先驗邏輯與精神發展-陳那與康德批判知識論的研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)Ph.D. Dissertation Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University Supervisor: Professor LIN, Chen-kuo. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Transcendental 立 Logic and Spiritual Development in Dignāga's and Kant's Critical Epistemology. ‧. 先驗邏輯與精神發展 – 陳那與康德批判知識論的研究. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. WANG, Chun-Ying June, 2017. v.

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(3) Abstract In Buddhism and in Kant, there exists a common quest for an incompatible yet harmonious mutual dependence between the constraining of all possible phenomena within the bounds of natural causality and the spiritual liberation from such causal chains: saṃsāra vs. nirvāṇa in Buddhism and nature vs. freedom in Kant. Kant believes that transcendental epistemology is necessary to resolve said paradox, and this position has proven so incomprehensible for later thinkers that philosophers nowadays still feel compelled to defend Kant. Meanwhile, in Buddhism, debates continue to rage on whether epistemology constitutes a proper means to explain the dependence, and such debates have resulted in the split of Mahāyāna Buddhism into Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, and subsequently Madhyamaka into Svātantrika and Prasaṅgika.. 立. 政治大. sit. io. n. er. Nat. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. The mainstream understanding of epistemology in the philosophical traditions of Kant and Buddhism is problematic because the cognitive system is understood to be operating ontologically in time. I shall attempt to demonstrate that the ontological assumption in the mainstream understanding is the root cause for both the difficulty in appreciating Kant's transcendental idealism and the indeterminable position of epistemology in Buddhism, especially Dignāga's anti-realistic epistemology. I will also defend epistemology by denying the ontological attribution to the epistemic system and by establishing what I term “critical epistemology.” This entails focusing on the need for an additional, distinct kind of causality (the causality of freedom) on top of the natural causality in both traditions, be it textually or philosophically. The al causality of freedom only necessitates the cause of cognition v and its relation to all i n cognitions, whereas the causalityC ofhnature is only effective in the results of cognition U i e h n g c the two kinds of causality operate but never on the cause of cognition. Although independently, they constitute a formal unity in the realization of every possible cognition. The orthogonality between the two kinds of causality sharply distinguishes the free (reflexively cognizing) status from the constrained (reflexively cognized) status of a person; furthermore, its empty inner product, i.e., the empty impact these two kinds of causality exert upon each other, makes sense of each vector subspace (dimension), namely ideality and reality, in all possible realized cognitions, thus culminating in a single world of “experience.”. Key words: freedom, self-awareness, formal causality / formal causation, epistemology, Kant, transcendental idealism, Dignāga, Mādhayamaka, Yogacārā, Pramāṇa-vāda.

(4) 中⽂摘要佛家哲學與康德哲學不約⽽同地要求著我們⼀⽅⾯必須被限制在制約著⼀切可能現象的⾃然因果律當中，卻又同時要求著我們可以從這個制約當中追尋精神上的解脫。這個不相容卻又互為需要的⼀種特殊依存關係，在佛家，我們有「輪迴」與「涅槃」︔在康德，我們有「⾃然」與「⾃由」。康德堅信先驗認識論是解釋這個關係的必要途徑，但是這個⽴場顯然難以輕易為後⼈所理解，以至於直到現在哲學家們仍然必須很努⼒來為康德辯護。另⼀⽅⾯，佛家哲學探討認識論是否構成恰當的⼿段來釋開這個關係，⽽不同的看法導致⼤乘佛教分裂為中觀學派與瑜伽⾏學派，⽽中觀學派又分裂為⾃續與應成兩派。. 政治大在康德學與佛學傳統中對知識論的⼀般理解，因為傾向于將認知系統理解為本立. ‧ 國. 學. 體地運作在時間當中，於是導致上述難題不易辨清。本⽂嘗試展⽰對知識論的本體價值預設是理解康德先驗觀念論的障礙，也造成知識論，特別是陳那所提. ‧. 出的反實在論知識論，在佛家解脫計劃中地位未定的原因。本⽂也嘗試透過解除對認知系統的本體論預設建⽴本⽂所謂的「批判知識論」，進⽽分別地在兩. Nat. sit. y. 個傳統中為知識論的地位辯護。這包含著我們在⾃然因果關係之外，還需要⼀. er. io. 個另外的他種因果關係（⾃由的因果），不論就⽂獻來說，或者就哲學系統來. n. al 說。⾃由因果只確⽴認知的因與⼀切可能認知之間的關係，⽽⾃然的因果只在 iv C. n. hengchi U 認知的結果之中有效卻不可能對認知的因有效。雖然這兩種因果關係彼此獨⽴地作⽤，它們在所有可能認識的實現之中形成⼀個形式的統⼀。這兩種因果關係的正交，明確地將⼀個個⼈的⾃由狀態（反身地正在認知中）與被限制狀態（反身地被認知）區分開來︔ 更甚，其空內積，也就是這兩種因果關係對彼此的無效，造就了⼀切可能被實現的認識之中，「理想」與「現實」這兩個向量空間的可能性，也因此拱起了⼀個單⼀的「經驗」世界。. 關鍵字：⾃由，⾃證（⾃我意識），形式因果，認識論，康德，先驗觀念論，陳那，中觀，瑜伽⾏派，識論.

(5) Preface Freedom, Cognition and Critical Epistemology – When Kant meets the Buddha. In the past, scholars attempting to reconcile Kant's philosophy and Buddhist philosophy (including Stcherbatsky, K. C. Bhattacharyya, Zongshan Mou and a number of Japanese monk-philosophers such as Hakuju Ui and Tetsurō Watsuji) were unified in their criticism of Kant from the standpoint of Buddhist thinkers that Kant should not have rejected intellectual intuition. Drawing on myriad oriental resources, they posited that in certain extraordinary scenarios, intellectual intuition can directly encapsulate things in themselves and that cognitive capacity can remain effective even beyond the scope of the appearance. Moreover, the idea of the thing in itself, as much as the idea of freedom, is indeed more than what Kant claimed to be without any positive account in cognition.. 立. 政治大. sit. io. n. er. Nat. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Such comments, whether in terms of Kant or Buddhism, actually confused epistemology with ontology in the background. In other words, the commentators understood epistemology with metaphysical and ontological assumptions in mind, and then further perpetuated the confusion in their interpretations of both Kantian epistemology and Buddhist epistemology. Though this confused notion has actually become the mainstream in both cases, it has not passed without challenge in the respective commentary histories. Also, in both fields, recent developments (for example, Henry Allison in Kant and Dan Arnold in Buddhism) have prompted a call to “let epistemology be simple a lepistemology.” In supporti vof my research, I have n cited materials in both original texts that lend support to C hand classical commentaries U i e n gthe this impending challenge, especially within camp. Obviously in favor of c hBuddhist the non-mainstream understanding, Kant categorically rejected epistemology with metaphysical and ontological assumptions of “transcendental realism.” Mainstream commentators in general did not agree, or took issue, with such a position of Kant. Besides, I believe that purely philosophical considerations would suggest that any epistemology with an ontological assumption cannot hold, either. Furthermore, the Buddhist thinkers were divided on the efficacy of the intellect (prajñā) on the thing in itself. This has led to the predicament whereby the role of epistemology in understanding and practicing the Buddha's teachings remains indeterminable for an extended period of time. Those who adhered to the principle of emptiness (the Madhyamaka) thought that the transcendent efficacy would undermine the position that rejects any transcendent reality. Others (the Yogācāra) believed that epistemology was more appropriate for uncovering the “meaning” of emptiness but failed to put forth any satisfactory answer to the challenge concerning the contradiction between the cognitive efficacy and the principle of emptiness. I believe.

