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第三節 研究建議
本研究實證結果顯示，董監事連結數量愈多、兼任比例愈高，皆與經營績效 呈現顯著負向關係；相反地，公司愈是居於網絡中之橋梁位置，愈能提升經營績 效。由此可知，從董監事連結行為之多重構面來看，其為公司帶來的價值有所不 同。一旦有過度的連結行為，不但無法提升公司經營績效，還可能影響監督品質 而產生反作用，因此，公司應適度地對連結行為加以管理，並以彈性方式、策略 性作為回應外在環境之變化。
本研究以台灣電子業上市公司為研究對象，其緊密的垂直與水平合作之特 性，致使本研究實證結果是否可類推至其他產業與網絡關係，有待進一步驗證。
本研究建議未來研究者可將上櫃公司納入研究對象，並擴大至其他產業，使研究 結果更加完善。另外，本研究係以特定的時點來分析董監事名單，至於是否加入 時間因素，藉由觀察社會網絡之動態連結，可做為未來研究方向。
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