1. Introduction
4.3 Twofold Appearance
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obvious firewall to preserve the position: (2) the time difference should not be applied in the understanding of the separation of these terms, for this invites self-contradiction whereby the form of the result (time as the form of akara) is presumed when it is not resulting (when there is no akara); it is reasonable to infer temporal relations among the objects of the resulting cognition, but it is not reasonable to infer those among the conditions of the cognition. Hence, these terms only refer to the elementary formal conditions, the properly coordinated sum of which would be thought of as conditional sufficiency for their resulting validity, and this is only restricted to the resulting cognition while the sufficiency is only formal. No independent (in no relation to the resulting cognition) elementary real conditions which themselves take the form of time or even of space for themselves should be required or admitted. This way, no representationalism is implied here; no absolute reality and absolute causality are required here to ascertain the validity in the
cognition. On the one hand, this says that as the resulting cognition, reality is true (and even externally true, for the object of the resulting cognition must take the
“external” form of space and time out there); on the other hand, this says that reality is only restricted to the resulting cognition with no further applicative possibility – hence, when the cognition is not resulting, emptiness is the only admitted. This is the meaning that the basic codes of “the formal conformity between pramāṇa and
prameya” and “cognition is not happening” in holistic epistemology try to convey.
And although this is about the cognition and hence about the convention, the codes are ultimately true. Ultimately, the conformity between pramāṇa and prameya is only formal, and the cognition is not happening – “devoid of activity (nirvyāpāra ).”
4.3 Twofold Appearance
Introducing his idea of self-cognition (svasaṃvitti) in PS(V)1 (Hattori, 1968: 28), Dignāga offered a theory for the twofold structure of the appearance.
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k. 9a. or [it can be maintained that] the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (svasaṃvitti) is here the result [of the act of cognizing].
In the vṛtti (ibid.), Dignāga commented that:
Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself [as subject] (svâbhāsa) and that of the object (viṣayâbhāsa). The cognizing of itself as [possessing] these two appearances or the self-cognition (svasaṃvitti) is the result [of the cognitive act]. Why?
k. 9b. Because the determination of the object (artha-niścaya) conforms with it [viz., with the self-cognition].
In the proceduralistic view, one says that in every production of the cognition, two appearances are produced, namely the appearance of the subject that is cognizing and the appearance of the object that is cognized. Since there exists the necessary
conformity between the determination of these two appearance (i.e., the object in the appearance of the object cognized and the object that is cognized in the appearance of the cognizing subject are formally identical – determined in the same way), these two appearances are said to be “twofold” with regard to the same “act” of appearing within the self-cognizing of the cognition. In the meantime, such a self-cognition is regarded as a causal act or at least as an causal act at the conventional reality.
Conventionally speaking, since the appearances are separate and separate in the way that one is acting upon the other (viz., the subject is known to cognize the object and the same object is known to be cognized by the same subject), we say metaphorically that this is a relation of the production (or the causation), i.e., the subject is assuming the form of the object in the double appearing, and say that this is the reason why the
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ordinary people would believe that the subject and the object are separated. But ultimately, there exists no real production or causation; the scenario is simply the twofold structure in which the cognition appears in “the self-cognition.” Hence, ultimately, we say that there is no act in which the subject cognizes the object; the cognition is actually the cognizing of itself by the cognition (the self-cognition) in this specific way. Given the ultimate formal identity of the object in the twofold appearances, it is warranted for us to conventionally admit that the object is cognized by the subject, and thus we say, as Dignāga said, that pramāṇa can be established because “the means of cognizing it (the external object) is simply [the cognition's]
having the (identical – my addition) form of the object” in PS(V) 1.9c-d1. This interpretation seems to be able to meet the position of the Yogācāra, the Sautrāntika and the external realists for the following reasons: (1) since the separation between the subject and the object is only due to the structure of the self-cognition, no external objective foundations such as the atoms and objective relations (spatiotemporal relation and causal relation) are needed; (2) the twofold structure of the appearance is the imaging of the external structures between the not-yet-represented subjects and the not-yet-represented objects, and since the representationalism is necessary for the Sautrāntika, the theory should suffice; (3) when admitting, conventionally, that the real object is external (since the object in the objective part of the appearance necessarily takes the form of being in space and time) while the subject is not
external (the subjective part of the appearance necessarily takes the form of being the cognitive subject in opposition to the cognized objects), the external realists should accept the twofold appearance theory too, when not binding it with the ultimate Buddhist tenet of emptiness.1 The pramāṇa theory should then have been able to play the role of a communication platform for these schools. Yet, the ontological
1 Stcherbatsky (1930-32, I: 164-166): the Sāṁkhyas maintain that cognition is a function of the awareness (buddhi) produced from the primordial matter (prakṛti); the latter is unconscious, but the former, as produced, is conscious.
The Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of apprehension (anuvyavasāya), that the contact of the sense organs with an object yields some unconscious “apprehension,” and at the subsequent time point in manas the awareness of the apprehension, some subsequent apprehension, is produced. The cognition in the Sāṁkhyas' view is reflexive, while the cognition in the Naiyāyikas' view is reflective, i.e., the cognition (the first five sense cognition) is cognized by another cognition (internal cognition in manas). Yet, both meet the twofold appearance theory when interpreted proceduralistically.
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status of svasaṃvitti itself in this theory still fails to meet the most extreme demands of the Yogācāra thinkers; besides, the binding between the theory's conventional admission (the causal relation between the subject and the object) and its
metaphysical basic code means that ultimately speaking, the twofold structure has to be abandoned too, thus leading the Buddhist-and-non-Buddhist conflict back to its old stage of impasse. In the end, this interpretation only works for the Sautrāntika thinkers.
However, when we do not employ the Two Truth Theory in this way, we say
ultimately that there is no real production (no real activity) in the cognition; it merely appears that every cognition must be in the form of belonging to some cognitive subject, and it also appears that every cognition must be in the form of confining to some object cognized by the same subject, meaning that the appearance can only be thinkable in this way. That is the end of the story, and there is no further
foundational stories to be told. When we talk about the resulting cognition (and hence about the conventional reality), viz., when our theorizing is taking place onsite within the consciousness (more precisely, in thinking in the sixth consciousness alone), the structure is necessitated and hence we say that the cognition has to be realized (resulting) in this specific necessary structure, since all possible cognitions have to be always thinkable in this manner. When we try to talk about the condition from which all cognitions are resulting, we say on the one hand the best we can postulate in thought alone is that there is this specific structure necessarily observable in all possible cognitions. On the other hand, when we try to think about the pre-cognitive foundations for the cognitions, we do not admit that the postulation of this specific structure in thought has some real basis that is independent from any
cognition. To put it in a simpler way, we demand that the necessary structure be exhaustively effective in the realms of experience (i.e., the realm of all possible resulting cognitions) and we also restrict the demand to within this realm. Such a necessary structure can be demanded only because the appearance can only be
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thinkable in this manner. Moreover, we say that consciousness can be thought of in this manner, but the best that we can do is to confine the theory in thought alone; we cannot even say that the structure “exists” in the consciousness, for it is indeed presumptuous, and not in a sound sense, to demand that the object has to exist in the manner from which it can be thought that the object of thought is thinkable in certain ways. On the contrary, we admit only that the holistic realm of experience (all
possible resulting cognitions) is thinkable in these ways, just because this is the observable nature of all possible resulting cognitions, i.e., all possible resulting cognitions must result from the necessary cooperation of the two pramāṇa-s plus the twofold structure. In this sense, we say that the two pramāṇa-s have to cooperate prior, logically, to the realization of any resulting cognition holistically, meaning that since the holistic pratyakṣa has to be thinkable in a way that anumāṇa can possibly infer, the realization of the former must be thought to have already been incorporated with the structure of inference that is sourced from the latter; the incorporation of the conceptual structure in the manifoldness of the direct experience is definitely
different from the reflective inferences about the content of the resulting cognition in time, in that the former cannot be wrong while the latter can. Besides, it is not accurate either, to say that the self-cognition is a real process in causal relation, because, prior to the realization of thought, causality is impossible – (1) without the realization of anumāṇa, pratyakṣa does not stand alone; (2) causality implies
separation and separation implies conceptualization, and thus we do not accept that causality is effective before the thought (though it is of course implied in the resulting cognition) is realized. Hence, conventionally, we do not even say that cognition (and self-cognition) is a real and causal process either; we do not admit that cognition shares the same ontological values as the other events that occur in time (in the resulting cognition) do. As maintained by epistemological holism, a time difference should not be assumed among the epistemic functional terms. Thus, with regard to the self-cognition, it is very plausible, as Dignāga wrote, that (Hattori, 1968: 29):
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k. 9c-d1. The means of cognizing it (the external object) is simply [the cognition's] having the form of the object.