(6) that the reason for the discrepancy between the two camps and the lackluster response of the Yogācāra rests with relative obscurity and incomplete development of the “critical nature” of Buddhist epistemology (“critical” meaning to remove any ontological assumption in epistemology). In my opinion, the ontological interpretation of Dignāga's epistemology, especially his theory of self-awareness (svasaṃvitti), in Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka influential response and Dharmakīrti's inside influential response has to be responsible for the lack of developments on this front. I hold that epistemology should be critical without any metaphysical and ontological assumption, and that epistemology should remain simple epistemology. I term this “critical epistemology.” To be specific, consider the following three tenets of critical epistemology. (1) Cognition is not real action and does not take place in time. (2) Cognition does not follow empirical causality but is in another type of causal relation that is formal (yielding forms, not matters) and free (spontaneous and autonomous). Following Kant, I call it “causality of freedom” in comparison to “causality of nature.” (3) It is not because cognition does not follow natural causal laws that we thus hold that its efficacy cannot be “positive”; nonetheless, its positivity does not necessarily imply any particular status of existence. With this idea in hand, I will argue for the “non-mainstream” interpretation in both traditions, textually (“Third Antinomy” in Kant and “theory of self-awareness” in Dignāga) and philosophically (one should not assume the cause to have really taken place in its result). Hopefully, with this very idea, the discrepancies brought forth by the ontological interpretation can be reconciled and the role of epistemology in the practical projects of both traditions can be determined at long last.. 立. 政治大. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. n. er. io. In short, cognitive capacities, freedom and the thing in itself as presumptions are not ontological presumptions – they a l simply concern cognitioni vitself (the condition of n cannot be the objects and cognition). They do not follow natural C h causal laws. UThey h i the empirical world. Therefore, n g caffect the results of cognition and they do notereally they would not cause any difficulty for the principle of emptiness. However, they are necessary, even in terms of reality. Without the presumptions, the philosophical considerations of the empirical world cannot hold. Besides, as opposed to Allison's view that these presumptions should be understood simply as theoretical demands of reason as enforced by the system, formal efficacy is as much effective (positive) as real efficacy. Nonetheless, they are different in kind. Both are requisite items in the condition of cognition when cognition is realized, i.e., when the condition of cognition is satisfied, they both have to be effective in their own ways. If we are to accept empirical reality, we will have to accept transcendental ideality, too – as Kant always claimed. Also, I suggest that we should try to understand Nāgārjuna's “if you make sense of emptiness, everything makes sense (以有空義故⼀切法得成)” in this sense. Let me be clear; I hold that Kant needs not accept intellectual intuition and that Buddhism does not really entail intellectual intuition either (i.e., there should not.

(7) have been a discrepancy between the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamaka in the first place). However, it does not follow that the thing in itself, etc., do not bear any positive account in cognition. In other words, pursuing some kind of transcendent cognition of the transcendent objects in themselves is not appropriate at all in both traditions, and the thing in itself, namely the causal relation of cognition and the subject of cognition, needs not take on any transcendent, ontological or real existences. Intellectual intuition is rejected because it poses problems for the philosophical consideration of the empirical world (this is exactly the crux of the Madhyamaka's attacks on the Yogācāra). However, freedom and the thing in itself, as transcendental ideas, are not transcendental illusions (simple conceptual constructions which do not fit the condition of cognition). They are not negative, theoretical presumptions either. Transcendental ideas are the absolute cause, in its own kind of causality. Needing no pre-condition and yielding no real result, they are in the condition which renders the result of cognition possible by holding the parts of the condition in a unity. There needs not be any metaphysical or ontological basis for them, but the satisfaction of the condition of cognition requires transcendental ideas. It therefore follows that ontology should best concern itself with merely the results of cognition and not with the cause or the condition of cognition. “Ontology” (or the Chinese concept Ben-ti 本體) is after all just the product of the mixture of experiences and ideas. There exists no transcendent status of it, and because of the limits of our sensibility, there exists no real status of it in totality. However, because of the necessary “participation” of reason in experience, the idea's (ontology's) totality and necessity in experience is totally reasonable – and at best only reasonable. The idea can be proved in the study of the condition of experience but never evidenced with any sensational proofs. The method to prove these reasonable ideas is dialectics, whereas the method to evidence empirical judgments is inference.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(8) To my late grandparents and late mother, with love and gratitude. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(9) Table of Content 1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 1.1 The Problems and General Ideas of the Investigation ..............................................................1 1.2 Analyses of the Problematics...................................................................................................11 1.3 Backgrounds of the Problems..................................................................................................20 1.3.1 Background in Buddhism.................................................................................................20 1.3.1.1 Two Truth Theory in Buddhism...............................................................................20 1.3.1.2 Probability for Critical Epistemology in Buddhism – Especially with the Clues in Chinese Commentaries.........................................................................................................31 1.3.2 Kant: Critical Epistemology and Transcendental Idealism .............................................42 2 The Problem of Kant's Third Antinomy on Freedom......................................................................51 2.1 The Problem of the Third Antinomy.......................................................................................56 2.2 Realistic Presentation of the Thesis and Two-World Reading of Its Modification of Transcendental Idealism................................................................................................................63 2.3 Kant's Proposal. Transcendental Idealism as the Resolution to the Antinomy, Two-Aspect Reading and Support from Critical Epistemology.........................................................................73. 政治大 3 Dignāga in the Middle of the Madhyamaka-Yogācāra Conflict, Especially on the Issue of 立 Causality.............................................................................................................................................83 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 3.1 Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka Worries about Absolute Causes in Relation to His Project of Practice...........................................................................................................................................92 3.2 Plural Vasubandhus and Dignāga..........................................................................................105 3.3 Yogācāra Dignāga and the Epistemological Turn in Buddhist Philosophy, Especially Regarding the Non-temporality of Cognitive Causality and the Allowability for a Holistic Model of Epistemology in Contrast to Proceduralistic Model in Time..................................................113. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. 4 The Ontological Neutralism in Dignāga's Epistemology – Critical Reconstructive Interpretation of Related Passages in NMukh and PS(V)...........................................................................................121 4.1 The Two Pramāṇa-s..............................................................................................................121 4.2 Formal Conformity between Pramāṇa and Prameya...........................................................126 4.3 Twofold Appearance..............................................................................................................132 4.4 The Claim about Self-awareness: Pramāṇa, Prameya and Phala Are Not Separate from One Another........................................................................................................................................147 4.5 The Holistic Argument for Mental Perception from Verse 6 on...........................................158 4.5.1 Valid Cognition Is Holism ............................................................................................158 4.5.2 Exhaustive Analysis of All Kinds of Mental Perception and Pseudo-mental Perception .................................................................................................................................................160 4.5.3 Mental Awareness Is Self-evident (Perceptual).............................................................165 4.5.4 Appendix. Explanation for the Twofold Appearance in the Demonstrative Fact of “Recollection”.........................................................................................................................168 4.6 Appendix. Jinendrabuddhi – The Difficulty in the Sharp Distinction between the Objectaspects in Accordance with the Two Pramāṇa-s.........................................................................174. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................199 5.1 Freedom and the World. General Review of the Critical Understanding of Kantian and Buddhist Epistemology ...............................................................................................................199 5.1.1 Freedom and Phenomenal Causal Exhaustion – West (Kant) and East (Buddhism).....199 5.1.2 Defending Kant's Transcendental Idealism on Freedom in the Thesis of the Third Antinomy................................................................................................................................202 5.1.3 The Madhyamaka-Yogācāra Conflict............................................................................204.

