1. Introduction
4.4 The Claim about Self-awareness: Pramāṇa, Prameya and Phala Are Not Separate from One
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4.4 The Claim about Self-awareness: Pramāṇa, Prameya and Phala Are Not Separate from One Another
Following the aforementioned theory of twofold appearance, Dignāga (ca. 440 – 520) presented his difficult claim that pramāṇa (the means of cognition), prameya (the object of cognition) and phala (the resulting cognition) are not separate from one another. This claim bothers the proceduralists the most, and the problem was noted by Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750 – 810) and Dharmottara (ca. 740 – 800), who joined the row among commentators on Dignāga after Dharmakīrti (7th century) and became puzzled with Dharmakīrti's exact interpretation of the issue, and picked up by Dan Arnold (2010, 2015). Arnold employed the two models of self-awareness introduced by Paul Williams (1998) and continued by Bilgrami (2006), namely, the model of reflective self-awareness and the model of constitutive self-awareness, to treat the very issue of self-awareness in two philosophical contexts: (1) the continental philosophy of consciousness in Kant and the German idealists and (2) the Buddhist theories about self-awareness after Dignāga. The reflective model maintains that the consciousness becomes self-aware because manas as a second-ordered consciousness apprehends the first-ordered perception of the former five sense consciousnesses in a subsequent time point. On the contrary, the constitutive model maintains that the self-awareness or the perception of manas is a necessary constituent of the condition of the cognition; until any cognition is realized, any constituent of the condition of the cognition is not realized. In the context of the Buddhist theory of self-awareness, according to Arnold's report (ibid.: 338 – 340), the development of the interpretation of Dignāga's theory of self-awareness and mental perception is a development (a) from the camp of the reflective model, representatively Candrakīrti, who raised challenges against the theory, and Dharmakīrti, who interpreted the theory in
response to these challenges, (b) via the transition point between the reflective model and the constitutive model, namely Prajñākaragupta, and (c) up to the formation of
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the camp of the constitutive model, chiefly Dharmottara. The problem that worried Prajñākaragupta, Dharmottara and Arnold is that the reflective model runs into a predicament with the claim that pramāṇa, prameya and phala are not separate from one another; if the transducers' contribution of raw (not-yet-meaningful/contentful) information about the external objects of the first five sense consciousnesses and the process of the sixth consciousness are two different real events at two different time points, the very claim of Dignāga cannot but be wrong, since under the
circumstances, the cognitive faculty, the object of cognition and the cognition itself are at three different spatiotemporal points in one real causal chain, implying that all of the three terms cannot be not separate from one another.
Introducing PS(V) 1.10, Dignāga wrote in the vṛtti (Hattor, 1968: 29):
Whatever form of a thing appears in the cognition, as, for example, something white or non-white, it is an object in that form which is cognized.
Thus, [it should be understood that] the roles of the means of cognition (pramāṇa) and of the object to be cognized (prameya) corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition, are [only] metaphorically attributed (upacaryate) to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case, because [in their ultimate nature] all elements of existence, [being instantaneous,] are devoid of function (nirvyāpāra).
Hattori (1968: 107) traced the idea of “nirvyāpāra” to the fundamental Buddhist idea that “all existents are non-eternal (aniccā sabbe saṅkhārā)” in the Saṁyutta Nikāya (IX, 6, 6, etc.); he wrote that “the fundamental teaching of the Buddha that all existent things are non-eternal is developed by the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras into the theory of universal momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), the theory that everything is liable to destruction at the very moment of its origination; see Mahāy Sūtrālam., XVIII, 82—91, etc. Being in a state of flux, a thing cannot possess any function
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(vyāpāra).” This is quite a typical Sautrāntika-Yogācāra (Dharmakīrti's)
understanding of the idea of “nirvyāpāra” here. As the ultimate truth, since all existents are in flux and thus nothing is ultimately functional (once the appearance is originated, its condition is destructed), we should more restrictively understand Dignāga's claim in the manner that the three terms here are not separate since their spatiotemporal separation in functions are merely conventional (metaphorical). Thus, we should understand PS(V) 1.10 to be restricting the three terms in the realm of the resulting cognition as the appearance (Hattori, 1968: 29):
k. 10. whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (prameya). The means of cognition (pramāṇa) and [the cognition which is] its result (phala) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another.
