1. Introduction
1.2 Analyses of the Problematics
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1.2 Analyses of the Problematics
First Problematic. In the commentary literature of Dignāga's epistemology and the commentary literature of Kant's epistemology, a controversy over interpretation has been raging over how one should understand the faculties25 and the epistemic system consisting of said faculties with regard to their ontological assumption.
The Indo-Tibetan discussions centered around the issue of Dignāga's idea of self-awareness (svasaṁvitti), evolving from Candrākīrti (ca. 600 – 650 C.E.) on through Dharmakīrti (ca. 600 – 660 C.E.), Jinendhrabuddhi (ca. 710 – 770 C.E.26),
Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750 – 810 C.E.) and Dharmottara (ca. 740 – 800 C.E.). Also, as suggested by the later, 11-century Bhramin thinker Rāmakaṇṭha and observed by Dan Arnold (2005), there was a gradual shift from treating these epistemological terms as individual “mere (offhand) things” to treating them as “conditions.” Meanwhile, the branch in China, viz., Xuanzang's Vijñāptimātratā (Xuanzang ca. 602 – 664 C.E.), which I consider to be a strong (not implying intentional) opponent to the ontic reception of Dignāga's philosophy, served as a vivid non-ontic counterpart in the tradition.
Almost in parallel, the German idealists tended to read Kant, who also focused on the issue of self-awareness, with a stronger ontological assumption that was covertly or overtly questioned by the later Kantians (D. Henrich, 1973, D.S. Pacini ed.). The Kantian pioneers in North America also read Kant's epistemology with a strong ontological assumption. A prime example was P. F. Strawson, who believed that the
“unnecessary” and “unfortunate” transcendental idealism should be removed from the
25 “Measure or means of cognition, pramāṇa” in Dignāga (ca. 480 – 540 C.E.) and “faculty, power, Vermögen or sometimes dynamis, falcultas, Fakultät,” in Kant (1724 – 1804 C.E.)
26 Funayama (1999: 92).
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first Critique and that the epistemic system, entailed in the “analytic argument” of the Critique (entitled by Strawson) – the transcendental arguments that are
“uncontaminated” by idealistic premises – can stand alone without requiring the support of an idealistic ground (1966: 240). Paul Guyer followed Strawson in thinking that Kant's attributing space and time should be granted to the appearance alone, though he believed also that things in themselves should be understood as ordinary objects like tables and chairs which are by nature distinct from our
representation of them in the spatiotemporal appearance. Therefore, he posited that transcendental idealism is not necessary for Kant while a “dogmatic metaphysical idealism” would suffice (1987: 335-336); here, an ontological presumption can
clearly be observed. Rae Langton (1998) even depicted Kant as a “scientific realist,”
in the term's modern literal meaning. However, this strong realistic acceptance of Kant was later on questioned by scholars such as John McDowell and Henry Allison.
They became more in favor of treating these terms as “condition” (McDowell) or
“not with ontological value” (Allison). In particular, Allison advocated for the two-aspect view to replace the comparatively standard “two-world view” of Kant's
phenomenal-noumenal distinction, in direct defense of Kant's transcendental idealism (1983/2004). On the other side, the continental scholarship over the past century seems to me to have maintained a much greater awareness of the problem, since one will observe far less frequently in that scholarship instances where an interpretation of Kant is bundled with some understanding of these terms with tacit, strong
ontological assumption. Also, unlike the situation in North America, it is not so often the case that Kant can be treated without undertaking a serious consideration of his position on transcendental idealism and his peculiar idea of space and time as mere forms of representation.
Whether these two epistemological systems should be taken without any ontological assumption, together with the problem of how this can be accomplished, is the initial problematic of this investigation.
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Second Problematic. The epistemology in both Dignāga and Kant is not isolated. It is at the service of practical needs.
The relation is clearer in Kant, especially within the three Critiques and other related works such as Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) and Prolegomena, that epistemology as a grand argument supports the position of transcendental
idealism and the distinction of the phenomenal/sensible and the
noumenal/intelligible, and hence anticipates freedom, which is the proof of morality (KpV27) as well as the basis of its metaphysics (GMS).
