75-INSAG-7 車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告中英對照翻譯之說 明：
由於在國內找不到有關「75-INSAG-7 車諾比爾事故摘要修 訂版」報告的公開的中英對照翻譯資料，但為了瞭解車諾比爾事 故與安全文化之間的關聯性，則又必需將「75-INSAG-7 車諾比 爾事故摘要修訂版」報告中與 safety culture 相關的條文逐一 中英對照翻譯，否則無法瞭解安全文化的起源，及其相關性。
「75-INSAG-7 車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版」報告總共有 135 頁，
經對照、統計後，發現總共有 13 個段落與安全文化有直接相 關，茲為便於對照、說明出處，將其條列於以供社會大眾參考。
然而，翻譯是一件不容意的事，其字詞常受個人背景、文 化之不同而有所不同，故不適當或謬誤之處，再所難免，若讀者 覺 得 有 「 不 適 當 或 謬 誤 」 之 處 ， 敬 請 不 吝 指 教 並 E-mail
[email protected] 翁慶 良電子信箱內，以便修
正。1. Efforts to enhance the safety of RBMK reactors will
continue; however, international assistance can only achieve a fraction of what has to be done at the national level. In addition, the general issues mentioned earlier require sustained efforts to upgrade the national nuclear safety regime before a safety culture can be inculcated at all levels and in all the
organizations concerned.
加強RBMK（鈾石墨沸水管）反應器安全的努力將予以持續,然而 國際的支援只能完成國家級的片斷成就。此外,先前所提到的一 般問題,必須要持續的努力以使安全文化能深植於所有階層及相 關組織裡,以提昇國家核能安全制度。
（資料來源：INSAG-7車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告之前言）
2. (1)Isolation of the emergency core cooling system
(14 ：00：00, 25 April) 【 切斷 緊 急 爐心 冷 卻 系 統 (14：
00：00,25April)】
It was stated in INSAG-1 that blocking of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) was a violation of procedures. However, recent Soviet information confirms that blocking of the ECCS was in fact permissible at Chernobyl if authorized by the Chief Engineer, and that this authorization was given for the tests leading up to the accident and was even an approved step in the test procedure. INSAG believes that this point did not affect the initiation and development of the accident. However, it must be recognized that the plant was being operated at half power for the period of approximately 11 hours leading up to the accident, with the ECCS blocked out. This could be viewed as no violation only if the 11 hour
period of half power operation were part of the planned test, which it clearly was not. Blocking the ECCS over this period and permitting operation for a prolonged period with a vital safety system unavailable are indicative of an absence of safety culture.
INSAG-1報告中提到切斷緊急爐心冷卻系統(ECCS),係違反了程 序。然而,近期蘇聯的資訊確認：在車諾比爾,如在值班主管的 授權下,切斷緊急爐心冷卻系統(ECCS)事實上是被允許的；而且 這項權限係被授予在造成意外事故的測試上,甚至是被認可之測 試過程中的一項步驟。INSAG相信,這一點並不影響事故的發生 及發展。然而,大家必須知道：在緊急爐心冷卻系統(ECCS)的切 斷下,電廠處於半載狀態大約11小時而導致事故發生。只要這11 小時的半載操作是電廠測試的一部份,則這項切斷可以視為未違 反程序,但卻明顯不是。在這段時間內切斷緊急爐心冷卻系統 (ECCS),並允許長時間在重要安全系統失效下操作,係顯示是一 種安全文化的缺乏。
（資料來源：INSAG-7車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告第10頁）
3. Disabling of the ECCS was not prohibited in principle
under normal procedures at Chernobyl. INSAG
understands that it was a requirement of the test
schedule, and, in accordance with regulations, special approval for this disabling had been obtained from the Chief Engineer. In any case, it was not necessary to
disable the ECCS for such a long period of time. INSAG believes that this did not affect the accident, but it did manifest a poor level of safety culture.