(10) 5.1.4 The Epistemological Situation Talks.............................................................................205 5.1.5 Conclusive Remark........................................................................................................208 5.2 Freedom and Hope. Practical Goals/Consequences of Doing Critical Epistemology..........209 5.2.1 Radical Evil, Banal Evil and Responsibility in Light of Critical Epistemology............209 5.2.2 Nirvāṇa as One Necessary Possibility for Awareness to Get Rid of Phenomenal Causal Exhaustion and the Goal of Cultivation in Buddhism............................................................215 5.2.3 Rejection of the Experience of Non-Conceptual Perception: A Tentative Response to Arendt's Pardoning Eichman...................................................................................................218 5.2.4 Conclusive Remark........................................................................................................222 5.3 Logic and Spiritual Development..........................................................................................222 5.3.1 Transcendental Logic Is Epistemological Logic, Whose Structure Is Necessarily Coined and Expressed in All possible Phenomena via Cognition/Self-cognition...............................222 5.3.2 Inference vs. Dialectics of reductio ad absurdum.........................................................228 5.3.3 Logic and Practice: The Same Logic, but Different Employments...............................231 Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................234 Summary..........................................................................................................................................245. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(11) Abbreviation Primary Literature: Buddhism 1. NMukh: Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, Chinese Version by Xuanzang. T. 1628, vol. 32. Alternative version by Yijing. T. 1629, vol. 32. Consulted: 1. Katsura, Shōryū (1977-1987). Inmyō shōrimon ron kenkyū I ~ VII. [A Study of the Nyāyamukha], Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō 37: 106126; 38: 110-130; 39:63-82; 41: 62-82; 42: 82-99; 44: 43-74; 46: 46-85. Ven. Renyiu's Chinese translation is forth-coming 2. Katsura, Shōryū's English Annotation and Translation (forth-coming). 3. Tucci, Giuseppe (1930). The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga. The Oldest Buddhist Text on Logic after Chinese and Tibetan Materials. Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus 15. Leipzig: In Kommission bei O. Harrassowitz. Reprint San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, Inc., 1978. 2. PS(V)1: Chapter 1, Pramāṇasamuccaya and Vṛtti of Dignāga's. Consulted: Hattori, Masaaki (1968). Dignāga, on Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 3. MMK: MūlaMādhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna. Editions of MMK consulted: 1. Kumārajīva's Chinese translation Chong lun. T. 1564, vol. 30. 2. Luetchford, Michael Eido (2002). Between Heaven and Earth: a Translation of Nāgārjuna's MūlaMādhyamakakārikā, with Commentary and Grammtical Analysis. Bristol [England]: Windbell Publications. 3. Ye, Shaoyong (2011). Zhunglunsong: Fanzanghan Hejiao, Daodu, Yizhu. [MūlaMādhyamakakārikā: New Editions of the Sanskrit, Tibetan and ChineseVersions, with Commentary and a Modern Chinese Translation]. Shanghai: Zhongxi Book Company. 4. Siderits, Mark and Shōryū Katsura (2013). Nāgārjuna's Middle Way. MūlaMādhyamakakārikā. Boston: Wisdom Piblications. 4. Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna, Editions consulted: 1. Vimokṣaprajñā-ṛṣi and Gautamaprajñā-ruci's Chinese translation Hui zheng lun. T. 1631, vol. 32. (Hui zheng lun 迴諍論). 2. Johnston, E. H. and A. Kunst, eds. (1951). “Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna.” Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, IX, 99-152. Re-edition Bhattacharya, Kamaleswar, E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst (1978). The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna. Vigrahavyāvartanī. Delhi: Motilal Bamarsidass Publishers. Reprint 2005. 5. Ālambanap.: Ālambanaparīkṣā with Vṛtti of Dignāga. 1. Chinese Version by Xuanzang. T. 1624, vol. 31. (Guan suo yuan yuan lun 觀所緣緣論) 2. Tibetan Version in Yamaguchi, Susumu and Jōshō Nozawa eds. (1953). Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei. Kyoto: Hōzōkan, appendix 1-13. Reprint 2011. 6. YMRZLLS: Yin ming ru zheng li lun shu 因明入正理論疏 of Kuiji 窺基, T. 1840, vol. 44. Cf. Zheng, Weihong (2010).Yin ming da shu jiao yi, jin yi, yien jiu, which covers Guang-sheng-si edition (1933). 7. MTS: Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō因明論疏明燈抄 of Zenjū 善珠. T. 2270 (cf.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(12) 1840), vol. 68. Cf. Zhan-ran-si edition 湛然寺本 (2011), ed. Ven. Shuiyue ⽔⽉法師 , following Yakushi-ji edition (1737) in Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho. 8. PV: Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, as published in PVBh and PVV. 9. PVBh: Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya (or Vārttikalaṁkāra) of Prajñākaragupta, ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. I, Patna, 1953. 10. PVV: Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin, ed. R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana. The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, vols. XXIV/3-XXVI/3, Patna, 1938-1940. 11. PSṬ: Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā of Jinendrabuddhi. Tibtan version, Sde-dge ed., Tohoku, No. 4268; Peking ed., Tibetan Tripitika, No. 5766. 12. PSP: Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti. Edition consulted: Mūlamādhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti, ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin ed., St. Pétersbourg (1903-1913), Bibliotheca Buddhica IV.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(13) Primary Literature: Kant All references to Kant's works are to Kants Gesammelte Schriften (KGS), herausgegeben von der Deutsche (formerly Königlichen Preussischen) Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902). All English translations (except for specified) follow the Cambridge Edition. Kritik der reinen Vernunft – KrV Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KGS 3-4). Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith. Boston & New York: Bedford and St. Martins: 1929. Kritik der praktischer Vernunft – KpV. 政治大. Kritik der praktischer Vernunft (KGS 5). Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, trans. by Mary J. Gregor, pp. 133-272. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Critique of Practical Reason, in Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, trans. by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten – GMS. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 4). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. by Mary J. Gregor, pp. 37-108. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by H. J. Paton. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. by Allen W. Wood. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Kritik der Urteilskraft – KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (KGS 5). Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Critique of Judgment, trans. by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987. Other works of Kant Die Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 6) – MS The Metaphyics of Morals, trans. by Mary J. Gregor, pp. 363-603. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können.

(14) (KGS 4) – Prolegomena Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, trans. by Gary Hartfield, pp. 29-170. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. by Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1950. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, in Immanuel Kant: Philosophy of Material Nature, trans. by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985. Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernuft (KGS 6) – Religion Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row, 1960.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(15) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(16) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(17) 1. Introduction 1.1 The Problems and General Ideas of the Investigation Is it at all possible for us human beings to rid ourselves of the constraints of natural causality? This question has taken on particular urgency for western philosophers since the emergence of the modern understanding of “nature” as elaborated by Newton (1687).1 With this idea, as Kant so nicely paraphrased in his “Third Antinomy” in KrV, people believe that everything that happens must have its cause in the previous temporal stage in accordance with causal laws. If this principle of. 政治大 determinism. And this exhaustion seems to tie in rather well with our modern 立 intuition, for little in our modern common sense understanding of the world casts causality exhausts the truth about the human experience, what follows is a strict. ‧ 國. 學. doubt on it. However, Kant (KrV: A 538 – 58 /B566 – 86.) concluded in his Third Antinomy that aside from natural causality, the causality of freedom (that there must. ‧. be an absolute cause kickstarting a new series of causation without any pre-condition). sit. y. Nat. is required as well and “in harmony” with the strict fact of the “universal law of. er. io. natural necessity,” so that the real human experience as such can be derived. This. n. treatment, especially his treatment a of the truth concerningvfreedom, has never stopped. i l C n courting controversies in Kantian studies, we modern folks often have little h e nand gchi U. difficulty assuming the exhaustion of natural causality in human experience. Strong naturalism, or the belief that all mental statuses can be reduced to physics, remains exceedingly popular among philosophers nowadays who are interested in the mind. This same question is actually also being posed with great urgency in another, much older philosophical tradition: Buddhism, particularly because the goal of the practical project in this tradition is to attain nirvāṇa when the practitioners in such a project cannot but situate himself or herself in saṃsāra. Saṃsāra is a common theme shared 1 Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy).. 1.

