福島核災後的核能發電安全制度檢討—從國際法架構到臺灣的個案分析

(1)

國立臺灣大學理學院氣候變遷與永續發展國際學位學程碩士論文

International Degree Program in Climate Change and Sustainable Development College of Science

National Taiwan University Master Thesis

福島核災後的核能發電安全制度檢討—從國際法架構到臺灣的個案分析 An Overhaul on the Nuclear Safety Regime after the Fukushima Nuclear

Disaster—from the International Legal Framework to the Case Study in Taiwan

顧昌庭

Chang-Ting Guh

指導教授：張文貞博士 Advisor: Wen-Chen Chang, Ph.D.

中華民國 109 年 2 月 February 2020

(2)

(3)

Acknowledgements

I sincerely thank Professor Wen-Chen Chang for patiently instructing me and warmly encouraging me throughout my master years. In addition, I have learned a lot of things from Professor, including the objective and critical thinking on a research question, the ability to resolve a problem, and the art of logical and insightful elaborations. It is truly my highest honor to have the chance to learn from Professor.

I am extremely thankful to Professor Wen-Chen Chang for sparing her precious time to guide me on my master thesis. In every discussion, Professor provided me a lot of professional and precious suggestions, helping me

develop a clear and concise structure and incorporate the important and applicable aspects into my thesis.

I am truly grateful to the comments of my thesis examiners—Doctor Tze-Luen Lin and Doctor Chun-Yuan Lin. Their valuable comments precisely pointed out the problems in my thesis, letting me significantly enhance the organization, structure and arrangement of my thesis.

I sincerely thank IPCS members for teaching me the invaluable knowledge and techniques during the courses and projects in my master years.

I am grateful to the unconditional love and support from my family. My family is the only reason why I never stop working hard and never give up despite all adversity. In the future, I will keep on improving myself and make the most of my abilities to help the ones who are in need in every corner of the society.

(4)

摘要

2011 年 3 月 11 號發生了日本歷史上有紀錄以來規模最大(9.0)的地震，並且造成福島核災，而這場災難讓我們必須重新審慎檢視既有的核能安全國際法架構。

於此同時，臺灣的核電廠正面臨運轉執照已經或即將到期的問題，然而，許多關於執照換發或除役所衍生的問題卻尚未解決。因此，本研究將相對應的核安國際公約與臺灣的內國法進行比較，藉此萃取出好的立法例提供臺灣參考，以期能進而解決核電廠執照換發或除役期間所面對的問題。本研究藉由管制目的、管制工

具、輔助措施和衡平措施這四個面向的分析，有系統地整理鮮少為人所知的1970

到90 年代正式通過的各部核能安全相關的國際公約。本研究發現當今既有的核

能安全國際公約已能完整囊括全球核能和平使用的每個面向，包含反應爐的運轉、

核廢料的處理、核事故的及早通報與國際互助。然而，這些公約對於核能安全的衡平措施和實質上國際技術支援的要求卻略顯不足。此外，本研究也發現儘管臺灣的核能安全法規大多已經符合各部國際公約授權各締約國所建立的行政與立法機制，但是對於代際正義和及早向國際社會通報核事故這兩件事情上，臺灣的核能安全法規尚有需要改進之處。因此，本論文建議臺灣的核能安全法規應儘快納入代際正義和國際通報機制，而國際公約也應加強衡平措施和跨國援助的量能。

本論文亦透過國際公約和臺灣法規各面向之比較，希望這些公約和法規能同步汲取對方好的措施，進而提升臺灣與全球的核能發電安全制度。

關鍵字:核能安全、核電廠除役、核電廠執照換發、世代正義、福島核災

(5)

Abstract

On March 11^th, 2011, a magnitude-9.0 earthquake, the largest earthquake ever recorded in Japanese history, caused the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. It unveils the necessity to reexamine the existing international legal framework on the nuclear safety regime. Meanwhile, Taiwanese nuclear power plants are urgently facing the license expiration dates, but several important issues in terms of license renewal or decommissioning have yet to be addressed. As a result, it is worthwhile to compare between the international legal framework and the case study in Taiwan in order to provide some good legislative examples for Taiwan to take into account. As a matter of fact, all the

international nuclear safety conventions were adopted in the 1970s to 1990s, and they were rarely noticed by the researchers nowadays. Through the analysis on the attributes of objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures, this thesis introduces those international nuclear safety conventions in a systematic manner. This study found out that the existing conventions have already covered a comprehensive range of nuclear activities, including the operation of reactor facilities, the treatment of radioactive wastes, the early notification of nuclear accidents, and the

assistance from the international society; however, the equitable measures and assistant missions of the conventions remained insufficient. On the other hand, this research also found out that the nuclear safety laws in Taiwan mostly comply with the guidelines of the conventions, but the intergenerational justice and the early report system to the neighboring countries of a nuclear incident shall be established as soon as practicable. As a result, this thesis suggests that the nuclear safety conventions need to be enhanced in terms of the equity and international assisting missions whereas the laws in Taiwan must promptly incorporate the intergenerational justice and a thorough

reporting mechanism. At last but not least, this study compares in between the relevant conventions and laws, hoping that both sides can learn from the good practices from the counterparts so as to improve the nuclear safety regime worldwide.