在車諾比爾的標準程序下,使緊急爐心冷卻系統(ECCS)的失效, 並未被準則所禁止。國際核能安全顧問團(INSAG)了解：那是 測試計劃的需求,然而,根據規定,本項失效必須獲得值班主管 的特許。在任何狀況下,使緊急爐心冷卻系統(ECCS)失效如此 長的時間,是非必要的。國際核能安全顧問團(INSAG)相信：其 並不影響這個事故,但却顯明了低水準的安全文化。
（資料來源：INSAG-7車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告第18頁）
4. 5.2.3 Other deficiencies in safety culture(其它 安全 文
化方面的缺失)
The foregoing discussion is in many ways an indication of lack of safety culture. Criticism of lack of safety culture was a major component of INSAG-1, and the present review does not diminish that charge. Two examples already mentioned are worthy of emphasis, since they bear on the particular instincts required in reactor operation.
前述的討論在各方面而言,顯示了安全文化的缺乏。對安全 文化缺乏的評論是INSAG-1的主要內容,而目前的復審並未減低 其責難,前已提過的兩個例子值得強調,因為它們與反應器操作 所需的特殊性質有關。
The reactor was operated with boiling of the coolant water in the core and at the same time with little or no subcooling at the pump intakes and at the core inlet. Such a mode of operation in itself could have led to a destructive accident of the kind that did ultimately occur, in view of the characteristics of positive reactivity feedback of the RBMK reactor.
Failure to recognize the need to avoid such a situation points to the flaws in operating a nuclear power plant without a thorough and searching safety analysis, and with a staff untutored in the findings of such a safety analysis and not steeped in safety culture.
這種反應器的操作是將爐心的冷卻水予以沸騰,同時有些許 或 沒 有 的 次 冷 卻 於 泵 浦 及 爐 心 的 入 口 。 根 據 鈾 石 墨 沸 水 管 (RBMK)反應器的正反應回饋特性,以此操作模式終究可能造成 其本身毀滅性事故的發生。未鑑別出要避免這種情況,顯示了 操作核能電廠而沒有徹底洞察此安全分析的瑕疵,並且未教育 員工,致使員工無法發現這種安全分析及未沉浸在安全文化 中。
This last remark is especially pertinent to the second point, which concerns operation of the reactor with almost all control and safety rods withdrawn to positions where they would be ineffective in achieving
a quick reduction in reactivity if shutdown were suddenly needed. Awareness of the necessity of avoiding such a situation should be second nature to any responsible operating staff and to any designers responsible for the elaboration of operating instructions for the plant.
最後論述的第二點乃最為貼切,此論述是有關反應器之所有的 控制及安全棒幾乎都被抽回,致使無法在緊急停機時,能迅速降 低反應的地步。認知要避免此種情況的必要性,是每個負責操 作的員工及每個擔負電廠操作手冊之細部設計者的第二天性
（經過後天學習而成的習慣）。 （資料來 源：INSAG-7車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告第19頁）
5. 5.3 SAFETY FRAMEWORK(安全準則)
INSAG-1 concentrated on the immediate issues of the Chernobyl accident and made little reference to the regulatory and general safety framework within which the plant was operated. A number of matters have since come to light and assertions have been made that make it right at this time to present broader views.
INSAG-1的報告,集中於車諾比爾事故的直接問題而很少提 及運轉電廠的內部管理及一般安全準則。有一些問題至今已真 相大白,而有一些評斷正好趁現在可以做更加寬廣的審查。
The SCSSINP Commission (Annex I, Section 1-3) has
compared the design of Chernobyl Unit 4 with the declared safety requirements at the time of design, stating that the design fell well short of the
standards set. INSAG notes that a number of the issues raised in the report of the SCSSINP Commission mirror its own concerns.
工業及核能發電安全監督委員會（SCSSINP,附錄I,章節1-3）將車諾比第四部發電機組的設計與設計時所宣稱的安全要 求做比較,結論是：設計極度缺乏標準。國際核能安全顧問團
（INSAG）注意到工業及核能發電安全監督委員會（SCSSINP）
在報告中所提的一些問題,並反映了他們自己所關心的事。
This point is further discussed in the following sections.
