1. Introduction
4.2 Formal Conformity between Pramāṇa and Prameya
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
cognition are holistically “in immediate connection” and (b) the object of the former five consciousness and the object of the sixth consciousness are one and the same object, which can be thought of in various aspects (approached in five kinds of spatial forms, in temporal forms or in thought). With these two immediate relations (a) and (b), the asymmetry pointed out by Candrakīrti no longer remains; the pair of the two means tie in with the two aspects of the same object, and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is ideally left to its own without taking any ontological status, as most of the rational
epistemologists so agree. To conclude this in a simplified way, only when the object-aspects are regarded as ontologically separate and when the means are assumed to function in different ontological statuses (different time and space) can there be the so-called problem of asymmetry.
4.2 Formal Conformity between Pramāṇa and Prameya
Now, we have learned that in Dignāga, the faculty (indriya) of the former five senses contributes only the perception (pratyakṣa) and the tricky sixth sense contributes both the perception and the inference (anumāṇa). Two different understandings follow.
The proceduralistic one posits that the external object causes the production of the five-sense perception, and at the next time point, manas (the sixth consciousness) apprehends (is caused by) the five-sense perception producing the sixth-sense
perception in itself (sharing the same form of the object of the five-sense perception) and it itself thus possesses an object to reflect about in the forms of inferences in itself. Holistically, there is only one consciousness and there is only one object cognized (both are restrictively valid as the resulting cognition). Since there are several sharply distinguished forms that can be told in one unitary consciousness itself including the universal aspect, the temporal aspect and the five-kinds spatial aspect, we say, metaphorically, that there are several functions in the mind in the holistic cooperation. Actually, Dignāga's idea that the conformity between the
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
means/cause of the cognition (pramāṇa) and its resulting object (prameya) is not real but formal ties in exceedingly well with the holistic view that even such prominent commentators as Dhamrakīrti (PV, III, 309), Prajñākaragupta (PVBh, p.344.11-12) and Manorathanandin (PVV, p.211.10)6 all seem to accept this idea. However, the mainstream Indo-Tibetan commentators, even including Dhamrakīrti himself,
nonetheless introduce Dignāga in the proceduralistic view, rendering this idea (and its relevant ideas) of Dignāga very difficult to interpret.
The idea of the formal conformity between pramāṇa and prameya was introduced when Dignāga presented his original, core idea of self-awareness (svasaṁvitti) in PS(V) 8cd (Hattori, 1968: 28).
k. 8cd. [we call the cognition itself] “pramāṇa” [literally, a means of
cognizing,] because it is [usually] conceived to include the act of [cognizing], although primarily it is a result.
In the vṛtti, Dignāga commented (ibid.):
The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object and [thus] is understood to include the act [of cognizing] (savyāpāra). For this reason, it is metaphorically called pramāṇa, the means of cognition, although it is [ultimately speaking] devoid of activity (vyāpāra). For instance, an effect is said to assume the form of its cause when it arises in conformity with its cause, although [in fact] it is devoid of the act [of assuming the form of its cause].
Similar is the case with this [resulting cognition].
Similarly, in NMukh (T. 1628, vol. 32), Dignāga briefly mentioned when the idea of self-awareness was introduced that:
6 Hattori (1968: 100).
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
又於此中7無別量果，以即此體8似義⽣故，似有⽤9故，假說為量10。
Furthermore, in [self-cognizing] itself there is no measured result of the means of cognition (pramāṇa-phala) different [from pramāṇa]; we metaphorically call it “the means of cognition” just because upon it (the appearing of self-awareness) the form/image (體 ākāratā) [identical to the cognized object]
appears to arise [in itself] and it thus appears to possess some function [to produce the form in itself]
In YMRZLLS (0140b10, T. 1840, vol. 44), Kuiji cited Śaṅkarasvamin's comments:
⽽⼆量中，即智名果。
In the two pramāṇa-s, the cognition itself is named their result.
