1. Introduction
1.3 Backgrounds of the Problems
1.3.1 Background in Buddhism
1.3.1.2 Probability for Critical Epistemology in Buddhism – Especially with the Clues in
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another, namely an additional or revised means for knowing. Is the knowledge in (1) equal to or sufficient to account for the “additional or revised means for knowing” in (2)? In order for the knowledge in (1) to be known, or to be proved to be knowable with certainty, we need to demonstrate the difference between the two means for attaining knowledge in (2). Or, if we reject the “additional or revised means for knowing,” will it then be the case, as with the challenge that Nāgārjuna attempted to respond to in MMK 24.8 – 10, that the practical path to attain full buddhahood has been rendered impossible? Or, are the differences in (1) and (2) actually not so profound after some additional philosophical reflections, especially the philosophical reconsideration of Dignāga's idea of awareness that may be different (the self-awareness being a necessary epistemic condition in formal causality) from
Candrākīrti's understanding (the self-awareness being a necessary ontological
condition in physical causality)? If so, we may come to agree that the self-awareness can be something true ultimately (certainly) without any a priori ontological support or assumption.
1.3.1.2 Probability for Critical Epistemology in Buddhism – Especially with the Clues in Chinese Commentaries
Dignāga (ca. 440 – 520) is typically thought to be a member of the Yogacārā. He is commonly agreed to be the mediate pupil of Vasubandhu, the founder of the school.
The criticisms of Dignaga's epistemology by later Madhyamaka thinkers in India, especially Bhāviveka (ca. 500 – 578) and Candrakīrti (ca. 600– 650), are rather eye-catching. They vividly captured the tension between the two approaches in later Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy inside of the school of Madhyamaka itself in response to Dignāga's epistemology. Bhāviveka adopted a sympathetic attitude toward epistemology, asserting that epistemology takes on a necessary and significant role in the Buddhist project of liberation. On the contrary, Candrakīrti, who emerged
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later and played a more dominant role in the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka development, strongly refuted this possibility. Stemming from Candrakīrti's
challenges against Dignāga, most of the interpretation controversies came to the fore during the Indo-Tibetan development of Buddhist epistemology after Dignāga, especially with regard to (1) the problematic idea of “self-awareness” (especially its infinite regress difficulty) and (2) the problematic idea of “mental perception”
(mental consciousness, mānasaṃ, as a kind of perception, pratyakṣa). Both ideas were introduced in the Nyāyamukha (NMukh) and the first chapter, “On the Treatise of Perception,” in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and its vṛtti (auto-commentary) (PS(V)1).
Jingwu Ouyang penned in the Yin ming zheng li men lun ben xu, Zangyao vol. 18, that “it should be the case that the ancestor of Buddhist logic is Dignāga, while the founder of the school is Dharmakīrti.”38 Indeed, few doubt that Dharmarkīrti was the most dominant figure in the development of Buddhist epistemology after Dignāga in India and Tibet (and consequently, in the present-day global scholarship, which is primarily the continuation of the Tibetan line). In fact, his work has even
overshadowed the difficult neutral (or critical, as the investigation would like to suggest)39 ontological stance of Dignāga. However, Dharmarkīrti's “realistic”
continuation of Dignāga's epistemology puzzles us. He claimed that (1) the causal relation assures the validity of knowledge (causal relation and validity could both be neutral and free of realistic assumption, but they are commonly received as being
“ontically real” by most of the Buddhist epistemologists following him, be it his or our contemporaries) and (2) there is a causal procedure from (a) the object (of the mind) via (b) the five-sense perception and (c) the perception in the mind (the sixth consciousness) to (d) the conceptual understanding (of the sixth consciousness) in the mind.40 This idea was his addition to Dignāga, and to me, this was a problematic addition, if I were to take seriously the notion of Dignāga being fully aware of
38 “因明學應祖陳那而宗法稱.”