Keywords: Atomic Energy Security; Decommissioning Procedures of Nuclear Reactor Facilities; License Renewal Application of Nuclear Reactor Facilities;

Intergenerational Justice; Fukushima Nuclear Accident

(6)

Contents

Acknowledgements ... 1

摘要 ... 2

Abstract ... 3

List of Figures ... 10

List of Tables ... 11

Chapter 1. Introduction ... 13

Chapter 2. International Legal Framework on Nuclear Safety ... 16

2.1. Development of Nuclear Safety Conventions ... 16

2.2. Analytical Method for Nuclear Safety Conventions and Taiwanese Laws ... 21

2.3. Convention on Nuclear Safety ... 22

2.3.1. Objectives ... 24

2.3.2. Implementing Measures ... 24

2.3.3. Assisting Measures ... 26

2.3.4. Equitable Measures ... 26

2.4. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management ... 26

2.4.1. Objectives ... 27

(7)

2.5. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident ... 33

2.5.1. Objectives ... 34

2.6. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency ... 38

2.6.1. Objectives ... 39

2.7. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities ... 47

2.7.1. Objectives ... 48

(8)

2.8. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter ... 51

2.8.1. Objectives ... 53

2.9. Merits and Flaws of the International Nuclear Safety Conventions ... 55

Chapter 3. Taiwan’s Nuclear Safety Laws ... 57

3.1. Domestic Legislation on Nuclear Safety ... 57

3.1.1. Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act ... 57

3.1.1.1. Objectives ... 58

3.1.1.2. Implementing Measures ... 59

3.1.1.3. Assisting Measures ... 59

3.1.1.4. Equitable Measures ... 60

3.1.2. Atomic Energy Law ... 60

3.1.2.1. Objectives ... 61

(9)

3.1.3. The Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act ... 63

3.1.3.1. Objectives ... 64

3.1.4. Nuclear Emergency Response Act ... 67

3.1.4.1. Objectives ... 68

3.2. Domestic Legislation in view of International Conventions 72 3.2.1. Domestic Legislation in view of Nuclear Safety Convention ... 74

3.2.1.1. Objectives ... 76

(10)

3.2.2. Domestic Legislation in view of Physical Protection Convention ... 78

3.2.2.1. Objectives ... 80

3.2.3. Domestic Legislation in view of Joint Convention and Marine Dumping Convention ... 82

3.2.3.1. Objectives ... 84

3.2.4. Domestic Legislation in view of Early Notification Convention and Assistance Convention ... 87

3.2.4.1. Objectives ... 89

(11)

3.3. Merits and Flaws of Taiwan’s Nuclear Safety Laws ... 92

Chapter 4. Taiwan’s Case Studies ... 94

4.1. License Renewal Application ... 94

4.1.1. Confidentiality shall be abolished ... 94

4.1.2. International technical cooperation in the Regulation Act ... 96

4.2. Decommissioning Procedures ... 100

4.2.1. International Technical Cooperation ... 101

4.2.2. Intergenerational Justice ... 104

4.3. Reflection on the Case Studies ... 105

Chapter 5. Conclusion ... 107

Reference ... 110

(12)

List of Figures

Figure 1. The timeline depicts the sequence of the major nuclear accidents happened in the past and the adoption time of the major international nuclear safety conventions. (at page 18)

Figure 2. The timeline depicts the sequence of the major nuclear accidents happened in the past and the time when the major international nuclear safety conventions entered into force. (at page 19)

Figure 3. The timeline depicts the sequence of the major nuclear accidents happened in the past and the amendments of the major international nuclear safety conventions. (at page 20)

Figure 4. The figure shows that among all the nuclear events, the IAEA provides assistance to only few of them. (at page 42)

Figure 5. Under the framework of the Nuclear Emergency Response Act, there are five fundamental agencies, four temporary agencies, and one temporary committee. The figure depicts the relationship between these components, including authorization, activation procedures of the recovery committee, assistance, decommissioning procedures, and communication channels. (at page 69)

Figure 6. The figure links the Taiwanese nuclear safety law with the matching international nuclear safety convention. (at page 73)

Figure 7. The figure depicts the safety review and environmental review process under the USNRC. (at page 95)

Figure 8. The figure demonstrates the nuclear waste treatment facility in France. (at page 103)

(13)

List of Tables

Table 1. The table categorizes the articles in the Convention on Nuclear Safety into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equity based on the function of each article. (at page 23)

Table 2. The table categorizes the articles in the Joint Convention into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures based on the function of each article. (at page 27)

Table 3. The table categorizes the articles in the Early Notification Convention into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equity based on the function of each article. (at page 34)

Table 4. The table categorizes the articles in the Assistance Convention into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equity based on the specific function of each article. (at page 39)

Table 5. The table categorizes the articles in the Physical Protection

Convention into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equity based on the function of each article. (at page 48)

Table 6. The table categorizes the articles in the Marine Dumping Convention into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equity based on the function of each article. (at page 52)

Table 7. The table categorizes the articles in the Nuclear Reactor Facilities Regulation Act into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures based on the specific function of each article. (at page 58)

Table 8. The table categorizes the articles in the Atomic Energy Law into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures based on the function of each article. (at page 61)

Table 9. The table categorizes the articles in the Nuclear Materials and

Radioactive Wastes Management Act into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures based on the specific function of each article. (at page 64)

Table 10. The table categorizes the articles in the Nuclear Emergency Response Act into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures based on the specific function of each article. (at page 67)

Table 11. The table compares the Regulation Act in Taiwan with the Nuclear Safety Convention in terms of the objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equity. (at page 75)

(14)

Table 12. The table compares the Atomic Energy Law with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities in terms of the objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures. (at page 79)

Table 13. The table compares the Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act in Taiwan with the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter in terms of the objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures. (at page 83)

Table 14. The table compares the Nuclear Emergency Response Act in Taiwan with the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in terms of the objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equity. (at page 88)

Table 15. This table puts together the safety and environmental concerns on the license renewal application of the Jinshan Nuclear Power Plant and

provides the solutions that would improve the situations based on international technical cooperation. (at page 98)

(15)

Chapter 1. Introduction

On March 11^th, 2011, an earthquake occurred with the epicenter located at 130 kilometers east of the city Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan. The magnitude of the earthquake was 9.0, the largest ever recorded in Japanese history. The earthquake caused a 15-meter-high tsunami that killed more than 15,000 people. Right after the earthquake, eleven operating nuclear reactors automatically shut down, including three in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. At that time, Units 1, 2 and 3 nuclear reactors in the Fukushima Station were operating, and they automatically shut down after the earthquake. Units 4, 5 and 6 were under a routine maintenance, so they were not operating.