We can already find here the clues on Dignāga's twofold appearance theory, namely the claim that pramāṇa, prameya and phala are not separate from one another, the complex sixth consciousness and the idea of self-awareness. Details on these issues will be examined shortly. Here, we focus on one obvious position that Dignāga maintained: that cognition is not real, not something happening; the relation between the cause of cognition (pramāṇa) and its result (phala) is not real, at least not in the same category as the relation we can observe in phenomena like that which an ax has upon a tree. However, the conformity between the determination of the cognition of an object and the determination of the object is admitted. That is, the form (ākāra) of the object cognized and the form of the object that our cognition perceives are
identical. The relation is not real, but there is a formal identity – more precisely, there are not two forms but only one. Hence, we say, only between pramāṇa and
7 Katsura (forth-coming): 此中 ＝ in this connection; “the connection” seems to refer to “prati,” since in the context the translation “connection” only occurs in translating “prati” in 現現別轉 akṣam akṣam prati varttate.
8 Katsura (forth-coming): 體 ākāratā
9 Katsura (forth-coming): 用 vyāpāra=function; 似有用 savyāpārapratītatvāt.
10 Katsura (forth-coming): 假說為量 pramāṇatvam upacaryate.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
prameya is there a formal conformity.
To understand this in the view of the Sautrāntika's proceduralism, the irreality of the cognitive causation comes from restricting the whole process in the appearance within the self-awareness itself alone. On the one hand, we have the appearance of the object via the former five senses and on the other hand, we have the apprehension of the appearance of that object in the sixth consciousness; since the appearance of the object (in the former five senses) and the appearance of the apprehension of that appearance in the sixth is actually the self-cognition within the self-awareness (within one consciousness, one cognition), they are not separate in the sense that they both belong and dwell in the same consciousness, even though they are different in the sense of the resulting cognition (the object of the former five senses vs. the object of the sixth sense). Ultimately speaking, the cognition (the relation between pramāṇa and prameya) is not real but only formal conformity (the self-cognition of the consciousness), but as the resulting cognition, the former is recognized as the cause while the latter is recognized as the result (Dharmakīrti, the PV, III, 26711). Besides, the representationalism (viz., the indirect epistemology whereby the appearance is but the imaging of the status out of representation; the appearance represents the external real status, and the external status can never be known except as represented) is implied here. Since the production of the appearance and understanding are
necessitated by the real imaging process, which is taken to be causal, the real external relation, on account of such conformity in the appearance and the understanding (the valid inference in anumāṇa), has to be valid and allows us to ascertain the validity of such cognition (inference about the relation between pramāṇa and prameya) itself, including its content (knowledge, here the factual self-awareness in the cognition).
Hence, such a position would maintain that conventionally speaking (restricted within the realm of the resulting cognition, i.e., restricted in the appearance/akara), external
11“arthātmā svātmabhūto teśāṃ tair anubhūyate / tenārthānubhvakhyātir ālambas tu tadābhatā //” (Tosaki, 1979: 361-362; Chen, 1997: 87).
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
things including both its object and the occurrence of the cognition itself are real, but ultimately speaking (having overcome the attachment to akara), as Dignāga himself claimed, “[in their ultimate nature] all elements of existence, [being instantaneous,]
are devoid of function (nirvyāpāra ).” As Chen (1997: 83) concluded, Dharmakīrti arranged his Sautrāntika-Yogācāra mixed position by pairing
Sākāravādin-Nirākāravādin (aspectarian-nonaspectarian) with the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. At the conventional level (as the aspectarians), on behalf of the unawakened awareness which can only restrictively recognize things as valid
resulting cognition (without being able to notice the always accompanying ultimate understanding), we say, metaphorically, that the relation between pramāṇa and
prameya is causal (and that the external reality of that relation can be validly inferred to ascertain the content of the cognition itself), but at the ultimate level (as
non-aspectarian), nothing really functions.