39 Matilal (1968:77, 362).
40 Cf. Hattori (1968: 90), Arnld (2014: 158).
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Vasubandhu's effort in idealizing Buddhism41 after Nāgārjuna's criticisms of Nyaya's epistemology (a realistic epistemology which proposes that the object and the
cognizing measures are both real entities that are related via causal links). It may be possible to interpret Vasubandhu as an advocate of that very same causal procedure insofar as the procedure is entirely taken to be ontologically illusory (dream-like, or merely conventionally true) and to be simply mental (the appearance). It is obvious that Dharmarkīrti first adopted such a reading of Vasubandhu's fundamental position before reading Dignāga in the same light; our contemporary scholarship of Buddhist epistemology, which is primarily the continuation of the Indo-Tibetan development, naturally follows the same line of thought and introduces to us this view in general as well. The problem is this: if the procedure is not at all real, can the relation between the cognized object and the cognitive measures remain causal conventional truth, as real as the existence of the movements of the trees in the wind (i.e., does mental causality belong in the same category together with psychological or physical
causality in time)? To probe further and rephrase our initial question: can this causal relation, especially the one between the five-sense perception and the sixth-sense perception, be regarded as a relation between mere appearance (pure sensational
“quasi-”reality) as much as that between cognized sensational objects? Another angle to address the question is this: if the procedure is conventional truth only, how does the practice of its self-investigation (epistemology) lead to the attainment of Buddhahood (pramāṇa-bhūta) while the continuation between an ordinary man and his achievement is still true, and true not merely in the conventional sense or in the metaphorical sense? Would the early Madhyamaka thinkers and the early Yogacārā
41 Of course, we are also aware that Vasubandhu was perhaps one of the most controversial figures in the history of Indian Buddhism. We have taken into account the speculations concerning the “two Vasubandhus,” as elaborated by Frauwallner (1951), and this particular figure seems to have been the embodiment of the development from the Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Vijñānavāda (Yao, 2005). We are also aware of the complicated divergence and doxographical classifications of the school of Yogācāra in general, especially the Tibetan doxographical distinction whereby Buddhist logic (tshad ma) is separated from idealism (sems tsam), and the distinction between nirākāravāda (the mind-only theory rejecting forms ākāra: Asaṅga – Vasubandhu – Sthiramati) and sākāravāda (the mind-only theory accepting forms: Dignāga – Dharmapāla – Dharmakīrti) (Kastura, 1969:10;
Yao, 2005:121-123). The development from Vasubandhu to Dignāga must be complicated, but the differences in-between cannot remit our serious consideration of the grounds justifying the establishment of Buddhists' own epistemology in Dignāga's situation. It is also reasonable too for us to examine Vasubandhiu's situation with regard to Nāgārjuna's criticisms of Nyaya's epistemology.
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thinkers, say Nāgārjuna and Dignāga, come to an agreement on this issue? Which option is better for understanding the relation of the procedure, Dharmarkīrti's causality and validity in the real sense, or perhaps something like Xuanzang's conformity in the self-awareness between the form of inference and the form of proposition? It is furthermore a question of how much and how differently Dignāga's original contribution to the development of Vasubandhu's idealism, viz., his idea of self-awareness, was appreciated by Xuanzang and Dharmarkīrti respectively.
Besides, Dharmarkīrti's “causal procedure” is also problematic within Dignāga's texts themselves. Both in NMukh and PS(V)1, Dignāga claimed that cognition (the
subject-part knowing the object-part) is not a real function or process. In NMukh, when explaining the reason why the measure and the result cannot be separate from each other, he wrote, “we metaphorically call it 'the means of cognition' just because upon it (the appearing of self-awareness) the form/image (體ākāratā) [identical to the cognized object] appears to arise [in itself] and it thus appears to possess some
function [to produce the form in itself].”42 In authoritative commentaries such as Wengui's Zhuang yian shu,43 compiled by Zōshun (藏俊) in vol. 40, Inmyō-daisho-shō (因明大疏抄, 764a, vol. 68, Tai-shō-zō), etc., Dignāga was commonly believed to assert that pramāṇa cannot be real existent and the cognition cannot be a real activity. In PS(V)1, with regard to a similar situation, Dignāga explained that:
Thus, [it should be understood that] the roles of the means of cognition (pramāṇa) and of the object to be cognized (prameya) corresponding to
42 My translation of “以即此體似義生故，似有用故，假說為量.” See. 4.4.
43 P. right 22 – p. left 23, vol. 3, Zhuang yian shu: “these two measure themselves (量體) have no real function; it is merely that the form (相) of the measured (cognized) object appears in the measuring-mind (能量心). Hence they are conventionally named “measures.” It is just as when we say the mirror [actively] reflects, it is in fact just the various forms of the object that appear in the mirror. Since the mind partially seems to have the function for measuring, we say that it seems to be functioning. Since the measured seems to appear as the partial effect of the mind, we say that the forms [of the measured] seem to appear [actively]. Since the mind that measures (cognizes) has the differentiation of the measuring and the measured, the result of the measures is also named “measure” 此二 量體無實作用，但所量境相於能量心上顯現，假名為「量」，譬如眾色於鏡上現，假說鏡照。即是心之一 分如有能量之用，故言「如有作用」，心之一分如有所量顯現，故云「而顯現故」。既於證相一心之上有 此能量、所量之義，故此證相量果亦名為量也”. In other words, measuring, as well as appearing, is not a real activity.