Although Units 1, 2 and 3 automatically shut down, continued cooling was necessary in order to remove the residual heat of the nuclear reactors;

however, the station loss power from the local electric grid because it was damaged by the earthquake and tsunami. Although each nuclear reactor was equipped with a diesel generator for backup electricity, it was also damaged by the tsunami, so the Fukushima Station experienced the ―station blackout‖, a dangerous situation that the cooling system was supported only by the batteries. It requires several days of continuous cooling to remove the entire residual heat, but the batteries can only sustain for several hours. Eventually, the reactor cores were melted, and the radioactive pollution damaged the health of the local residents. The soil, water, crops, and infrastructures around the nuclear station were also radioactively polluted.¹

Right after the nuclear damage, the compensation was urgently in need to mitigate the adversity on the victims,² and the international conferences started to discuss the adequacy of the existing nuclear liability conventions.³ More importantly, if the nuclear safety conventions were adequate enough, the nuclear accident might not happen. The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster indeed underscored the importance to overhaul the international legal framework especially on the nuclear safety regime. Additionally, Taiwan is in a special circumstance right now where the license expiration dates of the nuclear reactors are around the corner. On the other hand, due to the special identity in the international community, Taiwan was not allowed to join any of the international conventions on nuclear safety. As a result, it is necessary to do a case study to examine whether or not Taiwan could follow up the progress of the international legal framework. If not, it is important to identify the good legislative examples that Taiwan should learn from.

As a result, this thesis explores the provisions of the six international nuclear safety conventions and the domestic laws in Taiwan to see if there are some necessary improvements that must be made urgently in order to enhance the safety of nuclear power and prevent the accidents from

1 Burns, G. S. (2018). The impact of the major nuclear power plant accidents on the international legal framework for nuclear power. In Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 101 (Nuclear Energy Agency, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Ed., pp. 7-30).

(Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 101). Boulogne-Billancourt, France: OECD/NEA.

2 Cheng, M.-S. and Jhang, H.-D. (2011). An Examination on Taiwanese Nuclear Liability Laws (plans_04_e-100_03). Taipei, Taiwan: Library of Soochow University. (程明修主持(2011)。我國

核子損害賠償法制度之研修(行政院原子能委員會研究計畫期末報告，plans_04_e-100_03)。臺

北，東吳大學圖書館。)

3 Burns, supra note 1, at 28-29.

(16)

happening again in the future. Rather than the nuclear engineering experiments, the standard operation procedures on nuclear reactor facilities, or the prevention of complex natural disasters, this thesis focuses on the examination of the regulatory framework established by the international nuclear safety conventions. Meanwhile, the study compares the nuclear safety laws in Taiwan with the international nuclear safety conventions to see if the domestic laws could fulfill the obligations and core values of the international regime on the security of reactor facilities. Hopefully with the main findings and suggestions of the research, the international legal framework on nuclear safety would become more robust, so the reactor facilities could operate in a safer manner. On the other hand, the case study in Taiwan that was done by this thesis may also boost the domestic legislation to catch up with the pace of the international legal framework, apply the good practices from other countries, and resolve the intractable issues in Taiwan such as the disposal of high-level radioactive wastes, the environmental pollution of ionizing radiation, and the lack of consideration about the intergenerational justice.

In terms of the methodology, this thesis analyzes each nuclear safety convention and each Taiwanese nuclear safety law with respect to the objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures. By referring to the relevant papers, reports and articles, this thesis analyzes the pros and cons on each of the four aspects for each convention and domestic law, and then provides the practical recommendations accordingly. This thesis also puts together the matching convention and domestic law to see which one did a better job on each specific aspect so that the convention and domestic law can both improve by learning from its counterpart. Moreover, this thesis makes the most of the results from such comparison by applying the results—the good practices from each convention and domestic law—to address the issues that Taiwanese nuclear stations are facing, wishing that the good practices from the international society can enhance the nuclear security, environmental protection, and the intergenerational justice in Taiwan whereas the merits of Taiwanese nuclear safety laws and practices could be taken into account by other countries and improve as a whole.

When it comes to novelty and significance, this thesis may be one of the first researches, if any, to discuss all six of the nuclear safety conventions, all four Taiwanese nuclear safety laws, and compare between the international legal framework and Taiwanese legislation with regard to the objectives, implementation, assisting measures, and equity. While the laws and conventions are highly complicated and diversified, it is much more well-organized and systematic by categorizing the articles into the four aspects.

This method indeed provides a comprehensive interpretation on the nuclear safety regime that not only allows future works to research even further from this fundament, but also encourages scholars from all kinds of fields to discuss the international conventions and domestic laws based on the four components. Moreover, it is almost a decade from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, and human beings tend to forget the pain of past lessons as time passes. While climate change issues are more and more severe and the deadline of carbon reduction comes closer and closer, many countries have started to evaluate the possibilities of restarting, or increasing, the use of

(17)

nuclear power. While the fear of Fukushima gradually diminished, this thesis indeed serves as a timely reminder about the need of nuclear safety enhancement.

As for the structure of this thesis, Chapter 2 evaluates the international nuclear safety conventions, Chapter 3 examines the nuclear safety laws in Taiwan, Chapter 4 focuses on the case study in Taiwan, and Chapter 5 is the conclusion. To be more specific, in Chapter 2.1., there will be an overview on the development of the six nuclear safety conventions in the past, followed by Chapter 2.2., which introduces the method that this thesis utilizes to analyze the conventions and laws. Then, from Chapter 2.3. to Chapter 2.8., the thesis discusses each of the six nuclear safety conventions one by one. In Chapter 2.9., there is a general statement on the merits and flaws of the six nuclear safety conventions. In terms of Taiwan‘s nuclear safety laws, Chapter 3.1.

introduces each of the four domestic laws using the same method that was applied in Chapter 2. Then, in Chapter 3.2., each Taiwanese law is compared with the relevant nuclear safety convention which serves the same purpose. In Chapter 3.3., there is a general statement about the merits and flaws of Taiwan‘s nuclear safety laws. After that, there are two case studies that Taiwan is facing right now—Chapter 4.1. discusses the license renewal application of the Jinshan Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan, and Chapter 4.2. illustrates the environmental concerns and radiological threat of the decommissioning issues of Taiwanese nuclear reactors. Last but not least, Chapter 4.3. briefs the main findings of the two case studies as well as the limitation of this research.

