既然這麼重要，決策一定是主觀、本身的責任。

決策為什麼變成一門專門的學問？因為決策有它的困難性，比方說資訊不夠，或者財務、金錢、能力都不足，還有狀況不明時，不容易做風險評估，這都會造成決策的困難。我記得游院長剛剛就任時，希望我對行政院提出一些建言，我最重要的建言，就是必須加強政務官的決策能力，因為我感覺有些決策過於粗糙，我把它歸納為以下五個決策錯誤的主要模式：

1. 不經思考，憑直覺與經驗下結論，這類人充滿了知識的傲慢。

2. 先有結論，再找答案，這是官大學問大。

3. 意識型態主導決策，這是普遍的現象。

4. 為了解決今天的問題，製造了明天的問題，這是頭痛醫頭，腳痛醫腳。

5. 危機時遲疑不決，不敢下決心，這是沒擔當、無魄力。

決策錯誤比貪污更可怕。決策基本上有三種型態，第一種為實現一個好的願景而決策；第二種為了進行改革、變革而做決策；第三種為了防範或處理危機而做決策。前兩項是主動、正面，最後一項是被動、負面的。

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如果一個國家、一個政府、一個企業前兩項處理得比較多，必然是向上提升，若是後面的比較多，可能就是動盪不安。今天決策有這麼多的錯誤，有沒有可供遵循的原則？我認為有以下四項：

1.要有明確的目標。首先要釐清做什麼決策？希望達到什麼目標？獲得什麼效果？我們在決策的過程中才不會偏離了方向。

最好的例子就是第二次世界大戰時，希特勒進攻蘇聯，一開始勢如破竹，打到中途後，希特勒臨時決定要把大軍的主力向南轉，去打高加索的油田，其實，如果目標始終明確，把莫斯科打下來，高加索的油田就會在掌握當中，何必多此一舉。

2.第二個原則是無私的胸襟。1948 年當美國政府在決定要不要承認以色列獨立時，以馬歇爾為首的國務卿，及其身邊絕大多數的人都反對，因為當時條件、時機都不成熟。杜魯門總統被說服後，原則上同意，後來又接到猶太人領袖寫給他的信，最後，杜魯門還是承認以色列獨立，但這個承認是基於下次選舉要爭取猶太人的選票。

3.決策要有正確的情報。上次波灣戰爭之前，不論是衛星、人員都顯示伊拉克準備要出兵科威特，但當時大家都認為海珊虛張聲勢，結果使得可以預防的一場戰爭還是爆發了，這就是誤判情報的結果。

4.要有合理的邏輯，邏輯是思考、解決問題的程序。我年輕時所學的，現在都記得清清楚楚，比方說如何思考一個問題，做一個判斷，就是五字訣「使狀分比結」，就是「使命、狀況、分析、比較、結論」。決策的步驟如下：

1.這是個什麼問題，問題的性質在哪？究竟是一個戰略性、戰術性的問題，還是技術性的問題？這究竟是內政、外交、國防、還是財經等等問題？先把它搞清楚，就可以瞭解輕重緩急。

2.思考我自己看這個問題的立場、角度在哪？以前我服務公職時，凡是安全問題，我會站在國家的立場來思考；如果是人事問題，我會站在全單位或全局來看，如何找到最好的人；如果是事務性問題，要從基層開始思考問題。

3.瞭解相關及關鍵性因素。仁川登陸是地點的選擇，諾曼第登陸是時間的選擇，美國這次攻打伊拉克是人的選擇——海珊的行止，不但要瞭解相關因素、更要掌握關鍵性因素。

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4.合理、可行的方案。

5.分析、比較後，做出最後決策。

所謂決策就是能夠以最低成本、最少風險，獲得最大利益。此外還必須「無嚴重的缺失」，若有嚴重缺失，其他都很難實現。

三、執行力靠意志力

執行力其實是一種工作的態度，其實每件事情都有不同程度的困難，如時間不夠、財力不足、人手不夠等，如果這些都沒有困難的話，那我們都在當太平官。

最近有一本書叫《沒有任何藉口》，這本書的作者是西點軍校畢業學生，他描述一個西點軍校學生受訓的狀況，學生一開始學會四句話，「是」「不是」「不知道」，以及「沒有任何藉口」。我服務公職時，常常鼓勵我們的部屬，當你敢面對困難時，困難已解決一半。