This position of proceduralism in Buddhist epistemology gives rise to several difficulties, which will be treated in due course. The most remarkable one, among others, would be that the metaphysical conflict between the external/ultimate emptiness and the external/ultimate existence is bypassed, the most striking consequence of which we can easily find in history is that the philosophical
confrontation between the early Madhyamaka (Nāgārjuna) and the early Yogācāra was bypassed in a clever yet over-simplified application of the Two Truth scheme, as observed in the coincident league of Candrakīrti and Dharmakīrti. The unawakened awareness and the awakened awareness in this regard become differentiated in time (of course we could find support in the stage theories such as that in the
Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, but we should be very careful about the difference between a distinction that is made for the sake of cultivation in the unawakened appreciation and another one for the sake of theory alone that is merely meant for the guidance only in the sixth consciousness) and thus engender a gap of spiritual development in the theory about that. Consequently, we thus miss a chance to see (to appreciate in an
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
appropriate manner, viz., for the simple entertainment in the mind), in a possibly ultimate regard from the angle of the awakened awareness, how enlightenment is actually (ultimately) possible and that the ontological (temporal) separation between the awakened and the unawakened is actually (ultimately) not true. This should be the very fundamental meaning of the teachings of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, as Dignāga himself remarked at the very end of NMukh: it was desired to show the true meaning of pramāṇa-s to those non-Buddhists who were trapped in the wrong view about them – whether with or without the correct view about them, one has and is always employing them. Even when it concerns the conventional truth, what the Buddhist theory tries to convey should still hold true in a non-conventional manner;
otherwise, non-Buddhist logic and epistemology should suffice. Hence, the position asserting that epistemology in Buddhism is merely a conventional mechanism that serves the conventional purposes is always unsatisfying.
The alternative position to understand the formal conformity between pramāṇa and prameya confronts the conflict between the idea of ultimate emptiness and the idea of ultimate existence. To state outright, ultimate emptiness is admitted in the holism of Buddhist epistemology; external reality is admitted, too, but in a narrow sense:
external reality is restricted only in the resulting cognition and must take a spatiotemporal form; ultimate existence is refuted, i.e., the holism of Buddhist epistemology should be concerted with Nāgārjuna's early Madhyamaka position. In the epistemological holistic regard, even though we can separate these epistemic terms (each of the former five sense perception, the sixth sense perception, the concept, etc.) from one another, we admit that (1) they first become thinkable in separation like this only when all of these are realized in one consciousness, and the separation in thought does not imply the ontological separation among them; this is simply because the realization of reality takes the necessary cooperation of pratyakṣa and anumāṇa as the condition, only out of which the holistic reality also becomes thinkable and itself preserves its holistic nature in the meantime. Further, there is one
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
obvious firewall to preserve the position: (2) the time difference should not be applied in the understanding of the separation of these terms, for this invites self-contradiction whereby the form of the result (time as the form of akara) is presumed when it is not resulting (when there is no akara); it is reasonable to infer temporal relations among the objects of the resulting cognition, but it is not reasonable to infer those among the conditions of the cognition. Hence, these terms only refer to the elementary formal conditions, the properly coordinated sum of which would be thought of as conditional sufficiency for their resulting validity, and this is only restricted to the resulting cognition while the sufficiency is only formal. No independent (in no relation to the resulting cognition) elementary real conditions which themselves take the form of time or even of space for themselves should be required or admitted. This way, no representationalism is implied here; no absolute reality and absolute causality are required here to ascertain the validity in the
cognition. On the one hand, this says that as the resulting cognition, reality is true (and even externally true, for the object of the resulting cognition must take the
“external” form of space and time out there); on the other hand, this says that reality is only restricted to the resulting cognition with no further applicative possibility – hence, when the cognition is not resulting, emptiness is the only admitted. This is the meaning that the basic codes of “the formal conformity between pramāṇa and
prameya” and “cognition is not happening” in holistic epistemology try to convey.
And although this is about the cognition and hence about the convention, the codes are ultimately true. Ultimately, the conformity between pramāṇa and prameya is only formal, and the cognition is not happening – “devoid of activity (nirvyāpāra ).”