Chapter 6 結論
6.2 單一網路結構下的政策選擇
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環模式，長期下來經濟體系呈現最劇烈的波動情況。結合理論與實際，未來研究 者或許可用無標度網路結構強大的中心性特徵來解釋某些總體經濟的情況。
以上是關於網路結構特徵性的推論。由於本次模擬實驗的模型依據為簡化後 的新凱因斯動態隨機模型，且實驗中載入的網路樣本並不多，故以上推論的效度 與信度仍有許多改進空間；未來，透過擴大模擬實驗的網路樣本數與參數設定，
配合迴歸分析等驗證方法，相信能有效地強化網路結構特徵分析的價值。
進一步觀察本次代理人基網路總體模型的模擬結果，本研究發現，在某種程 度上央行採用權衡式貨幣政策或法則式貨幣政策的效果差距不大，表示貨幣政策 的改變不一定是影響經濟波動的主要因素；實驗結果也指出，在某些特定的社會 網路結構下執行政策，可以有效率的達成經濟穩定的目標。因此，隱藏在總體經 濟社會背後的網路結構，或許才是影響政策執行成功於否的先決條件。但，同前 段所述，由於本次實驗的模型依據與參數設定仍存在諸多限制，若想強化「網路 結構重於貨幣政策選擇」此論證的可信度，未來必須擴大模擬的模型範疇與嘗試 更多可能的網路結構，同時設置多組參數來印證。
6.2 單一網路結構下的政策選擇
本研究後半針對個別網路結構進行政策有效性分析，分析結果顯示，在本次 實驗採用的十個網路結構中，沒有一個網路結構可讓本模型下的權衡與法則成為 絕對有效的支配策略。只要央行欲穩定其中某一變數的波動，勢必會加劇另一個 變數的波動情況，產出缺口與通貨膨脹波動性存在負向的抵換關係；因此，在本 次模擬的模型架構下，權衡政策或法則政策只能鎖定單一變數的穩定性，無法同 時兼顧產出缺口穩定與通貨膨脹穩定的目標。往後的研究可以嘗試運用不同的衡 量標準，持續比較不同貨幣政策模擬效果的優劣性，在特定目標下歸納出各網路 結構中表現最佳的政策選擇。
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6.1,6.2 節闡述了本次研究的主要結論。未來，研究者可以建置更完整的社會 網路與總體模型，透過參數設定模擬多組貨幣政策，擴大模擬實驗的範圍，並嘗 試使用其他衡量貨幣政策有效度的方法與指標(舉例，考慮平均通膨率，針對變 數設定比較權數等)，重新驗證或改良本次模擬實驗推得的假設與結論；一旦前 述假設與結論得到充分的支撐與修正，後續研究便可建構於此基礎之上，延續社 會網路分析與經濟議題的整合應用。
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附錄
附表 1 網路結構與不同貨幣政策組合之平均波動計算(λ =0.1)