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第六章 結論
本文透過垂直差異化模型描述消費者行為，並仿照 Grossman and Shapiro (1988) 一文，假設市場存在多家非環保標章廠商與一家環保標章廠商，並於本國市場進 行價格競爭的兩國兩廠商理論模型，主要探討環保標章制度的存在下，最適污染 稅的相關分析，並進一步分析全球化和區域整合下，調降進口關稅對國內外廠商 產品的銷售量及環境品質的影響。由模型中我們得到以下結論：
一、非環保標章產品的存在，雖然必然會使得環保標章廠商之產品價格下降、利 潤減少，但有可能造成環保標章產品的銷售量因此而增加。
二、政府在追求社會福利極大的目標下，當同時存在環保標章與非環保標章產品 且本國為環保標章廠商時，將對污染進行課稅。關稅下降促使本國政府提高污染 稅，造成國外非環保標章產品銷售量增加，本國環保標章產品銷售量減少，因此 國內的環境品質隨著關稅下降而惡化。
三、政府在追求社會福利極大化的目標下，當同時存在環保標章與非環保標章產 品且本國為非環保標章廠商時，將對污染進行補貼。關稅下降促使本國政府提高 污染補貼，導致外國環保標章產品銷售量增加，本國非環保標章產品銷售量不確 定，但國內的環境品質隨著關稅下降而惡化。
四、就全球福利的觀點而言，當本國為環保標章廠商時，由於國外廠商為完全競 爭的市場結構，故國外廠商的超額利潤為零，其結果與單一考量本國社會福利的 情況相同。至於當本國為非環保標章廠商的情況下，則對污染進行課稅，且關稅 的下降促使污染稅跟著調降，導致 非環保標章產品銷售量下滑，環保標章產品的 銷售量增加，因此國內的環境品質隨著關稅下降而改善。
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