(18)

Chapter 2. International Legal Framework on Nuclear Safety

The international conventions that are relevant to nuclear activities can be divided into two types: nuclear liability conventions and nuclear safety conventions. Nuclear liability conventions are to compensate the loss of life and property after a nuclear accident, and nuclear safety conventions are to prevent the accidents from happening, or to minimize the radiological consequence once an incident occurs. In order to enhance the nuclear security worldwide, this thesis focuses on the examination of the international nuclear safety conventions and leaves the nuclear liability conventions for future works to discuss.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established on July 29th, 1957, and it is one of the most authoritative international organizations on nuclear safety. To date, there are 171 Member States in the IAEA. Even though this organization was founded independently of the United Nations through its own international treaty, the IAEA Statute, it reports to both the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations. Therefore, it is believed that the international nuclear safety conventions adopted by the IAEA are authoritative to secure reactor facilities worldwide and worthy of taking into consideration. However, it is also important to note that despite its credibility, not every country with operating nuclear power plants get to join this organization; for instance, Taiwan is not a Member State of the IAEA.

In accordance with the IAEA, there are currently four major international nuclear safety conventions: the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.⁴ In addition, the IAEA recommends each country to also take the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter into account, as stated in the thirteenth paragraph in the preamble of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.⁵ Therefore, there are a total of six international conventions highly related to the nuclear safety regime. This chapter will first elaborate the development of these international nuclear safety conventions, and then introduce the analytical method that this research applies to evaluate the conventions. Finally, there will be detailed and critical analysis for each of the nuclear safety conventions.

2.1. Development of Nuclear Safety Conventions

Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 are the timelines of the adoption, entrance into force, and amendments for each of the six conventions, respectively. Typically, a convention would be opened for signature shortly after its adoption; for instance, the Convention on Nuclear Safety was opened for signature on 20 September 1994, only three months after its adoption on 17

4 Ibid., 23-28.

5 International Atomic Energy Agency (1997). Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Vienna, Austria:

International Atomic Energy Agency.

(19)

June 1994.⁶ As a result, the timelines did not show the date when each convention was opened for signature. In addition, there are some preliminary conditions before an amendment proposal could be adopted or enter into force.

Take the Convention on Nuclear Safety for example, according to Article 32, all Contracting Parties must reach a consensus in order to adopt a proposed amendment. In the absence of consensus, the amendment proposal has to enter a Diplomatic Conference and obtains a two-thirds majority vote before its adoption.⁷ As a result, although States Parties might propose a number of amendments on a convention from time to time, only few of them could successfully complete the adoptions. For instance, after the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, Russia, Spain and Switzerland each drafted an amendment proposal on the Convention on Nuclear Safety, but each of the proposed amendments failed to reach the adoption.⁸ Thus, the following timeline did not reveal any proposed amendment which was declined; instead, it only shows the adopted amendments and the time when they entered into force. On the other hand, even when an amendment proposal was already adopted, there are some further conditions before it could enter into force. For example, in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, Article 32.5 states that the adopted amendment would come into force only in those Contracting Parties which have ratified, accepted, approved or confirmed it on the ninetieth day after the receipt by the Depositary of the relevant instruments by at least three fourths of the Contracting Parties.⁹ This is probably the reason why there is a long gap between the adoption date and the date of entrance into force—As it could be seen in the following timelines, in both the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities and the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, it took approximately ten years to let each amendment proposal enter into force.

6 International Atomic Energy Agency (1994). Convention on Nuclear Safety. Vienna, Austria:

7 Ibid., Article 32.

8 Burns, supra note 1, at 25-26.

9 International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 6, at 12.

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

According to Burns (2018), the nuclear safety conventions were developed in an early stage after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Disaster in 1979 and experienced a rapid progress with international consensus after the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster in 1986.¹⁰ From Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, it could be observed that shortly after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Disaster, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities was adopted. Moreover, shortly within two years following the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster, two nuclear safety conventions were adopted and three nuclear safety conventions entered into force. Despite all the efforts, another major nuclear accident—the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster—still occurred. Therefore, it is inevitable to overhaul the existing nuclear safety conventions and find out what are the probable defects resulting in the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster.

2.2. Analytical Method for Nuclear Safety Conventions and Taiwanese Laws

This study applies the approach designed by Professor Jiunn-Rong Yeh.¹¹ In the approach, each international convention was analyzed with four aspects:

objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures.¹² This is an effective way to analyze an international convention because international conventions are always complicated and contain many articles. By dividing an international convention into objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures, it is much clearer and much more organized to see the merits and drawbacks of each convention.

Furthermore, this thesis also utilizes the same analytical method to analyze the nuclear safety laws in Taiwan in Chapter 3 and then tries to compare the relevant conventions with the matching Taiwanese laws.

In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,¹³ a signatory may not violate the objectives of the signed convention even before its deposition of the instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Since the objectives of each convention have such a special regulatory power even before the convention enters into force for that State Party, in the following sections, this study would first discuss the adequacy and appropriateness of the objectives for each nuclear safety convention, followed by the analysis of implementing, assisting, and equitable measures.

As for implementing measures, it could be inferred that there are at least two kinds—―command and control‖ and ―economic incentives‖.¹⁴ Under

―command and control‖, there are five sub-categories: prohibition, quantitative regulations, permission, compensation of damage, and sanctions. ¹⁵

"Command and control" is generally utilized under the physical control of a

10 Burns, supra note 1, at 30.

11 Yeh, J.-R. (1999). Global Environmental Issues—from the Viewpoint of Taiwan. Taipei, Taiwan: CHULIU PUBLISHER. (葉俊榮(1999)。全球環境議題:臺灣觀點。臺北市:巨流。)

12 Ibid., 129.

13 United Nations (1980). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In MULTILATERAL (United Nations Ed., pp. 331-512). (United Nations-Treaty Series, No. 18232). New York, NY:

United Nations.

14 Yeh, supra note 11, at 130-131.

15 Ibid., 131-134.

(24)

sovereign state.¹⁶For example, if a criminal violates human rights, he will be punished by the domestic law. On the other hand, "economic incentives" were widely applied in terms of the issues that are related to the inherent difference in between the developed and developing countries, such as the emission of greenhouse gas.¹⁷ In the following sections, it could be seen that the implementing measures of the nuclear safety conventions were not strictly confined to either "economic incentives" or "command and control"

approaches. Instead, those conventions authorize each State Party the power to develop its domestic legislation and executive methods as long as the objectives of the conventions could be met.