(18) among many ancient Asian cultures including Hinduism, Buddhism, Bön, Jainism, Taoism, etc., and it refers to the repeating cycle of a single subject in various forms of birth, life and death (reincarnation), whereas karma, the principle of causality, webs all the elementary forms of actions and existences in the cycle. Nirvāṇa in general entails a profound, still status liberated from the network of the forces of karma. Buddhism clings on to the necessity of the karma network on the one hand but aims to attain nirvāṇa on the other hand. Hence, the proper understanding of the relation between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra has been an enduring hot bed of philosophical debates in the tradition, one in which philosophers continue to be engaged nowadays. Also, many philosophers in present-day Buddhist philosophy are investing immense efforts. 政治大 to wonder if there is any positive account of the free status when we have to be 立. to determine whether Buddhism can be “naturalized,”2 meaning that people continue situated in nature.. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Quite interestingly, we can identify a similar philosophical conumdrum in both traditions: there exists a demand for the incompatibility and, at the same time yet. Nat. sit. y. almost paradoxically, also a harmonious interrelation, between natural necessity. er. io. and some true, free status from that necessity. More precisely, if we look at. n. Mahāyāna Buddhism, which ahas rejected the ultimate reality v (the ultimate real. i l C n ontological status) of atoms as claimed Hīnayāna/Abhidharma Buddhism, we can h ebyn g chi U. proclaim that in both Buddhist philosophy and Kant, the possibility for the free status to be any ontological status has already been ruled out. Then, the question is how we should understand the free status and make a clear differentiation as well as a clear connection between the free status and the status situated in the natural constraints, if such a distinction and relation cannot be “ontological.” Perhaps the only other option for the unification of natural constraints and spiritual liberation rests with the investigation of the condition through which all possible cognitions can be resulted. If this is indeed the case, then we should not be surprised that in both traditions, 2 See Arnold (2012: 1 – 13).. 2.

(19) epistemology assumes paramount importance and is taken to be one crucial path or method of practice to uncover such an almost paradoxical unification in humanity. Kant's response to the question consists of a treatment of the epistemology (KrV) and a positive proof for freedom upon the epistemology (G). Believing that any possible experience has to be a possible cognition and that one cannot experience the unknowable, Kant established a system of cognitive faculties by abstracting the empirical contents (affected sensation / matter) and analyzing the domains and relations (forms) among the necessary and non-empirical forms in the cognitive consciousness.3 Upon the ground of his epistemology, Kant proposed a two-fold. 政治大 the result of cognition, experience is empirically real, for the cognition is so resulted 立. scheme between empirical reality and transcendental ideality.4 On the one hand, as with certain observable and undeniable formal necessities, e.g., objectivity (as an. ‧ 國. 學. object), spatio-temporality (in time and space), etc. Of course, although experience. ‧. derives its reality from cognition, our thoughts about the experience can still be false, because the empirical judgment in thinking may be different from how the. Nat. sit. y. appearance is synthesized in the cognition (transcendental judgment, Überlegen,. er. io. reflexio5). On the other hand, as the established system, the individual distinct forms,. n. functions and inter-relations of a the domains of the cognitive v system must possess. i l C n certain non-empirical necessities, because they arei based heng c h U on the necessary results of. the critical abstraction of the sensational (i.e., empirical) contents in cognitions.. Furthermore, as Kant claimed6 and posited7 in KrV, the assumption that these forms and functions have external causes in the “transcendental reality” must undermine the possibility of both nature (empirical reality) and freedom, and these transcendental forms and functions of cognition can only be transcendentally ideal, not real.. 3 4 5 6 7. KrV: A 19 – 22 / B 33 – 36. KrV: A 28 / B 44; A 36 / B 52; A 36 – 41/ B 53 – 58; A 367 – 80; A 490 – 91/B 518 – 19. KrV: A 260 – 2 / B 316 – 7. KrV: A 543 / B 571. KrV: A369; A 490 – 91/B 518 – 19.. 3.

(20) Thereafter, Kant was able to restrict the efficacy of natural causality within the empirical reality, insofar as the critical self-investigation of cognition proves and establishes that “causality” is one of the necessary transcendental conditions for cognition and experience (one function of the transcendental logic). On the other hand, the conditions, including the abstract forms, functions and interrelations among them, as Kant attempted to argue, have to hold true when they are expressed in the empirical reality and cannot hold true when they are also inferred as remaining true beyond the scope of the empirical reality. It was exactly at this two-fold investigation stage that Kant laid out his argument for the truth of freedom: a. It is a truth that there is a conditional need (for nature as well as for freedom) for “another” type of. 政治大 empirical reality (KrV, Third Antinomy); b. free will is a categorical and formal 立 causality, the formal causality in freedom, in contrast to natural causality in the. imperative that has to do “not with the matter of the action and what is to result from. ‧ 國. 學. it, but with the form (of action) and the principle from which the action itself. ‧. follows” (GMS: 4168).. Nat. sit. y. With regard to this investigation stage, we can see that contemporary scholars in the. er. io. philosophy of Kant continue to dispute two issues: (1) Does Kant's epistemology. n. successfully support his transcendental idealism? (2) Arevthe arguments for freedom a. i l C n in the Third Antinomy in KrV and those h e ningGcsuccessful? hi U. The mainstream. philosophers take a dim view of issue (1) and seek to “remove” or “separate” transcendental idealism from empirical realism. Henry E. Allison's work (1983), together with the revised and augmented edition (2004), is a veritable tome encapsulating the extensive debates. He expertly put together the arguments of the philosophers championing anti-idealism – P. F. Strawson (1966) and his followers, mainly H. A. Prichard (1909) – and the philosophers adhering to the separabilitythesis – including also certain followers of Strawson, primarily Paul Guyer (1982, 1983 & 1987) and Rae Langton (1998). The anti-idealists rejected the claims of Kant 8 Translation and pagination follow the Cambridge edition, 1996. Insertion is mine.. 4.