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differences of [aspect of] the cognition, are [only] metaphorically attributed (upacaryate) to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case, because [in their ultimate nature] all elements of existence, [being instantaneous] are devoid of function (nirvyāpāra). (PS(V) 1.9d; Hattori, 1968: 29)
Following this, Dignāga concluded that the measure (pramāṇa), the meant (prameya) and its result (phala) cannot be separate from one another (PS(V) 1.10). And this
“nirvyāpāra” had actually been explained previously in PS(V)1.8cd (Hattori, ibid.):
8cd. [we call the cognition itself] “pramāṇa” [literally, a means of cognizing], because it is [usually] conceived to include the act [of cognizing], although primarily it is a result.
Vṛtti: Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (pramāṇaphala) differs from the means of cognition (pramāṇa). The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and [thus] is understood to include the act [of cognizing] (savyāpāra). For this reason, it is metaphorically called pramāṇa, the means of cognition, although it is
[ultimately speaking] devoid of activity (vyāpāra). For instance, an effect is said to assume the form of its cause when it arises in conformity with its cause, although [in fact] it is devoid of the act [of assuming the form of its cause]. Similar is the case with this [resulting cognition].
Jinendrabuddhi44 explained that there is indeed no process of production or resulting, just as the light is illuminating itself. The statement that the light illuminates itself can only be valid metaphorically, because, in fact, we say that the light is illuminating itself solely because the illuminating of the light itself has just the form of
44 Steinkellner et al. (2005) Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā: cognition is not in a process, 65,7 (Page 65, line 7; responding to PS(V) 1.8cd); the metaphor of light, 70, 11 (PS(V) 1.9b). For the most part, my access to the text came courtesy of Junjie Chu (1999, verses 1.2-1.8ab) and his elaborate lectures on Sanskrit translation (verses 1.6ab-1.12) delivered at National Chengchi University in the summer of 2010.
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illuminating (the light is making something illuminated). Moreover, he stressed, there is actually no process of the light illuminating itself, nor that of the light becoming the illuminated object via the process. This suggests that the cognition's self-cognition does not imply cognizing itself in a real process; it is simply because cognition assumes the form of “knowing something,” namely, the form of the subject-part knowing the object-part in the self-aware consciousness (i.e., the cognition having the form of an external thing in itself) as its core essence
(tasyātmabhūtā, 65,11), that we make the claim that cognition seems to “have taken place” in the form of something being known by the subject (just as how cognition appears to our access). In Jinendrhabudhi's plausible view, the entire discussion here is actually the argument or explanation referring to Verse 9d: “it (any thing known) is known only through this45 [viz., through the cognition's having the form of it]”
(emphasis added). Hence, this becomes the necessary and only condition of all objects known, including the known objective part and the known subjective part as well. By postponing the detailed discussions to the forthcoming pages for the time being, what we want to focus on here is this: Dharmarkīrti's realistic account seems to be the position that Dignāga directly resented, as he wrote that: “Here we do not admit, as the realists do, that the resulting cognition (pramāṇaphala) differs from the means of cognition (pramāṇa).”
Given the commonly accepted views of Dharmarkīrti's development from Dignāga's epistemological project, some present-day scholars have begun to cast doubts on the supposedly smooth continuation between Dignāga and Dharmarkīrti and to question the latter's understanding of the former. We can discern such doubts from the two angles examining Dignāga's original contribution to the idea of self-awareness: (1) the reflective model vs. the reflexive model for understanding the self-awareness and (2) the self-awareness understood as a phenomenon, conceptual or some other
45 Introducing the verse, Dignāga wrote: “For, in this case (in the case of the perceptual awareness of an external object in consciousness), we overlook the true nature of the cognition as that which is to be cognized by itself, and [claim that] its having the form of a thing is our means of knowing that thing” (PS(V)-V1.9c-d1).
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possible alternatives. We can perhaps agree with Zhihua Yao (2005: 1) that although the self-awareness is an important and original idea that Dignāga developed in
Buddhist epistemology, the scholars in this field around the end of the 20th century paid “comparatively little attention” to the topic, if at all. According to Yao, even Paul Williams's The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defense (1998), being the first book of this generation that mentioned Dignāga's idea on self-awareness, “makes no effort to examine the origin or the early development of the concept.” His observation was that the large group of scholars who studied Dignāga through the works of Dharmarkīrti, including Dunne (2004), Tillemans (1999), Franco (1997) and Dreyfus (1997), “seem not interested in the issue of
self-cognition.” Ironically, the few scholars who followed other lines, such as Shōshin Fukihara (1955) who followed Dharmapāla and Xuanzang (especially his
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi/Cheng wei shi lun), demonstrated more interest in this issue (ibid.). This was exactly in line with the expectation that we have stated above in the present investigation. In more recent days, when the issue of self-awareness had become more popularly reported, we can still observe how the scholars following the works of Dharmarkīrti tended to view this idea with a model which is very different from that of the scholars who do not follow the works of Dharmarkīrti. Scholars following the works of Dharmarkīrti, notably Birgit Kellner (2010), Chien-hsing Ho (2007), etc., adhered to a reflective model for understanding Dignāga's idea of self-awareness, holding that there exists a real causal link between the five-sense
perception and the sixth-sense perception, between which a time difference can be established.