談執行力，要瞭解執行力可表現三種人生態度：第一種人是最高級的，員工本於自己的榮譽心、責任感、自發性工作態度，自我追求完美。標準石油公司有個小職員，在簽收任何文件時，皆不忘寫上「標準石油每桶 4 美元」來宣傳公司，後來，接替洛克斐勒董事長的人，就是這位發自內心，在工作中追求盡善盡美的人。

第二類的人就是受到領導者的感召，和單位良好的風氣潛移默化，他也會願意發自內心把事情做好。

第三類的人是透過上級的要求、嚴格的紀律規範而做好事情，如果連第三種也做不到的人，就只好把他開除。

領導者本身的執行力，簡單地講就是要有強烈的使命感，與堅定的毅力。我一生當中，一直惕勵自己盡可能把每件事情達成，在時間當中比別人早一點；在品質當中比別人高一點，人生就是在一點一滴、長期辛勤地累積下，才能成為一位值得信賴的人。

結論有兩點：領導是用心，決策是用腦，執行力是靠意志力，這三項就是我們人生邁向成功的三大法寶。另一個結論是，一個領導者不論在決策、執行、或言行中，都不要違背自己所追求的價值觀與理想。

1962 年麥克阿瑟當時已八十二歲，西點軍校邀請他回去做最後一次演講，他說，爬也要爬回去。這篇演講的最後提到，「國家、責任、榮譽」這個信念引導了他的一生，使他

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成為一個偉大的人，我也希望每個人的身上都有自己的信念，能夠引導你未來的前途與實踐自己的理想。

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SI-2106 電子化政府

International Conference of E-Government 2004

Theme: E-Government & Pursuit of Public Value Date: October 28th and 29th, 2004

Venue: Far Eastern Plaza Hotel Conference Center, Taipei, Taiwan

Sponsored by: Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission (RDEC, 研考會) The Executive Yuan

Organized by: The E-Gov Project Office Taskco E-Business Corp

International Data Corporation (IDC) Schedule:

Date Time Topic Speaker

8:15-9:00 Registration

9:00-9:30 Welcome & Opening Address

Yeh, Jiunn-Rong

Chairman, RDEC, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Lin, Ferng-Ching

Minister without Portfolio, Executive Yuan, Taiwan

9:30-10:20

Keynote address:

Using e-World for Service Transformation in Large Public Service Organizations

A Canadian Perspective

Howard Dickson

Former Assistant Deputy Minister, Information Management, Dept of National Defense, Government of Canada

10:20-11:00

Keynote address:

Digital Divide Policy and Practice in Taiwan

Lin, Yu-Chuan

Deputy Director, RDEC, Executive Yuan, Taiwan

11:00-11:20 Break

11:20-12:20

Discussion Forum

The Role of Chief Information Officer (CIO) in e-Government Transformation

Chair:

Ho, Chuan-Te

Director, RDEC, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Panelists:

Howard Dickson

Former Assistant Deputy Minister, Information Management, Dept of National Defense, Government of Canada Farn, C.K.

Professor, National Central University, Taiwan

Hsiao, Naiyi

Assistant Professor, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

10/28

12:20-13:30 Lunch

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13:30-14:30 Keynote address:

The Future e-Government Services

Hsu, ChingChi

Executive Vice President, Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan

14:30-14:50 Break

14:50-16:30 Discussion Forum

Creation of Public Value for e-Gov - The Present & the Future of

Online Services

- Security & Privacy of a Networked Society - Humanity aspect of

e-government

Chair:

Hsu, ChingChi

Executive Vice President, Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan

Panelists:

Howard Dickson

Former Assistant Deputy Minister, Information Management, Dept of National Defense, Government of Canada Huang, Kuan-Tsae

Principal, National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan

Liao, Mark

Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, Taiwan

09:00-09:50

Keynote address:

Delivering Customer-Focused e-Government

- A UK Perspective

Bill Edwards

Managing Director, Directgov e-Government Unit, UK

09:50-10:40

Keynote address:

U.S.’s and Western Europe’s Governments IT Trends and Priorities for IT Spending in 2004

Yang, Eddy

Consultant, IDC, Taiwan

10:40-11:00 Break

11:00-12:00

Discussion Forum

Promotion & Evaluation of e-Gov Services

-How to Improve Usage Rate -The Framework &

Methodology for e-Gov Service Evaluation

Chair:

Shih, Jay N.