In terms of assisting measures, there are at least three types, including

―information dissemination‖, ―implementation assessment‖, and ―resolution of disputes‖.¹⁸ "Information dissemination" is used to inform each Contracting Party about any important message and update that is related to the convention; "implementation assessment" is to regularly evaluate the implementing status of the convention in each State Party; and "resolution of disputes" is to revolve the disagreements among the States Parties in terms of the explanation or reinforcement in any article of the convention. Overall, assisting measures are to help the conventions to execute more smoothly and effectively, and they are necessary for every international convention no matter what kind.

Last but not least, "equitable measures" are to compensate the vulnerable developing countries. Thus, they are more likely to be seen in the abovementioned greenhouse gas emission issues or in the international environmental laws ¹⁹ where there is inherent difference between the developed and developing countries. It would be good to have equitable measures to transfer the advanced technology and skillful personnel to the countries that are in need.

Depending on the objectives and nature of the convention, it is not necessarily a bad thing if a convention lacks certain items.²⁰ On the other hand, even if a convention covers all the aspects, some of the articles might be redundant and useless.²¹ The following sections will analyze the six nuclear safety conventions based on this analytical method, and then each convention would be examined if there were any deficiency or redundancy.

2.3. Convention on Nuclear Safety

Table 1 categorizes the articles in the Convention on Nuclear Safety into the four broad categories: objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures based on the function of each article.

16 Schwelb, E. (1968). Civil and Political Rights: The International Measures of Implementation. The American Journal of International Law, 62(4), 827.

https://doi.org/10.2307/2197013

17 Yeh, J.-R. (2015). Climate Change Management and Laws. Taipei, Taiwan: National Taiwan University Press. (葉俊榮(2015)。氣候變遷治理與法律。臺北市:臺大出版中心。)

19 Hunter, D., Salzman, J., and Zaelke, D. (2015). International Environmental Law and Policy.

Minnesota, MN: Foundation Press.

20 Canfa, W. (2007). Chinese Environmental Law Enforcement: Current Deficiencies and Suggested Reforms. Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 8, 159-193.

21 Quinn, E. (2011). The Refugee Convention Sixty Years On: Relevant or Redundant.

Working Notes, 68, 19-25.

(25)

Moreover, both the categories of implementing measures and assisting measures could be broken down into more detailed subsets as elaborated in the introduction of the analytical method.

E qu ita ble M ea su re s A rticl e 1 1 R eso luti on o f D isp ute s A rticl e 2 9 A ssi st ing M ea su re s Im ple m en ta tio n A sse ssm en t C ha pte r 3 Info rm atio n D isse m ina tio n A rticl e 5 a nd C ha pte r 3 S an ct io ns A rticl e 9 C om pe nsa tio n o f D am ag e A rticl e 4 Im ple m en tin g M ea su re s P erm issi on A rticl es 7.2 .2 a nd 1 7 Q ua ntit ativ e R eg ula tio ns P ro hib itio n A rticl es 14 a nd 1 7 O bje ct ive s A rticl e 1

T a b le 1 . C o n v e n tio n o n N u c le a r S a fe ty Th e ta ble p uts the a rticl es into d iffe re nt ca te go rie s ba se d o n th e sp eci fic fun ct io n o f e ach a rticl e.

S ou rce :

Y e h, J. -R . ( 1 9 9 9 ). G lo b a l E nv iro nm e nta l Issu e s—f ro m th e V ie w p o in t o f T a iw a n. T a ip e i, T a iw a n: C H U LIU P U B LIS H E R . ( 葉俊榮 (1 99 9) 。全球環境議題 :臺灣觀點。臺北市 :巨流。 ) Inte rna tio na l A to m ic E ne rg y A ge ncy (1 99 4). C on ve ntio n o n N ucl ea r S afe ty. V ie nn a, A ust ria : Inte rna tio na l A to m ic E ne rg y A ge ncy .

(26)

The following sections will evaluate the adequacy and deficiency of the Convention on Nuclear Safety with respect to its objectives, implementation, assisting approaches, and equity.

2.3.1. Objectives

As described in Article 1 of the Convention, the objectives of this Convention are to enhance national measures and international safety related technical cooperation in order to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide, prevent accidents with radiological consequences, mitigate radiological consequences should they occur, establish effective defenses in potential radiological hazards of nuclear installations, and maintain the effective defenses. With the above effort, hopefully it could protect individuals, society, and the environment from harmful radiation of the nuclear installations.²² From the objectives, it could be inferred that this Convention requires each State Party to set up its own domestic legislation, regulatory methods, and safety standards rather than the central authority—IAEA—sets up a universal standard and obligates every Contracting Party to follow. Some people may argue that it would be better for the IAEA to set up a common regulation for all States Parties to follow, but actually it is very difficult because

―state sovereignty‖ is the principle of international law.²³ As Hunter et al. (2015) illustrates in Chapter 8.2., Principles Shaping International Environmental Law and Policy, of their publication, state sovereignty in the legal sense signifies independence—that is, ―the right to exercise, within a portion of the globe and to the exclusion of other States, the functions of a State such as the exercise of jurisdiction and enforcement of laws over persons therein.‖²⁴ In other words, there is no international convention which has the right to make a State Party obey the obligations. As a result, it would be more practical to let each State Party establish its own domestic legislation and reinforcement procedures, and then review each State Party‘s implementing status by regularly holding diplomatic conferences, and this is basically the way that was adopted in the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In addition, although the objectives of the Convention aim to facilitate technical cooperation, some people might think that it is better to ban the technically poor countries from constructing nuclear power plants. Once again, no international law could violate state sovereignty,²⁵ so technical cooperation is by far the best way to secure the nuclear safety worldwide.