k. 9d2. It (the external object) is known only through this [viz., through the cognition's having the form of it].
The representationalism in proceduralistic epistemology cannot become concerted with this passage, while we will also find that the most troublesome part in it is not the externalist inclination but the representationalism that (1) there exists the
necessary mediating role of representations, in the concept of which the represented but not the representational reality is tacitly implied, and (2) time is assumed outside of the representations (i.e., in that non-representational reality). With regard to epistemological holism, the most alien school on the platform turns out to be the Sautrāntika. Aside from the Sautrāntika, all the other schools including the non-Buddhist Naiyāyikas, the Sarvāstivāda, the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka maintain some kind of direct epistemology, which maintains that the directly cognized is all that which can be cognized and nothing further. The most obvious distinction between proceduralism and holism here is that there exist two forms which are formally identical in proceduralism whereas there exists only one form, namely, the form of the cognized object, in holism. The ontological separation between the form of the object itself in the object-appearance and the form of the object that is in the subject-appearance not only forces us to admit the duality (the ontological separation) between the subject and the object at the conventional reality (which is rejected in holism) but also invites the difficulty concerning the non-representational reality outside of the self-awareness: the conformity between the two forms has to be warranted via the process of imaging, i.e., the causal relation between the non-representational object and the faculties forming the representations of the forms.
Without the imaging, the formal conformity between the two forms would become groundless, and the proceduralists cannot ignore the difficulty. On the contrary, there is only one form in holism, the one form that belongs to both the subject-part and the
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object-part. Although it appears that the object is cognized by the subject, it is not the case as the proceduralists maintain that the form of the object is reproduced in the apprehension (the self-awareness) and then is thought of, but the case that the
cognition itself is some holistic self-awareness in nature. The subject appearing to perceive an object and the same object appearing to be perceived by the same subject is a holistic phenomenal fact whereby there is only one cognition from which the subject-part and the object-part can be told in thought (and thought itself is
necessarily a part incorporated in this very fact). It is not the case that two forms are conformed via causality between the affecting object and the affected subject, but the case that in the same fact (the same appearance), the form itself, whose appearance must belong to an object and must also be had by a subject, thus enables us to tell the subject from the object (in thought).
In Kuiji's YMRZLLS (T. 1840, vol. 44; Ven. Shuiyue, 2011: 1588), a question was raised and responded to:
問：「言現量者，為境、為心？」
答：「二種俱是。境現量所緣，從心名現量；或體顯現為心所量，名為 現量。」
Question: “Does what is named 'perception' refer to the object or the mind?”
Answer: “Both. The object is the percept (ālambana) apprehended by/in perception; from the angle of the mind [that perceives], [it] (the object) is thus named 'perception.' Or, the cognition itself that appears is measured by the mind, and hence it (the mind) is named 'perception [too].'”