On the other side, albeit with Dignāga, we may not have a strong plan as clear-cut as what we have with Kant or even with other like-minded Buddhist thinkers (e.g., Dharmakīrti); on at least three points, we are obliged to admit that the epistemology of Dignāga indeed anticipates a further practical end aside from the end as providing a ground for the conventional, theoretical polemics among the Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. (1) With the literature of Dignāga himself, the claims that the Buddha be the “personification of the means of cognition (pramāṇa-bhūta)” (PS(V) 1.1) and that the (epistemological) treatises hereby aim to guide those tīrthika lost amid the stream of saṃsāra to return to the right path (NMukh, last verse), and their related commentaries or allusions, especially those compiled in the commentaries and works of Kuiji (632 – 682 C.E.) and Huizhao (651 – 714 C.E.), we are so obliged.
Besides, (2) within both the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna classical sutras and
treatises, the role that epistemology plays is so profound and so difficult to ignore that we can hardly omit its commonly agreed function from the project of liberation
27 “Now, the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodeictic law of practical reason, constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of the system of pure reason, even of speculative reason; and all other concepts (those of God and immortality), which as mere ideas remain without support in the latter, now attach themselves to this concept and with it and by means of it get stability and objective reality, that is, their possibility is proved by this: that freedom is real, for this idea reveals itself through moral law” (Cambridge edition of KpV, 5: 4-5;
emphasis is mine).
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without more rigorous grounds and arguments.28 (3) Also, with Buddhism as a historical or religiously practical whole – especially as an entire project devoted to the attainment of liberation – to establish the means for proper cognition only for the sake of conventional communications (scientific or technical deliberation) is not sufficiently justified within the project. The burden of justification actually rests upon the camp claiming that Buddhist epistemology should merely be established for the purpose of treating the simple theoretical or technical problems at the conventional level, or only in passive response to the non-Buddhists. We need to ask: (1) what is the role of epistemology in the process of religious practice, (2) what is the
significance of epistemology in the philosophy of Buddhism, and (3) what is the feature which distinguishes Buddhist epistemology from other non-Buddhist epistemologies that makes Buddhism a more persuasive philosophy?
To sum up, the exact role of the epistemology in each of the Buddhist and Kant's grander projects of practice is the second problematic of the investigation. To be more precise, with Kant, the investigation is to focus on how and whether Kant's epistemology succeeds in supporting transcendental idealism together with the phenomenal-noumenal distinction, as well as the vision of a practical philosophy thereupon. As an initial attempt, we deal with Kant's resolution to the Third Antinomy in KrV, to illustrate how Kantian epistemology indeed succeeds in
supporting transcendental idealism and anticipating freedom as a fact. With Dignāga, the investigation involves reconstructing a reasonable, historical as well as
philosophical significance of such a Buddhist epistemology in the context of the
28 In vol. 531, Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the Buddha says that a bodhisattva as in the cause-position and a buddha as in the result-position cognize the particular aspect (sva-lakṣaṇa) and the universal aspect (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of every dharma completely without any concealment and defilement. “於一切法自相、共相照了無闇清淨具足，住
因位時名為菩薩，若至果位即名如來.”
In vol. 6, Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra, the Buddha is described as knowing the particular aspect and the universal aspect of every dharma with Subtle Observing Wisdom, so that all the confusions surrounding these two aspects are removed …... “如是如來妙觀察智，遍知一切自相共相，能斷世間一切疑惑自共相愚，是疑惑因知自共相無 此愚故，自無疑惑能斷他疑，大圓鏡智永離二障不愚...”
In A Pi Tan Xin Lun, it is said that whoever knows the particular aspect and the universal aspect of every dharma can lay claim to being the Buddha. “能知諸法自相、共相，名為佛”.
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Buddhist project of practice, especially after Nāgārjuna's dominant criticism of the epistemology proposed by the Nyāya school (a realistic stance). This will necessarily place Dignāga in the middle of the fight, or the continuation, between the two main Mahāyāna branches: the Madhyamaka and Yogacārā.