“In this verse the Yogācāra view is clearly expounded” was the comment by Hattori (ibid.); “'yad-ābhāsam' means that a cognition has 'viṣayâbhāsa=grāhyâkara,' and 'saṁvitti' implies 'sva-saṁvitti'.” The cognition's “having some content” (Arnold 2014: 273) means that the cognition has the form of the object (viṣayâbhāsa) or the comprehended form [of the object] (grāhyâkara). Regarding the appearance (form) only, the form of the object is grasped by the cognition and this (the cognition's having the form of the object) is reflexive because the comprehended form is
reflexively taken to be the form of the cognized object (and not otherwise), regardless of whether the object of cognition in itself and the object in the cognition are
ontologically separate and different. When the content of the object of cognition is taken, the form of the object is thus necessarily the comprehended form (and vice versa); in this sense (i.e., with regard to the appearance only), we say that the means of cognition, the object of cognition and the resulting cognition are not separate, because in the cognition (the cognition's having the form), there is only one
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appearance (the resulting cognition) in which the twofold structure of self-awareness is always observable while the twofold structure allows the appearance to have the respective aspect of the cognizing side (the means of cognition) and the respective aspect of the cognized side (the cognized object). As the appearance (the form), the three terms are not separate; however, with regard to the “reality” beyond the appearance, although the real causal sequence, which warrants the validity of the equation between viṣayâbhāsa (the form of the object) and grāhyâkara (the form grasped in comprehension), must necessarily bring the three terms apart, since ultimately (beyond the form of cognition) nothing is really functional (the
Yogācāras), or, given that the causality in the three terms themselves is effective, none of them can directly appear in the cognition (the Sautrāntikas), we do not recognize that they are separate from one another. Following this line of thought, it seems quite natural that Dignāga then concluded the claim with his theory of twofold appearance yet again (Hattori, 1968: 29-30):
How, then, is it understood that cognition has two forms?
k. 11ab. That cognition has two forms is [known] from the difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that [cognition];
Vṛtti:
The cognition which cognizes the object, a thing of color, etc., has [a twofold appearance, namely,] the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself [as subject]. But the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object has [on the one hand] the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with the object and [on the other hand] the appearance of itself. Otherwise, if the cognition of the object had only the form of the object, or if it had only the form of itself, then the cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object.
Further, [if the cognition had only one form, either that of the object or that of
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itself,] then the object which was cognized by a preceding cognition could not appear in a succeeding cognition. Why? Because that [object of the preceding cognition does not exist when the succeeding cognition arises and] could not be the object of the latter. Hence it is proved that cognition has two forms.
When we admit (a) the necessary twofold structure of self-awareness in the
appearance, i.e., we acknowledge that there must exists a conformity between the form of the object of cognition and the form of the object in the cognition of that very cognition, such conformity being warranted via the causal story behind, and (b) the Two Truth Theory, i.e., we confine the conventional reality to be that which is cognized in the appearance, and we refuse any reality beyond the appearance, we seem to be able to accept that although we metaphorically establish the three terms (pramāṇa, prameya and phala) because there exist the three factors in such a structure of the appearance, ultimately speaking, they are not separate from one another – there is only one appearance. Then, the claim seems not to cause any problem with the proceduralists. This also fulfills Dhrmakīrti's arrangement of the Two Truth Theory whereby as the awakened (as the non-aspectarians), we refuse any reality of that which is beyond the appearance; as the unawakened (as the
aspectarians), because we are attached to the necessary structure of the twofold appearance, we believe that the means of cognition (the subject), the object of
cognition (the object) and the self-awareness of the cognition (the subject's having the form of the object as its content) are three different realities. Here, the very claim of Dignāga is taken to be addressed in the position of the awakened, while it remains metaphorically acceptable in the position of the un-awakened that the three terms are separate from one another in a real causal chain.