This passage is further elaborated in MTS（T. 2270, vol. 68; Ven. Shuiyue, 2011:
1589）:
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此問意云，前說境、具2合名為量，境非是心，何得名量？故有此問。
答中有二義：初義云，境之與心，俱是現量。境是現量所緣，從能緣心，
名為現量。第二義云，境體3顯現，為心所量，是故境體，名為現量。
The question is meant to ask why the object, which is not mental, is named the means of cognition (pramāṇa) [too], when we previously said that the
combination of the object (境 prameya) and the means (具) [of cognition]
(pramāṇa) are altogether named “means of cognition” (pramāṇa). This is the context why the question is raised. .
The question is answered in two ways: First, both the object and the mind can be named perception. The object is the percept (所緣 ālambana) apprehended by/in perception; in terms of the mind that perceives, we name [the object]
perception. Second, the appearance of the object itself is the measured (所量 prameya) of the mind, so the object itself is named “perception.”
One may understand this passage in a way that panders to all the sides, namely that all the positions require the role of representation, and at least with regard to
representations, we can say that both the object and the mind can be termed
perception, because we must have the representation of the object so that we can first come to cognize it as an object (the first way) and because the the object itelf (體) that is represented as the appearance has to be perceived by the mind (the second way). However, the representationalism in proceduralism would have difficulty getting itself concerted with the passage, for the representationalism demands the warrant from the causal relation between the non-representational reality and the production of the cognitive means in representation itself, while both of these two ends in the causal relation do not fit the description of the object and means of
2 “Jü 具” refers to the two pramāṇas; the two pramāṇas are the remote reason (遠因) of the cognition that comprehends the thesis (了宗智) and thus can be referred to by the terms of “the means” (具) and “the object” (境) of the cognition. “此二望智，俱為遠因，是量具故，是量境故”(Ven. Shuiyue, 2011: 1583). To stress the difference between the cognitive causality and the causality among the cognized objects, “因 hetu” in “了因 jñāpaka-hetu” translates to “reason”, not to “cause.”
3 “Ti 體” refers to the substance; e.g., “jing ti 境體” refers to the substance of the object of cognition. In order to neutralize the ontological implication, we translate the term as “itself.”
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cognition here. From this, we say that in Kuiji and his commentator's understanding, strong proceduralism is not observed while the Yogācāra tendency is quite evident;
meanwhile, at this point, two urgent questions arise and await responses from the proceduralists: (1) as addressed by Nāgārjuna, the formal conformity between
pramāṇa and pramey and the causal relation between the non-representational reality and the cognitive faculties are incompatible and (2) why is it that the (re-)production of the cognition in the mind first becomes self-aware that the non-representational functioning of the cognitive faculties and the internal experience of cognizing can be warranted, since the former must be non-representational while the latter must be representational?4 We can find the answers to these questions in Dignāga's
epistemology, and from the answers, we can proclaim that Dignāga did not agree with proceduralism. To answer (1), the cognition is not a real event that is happening in causality; in response to (2), no non-representational reality is admitted, and the cognition itself is exactly the appearance that is reflexive and self-aware (the twofold appearance theory and the theory of self-awareness). Following this passage, i.e., sticking to an anti-realistic tendency, the definition of the term “object” is restricted to the object in the form of appearing as in space and time and measured via the cognitive faculties. In this sense, we say that the object is exactly the mind (and vice versa) and that both of them belong to the perception. Our being able to think that
epistemology, and from the answers, we can proclaim that Dignāga did not agree with proceduralism. To answer (1), the cognition is not a real event that is happening in causality; in response to (2), no non-representational reality is admitted, and the cognition itself is exactly the appearance that is reflexive and self-aware (the twofold appearance theory and the theory of self-awareness). Following this passage, i.e., sticking to an anti-realistic tendency, the definition of the term “object” is restricted to the object in the form of appearing as in space and time and measured via the cognitive faculties. In this sense, we say that the object is exactly the mind (and vice versa) and that both of them belong to the perception. Our being able to think that