(21) that space and time are the mere aesthetic (sensible) forms of representation and that they possess no external reality (transcendental reality)9. The other group of philosophers further believe that with the removal of Kant's idea on the ideality of space and time, Kant's epistemology can still suffice for science and objective validity in nature and succeed in refuting skepticism. Allison's interpretation and defense are still being disputed nowadays, and his position has not been receptively received or answered thoroughly by contemporary scholars. The main thrusts of his interpretation and defense are to focus on the distinction that Kant made between the two characters of a person, namely the intelligible character that belongs in the realm of intelligibility and the kingdom of freedom, and the empirical character that belongs. 政治大 distinction is one between two aspects, not between two objects or two worlds. His 立 in the realm of sensibility and the kingdom of nature, and to emphasize that the criticisms of his opponents fall primarily along the line of attack that their. ‧ 國. 學. interpretation of the distinction is merely an ontological distinction and fails to take 11).. ‧. into account what Kant claimed is an epistemological distinction (Allison, 2004: 4 –. sit. y. Nat. er. io. As for issue (2), Allison (1990), with his two-aspect interpretation, attempted to. n. defend the success of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy a v in KrV. However,. i l C n interestingly, H. J. Paton (1947: 224-5), yet another earlier philosopher who held a hen gchi U similar two-aspect view (or, in his wording, two standpoints), believed that Kant's. argument in G had failed and that the whole argument for freedom has taken on the form of a “vicious circle.” In contrast, Allison (2011) continued to defend the success of the argument in G. Without going into the details of the discussions centering around the two issues, here, we may want to take a close look at the two shifts in the lines of commentaries on the side of Buddhist philosophy, in which we will find certain patterns of problematic interpretations similar to what we have witnessed in the modern philosophical debates concerning Kant's idea of freedom. 9 Strawson (1966: 16) labeled transcendental idealism a “disastrous” doctrine of Kant.. 5.

(22) The first shift came courtesy of Candrākīrti (ca. 600 – 650 C.E.), an influential thinker in the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In Buddhism, philosophers have also developed a two-fold scheme to treat the relation between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, and this is known as the “Two Truth” or “Two Reality Theory.” The earliest written philosophical discussions about the scheme, to the best of our knowledge, took place in the Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra,10 a canonical text of Abhidharma Buddhism. Essentially, the scheme makes a distinction between the understanding of the real world in the common opinion of the people and the understanding of the real world in the awakened awareness (buddhas). The early. 政治大 Maitreya (Yogācāra thinker, second half of the 4 century), Dignāga (the founder of 立 discussions about the scheme by Nāgārjuna (Madhyamaka thinker, 150 – 250 C.E.), th. the new Buddhist epistemology and logic, 480 – 540 C.E.)11 and Bhāviveka (the. ‧ 國. 學. founder of the Madhyamaka school,12 ca. 500 – 578) can be characterized as a. ‧. description of an epistemological distinction (see 1.3.1.1). These discussions attempted to make sense of the differences and relations between the conventional. Nat. sit. y. truth and the ultimate truth as some different employments of the same epistemic. er. io. capacity. Naturally, their ideas on Buddhist practice exhibit some kind of trust in the. n. moderate employment of epistemology and logic (moderate a v because of their. i l C n constrained use only within the conventional and not beyond it), suggesting or h e n g creality hi U demonstrating the performance of the epistemological practice (self-critique) in the investigation of cognition in order to clear away the inappropriate, incomplete understanding of reality and to unveil the appropriate knowledge. However, Candrākīrti objected to such an opining difference with regard to the distinction. He was convinced that the difference is one between linguistic activities and the 10 The text is believed to have been produced in 150 C.E. (Potter, 1996: 112). We also have Xuanzang's Chinese translation A Pi Da Muo Da Pi Puo Sha Lun 阿毘達磨⼤毘婆沙論. 11 We do not have direct textual proof of Dignāga's involvement in interpreting the Two Truth Theory. However, given his status as one of the most significant contributors to Buddhist epistemology, his account of epistemology should reasonably be included in the line of epistemological interpretations of the Two Truth Theory, especially when the two different responses to his epistemology have resulted in the divide of the Madhyamaka, following which the epistemological interpretation of the Two Truth Theory is argued for in one group and denied in the other. 12 Saito (2006).. 6.

(23) unspeakable,13 which in some sense transforms the epistemic distinction into an ontological one – a distinction between two ontological statuses: words and the unspeakable (see 1.3.1.1). His understanding of the Two Truth Theory quickly gained influence. On the one hand, his criticism of the Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga (especially his notion of self-awareness, svasaṁvitti14/svasaṁvedana15) paved the way for the profound changes in the philosophical development of Dignāga's famed follower and promoter Dharmakīrti (the founder of the school of Buddhist epistemology, ca. 600 – 660 C.E.16). On the other hand, his disagreement with his clansman and predecessor Bhāviveka splintered the school of Madhyamaka into two main streams over the course of the school's subsequent development: one. 政治大 other categorically rejects epistemology. 立. holds on to epistemology as a method for unveiling the true knowledge whereas the. ‧ 國. 學. The second shift took place after the ascent of Dharmakīrti within the circle of the. ‧. epistemologists. Later Buddhist epistemologists have experienced significant problems interpreting Dharmakīrti's further development of Dignāga's epistemology. Nat. al. er. io. sit. y. because of its realistic and physicalistic (Sautrāntika) character17; more precisely, the. n. 13 Candrākīrti's commentary in the Prasannapadā on MMK 24.8 – 10. Ven. Jianhong Shi (2010: 15) wrote that the key representatives maintaining this view are Gajin Nagao (1978) and Yuichi Kajiyama (1982), cf. Yoshimizu (1990: 105-107, 110-111 and note 6, 144). We can cast reasonable doubts on Candrākīrti's “clear distinction” between the “two truths” (Ven. Jianhong Shi, 2010: 19), given that there exists some gradient between the two. Nonetheless, the gradient here concerns the various compositions of knowledge among the practitioners from ordinary persons via the stages of bodhisattvas to buddhas, while the fundamental difference between the two remains very sharp. 14 PSV 1.6ab. 15 Auto-commentary of PSV 1.6ab. 16 Ouyang Jingwu's Yin ming zheng li men lun ben xu. 17 Although most of the contemporary Dharmakīrti scholars would accept the claim that Dharmakīrti's epistemic project is some kind of realistic epistemology (holding a real causal relation between the object of the mind and the cognition in the mind), it is somewhat accepted also that Dharmakīrti's philosophy is highly complicated and perhaps consists of different “stages.” For instance, G. Dreyfus (1997) believed that, following the Tibetan thinker Śākya Chok-den, there are four stages in Dharmakīrti's philosophy, and each stage is denied by the one immediately following it. Dreyfus believed that the realistic characters (together with the assumption of the real existence of the external world) of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy remain only in the scope of the former three stages while the last stage is purely idealism. Without going into the details for now, Dreyfus and Śākya Chok-den's materials suggest that, aside from the “standard interpretation” that the contemporary Dharmakīrti scholars prefer, we may also want to begin to consider an “alternative interpretation”: not simply inking Dharmakīrti as a simple realist. We should keep this in mind, but in the present investigation, Dharmakīrti is made the strawman representing realistic epistemology, which assumes the cognition procedure to be real in time; it thus follows that Dreyfus is believed to be the standard interpretation of the present-day mainstream scholarship.. Ch. engchi. 7. i n U. v.