2.3.2. Implementing Measures

In the Convention on Nuclear Safety, pursuant to Article 18, within the national law, each Contracting Party shall take the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention.²⁶ This certainly makes sense because each State Party has its own sovereignty; no international convention has the right to interfere the domestic affairs.²⁷ As a result, it is much more practical to let the States Parties decide their own affairs while the Convention provides a general

22 International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 6, at Article 1.

23 Hunter, supra note 19, at Chapter 8.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

27 Hunter, supra note 19, at Chapter 8.2.

(27)

direction. After all, any compulsory international convention is impossible.

Even the ―compulsory jurisdiction‖ of the International Court of Justice is not compulsory; instead, any State has the option not to accept the Court‘s jurisdiction. If and only if the State has granted its consent, it must subject itself to the Court‘s jurisdiction.²⁸

When it comes to the legislative and regulatory framework, Article 19 says that each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.²⁹ Meanwhile, the legislative and regulatory framework should provide for the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety a system of licensing of spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities a system of prohibition of the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility without a license the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licenses and a clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in different steps of spent fuel and of radioactive waste management.

In terms of the regulatory body that implements the legislative and regulatory framework, Article 20 provides that each Contracting Party should support the regulatory body with adequate authority, competent financial resources, and human resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.

Moreover, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure separation between the functions of the regulatory body and the functions of organizations that are involved in spent fuel management or radioactive waste management. As a matter of fact, the background of making this Convention was under the stress of the previous Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. Back in the time, the nuclear safety technology was not generally mature in most of the countries,³⁰ so it was difficult to set up a high standard that was universal for the entire world. It was rather applicable to let each State Party develop its own regulatory body and implementation organization like what was mentioned in this Convention. However, theoretically, under the design of the Convention, the peer review process should have boosted the progress of nuclear safety technology of each State Party over the years. As mentioned in Article 5 in the Convention, each Contracting Party must report the domestic measures that it took to meet the obligations of this Convention. Such report would then be reviewed in the regularly held review meetings; the peer pressure should force each State Party to enhance its domestic nuclear safety measures.

Unfortunately, it turns out that the peer review mechanism is more likely to be a form with very little realistic effects. According to the ―2011 Annual Report‖

submitted by the IAEA, in which the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster occurred in March 2011, in April 2011, the review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the

28 Alexandrov, S. A. (2006). The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:

How Compulsory Is It? Chinese Journal of International Law, 5(1), 29–38.

https://doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jml008

30 Jankowitsch-Prevor, O. (2006). The convention on nuclear safety. In The Convention on Nuclear Safety, In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, A Joint Report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (pp. 155-168).

(28)

Convention on Nuclear Safety was convened in Vienna.³¹ By instinct, in the review meeting especially right after the catastrophic nuclear disaster, the contracting parties should aggressively reexamine the existing articles and come up with a lot of improvements. However, it turned out that the Contracting Parties only made a specific statement in response to the accident.³²

2.3.3. Assisting Measures

In Chapter 3 of the Convention, there are detailed deliberation procedures of each review meeting. Furthermore, Article 29 provides that the disputes in between two or more Contracting Parties should be discussed and resolved in a review meeting.³³ Overall, the assisting measures are robust in this Convention that cover information dissemination, implementation assessment, and resolution of disputes. Even so, just like what was mentioned in the above discussion of implementing measures, there is doubt that the review meetings are simply a form without any effective influence on the improvement of nuclear safety. Or maybe the content of the review meetings are rich and effective, but it is the confidentiality provided in Article 36 in this Convention³⁴ that makes the IAEA Annual Report seems hollow.

2.3.4. Equitable Measures

In this Convention, Article 11 did mention that the financial and human resources must be plentiful enough and available throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation, and that each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all safety related activities for each nuclear installation,³⁵ but it did not mention how the developed countries could aid the developing countries in terms of the fund and techniques. Some may argue that such equitable measures are unnecessary since there are many energy options, and the countries without the necessary fund and techniques could simply decide not to use nuclear power plants.

However, as mentioned earlier for several times, each country has the absolute sovereignty to decide its domestic affairs,³⁶ so the States Parties must add the equitable measures as soon as possible in the future in order that the nuclear safety in the developing countries could be improved and hopefully the nuclear disasters would never happen again.

2.4. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Table 2 categorizes the articles in the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management into the four broad categories: objectives, implementing measures, assisting measures, and equitable measures based on the function of each article.

Moreover, both the categories of implementing measures and assisting

31 International Atomic Energy Agency (2012). IAEA Annual Report 2011. Vienna, Austria:

32 Burns, supra note 1, at 25.

33 International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 6, at 8-11.

36 Hunter, supra note 19, at Chapter 8.

(29)

measures could be broken down into more detailed subsets as elaborated in the introduction of the analytical method.

The following sections will evaluate the adequacy and deficiency of the Joint Convention with respect to its objectives, implementation, assisting approaches, and equity.

2.4.1. Objectives

As illustrated in Article 1, the objectives of this Convention are to ―achieve and maintain a high level of safety worldwide in spent fuel and radioactive waste management.‖³⁷ Furthermore, Article 1 also says that this Convention

―aims to ensure that during all stages of spent fuel and radioactive waste management, there are effective defenses against potential hazards so that

O bje ct ive s A rticl e 1 P ro hib itio n A rticl es 18 , 1 9, a nd 2 0 Q ua ntit ativ e R eg ula tio ns A rticl es 18 , 1 9, a nd 2 0 Im ple m en tin g M ea su re s P erm issi on A rticl es 18 , 1 9, a nd 2 0 C om pe nsa tio n o f D am ag e A rticl es 18 a nd 2 1 S an ct io ns A rticl es 18 a nd 2 0 Info rm atio n D isse m ina tio n A rticl es 6.1 .3 a nd 3 4 A ssi st ing M ea su re s Im ple m en ta tio n A sse ssm en t A rticl es 30 a nd 3 2 R eso luti on o f D isp ute s A rticl e 3 8 E qu ita ble M ea su re s A rticl e 2 2

S ou rce :

Y e h, J. -R . ( 1 9 9 9 ). G lo b a l E nv iro nm e nta l Issu e s—f ro m th e V ie w p o in t o f T a iw a n. Ta ip ei, Ta iw an : C H U LIU P U B LIS H E R . ( 葉俊榮 (1 99 9) 。全球環境議題 :臺灣觀點。臺北市 :巨流。 )

Table 2. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management andon the Safety of Radioloactive Waste Management

Th e ta ble p uts the a rticl es of Jo int C on ve ntio n in to d iffe re nt ca te go rie s ba se d o n the sp eci fic fun ct io n o f e ach a rticl e.