The interpretation of the Two Truth Theory, which is shared by Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti (i.e., the distinction between the ultimate and the conventional is one between two worlds, the world of non-conceptual reality and the world of language
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use – papañca) is different from the interpretation before Candrakīrti. Before Candrakīrti, the distinction was understood to be an epistemological distinction, that although the reality is one, because the righteous view of the awakened and the confused view of the unawakened are different, there are two ways of knowing the same reality, and the world thus appears in two manners: self-evident and collectively approved. We do not take Candrakīrti's interpretation for granted, since the other interpretation is more likely to be the one that Dignāga had in mind. Therefore, the interpretation of the theory of self-awareness and the claim that pramāṇa, prameya and phala are not separate from one another, as expounded above, may be
inappropriate. In this possibly inappropriate interpretation, the reality as in the appearance allows us to maintain that there are the three terms, and there necessarily exists the structure of self-awareness with the twofold appearance structure; the reality is as real as any event that occurs in the appearance, like the rise of the sun.
On the other hand, the reality beyond the appearance (the ultimate truth about the cognition) is that the three terms are not separate from one another because no ultimate entity is functional and there is only one appearance, whether or not one ideologically refuses such a reality (the Yogācrās) or admits it without admitting any possibility for its appearing (the Sautrāntikas). First (historically), the interpretation is inappropriate because the Two Truth scheme is regarded as an ontological
distinction (between two worlds) and does not fit the epistemological Two Truth scheme (between the righteous way and the confused way of viewing the same reality). With the latter scheme, there is only one reality and the reality is shared in the two different views, whereas with the former scheme, there are two realities (one as the appearance and the other as the emptiness of any appearance). Second
(theoretically), the interpretation is likely to collapse because the use of the Two Truth scheme blurs the distinction itself (and this has become a major weak point at which the Madhyamaka, e.g., Candrakīrti, targeted attacks). If one sticks to the ultimate principle of emptiness (that nothing is ultimately functional or
non-momentary), no statement can be addressed in the position of the ultimate reality at
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all, even including the claim about “one appearance” which is “self-aware” and “not separate in parts”; the inference from “no ultimate entity is functional and non-momentary” to “there is only one undifferentiated appearance” contradicts the distinction of two truths. When Dharmakīrti ventures into Candrakīrti's framework, the “establishment” is destined to fail in front of the Mādhyamikas.
More importantly, aside from the problem with the appropriation adopting the interpretations of the Two Truth Theory, in Dharmakīrti's interpretation, the relationship among the theorems (twofold appearance, self-awareness and no separation among the three terms) is randomized. The best we can say is that the three theories support and explain one another to form a self-sustained whole
archiving the so-called epistemic idealism of Dharmakīrti (Dunne 2004: 59), soaring around and raising the idea of svasaṃvitti; this was described by Arnold (2014: 175) as “Dharmakīrti's culminating argument for svasaṃvitti” that “cognition is intelligible (self-aware1) apart from any consideration of its semantic content (subject-part), apart from its being of a world (object-part),” something akin to John McDowell's “highest common factor.” As suggested by Arnold, Dharmakīrti was actually advancing the stance that “it is only in virtue of intrinsic properties of awareness that perceptual objects can seem in the first place to be distinguished by their independence from awareness.” Indeed, this very cleverly boils down Dharmakīrti's interpretation of PS(V)1.9–10. Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's epistemology in general possesses dual characters: the Sautrātika and the Yogācāra, and the characters are interacting with each other over the core idea of “mental representations” (akara, Arnold's translation). Arnold (ibid.: 158) wrote, “as particulars, they are causally describable (they are the effects of perceptual encounters2); as representations, they are also phenomenally contentful, and it is only at this level of description that Dharmakīrti allows for the kind of 'sameness' seemingly necessary to get semantic content off the ground.” That is, the universals (following the samenesses) in