(24) difficulties arose because the epistemic validity in his opinion has to be guaranteed by the causal efficacy of the pramāṇa-s,18 the measures of cognition (or cognitive faculties, a term we modern folks are more accustomed to). On the surface, if the relation between the sensational cognitive faculty (perception, pratyakṣa) and the faculty for conceptual construction (inference, anumāna)19 in Dignāga is properly understood, as Dharmakīrti preferred, to be natural causal relation, Dignāga's claim that the cognitive faculties and their result (the resulted cognition) have to be one and the same20 would be very inappropriate.21 Moreover, this claim is highly profound for the philosophical position of Mahāyāna in general, viz., an idealism that refuses selfexisting basic elements independent from cognition. If the cognitive faculties and the. 政治大 naturally effective and independent of cognition – in other words, something 立. cognition were related in natural causality, the faculties would become something effective at the non-conventional level. The later Buddhist epistemologists after. ‧ 國. 學. Dharmakīrti thus began to debate the status of the cognitive faculties, as Dan Arnold. ‧. (2010) pointed out. In contrast to Dharmakīrti's causal explanation about the operation of the cognitive faculties, later thinkers such as Prajñākaragupta (750 – 810. Nat. sit. y. C.E.) and Dharmottara (700 – 800 C.E.) began to interpret the cognitive faculties as. er. io. some formal conditions only through whose complete satisfaction in the resulted,. n. realized cognition that they themselves can be counted as v“pramāṇa-s”; this is also a. i l C n 22 U developments have made the position that Bhāviveka obviously h eassumed. n g c h i Such. notable Dignāga's not-so-well-appreciated original idea of “the formal conformity,” 18 Pramāṇasvārtika 3.3 (Shastri, 1968: 100): “whatever has the capacity for causal efficacy (arthakriyāsamartham yat) is ultimately existent (paramārthasat); everything else is conventionally existent.” Translation uses Arnold (2012: 21-22). 19 Dignāga established only two pramāṇas, because in every object of cognition we can only have two “aspects (akara)” of it: its immediate particularity and its mediate universality (PSV 1. 2). 20 PS(V) 1.10: “Therefore, these three factors of cognition (object of cognition, cognitive faculty and the resulted cognition) are not separate from one another.” 21 Of course, there are also issues concerning Dignāga's notion of “self-awareness” and “formal conformity” between the determination of the object and the determination in the self-awareness (PS(V) 1.9) underlying the discussions within this group of thinkers. However, since Dharmakīrti himself has already been suspected to accept Candrakīrti's suggestion to quietly remove the notion of mental perception (Arnold 2010: 340), to introduce these problems would obfuscate the debate on our main thesis. Therefore, I shall put these issues aside for the time being. 22 “dbu ma'i rtsa b'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma,” 45b-62b, also 46b-47a (etymology), Prajñāpradīpa (Derge Version of Kangyur; cf. Taishō tripiṭaka No. 3853). The understanding of the Tibetan text relies primarily on the investigation in the dissertation of Su-an Lin, NCCU (forth-coming).. 8.

(25) in PS(V) 1.9, between the determination of the form of the object and the determination of the awareness of the cognition of the object. In face of the concerns about Dignāga's “pramāṇa-prameya-phala-being-the-same” thesis, Arnold (2010) employed the distinction put forth by Paul Williams (1980) and suggested that Candrākīrti and Dharmakīrti had interpreted Dignāga's idea of selfawareness as “reflective,” meaning that the sixth consciousness (mental consciousness) processes the result of the first-five-sense consciousness causally. Such a “reflective” understanding actually casts a doubt on the sixth consciousness being “direct and perceptual” in character, so far as I can see, because if the sixth. 政治大 real causal efficacy, the perceptual character in the former-five-sense consciousness 立 consciousness and the former-five-sense consciousness were to be related with the. and that in the sixth consciousness would be individuated respectively by the causal. ‧ 國. 學. distinction and thus undermine the definition of the unitary feature of perception. ‧. (pratyakṣa) in one consciousness: “perception is free from conceptual construction (kalpanā, differentiation).”23 To put it more directly, causal efficacy must imply. Nat. sit. y. conceptual differentiation, or otherwise, the relation between cause and effect would. er. io. collapse. Hence, the later thinkers' attempt to define the role of pramāṇa-s as mere. n. a being attached with any strong conditions of cognition without i v realistic character in l C nof the causal explanation U h e ton the themselves can be understood as a shift rejection gchi. among the cognitive faculties and the call to rejoin the immediacy of self-awareness through the unification of “all six consciousnesses.” That is, the later thinkers have shifted from the reflective model of self-awareness to the “reflexive model” of selfawareness, a model which does not regard the operation of the understanding in the operation of the sixth consciousness as another individual real operation separated from the operation of the former five-sense consciousness. This is also a position that, 23 PS(V) 1.3c. We can also note the relevant discussions on how many “types of perception” there are in Dignāga, how these types are different and whether the different types undermine the “free-of-differentiation” nature of perception itself in general. In his Ph.D. dissertation, Zhi-hua Yao suggested that “self-awareness” should be the fourth type of perception, as opposed to the previous consensus (except Alex Wayman, 1991) that there are only three types. In Jun-jie Chu's Ph.D. dissertation, he argued that there exists only one type, and the discussions on the various types are merely expedient responses to the opponents.. 9.

(26) as we shall find, Dignāga himself was more in favor of.24 In addition to the developments in India, Xuanzang's idea of Wu-ju-yi-shi (五俱意識, i.e., the mental consciousness always accompanying the five-sense consciousness), which had probably been developed earlier than Dharmakīrti's causal account, thrust the development of the issue within the Chinese philosophical community into a direction of the aforementioned “reflexive model” that is more loyal to the position of “idealism.” Apparently, the similar patterns of interpretative discrepancy in these two traditions (Mahāyāna Buddhism and Kant) can be summarized as follows: (1) a two-fold. 政治大 harmonious relation between natural causality and the status that is free of the 立 scheme was developed to treat the issue of the incompatibility and necessary. causality; (2) the interpretation of the two-fold scheme was shifted by influential. ‧ 國. 學. interpreters and promoters from an epistemological one to an ontological one (and. ‧. hence a metaphysical one), resulting in enduring debates. Moreover, if we look into the system of epistemology developed in each tradition (Kant's and Dignāga's), we. Nat. sit. y. can find that (3) aside from the natural causality, another kind of formal. er. io. causality is needed to meet our experience as such, and it should be the formal. n. causality along with which the This a cognitive faculties are coordinated. v. i l C n U dissertation seeks to argue that by interpreting of the cognitive faculties h e n g cthe h ioperation with the formal causality, we can not only obtain a coherent understanding of the original text of the epistemology but also facilitate the resolution of the two-fold scheme in each tradition for treating the issue of the incompatible but harmonious relation between our physically constrained situation and our spiritual liberation. This dissertation will also put forth a reconstructed model of epistemology (without any assumption of the ontological status for the cognitive faculties; in this dissertation, such kind of epistemology is termed critical epistemology) and entertain the treatment for freedom within said model. 24 Matilal (1986: 148-9); Yao (2005: 144-5). 10.

(27) 1.2 Analyses of the Problematics First Problematic. In the commentary literature of Dignāga's epistemology and the commentary literature of Kant's epistemology, a controversy over interpretation has been raging over how one should understand the faculties25 and the epistemic system consisting of said faculties with regard to their ontological assumption. The Indo-Tibetan discussions centered around the issue of Dignāga's idea of self-. 政治大 Dharmakīrti (ca. 600 – 660 C.E.), 立 Jinendhrabuddhi (ca. 710 – 770 C.E.. awareness (svasaṁvitti), evolving from Candrākīrti (ca. 600 – 650 C.E.) on through 26. ),. ‧ 國. 學. Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750 – 810 C.E.) and Dharmottara (ca. 740 – 800 C.E.). Also, as suggested by the later, 11-century Bhramin thinker Rāmakaṇṭha and observed by Dan. ‧. Arnold (2005), there was a gradual shift from treating these epistemological terms as individual “mere (offhand) things” to treating them as “conditions.” Meanwhile, the. y. Nat. sit. branch in China, viz., Xuanzang's Vijñāptimātratā (Xuanzang ca. 602 – 664 C.E.),. er. io. which I consider to be a strong (not implying intentional) opponent to the ontic. n. a l served as a vivid non-ontic reception of Dignāga's philosophy, i v counterpart in the tradition.. Ch. n U engchi. Almost in parallel, the German idealists tended to read Kant, who also focused on the issue of self-awareness, with a stronger ontological assumption that was covertly or overtly questioned by the later Kantians (D. Henrich, 1973, D.S. Pacini ed.). The Kantian pioneers in North America also read Kant's epistemology with a strong ontological assumption. A prime example was P. F. Strawson, who believed that the “unnecessary” and “unfortunate” transcendental idealism should be removed from the 25 “Measure or means of cognition, pramāṇa” in Dignāga (ca. 480 – 540 C.E.) and “faculty, power, Vermögen or sometimes dynamis, falcultas, Fakultät,” in Kant (1724 – 1804 C.E.) 26 Funayama (1999: 92).. 11.