Inte rna tio na l A to m ic E ne rg y A ge ncy (1 99 7). Jo int C on ve ntio n o n th e S afe ty o f S pe nt F ue l M an ag em en t a nd o n th e S afe ty o f R ad io act ive W ast e M an ag em en t. V ie nn a, A ust ria : In te rna tio na l A to m ic E ne rg y A ge ncy .

(30)

individuals, society, and the environment are protected from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.‖³⁸ At last but not least, this Convention ―aims to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate their consequences should they occur during any stage of spent fuel or radioactive waste management.‖³⁹ Hopefully in this way, ―the usage of nuclear energy would not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs and aspirations.‖⁴⁰

As mentioned earlier, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, once a State Party has signed an international convention, it may no longer violate the objectives of that Convention even if it has not deposited the instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession yet.⁴¹ From this regard, those who drafted the Joint Convention seem to have done a good job crafting the objectives because the signatories could no longer do anything that is opposite to the hazard mitigation, accident prevention, and the intergenerational justice in terms of nuclear fuel and waste.

According to Di Nucci and Isidoro Losada (2015), the principles in the Joint Convention are non-binding, and there are no sanctions in the case of non-compliance. Even so, the Joint Convention is recognized internationally, and most countries have voluntarily incorporated these standards into their regulatory frameworks.⁴² Therefore, it is indeed an effective and successful Convention.

2.4.2. Implementing Measures

As mentioned before, just like any other nuclear safety conventions, the Joint Convention lets each State Party develop each of its own methods to meet the standards of the convention. For example, based on Article 18,

"within the national law, each Contracting Party shall take the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention." This is a very good approach because back in the time when the Joint Convention was under the process of adoption, even the technically advanced countries were not certain about how to come up with the universal standard for each country to comply with, and such phenomenon could be seen in the 2002 IAEA Annual report, the one that was released one year after the Joint Convention entered into force in June 2001.

In the ―Spent Fuel Management‖ section of the IAEA 2002 Annual Report, it could be seen that the IAEA would send consultant to the States Parties that have advanced spent fuel management technology. The results recorded by the consultants would then be put together and become the recommendations of Member States. Such recommendations were planned to release in 2003.⁴³ Although this seems to be the wonderful solution, it was only applied in the spent fuel management, but not on the management of radioactive waste. In

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., Article 1.3.

40 Ibid., Article 1.2.

41 United Nations, supra note 13.

42 Di Nucci, M. R., & Isidoro Losada, A. M. (2015). An Open Door for Spent Fuel and

Radioactive Waste Export? In Nuclear Waste Governance (pp. 79–97). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-08962-7_3

(31)

the same IAEA 2002 Annual Report, the ―Management of Radioactive Waste‖

section outlined the five key points, but none of them mentioned the way to craft a general standard for every Member State to follow.⁴⁴ In spite of such deficiency, it seems to be a good idea that ―A Radioactive Waste Management Registry was developed and the software package made available to Member States.‖⁴⁵ This would allow the experts of each State Party to peer review the site selections and safety of the radioactive waste disposal facilities worldwide.

In 2003, not only did the spent fuel management standard come out, but the Contracting Parties also showed great concern and cooperation toward the universal spent fuel governing criteria, as illustrated in the ―Joint Convention‖

section of the IAEA 2003 Annual Report.⁴⁶ While all States Parties had shown great willingness to comply with the Joint Convention in its early time since it entered into force, the only concern back then was ―the comparatively small number of Contracting Parties—numbering 33 at the end of 2003.‖⁴⁷ This number had increased to 69 as described in the IAEA 2018 Annual Report, and all the countries that are currently operating nuclear power plants have signed the Joint Convention except for Taiwan.⁴⁸ The Joint Convention is indeed in a good shape in terms of spent fuel management with clear universal standards, high participations from all Members States, and a complete coverage of all nuclear power plant countries worldwide.

When it comes to the radioactive waste management, on page 44 of the IAEA 2003 Annual Report clearly says that the document ―The Long Term Storage of Radioactive Waste: Safety and Sustainability‖ was already passed by the Board of Governors in 2003.⁴⁹ In the document ―The Long Term Storage of Radioactive Waste: Safety and Sustainability‖, the experts have provided plentiful information on the storage and disposal of the radioactive waste. For example, it tells each country to store the fresh radioactive waste for 3 to 5 years before it is moved to the dry storage. Moreover, the containers for the storage must be extremely durable and resistant to corrosion. The containers should be stored inside the concrete structure with security fence surrounding the structure to prevent people from entering it, and elaborate methods must be applied to detect any leakage of contaminants.⁵⁰ It is very likely that the radioactive waste issue could be perfectly resolved as long as each State Party complies with the guidelines. Although there might be skepticisms about the possibility that the radiation leaks out from the storage facility, according to Harrar et al. (1990), the nuclear waste storage facility is totally safe. Harrar et al. (1990) examined the water from the wells in Nevada that were extremely close to the discharge of nuclear power plant, but after detailed investigation, it was firmly concluded that there was absolutely no

44 Ibid., 59.

45 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 5.

49 International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 46, at 44.

50 International Atomic Energy Agency (2003). The Long Term Storage of Radioactive Waste:

Safety and Sustainable. Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency.

(32)

such radioactive contaminants in the samples.⁵¹ From the experiment, it could be seen that even the cooling water that runs through the nuclear reactor cores contains no radioactive pollutants, not to mention the safe and secure nuclear waste storage facilities in which the nuclear waste is sealed in extremely durable and corrosion-resistant containers and those containers are sealed in the concrete structure while the concrete structure is surrounding by fence with 24-hour continuous and elaborate monitoring on the leakage of contaminants.