The Main Contribution of the investigation of these problematics rests on
answering the second by determining the first. In order to do so, the investigation seeks to deal first with a philosophical question: what is epistemology? We raise two challenges against the epistemology with the ontological assumption (assuming that the epistemological terms have already had “real” references and that they “co-work”
in “real causal” relations) – viz., Logical Question 1: the results cannot be “really”
presupposed in their causes; and Logical Qestion 2: direct (sensational) experiences cannot occur “logically” prior to the indirect (conceptual) experiences. As such, the investigation suggests that the epistemology will need to be implemented critically and radically (attributing no ontological assumption to the epistemological terms);
accordingly, the investigation would also suggest the rejection of the ontic
interpretation line of the two epistemic systems, since the interpretations would be basically and philosophically problematic. Next, the investigation attempts to formulate reasonable and coherent reconstructions of these two epistemic systems with “critical” and “radical” attitudes. Being reasonable and coherent means that (a) the interpretation discrepancies can be more easily reconciled or explained away with this interpretation and (b) stronger and more coherent significance of epistemology in the context of the higher plan of both Dignāga and Kant can be obtained with the critical interpretation. As the findings and reconstructions of the investigation would suggest, the critical interpretation is not only more plausible than the ontic
interpretation, but it is indeed also the case that the two epistemic systems can better sustain themselves with the non-ontic reading.
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Exposition of Key Ideas and Clarifications. The idea of transcendental logic is basically derived from Kant. Here, in this investigation, the term is generalized to mean the epistemic condition in the following 3 senses: (1) the epistemic condition of the general logic and its operation. With the condition, the regularity in thinking about objects (concepts) and thinking of them in relations (repeatable laws) is made possible, while the term “laws” is meant in a broad sense, including the (natural) laws adopted in theoretical reasoning and the (natural) laws that can be willed in the
universal consideration (in freedom/morality). (2) It is also intended that transcendental logic is the epistemic condition for our direct experience to be extended in space and time “as so intuited.” (3) Ruling out all of the ontological assumptions in the Buddhist epistemology immediately suggests that there is implied in the Buddhist epistemic system the transcendental logic – the condition for any empirical inference in our experience to be possible (and for the validity of each instance of inference to be questionable and determinable). This suggestion, as the findings will indicate, may prove to be a better option than those options regarding the Buddhist logic as a subdivision of the abstract formal or general logic, a stance that most of the contemporary researchers have tacitly presumed to be what Dignāga had in mind with his treaties on logic. Also, the understanding has more
epistemological as well as practical contents than the understanding that the Buddhist logic is a combination of Indian logic and the rules of polemics (Daqi Chen and S.
Katsura)29.
29 To the best of my knowledge, all of the scholars in the 20th century Chinese circle treated Dignāga's logic as one type of the theories concerning formal/general logic; in other words, the treatises of this logic are carried out with an attempt to establish an objective, universal logic theory, toward which the other western modern studies of logic are also heading. The thrusts of these studies center on collating the formulae, identifying the flaws within the formulae and deciding whether the system is induction or deduction, mainly with the use of apparatus that modern logic studies have so far uncovered. However, in Daqi Chen (1952), we can observe a direct attempt to relocate Dignāga's logic treatise in the context of epistemology, which has often been observed in the classical Chinese Yin-ming tradition. Besides, in both Chen and Katsura (2010), the polemics context of Buddhist logic was emphasized.
Katsura (2010) offered a summary of the Japanese scholarship on Buddhist logic during the second half of the 20th century (pp. 254-259); Weihong Zheng (1996: 199 – 244) compiled a summary of the Chinese scholarship during 1919 – 1949. Both accounts indicated that the development of Buddhist logic in the 20th century Asia was basically a component of the globalized formal logic. In Zheng's view, the most influential scholars of Buddhist logic in the 20th century China were Cheng Lü and Daqi Chen, with Lü representing the old approach of the Chinese Yin-ming tradition and inclined toward epistemology and Chen embodying the approach of modern logic.