(28) first Critique and that the epistemic system, entailed in the “analytic argument” of the Critique (entitled by Strawson) – the transcendental arguments that are “uncontaminated” by idealistic premises – can stand alone without requiring the support of an idealistic ground (1966: 240). Paul Guyer followed Strawson in thinking that Kant's attributing space and time should be granted to the appearance alone, though he believed also that things in themselves should be understood as ordinary objects like tables and chairs which are by nature distinct from our representation of them in the spatiotemporal appearance. Therefore, he posited that transcendental idealism is not necessary for Kant while a “dogmatic metaphysical idealism” would suffice (1987: 335-336); here, an ontological presumption can. 政治大 in the term's modern literal meaning. However, this strong realistic acceptance of 立. clearly be observed. Rae Langton (1998) even depicted Kant as a “scientific realist,” Kant was later on questioned by scholars such as John McDowell and Henry Allison.. ‧ 國. 學. They became more in favor of treating these terms as “condition” (McDowell) or. ‧. “not with ontological value” (Allison). In particular, Allison advocated for the twoaspect view to replace the comparatively standard “two-world view” of Kant's. Nat. sit. y. phenomenal-noumenal distinction, in direct defense of Kant's transcendental idealism. er. io. (1983/2004). On the other side, the continental scholarship over the past century. n. seems to me to have maintained a a much greater awarenessv of the problem, since one. i l C n U will observe far less frequently in that where an interpretation h escholarship n g c h i instances of Kant is bundled with some understanding of these terms with tacit, strong. ontological assumption. Also, unlike the situation in North America, it is not so often the case that Kant can be treated without undertaking a serious consideration of his position on transcendental idealism and his peculiar idea of space and time as mere forms of representation. Whether these two epistemological systems should be taken without any ontological assumption, together with the problem of how this can be accomplished, is the initial problematic of this investigation. 12.

(29) Second Problematic. The epistemology in both Dignāga and Kant is not isolated. It is at the service of practical needs. The relation is clearer in Kant, especially within the three Critiques and other related works such as Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) and Prolegomena, that epistemology as a grand argument supports the position of transcendental idealism and the distinction of the phenomenal/sensible and the noumenal/intelligible, and hence anticipates freedom, which is the proof of morality. 政治大. (KpV27) as well as the basis of its metaphysics (GMS).. 立. On the other side, albeit with Dignāga, we may not have a strong plan as clear-cut as. ‧ 國. 學. what we have with Kant or even with other like-minded Buddhist thinkers (e.g.,. ‧. Dharmakīrti); on at least three points, we are obliged to admit that the epistemology of Dignāga indeed anticipates a further practical end aside from the end as providing. Nat. sit. y. a ground for the conventional, theoretical polemics among the Buddhist and non-. er. io. Buddhist schools. (1) With the literature of Dignāga himself, the claims that the. n. Buddha be the “personification a of the means of cognition v(pramāṇa-bhūta)” (PS(V). i l C n U to guide those tīrthika lost 1.1) and that the (epistemological) treatises h e n ghereby c h i aim. amid the stream of saṃsāra to return to the right path (NMukh, last verse), and their related commentaries or allusions, especially those compiled in the commentaries and works of Kuiji (632 – 682 C.E.) and Huizhao (651 – 714 C.E.), we are so obliged. Besides, (2) within both the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna classical sutras and treatises, the role that epistemology plays is so profound and so difficult to ignore that we can hardly omit its commonly agreed function from the project of liberation. 27 “Now, the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodeictic law of practical reason, constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of the system of pure reason, even of speculative reason; and all other concepts (those of God and immortality), which as mere ideas remain without support in the latter, now attach themselves to this concept and with it and by means of it get stability and objective reality, that is, their possibility is proved by this: that freedom is real, for this idea reveals itself through moral law” (Cambridge edition of KpV, 5: 4-5; emphasis is mine).. 13.

(30) without more rigorous grounds and arguments.28 (3) Also, with Buddhism as a historical or religiously practical whole – especially as an entire project devoted to the attainment of liberation – to establish the means for proper cognition only for the sake of conventional communications (scientific or technical deliberation) is not sufficiently justified within the project. The burden of justification actually rests upon the camp claiming that Buddhist epistemology should merely be established for the purpose of treating the simple theoretical or technical problems at the conventional level, or only in passive response to the non-Buddhists. We need to ask: (1) what is the role of epistemology in the process of religious practice, (2) what is the significance of epistemology in the philosophy of Buddhism, and (3) what is the. 政治大 epistemologies that makes Buddhism a more persuasive philosophy? 立. feature which distinguishes Buddhist epistemology from other non-Buddhist. ‧ 國. 學. To sum up, the exact role of the epistemology in each of the Buddhist and Kant's. ‧. grander projects of practice is the second problematic of the investigation. To be more precise, with Kant, the investigation is to focus on how and whether Kant's. Nat. sit. y. epistemology succeeds in supporting transcendental idealism together with the. er. io. phenomenal-noumenal distinction, as well as the vision of a practical philosophy. n. thereupon. As an initial attempt, to the Third a we deal with Kant's resolution v. i l C n Antinomy in KrV, to illustrate how h Kantian e n gepistemology c h i U indeed succeeds in. supporting transcendental idealism and anticipating freedom as a fact. With Dignāga, the investigation involves reconstructing a reasonable, historical as well as philosophical significance of such a Buddhist epistemology in the context of the. 28 In vol. 531, Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, the Buddha says that a bodhisattva as in the cause-position and a buddha as in the result-position cognize the particular aspect (sva-lakṣaṇa) and the universal aspect (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of every dharma completely without any concealment and defilement. “於一切法自相、共相照了無闇清淨具足，住因位時名為菩薩，若至果位即名如來.” In vol. 6, Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra, the Buddha is described as knowing the particular aspect and the universal aspect of every dharma with Subtle Observing Wisdom, so that all the confusions surrounding these two aspects are removed …... “如是如來妙觀察智，遍知一切自相共相，能斷世間一切疑惑自共相愚，是疑惑因知自共相無此愚故，自無疑惑能斷他疑，大圓鏡智永離二障不愚...” In A Pi Tan Xin Lun, it is said that whoever knows the particular aspect and the universal aspect of every dharma can lay claim to being the Buddha. “能知諸法自相、共相，名為佛”.. 14.