Vice Chairman, RDEC, Executive Yuan, Taiwan

Panelists:

Bill Edwards

Managing Director, Directgov e-Government Unit, UK Chou, Shrane Koung

Professor, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Huang, Kenny

Director, AsiaInfra , Taiwan Yang, Eddy

Consultant, IDC, Taiwan

12:00-13:10 Lunch

13:10-14:00

Keynote address:

E-Government services in Japan -A Japan Perspective

Nakagawa Tsutomu VP, Fujitsu Taiwan

14:00-14:50

Keynote address:

Building an e-Government Framework of Cross-Agency Interoperability

- A Taiwan Perspective

Lee, Yen-Sung

VP, Chunghwa Telecom Co., Taiwan 10/29

14:50-15:10 Break

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15:10-16:10

Discussion Forum

The Future Trend of e-Government

-Customer relations

Management

-Effective Governance -Citizen Participation -One-stop Services

Chair:

Yeh, Jiunn-Rong

Chairman, RDEC, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Panelists:

Bill Edwards

Managing Director, Directgov e-Government Unit, UK Lee, Yen-Sung

VP, Chunghwa Telecom Co., Taiwan Nakagawa Tsutomu

VP, Fujitsu Taiwan Lee, Der-Tsai

Academician, Academia Sinica, Taiwan 16:10-16:30 Concluding Remarks Luo, Minsky

Consultant, e-Gov Project Office

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Keynote Speaker

Speaker Current Position

Profile

Howard Dickson

Independent consultant in e-Gov related area

Mr. Dickson was the first Assistant Deputy Minister of Information Management (CIO) at the Department of National Defense, which is the largest user of Information Technology of the Government of Canada. In this role, his responsibilities included the implementation of the Defense e-Government program as well as being a member of the Government of Canada Service Improvement Management Board, which oversaw related investments across the Federal Government.

Bill Edwards

Managing Director, Directgov at e-Government Unit, UK

Bill Edwards was instrumental in creating the vision for Directgov, the pan-governmental program that is transforming the everyday relationship between citizens and government by delivering services and information in one convenient place online. He has been responsible for the teams that created Directgov on the web and on digital television, and formally became its Managing Director in April 2003.

Hsu, ChingChi

Executive Vice- President, Institute for Information Industry

Doctor, Dept. of Electrical Eng., NTU Director, Dept of CSIE, NTU

Principal, Kainan Univ.

Lee, Yen-Sung

Vice-President, Chunghwa Telecom Taiwan

Doctor, Dept of CSIE, CTU

Director, Information Group, Chunghwa Telecom Co., Taiwan Manager, Data Comm. Group, Chunghwa Telecom Co., Taiwan

Yang, Eddy

Consultant at International Data

Corporation (IDC)

Eddy Yang has joined IDC and is in charge of consulting businesses in Taiwan. He has worked for global companies as well as large listed companies in hardware, software, and communications. He has solid experiences in strategy articulation, process improvement, performance management, e-business design, and system implementation. He has been trained and has earned certificates in SAP, Adexa, and PTC. His areas of expertise include high-tech semiconductors, electronics, financial services, and retail.

Nakagawa Tsutomu

Vice-President, Fujitsu Taiwan

Responsible for the integration and planning of computer systems, and for various kinds of business solutions. He has solid experience of network and information technologies.