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The notion of spiritual development in this investigation is limited to the process of positioning the absolute, highest point in our conscious experience. By spirit, I refer to that which is non-sensible, non-material and non-cognizable but possible and true in “consciousness,” and which is also understood, similarly to the common
understanding, as the core value of the sentient being with consciousness. In other words, spiritual development here refers not to a process from the sensible experience to the ontologically transcendent experience but to the re-ascertainment of the fact:
the continual up-lifting of the self-awareness, the awareness that the self-awareness is by nature distinct from the cognized subject (pathological subject and psychological subject), which can be possible only with the precondition of the factuality of self-awareness and avails itself of the fact that such a precondition takes on a distinctive, individual and always-superior position in the scope of the conscious experience.
It is however not intended here that the two ideas with their so-limited contents are assumed to be true at the outset. Nor is it intended that the limited meanings of the two ideas will mark the end of the arguments here. The two arguments put forth in determining the first problematic and resolving the second are self-sustained. The main thesis is that the non-ontic reading of the two systems carries more weight than the ontic one. Thus, the reconstructions of the two systems and their services for the two practical projects, as part of the argument, should be allowed only to consider the non-ontic and pure epistemic version of the scheme, which is of course the version that the investigation recommends. The investigation wishes to withhold from attacking the scope of soteriology by not cross-questioning the either mystic or despairing scheme of the other version of the two practical projects, which the ontic interpreters would naturally favor more. Here, only the reason as to why the scheme must necessarily lead to the either mystic or despairing “practical end” will be
provided. We take Heidegger and Arendt's reaction to Kantian moral philosophy as a demonstrative example (see 5.2).
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Epistemology and Ontology. Critical epistemology's priority over ontology poses no harm to any ontic state. When epistemology precedes ontology, the question may be raised as to whether it will necessarily follow that the position contradicts our intuition that how the universe unfolds of its own accord should not at all be interrupted by our activity of cognition alone. Therefore, it stands to reason that ontology should precede epistemology. Such concerns are actually unwarranted in critical epistemology. “Taking a priority position” is itself epistemological and not an ontic “undertaking,” and whether or not one practices epistemological contemplation, the world will remain there to be known as it is. The world is always there to be known, as long as there is a knower. The purpose for ascertaining the priority rests with calling for an awareness that the assumption of any ontic state that is
independent of cognition is problematic, for such an assumption implies a real, ontic disconnect between consciousness and “the world,” meaning that “the world” is never there to be really known without any real mediation (e.g., God or some real causal relation between the object known and the cognizing subject). And to accept that the world is always there to be known, whether or not it is really known, does not necessarily imply that the world exists by itself without being in any relation to cognition. Furthermore, ontological forms as in space and time do not exhaust consciousness, which is supported by the fact of the always up-lifting position and non-representational nature of self-awareness. For the consideration of epistemic investigation and the investigation of consciousness itself, epistemology precedes ontology. In summary, the epistemological consideration that epistemology precedes ontology is totally compatible with the fact that the world itself goes without being causally constrained by the fact of cognition; however, this fact does not imply that a world independent of cognition (or of pratītyasamutpāda) is assumable. And, as the question itself correctly observes, the fact that the epistemic contemplation does not in reality interfere with the ontic states and the priority of epistemology over
ontology (being an epistemic consideration, too) pose no harm to the ontic states at
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all. Additionally, judging from this ordinary observation, it seems to be quite
common-sensical that the epistemology itself (i.e. the epistemic systems) cannot be ontically real (empirically causal) at all.
Side Contributions. The investigation also contributes to the issue of self-awareness in both traditions by advocating for the rejection of the idea of intellectual intuition and the positions that the self-awareness can be phenomenal, e.g., Christian Coseru (2012) and Ganari (2012), or is merely conceptual, e.g., Dan Arnold (2010, 2012).
Intellectual intuition is the product of the ontic understanding of our consciousness, and this will be pointed out in the investigation to be creating systematic flaws both in Dignāga and Kant. Furthermore, this investigation will help facilitate the
acceptance of the non-intuitive intellectual nature of self-awareness, the resolutions to a number of disputes on both sides, such as the Madhyamaka's attack on Dignāga's idea of svasaṁvitti, and the determination of the priority between the theoretical and
acceptance of the non-intuitive intellectual nature of self-awareness, the resolutions to a number of disputes on both sides, such as the Madhyamaka's attack on Dignāga's idea of svasaṁvitti, and the determination of the priority between the theoretical and