(31) Buddhist project of practice, especially after Nāgārjuna's dominant criticism of the epistemology proposed by the Nyāya school (a realistic stance). This will necessarily place Dignāga in the middle of the fight, or the continuation, between the two main Mahāyāna branches: the Madhyamaka and Yogacārā.. The Main Contribution of the investigation of these problematics rests on answering the second by determining the first. In order to do so, the investigation seeks to deal first with a philosophical question: what is epistemology? We raise two challenges against the epistemology with the ontological assumption (assuming that. 政治大 in “real causal” relations) – viz., Logical Question 1: the results cannot be “really” 立. the epistemological terms have already had “real” references and that they “co-work” presupposed in their causes; and Logical Qestion 2: direct (sensational) experiences. ‧ 國. 學. cannot occur “logically” prior to the indirect (conceptual) experiences. As such, the. ‧. investigation suggests that the epistemology will need to be implemented critically and radically (attributing no ontological assumption to the epistemological terms);. Nat. sit. y. accordingly, the investigation would also suggest the rejection of the ontic. er. io. interpretation line of the two epistemic systems, since the interpretations would be. n. basically and philosophicallyaproblematic. Next, the investigation attempts to v. i l C n formulate reasonable and coherent reconstructions h e n g c h i ofUthese two epistemic systems. with “critical” and “radical” attitudes. Being reasonable and coherent means that (a) the interpretation discrepancies can be more easily reconciled or explained away with this interpretation and (b) stronger and more coherent significance of epistemology in the context of the higher plan of both Dignāga and Kant can be obtained with the critical interpretation. As the findings and reconstructions of the investigation would suggest, the critical interpretation is not only more plausible than the ontic interpretation, but it is indeed also the case that the two epistemic systems can better sustain themselves with the non-ontic reading.. 15.

(32) Exposition of Key Ideas and Clarifications. The idea of transcendental logic is basically derived from Kant. Here, in this investigation, the term is generalized to mean the epistemic condition in the following 3 senses: (1) the epistemic condition of the general logic and its operation. With the condition, the regularity in thinking about objects (concepts) and thinking of them in relations (repeatable laws) is made possible, while the term “laws” is meant in a broad sense, including the (natural) laws adopted in theoretical reasoning and the (natural) laws that can be willed in the universal consideration (in freedom/morality). (2) It is also intended that transcendental logic is the epistemic condition for our direct experience to be. 政治大 assumptions in the Buddhist epistemology immediately suggests that there is implied 立 extended in space and time “as so intuited.” (3) Ruling out all of the ontological. in the Buddhist epistemic system the transcendental logic – the condition for any. ‧ 國. 學. empirical inference in our experience to be possible (and for the validity of each. ‧. instance of inference to be questionable and determinable). This suggestion, as the findings will indicate, may prove to be a better option than those options regarding. Nat. sit. y. the Buddhist logic as a subdivision of the abstract formal or general logic, a stance. er. io. that most of the contemporary researchers have tacitly presumed to be what Dignāga. n. had in mind with his treaties a on logic. Also, the understanding v has more. i l C n epistemological as well as practical h contents e n g than c h itheUunderstanding that the Buddhist logic is a combination of Indian logic and the rules of polemics (Daqi Chen and S. Katsura)29. 29 To the best of my knowledge, all of the scholars in the 20th century Chinese circle treated Dignāga's logic as one type of the theories concerning formal/general logic; in other words, the treatises of this logic are carried out with an attempt to establish an objective, universal logic theory, toward which the other western modern studies of logic are also heading. The thrusts of these studies center on collating the formulae, identifying the flaws within the formulae and deciding whether the system is induction or deduction, mainly with the use of apparatus that modern logic studies have so far uncovered. However, in Daqi Chen (1952), we can observe a direct attempt to relocate Dignāga's logic treatise in the context of epistemology, which has often been observed in the classical Chinese Yin-ming tradition. Besides, in both Chen and Katsura (2010), the polemics context of Buddhist logic was emphasized. Katsura (2010) offered a summary of the Japanese scholarship on Buddhist logic during the second half of the 20th century (pp. 254-259); Weihong Zheng (1996: 199 – 244) compiled a summary of the Chinese scholarship during 1919 – 1949. Both accounts indicated that the development of Buddhist logic in the 20th century Asia was basically a component of the globalized formal logic. In Zheng's view, the most influential scholars of Buddhist logic in the 20th century China were Cheng Lü and Daqi Chen, with Lü representing the old approach of the Chinese Yin-ming tradition and inclined toward epistemology and Chen embodying the approach of modern logic.. 16.

(33) The notion of spiritual development in this investigation is limited to the process of positioning the absolute, highest point in our conscious experience. By spirit, I refer to that which is non-sensible, non-material and non-cognizable but possible and true in “consciousness,” and which is also understood, similarly to the common understanding, as the core value of the sentient being with consciousness. In other words, spiritual development here refers not to a process from the sensible experience to the ontologically transcendent experience but to the re-ascertainment of the fact: the continual up-lifting of the self-awareness, the awareness that the self-awareness is by nature distinct from the cognized subject (pathological subject and psychological. 政治大 awareness and avails itself of the fact that such a precondition takes on a distinctive, 立 subject), which can be possible only with the precondition of the factuality of selfindividual and always-superior position in the scope of the conscious experience.. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. It is however not intended here that the two ideas with their so-limited contents are assumed to be true at the outset. Nor is it intended that the limited meanings of the. Nat. sit. y. two ideas will mark the end of the arguments here. The two arguments put forth in. er. io. determining the first problematic and resolving the second are self-sustained. The. n. main thesis is that the non-ontic a reading of the two systemsv carries more weight than the ontic one.. i l C n U Thus, the reconstructions and their services for the h e nofgthec two h i systems. two practical projects, as part of the argument, should be allowed only to consider the non-ontic and pure epistemic version of the scheme, which is of course the version that the investigation recommends. The investigation wishes to withhold from attacking the scope of soteriology by not cross-questioning the either mystic or despairing scheme of the other version of the two practical projects, which the ontic interpreters would naturally favor more. Here, only the reason as to why the scheme must necessarily lead to the either mystic or despairing “practical end” will be provided. We take Heidegger and Arendt's reaction to Kantian moral philosophy as a demonstrative example (see 5.2). 17.

(34) Epistemology and Ontology. Critical epistemology's priority over ontology poses no harm to any ontic state. When epistemology precedes ontology, the question may be raised as to whether it will necessarily follow that the position contradicts our intuition that how the universe unfolds of its own accord should not at all be interrupted by our activity of cognition alone. Therefore, it stands to reason that ontology should precede epistemology. Such concerns are actually unwarranted in critical epistemology. “Taking a priority position” is itself epistemological and not an ontic “undertaking,” and whether or not one practices epistemological contemplation, the world will remain there to be known as it is. The world is always there to be. 政治大 with calling for an awareness that the assumption of any ontic state that is 立. known, as long as there is a knower. The purpose for ascertaining the priority rests independent of cognition is problematic, for such an assumption implies a real, ontic. ‧ 國. 學. disconnect between consciousness and “the world,” meaning that “the world” is. ‧. never there to be really known without any real mediation (e.g., God or some real causal relation between the object known and the cognizing subject). And to accept. Nat. sit. y. that the world is always there to be known, whether or not it is really known, does not. er. io. necessarily imply that the world exists by itself without being in any relation to. n. cognition. Furthermore, ontological forms as in space andv time do not exhaust a consciousness, which is. i l C n supported by h ethen fact i Ualways up-lifting position and g cofh the. non-representational nature of self-awareness. For the consideration of epistemic. investigation and the investigation of consciousness itself, epistemology precedes ontology. In summary, the epistemological consideration that epistemology precedes ontology is totally compatible with the fact that the world itself goes without being causally constrained by the fact of cognition; however, this fact does not imply that a world independent of cognition (or of pratītyasamutpāda) is assumable. And, as the question itself correctly observes, the fact that the epistemic contemplation does not in reality interfere with the ontic states and the priority of epistemology over ontology (being an epistemic consideration, too) pose no harm to the ontic states at 18.