1 My insertion in the parentheses.
2 Namely, contact.
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Dharmakīrti are not obtained from the object out there but from the “phenomenally recognizable character of the first-personally experienced mental events,” an account very similar to that of Hume, and also that of McDowell, actually.3 To put it in other words, the Sautrāntika causal story about the perceptual encounters cannot itself be experienced phenomenally. However, owing to the imaging correspondence, which representations are assumed to have as their very nature, the causality in cognition is as real as the causality we infer from any other phenomenally recognizable
experienced events; with the mental events warranted in such a way, the recognizable
“sameness” among the objects in all these mental events allows us to (re-)cognize them in accordance with the rules and concepts in the sixth consciousness. Thus, with regard to the cognition, we do not have to take into account the causal story of the perceptual encounters anymore; this is where Dharmakīrti's character of epistemic idealism shows up and engulfs the Sautrāntika character. “All entities are mental”
and “objects of awareness are internal” (Dunne 2004: 59) – such a self-restriction to the phenomenal descriptions is the spirit of what Arnold termed “Dharmakkīrti's methodological solipsism,” via which Dharmakkīrti is found referable to the theories of intentionality in analytic philosophy. Nonetheless, when so interpreted, the self-sustained whole theory proceeds in an argumentative circle and would be found unsatisfactory, for instance, by Candrakīrti still, as an argument for the persuasion of the acceptance of the idea of “self-awareness.” The argumentative circle can only be taken as a claim, and this is why, even when Dignāga had clearly stated that the self-awareness is reflexive and requires no further cognition to cognize itself (as argued with his theory of twofold appearance), Candrakīrti, not being ignorant, continued to attack the former's theory of self-awareness with the charge of creating an “infinite regress” of the infinitely further cognitions. Obviously, one cannot argue for the self-awareness with an argument (the twofold appearance) which itself requires a ground with the assumption demanding the self-awareness itself. Mere claims cannot stop challenges. In other words, Dignāga's methodology to establish pramāṇa-s, namely,
3 Such Humean psychological epistemology invites the self-contradiction to the defining sharp distinction between the two pramāṇa-s; this will be treated in 4.6.
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“concerning (the necessary features in) the result, we determine the names of the reasons 因從果名,” became a burden in Dharmakīrti's “methodological solipsism (Arnold 2015: 158)” as the argument defending the doctrine of self-awareness.
Furthermore, in response to Candrakīrti's challenge against Dignāga's theory of self-awareness, Dharmakīrti's interpretation can easily be taken to be a defense for the theory; then, the interpretation as so understood may deviate from Dignāga's original conception and moreover may jeopardize his philosophical systematics. First, to defend the self-awareness, Dignāga is understood to invoke (a) the theory of twofold appearance and (b) the claim that the three terms are not separate from one another;
(a') the former is argued for by demonstrating that otherwise, “the cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object,” and “the object which was cognized by a preceding cognition could not appear in a succeeding cognition” in the vṛtti to PS(V) 1.11ab, while (b') the latter requires the
post-Candrakīrti version of the Two Truth Theory. As aforementioned, the argument fails because (a') the highest common factor of the intelligibility in the cognition is both the argued and the demanded at the same time, and recollection in this model
contradicts the defining sharp distinction of the two pramāṇa-s (see 4.6; cf. Hattori, 1968: 81); (b') in Candrakīrti's framework, the so-interpreted statement addressed in the position of the awakened, i.e., the claim about “one appearance” which is “self-aware” and “not separate in parts,” is problematic. When viewed in a broader scope, the failed defense of Dharmakīrti explains the fact in history of how the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti platform of epistemology in the end was not accepted by the post-Candrakīrti Mādhyamikas and merely dismissed as burdensome – at best, not very helpful— pals by the Yogācārins in their array of counters against their opposing Mahāyāna siblings. As such, while the platform accelerated the communications with the Hināyāna Buddhists and the non-Buddhist epistemologists and logicians in India, it patently failed to facilitate the intrinsic unification within Mahāyāna
Buddhism. When viewed in a more specific scope, the claim that pramāṇa, prameya
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and phala are not separate from one another is not well established either, in the sense that as the argument goes, the Two Truth Theory as employed by Dharmakīrti brings the difficulty back to an even more formidable, unsolved problem: the
metaphysical conflict between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. As we have explained, Dharmakīrti cannot but fail when he places the chess piece right into
metaphysical conflict between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. As we have explained, Dharmakīrti cannot but fail when he places the chess piece right into