The only problem might be the nuclear waste disposal issue afterwards. In accordance with the document ―The Long Term Storage of Radioactive Waste:

Safety and Sustainability‖, when the activity of the radioactive waste is below a certain level, it is ready for the geological disposal. The ideal disposal site should be 500 to 1,000 meters underground with no significant fracture zones or faults.⁵² This kind of geologically ideal site is indeed difficult to find in those small island states that are situated in the collision zone of different tectonic plates like Taiwan.

2.4.3. Assisting Measures

As mentioned in the previous sections, in the analytical method that is applied by this research, the assisting measures could be broken down into three types: information dissemination, implementation assessment, and resolution of disputes.⁵³ The Joint Convention indeed completely covers all the three aspects.

In terms of information dissemination, Article 29 provides the preparatory meeting for all Contracting Parties to determine the date of the first review meeting, set up Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules, and determine the structure, submission deadline, and reviewing process of the national reports.⁵⁴ This is undoubtedly a very good start for the Joint Convention. In fact, the preparatory meeting was the first meeting ever since the Joint Convention entered into force. By determining the date for the first review meeting, all Contracting Parties get to exchange the valuable information based on each of their own operational experiences in the early stage of the Joint Convention in the first review meeting. By setting up the Rules of Procedure and Financial Rules directly in the preparatory meeting, every Member State get to have the first-hand information on two of the most important document for future operation. Last but not least, since the States Parties determined the structure, submission deadline, and reviewing process of the national reports directly in the preparatory meeting, they had a clear idea about how to prepare for their own national reports over the following years for the first review meeting. The Joint Convention certainly did a phenomenal job when it comes to information dissemination, and it is worthwhile for other Conventions to learn from in the future whether they are relevant to nuclear power or not.

As for implementation assessment, Article 32 regulates that the national reports must include the management practices, the location and essential

51 Harrar, J. E., Carley, J. F., Isherwood, W. F., and Raber, E. (1990). Report of the Committee to Review the Use of J-13 Well Water in Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations.

Virginia, VA: National Technical Information Service, US Department of Commerce.

52 International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 50, at 4-10.

surrounded

(33)

features of each management facility, a specific inventory of the domestic spent fuel and radioactive waste, and a specific list of the domestic decommissioning nuclear installations.⁵⁵ This approach is excellent because the States Parties can peer review the implementing status of each country based on the submitted national reports. If they find out anything wrong in a Member State either because its domestic management practices did not follow the standard operation procedures (i.e. the aforementioned ―The Long Term Storage of Radioactive Waste: Safety and Sustainability‖ issued by the experts) or due to the dangerous site selection of a management facility (e.g.

the disposal site is too close to an active fault), they can immediately require that State Party to improve. For instance, in the ―Review Services‖ part under the ―Management of Radioactive Waste‖ section in the IAEA 2009 Annual Report, it was recorded that all the radioactive waste management facilities in Ukraine were subject to a large-scale review by the IAEA. Moreover, the Central Organization for Radioactive Waste facilities in the Netherlands was also evaluated by the IAEA to see if the treatment and storage process complied with the safety standards. The technical documentation of a proposed low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Saligny, Romania was also reviewed by the IAEA.⁵⁶ The safety standards were based on the ―IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5‖, which contains detailed requirements on the protection of human health, the preservation of the environment, the treatment on nuclear waste before disposal, and the development of the management facilities.⁵⁷ The nuclear safety conventions generally let each State Party develop its own regulatory system and implementing measures, as discussed in the previous sections. However, it seems that the review meetings are still capable of governing the nuclear safety worldwide once a problem is pointed out during the international conference of all Member States. In the aforementioned cases, the facilities in the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Romania were all subject to the evaluation by the IAEA.

At last but not least, when it comes to the resolution of disputes, Article 38 provides that the Contracting Parties shall consult within the framework of a meeting to resolve the disagreement.⁵⁸ This seems inadequate especially when considering the potential conflicts that might occur in terms of the spent fuel and radioactive waste management issues. As mentioned earlier, countries like Taiwan could hardly find a place for permanent nuclear waste disposal because there are too many geological fault lines. An alternative way to cope with this problem is to export the nuclear waste to other countries where the geologic conditions are more stable. According to the latest edition of ―Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (2018 Edition)‖, before each shipment of any package, it shall be ensured that the package design matches the radionuclides that are being transported, the attachments that do not match the requirements have been lifted, and certain types of

57 International Atomic Energy Agency (2009). Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste. Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency.

福島核災後的核能發電安全制度檢討—從國際法架構到臺灣的個案分析

International Degree Program in Climate Change and Sustainable Development College of Science

National Taiwan University Master Thesis

T a b le 1 . C o n v e n tio n o n N u c le a r S a fe ty Th e ta ble p uts the a rticl es into d iffe re nt ca te go rie s ba se d o n th e sp eci fic fun ct io n o f e ach a rticl e.

S ou rce :

S ou rce :

Y e h, J. -R . ( 1 9 9 9 ). G lo b a l E nv iro nm e nta l Issu e s—f ro m th e V ie w p o in t o f T a iw a n. Ta ip ei, Ta iw an : C H U LIU P U B LIS H E R . ( 葉俊榮 (1 99 9) 。全球環境議題 :臺灣觀 點。臺北市 :巨流。 )

Th e ta ble p uts the a rticl es of Jo int C on ve ntio n in to d iffe re nt ca te go rie s ba se d o n the sp eci fic fun ct io n o f e ach a rticl e.

Inte rna tio na l A to m ic E ne rg y A ge ncy (1 99 7). Jo int C on ve ntio n o n th e S afe ty o f S pe nt F ue l M an ag em en t a nd o n th e S afe ty o f R ad io act ive W ast e M an ag em en t. V ie nn a, A ust ria : In te rna tio na l A to m ic E ne rg y A ge ncy .

Y e h, J. -R . ( 1 9 9 9 ). G lo b a l E nv iro nm e nta l Issu e s—f ro m th e V ie w p o in t o f T a iw a n. Ta ip ei, Ta iw an : C H U LIU P U B LIS H E R . ( 葉俊榮 (1 99 9) 。全球環境議題 :臺灣觀點。臺北市 :巨流。 )