此點將於以下章節深入討論。
（資料來源：INSAG-7車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告第20頁）
6. 5.6.1 General deficiencies (一般的缺失)
The assurance of safety in the face of the inevitable pressures to meet production goals requires a dedicated operating organization and a strong and independent regulatory regime, properly resourced, backed at Government level and with all necessary enforcement powers. This sort of regime did not exist in the USSR at the time of the accident.
要達成生產目標及又要面對確保安全之不可避免的壓力,需 要一個專注的營運組織及堅強而獨立的管理制度、適當的資 源、政府級的支援以及具有全然必要的強制力。在事故發生時, 這種制度並未存在於蘇聯。
INSAG is informed that the regulatory regime was ineffective in many important areas, such as analysing the safety of the design and operation of plants, in requirements for training and for the introduction and promotion of safety culture, and in the enforcement of regulations. It did not function as an independent component in ensuring safety.
國際核能安全顧問團（INSAG）知道其管理制度在許多重 要方面是無效的,諸如：設計及操作電廠的安全分析,要求因引 進及提升安全文化的訓練,以及規定的強力執行。其在確保安 全之獨立運作部份,並未產生作用。
（資料來源：INSAG-7車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告第21 頁）
7.
5.7 GENERAL REMARKS ON THE LACK OF safety culture（缺乏安全文化的一般評論）
In its report on the Chernobyl accident, INSAG coined the term 'safety culture' to refer to the safety regime that should prevail at a nuclear plant.
In its later report, INSAG-4, safety culture3, which
expounded the concept, INSAG traced the development of a safety culture to its origin in the national regime of law relating to nuclear safety. This establishes the proper chain of responsibility and authority for the required level of safety. In both operating and regulatory regimes, safety culture must be instilled in organizations through proper attitudes and practices of management. It has been pointed out several times in the preceding discussion that safety culture was lacking in the operating regime at Chernobyl. In conformity with its views as expressed in INSAG-4, INSAG now confirms the view that safety culture had not been properly instilled in nuclear power plants in the USSR prior to the Chernobyl accident. Many of its requirements seem to have existed in regulations, but these were not enforced.
Many other necessary features did not exist at all.
Local practices at nuclear plants, of which it may be assumed that practices at Chernobyl were typical, did not reflect a safety culture.
在車諾比爾的報告內,國際核能安全顧問團(INSAG)創造了
"安全文化"的術語,以說明安全制度必須普及於核能電廠。在 其稍後編號為INSAG-4,安全文化的報告中,解釋了這個概念。
國際核能安全顧問團（INSAG）追溯安全文化的發展,至其起源 的核能相關法令之國家制度,以使在必要之安全水準的責任及
職權間,建立了適當的連結。在操作及管理之兩個制度上,安全 文化必須經由適當的態度及管理的執行,以灌輸在組織裡。先 前的討論已數度指出：在車諾比爾之操作制度上,缺乏了安全 文化。此一致性的觀點,被陳述於INSAG-4；國際核能安全顧問 團（INSAG）現在已確認：車諾比爾事故發生以前,蘇聯未將安 全文化適當地灌輸於核能電廠內。許多要求似乎存在規章內, 但未見強力實施；其它必要的特性,甚至一點也不存在。由該 區核能電廠的運作,可推知車諾比爾的運作是未反映出安全文 化的典型。
（資料來源：INSAG-7車諾比爾事故摘要修訂版報告第21頁）
8. CONCLUSIONS ON FACTORS CONTRIBUTORYTO THE ACCIDENT(事
故相關因素的結論)
(1) Information coming to light since 1986 on the accident at Chernobyl Unit 4 has been reviewed. It has been approached with caution in recognition that further information yet to come might change the picture again. However, it appears now that the main outlines of the problems are becoming clear.
1986年發生車諾比4號機事故以來,其所揭露的資料再度被重 新探討。它被仔細探討,而且大家知道進一步的新資可能再次 改變了情況。然而,問題的主要輪廓目前似乎漸漸明確了。
(2) In 1986, INSAG issued its report INSAG-1, which discussed the Chernobyl accident and its causes on