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SI-2107 專業

—你的唯一生存之道

主講人：王文璨明基電通全球營銷總部總經理

吳昇奇曾經在美國，一連攻讀三個碩士，他認為「堅持」是培養專業的不二法門，

不管遇到多大挑戰，都要勇於付出。他鼓勵職場個人，不管位於初階、中高階，都要有長遠的眼光，專注在核心領域，透過公司培訓、自行進修等，一步步邁向專業。

各位貴賓、各位女士、各位先生，大家午安。

日本會成為日本第一，就是因為有一群 ...在這個書本裡面寫到的這一群人。他是個英明的領袖，開創了很多的事業，然後把事業規模做到一個程度，蠻龐大的一個程度，而且把它全球化了。那英明的領袖，到最後變成領袖英明，所以日本第一之後它就面臨到了問題。

所以當第二代要接班第一代的時候，因為領袖確實是很英明，所以他的腦筋的開創力就不行了。所以會 ...日本又很喜歡 yes, yes 嘛，是 ...這一些基本上形式，就會轉到內心裡頭確實是這樣。

領袖英明久了以後會怎麼樣？英明領袖就造就了將才，那領袖英明就造就了一堆奴才，所以他變成思考力，或是這所謂的議論力、架構力、這一些的能力，其實相對的就變成比較微弱一點。

那 Nissan 為什麼內部找不到人才，到最後是由高恩先生來把它 turn around？ Sony 內部提拔了 Stringer 來做他們總經理。日本有這麼多的人才，Sony 也好 , Nissan 也好，

或是日本在產業界裡頭也好，它就有它的困難。

所以這裡產生的問題是什麼？為什麼歐美能比我們或是比日本，能產生更多的人才？這其實有很多基本上的不同。機會主義、學歷主義、機會主義到處都機會。

各位可以看到，不管在美國’尤其在美國或是歐洲，很多那個大學沒畢業的，通通變成今天的名人。 Bill Gates、 Michael Dell， You name it。基本上都是個機會，只要你有天賦的能力，你基本上就有機會可以熬出頭。

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那這個就是環境的養成，環境可以容許你這樣子做。日本如果要這樣，大概是學歷主義才有。最近我收到那個…一個網路上說人生有七力：二十歲是靠學歷、三十歲就靠能力、四十歲靠經歷、五十歲靠財力、六十歲靠體力、七十歲看病歷、八十歲看黃曆。

那這一些基本上是在講說，學歷在台灣也是很重要。二十歲你如果學歷不對，大概進不了這一些有機會讓你發揮的一個場所，除非是有了這個機會，那這個環境要讓他有這樣的機會才可以。

個人主義跟群體主義。群體主義是比較屬於東方的，這是因為整個儒家的思想是影響日本、韓國、台灣非常大的地方。所以這個君要君、臣要臣、子要子、父要父。這些倫理會產生說，你需要隨著時間而成長，不要去跳躍式的。

個人主義就是非常英雄主義。英雄是被 appreciate 的，那在亞洲來講英雄會被修理的。自由放任跟井然有序的社會，是有很大的差別。德國跟日本很多的相像。我在慕尼黑待了大概八九個月，實際上它整個社會，跟日本的社會都很相像，很 structure、

非常結構化。很結構化，所以腦筋不用思考。時間到、上電車。時間到、下電車。這一站到那一站幾分鐘，寫得都非常清楚。絕對是準時、絕對到達。非常的龜毛主義，非常的井然有序。

所以百姓是不用思考的，時間到就上車、時間到就下車，然後就到那邊。時間到上班、時間到下班。這個很正常。那你怎麼拼命都沒關係，但是就在井然有序裡頭，被架構住了。所以這個也產生它整個的人才的培養，會有今天的結果。自由放任。

越往南歐走，自由放任的機會越大，越往北歐走，這個井然有序越大。這個不一定好與壞，只是時間到最後的形成，會產生不同的人才的結構。

專業出頭跟排隊等候，這個在歐美跟在日本是差異很大。所以日本一直有專業的人才，在排隊等候。造反有理、革命有罪。所以造反有理是 break the rule，然後革命有罪是，你要去 follow the rule。這是跟社會的形態是有相同。

這是我個人的觀察，也因為這樣產生到，整個日本在所謂的專業經理人上面的人才的空洞化。也不叫空洞化，而是沒有辦法帶領這個困境裡頭，走到一個另一番境界來讓整個企業起死回生。

從我的角度或是從 BenQ 的角度來看，實際上什麼叫專業人才？什麼叫專業？專