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相較於國際四大會計師事務所，財務主管較於審計委員會的相對影響力越 大，企業更傾向於選擇其它非十大本土會計師事務所，對高質量外部審計的需 求更小。國有企業對這種情況有所抑制；較於地方政府控股企業，中央政府控 股企業對這種情況的抑制效果更為明顯。
相較於本土六大會計師事務所，財務主管較於審計委員會的相對影響力越 大，企業更傾向於選擇其它非十大本土會計師事務所，對高質量外部審計的需 求更小。國有企業對這種情況有所抑制；較於地方政府控股企業，中央政府控 股企業對這種情況的抑制效果更為明顯。
相較於國際四大會計師事務所，財務主管較於審計委員會的相對影響力越 大，企業更傾向於選擇本土六大會計師事務所，對高質量外部審計的需求更 小。地方政府控股企業對這種情況有所加強。
第二節、研究展望
本研究在前期數據處理時，並未進行資料插補，對與資料不足觀測值採取 直接刪除的處理方式。在去除不全樣本後，可能產生推論性之疑慮，從而在一 定程度上影響研究結論。
在對審計品質的衡量上，將十大會計師事務所視為高審計質量，而在實際 中，影響審計質量的因素有很多，不僅僅只有會計師事務所規模；並且十大會 計師事務所之間，以及非十大會計師事務所之間提供的審計服務質量也有差 別。
本研究可從以下幾方面作改善：
1.完善數據處理，對缺失數據進行收集及資料插補，使研究結論更具說服 力。
2.進一步考慮各省份之間的市場化程度對被解釋變數的影響。
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