Satkari Mookerjee (1935; reprint in 1975, 1997) devoted an entire chapter to the concept of self-awareness and entertained the notion of its necessity for the experience of consciousness and for the possibility of any form of knowledge, a stance which I believe is commonly accepted in this field. Although Mookerjee commented that knowledge and its content must be known “in one sweep” (ibid.:
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328), he, like the scholars adhering to the reflective model, also failed to note the impossibility for this (for them to be known in one sweep) if the self-cognition is not reflexive. However, he did note that with Dharmarkīrti's causal efficacy model, Dignāga's idea of pramāṇa and phala being not separate is problematic. This, he posited, can perhaps be resolved by Dharmottara's suggestion that “the relation between pramāṇa and phala is not a causal relation but one of determination” (ibid.:
340).46 On the other hand, Junjie Chu (1999), following the works of Xuanzang as well as Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on PS(V), as well as Dan Arnold (2005, 2010), from a philosophical point of view together with a general review of the literary development from Dignāga on till Dharmottara, were among the first to challenge this standard understanding. Junjie Chu understood the relation between the five-sense perception and the sixth-five-sense perception following Xuanzang's idea of wu-ju-yi-shi (五俱意識), with the sixth-sense perception always accompanying any
instance of the five-sense perception, and therefore was skeptical about
Dharmarkīrti's model that places the five-sense perception and the sixth-sense perception in two (temporal, the investigation would like to emphasize) phases or moments. Dan Arnold (2010) interpreted the development of Dignāga's theory of self-awareness to be a development from a reflective understanding (Candrakīrti, Dharmarkīrti) toward a reflexive understanding (Prajñakaragupta, Dharmottara) and viewed the epistemological terms, such as “the five-sense perception,” “the sixth-sense perception,” “inference,” etc., as not-yet-real conditions of cognition only whose satisfaction in certain coordination, namely, the result of pramāna (phala), is real (the realized cognition). Ven. Yinshun (1949: 115), despite a number of
ontological assumptions in his description of the process of cognition, also pointed out that attributing time difference or internal-external distinction to the stages of cognition should be avoided. “Or otherwise,” as he wrote, “it is very easy to mislead to the conclusion that mind exits eternally even in no relation to the faculties and the
46 Arnold (2010) also adhered to a similar interpretation as Mookerjee's and included the problem of pramāṇa and phala being not separate as one of his leading problematics in his treatises on the issue of self-awareness.
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objects.”47 During the XVIth Congress of the IABS in 2011, I proposed a
philosophical argument against temporal causal relation between the five-sense perception and the sixth-sense perception: temporality in the form of the appearance can only be possible in the resulting cognition, and the form of the resulting cognition should not be presupposed in the stage where its cause “has its place.” By doing so, I addressed a lingering doubt on whether Dharmarkīrti's real efficacy theory on
Dignāga's idea of self-awareness is a plausible approach. The modern development of the controversy is not surprising, for we can also unearth a similar controversy during Dignāga's time (Matilal: 1986: 148-149), when there were three competing views for understanding the awareness, namely, the reflexive view (that the self-awareness reveals itself in the self-awareness), the retrospective view (that ontologically independent awareness cognizes the awareness, e.g., Nyāya), and the reflective view (that inference, which must take place in a time point other than the inferred fact, is required for the appearance of the self-awareness, e.g., Bhāṭṭa), to which “Diṅnāga gave three succinct arguments in favour of his doctrine of “self-awareness
Dignāga's idea of self-awareness is a plausible approach. The modern development of the controversy is not surprising, for we can also unearth a similar controversy during Dignāga's time (Matilal: 1986: 148-149), when there were three competing views for understanding the awareness, namely, the reflexive view (that the self-awareness reveals itself in the self-awareness), the retrospective view (that ontologically independent awareness cognizes the awareness, e.g., Nyāya), and the reflective view (that inference, which must take place in a time point other than the inferred fact, is required for the appearance of the self-awareness, e.g., Bhāṭṭa), to which “Diṅnāga gave three succinct arguments in favour of his doctrine of “self-awareness