2. China’s challenge to the security in East Asia and Taiwan’s extended deterrence
2.2 Japan and Taiwan
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2.2 Japan and Taiwan
2.2.1 Context
Following the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 and until the end of the Second World War in 1945, Taiwan was colonized by the Empire of Japan. In fifty years, the island underwent a profound economic and societal transformation and has come out quite acculturated. While everywhere else, the memory of the Japanese occupation is very negative, the Taiwanese still value their proximity with the archipelago.
Although Japan officially recognizes the PRC since 1972 and observes a one-China policy, unofficial contacts between Taiwan and Japan are striving. While the Japanese briefly worried about President Ma Ying-jeou's attempts to bring Taiwan closer to China, the return to the DPP to power, traditionally favorable to Japan, and the election Tsai Ing-wen as president reinforced the proximity between both Asian powers. Taiwan expects a lot from its relationship with Japan, which support is hoped for the island’s quest for a more comfortable international space. Taiwan has multiplied friendly gestures towards Japan: Tsai Ing-wen visited Japan and met Shinzo Abe before her election, afterwards she appointed Frank Hsieh, who makes no secret of his admiration for the archipelago, as Taiwan’s representative in Japan. Taiwanese and Japanese have a high opinion of each other, with poll showing more than 65% of favorable view among both populations.44
Taiwan and Japan share many security interests and both are worried about China’s expansionist behavior. But while the security partnership in being between Japan and Taiwan is very promising, it will remain constrained by China’s pressures on both actors.
And the attitude of Japan remains prosaic: Abe does not want to strengthen ties to Taiwan at the expense of the stability of Japan’s relations with China.
2.2.2 Rationales for Rapprochement
We will see in this part what the potential areas of rapprochement between Japan and Taiwan are, before we move on in subsequent sections to the challenges and constrains the Taiwan – Japan rapprochement faces.
Legacies of Taiwan’s 50 years colonization by Japan has left strong cultural affinities between the island and the archipelago. Historically, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has kept close ties with Japanese politicians, and this is reflected in the Japanese Diet with a strong sympathy towards Taiwan shared among all political parties. This is especially the case regarding Shinzo Abe's administration, which enjoys a very strong
44Bosco, J.A., "Watch Out, China: Taiwan and Japan Are Teaming Up", The National Interest, May 26, 2016, URL:http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-china-taiwan-japan-are-teaming-16358.
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mandate in Japan and is favorable to a closer cooperation with Taiwan.45 According to Dickey, unofficial relations and people-to-contacts are facilitated by the fact that Taiwanese and Japanese politicians often know each other, stating that Tsai’s
“administration’s comparative advantage lies in its intraparty connections and non-official channels maintained by the DPP over the last several decades”.46 This close yet informal network of relationships between both countries’ political spheres makes it easier for Taiwan to advocate for stronger political and security ties. This has been exemplified by Tsai’s pre-election trip to Japan, where she visited Japan's LDP secretary general, Japanese cabinet offices, and met with Prime Minister Abe. The move was reciprocated by the Japanese after Tsai’s election.47
Japan and Taiwan share a common concern vis-à-vis China’s expansionist and destabilizing policies. Taiwan is seeking larger countries’ support to enhance its international space and has been eager to diversify its military contacts with other countries’ than the U.S in order to compensate China’s relentless pressures and military might. Besides, it is not in the interest of Japan to let the island be absorbed by China, its historical rival. Taiwan’s geographical position at the center of the first island chain makes that the island serves as a buffer between China and Japan – and a friendly Taiwan ensures the safety of the sea lanes of communication on which Japan depends for its energy supplies.
For Dickey, “the “gray zone” situations in northeast Asia highlighted in Japan’s 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines incentivize greater military-to-military links, as does the reality that a Chinese reclaimed Taiwan will put Beijing’s forces significantly closer to Japanese territory.”48
The U.S., which demanded that its Asian partners take a larger role in their defense, welcomes the rapprochement. And Taiwan’s deterrence against China would be well augmented if a security triad between the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan would come to reality.
In all cases, the U.S. expects that Japan, which is revising its defense policies in favor of more military presence in the region, takes a larger role in regional security. All of these make Japan a natural ally for Taiwan, and Taiwan a logical ally for Japan.
Greater security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan could take several forms.
At first, both countries could augment their military-to-military contacts through joint military exercises, such as with Taiwan re-inviting the Japanese military to take part in the annual Han Kuang exercises.49 Taiwan and Japan could also strengthens cooperation in maritime security, increasing joint Coast Guards patrols to counter
45Chang, C.C., Chen, C.C., "Taiwan's Puzzling New Approach to Japan", The Diplomat, September 16, 2016, URL: https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/taiwans-puzzling-new-approach-to-japan/.
46Dickey, L., "Taiwan-Japan Ties Deepen Amid Chinese Assertiveness", China Brief Volume: 16 Issue:
16, The Jamestown Foundation, October 26, 2016, URL: https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-japan-ties-deepen-amid-chinese-assertiveness/.
47Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49Ibid.
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China’s maritime salami tactics in the East China Sea and by coming to an agreement regarding their dispute about overlapping territorial claims in the East China Sea, which acts as an unnecessary stumbling block in the countries’ relationship. Both militaries could also step up intelligence sharing and cyber-warfare cooperation to counter regional challenges, ranging from China’s military adventurism and cyberattacks to North Korea’s missile threat.50 And as Taiwan needs greater technological cooperation with its key partners, it would be pleased to receive Japanese engineering support (Mitsubishi, Kawasaki) for the development of its domestic fleet of diesel-electronic submarines.51
In the economic realm, Taiwan could take advantage of being Japan’s third largest trading partner for obtaining Japanese support regarding a greater integration of the island within Asia’s regional economic order.52 Japan has offered its support for Taiwan’s admission to the Transpacific Partnership, and efforts could be made to create the favorable conditions for a FTA between both countries. To this end, Taiwan could offer incentives such as ending its ban on Japanese food imports from areas touched by the Fukushima nuclear incident in 2011 (the food has been proved to be safe to eat since then).
2.2.3 Building Trust
Despite all the surveyed areas of potential cooperation, actual advances are largely symbolic with either limited actions designed to signal the rapprochement or friendly declarations. Current Japan – Taiwan rapprochement has therefore resulted mainly in
“expectations” and “hopes” rather than substantially increased cooperation. All of the visible actions that Japan has taken in favor of Taiwan have fell under the threshold of Beijing’s tolerance, provoking mild condemnations and reminds to Japan to abide to its One China Policy.
Among cordial signals albeit unfollowed yet by significant policy changes are Shinzo Abe’s warm welcoming of Tsai’s election, his declaration that both countries’
friendship supersedes their dispute in the East China Sea, and characterization of Taiwan as a “special partner” that shares mutual values and interests.53
50Cole, J.M., "Why strengthening the Taiwan-Japan alliance makes perfect sense", The Lowy Institute, March 23, 2017, URL; https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-strengthening-taiwan-japan-alliance-makes-perfect-sense.
51Dickey, L., "Taiwan-Japan Ties Deepen amid Chinese Assertiveness", China Brief Volume: 16 Issue:
16, The Jamestown Foundation, October 26, 2016, URL: https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-japan-ties-deepen-amid-chinese-assertiveness/.
52Ibid.
53 Bosco, J.A., "Watch Out, China: Taiwan and Japan Are Teaming Up", The National Interest, May 26, 2016, URL: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-china-taiwan-japan-are-teaming-16358.
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Taiwan’s representative in Japan, the renaming in 2017 of Japan’s de facto embassy in Taiwan from the original Association of East Asian Relations to Taiwan Japan Relations Association54, Japan’s support for the participation of Taiwan at the WHA,55 the 2017 visit to Taiwan of Japanese State Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Jiro Akama, the renaming of Japan’s main opposition party to an appellation very close to the one of Taiwan’s DPP and appointment at the head of this party of Renho Murata (who has family links to Taiwan, critic of China).56This being said, the Taiwan / Japan rapprochement has barely started, and one should be patient before witnessing direct consequences on their security relationship. For Yujen Kuo, a Taiwanese academic who plays a direct role in the rapprochement, both administrations’ respective personnel are only beginning to establish contact and meet each other. The stated goal is to strengthen personal contacts so as to foster mutual trust between both governments. The more the cooperation goes, the more Japanese and Taiwanese administrations will get to know each other. Once this will be done, then more significant areas of cooperation could be explored. Right now, talks are taking place regarding greater Coast Guard cooperation, law enforcement cooperation and regulation of fishing quotas in the East China Sea, as well as disaster-relief operations (HA/DR). For Kuo, it seems important that Taiwan does not leapfrog steps in its relationship to Japan, first given the risk it entails for the stability of cross-strait relations, and also because of the Japanese temptation to play Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China. Kuo believes Taiwan has time to strengthen its links to Japan, with Shinzo Abe being likely to stay in power at least until 2021. Likewise, Kuo considers that as long as the Taiwanese and the Japanese don’t rush and communicate to China their intentions, the latter will have less incentives for ramping up pressures. In other words, the current rapprochement of Taiwan and Japan is an open secret, a timely signal to China that Taiwan and Japan are teaming together, and an attempt to elevate Beijing’s tolerance by not engaging in drastic steps. By approaching Japan, the Taiwanese then hope to make China more prudent, not more aggressive.57
Of significance for Taiwan’s deterrence, Japan’s 2013 White Paper identified a Chinese aggression on Taiwan as likely to bring China and Japan into open conflict. This at least is a credible indication that Japan has been signaling its willingness to oppose a coercive scenario in the Taiwan Strait.58 There is also the fact that should the U.S. be involved in a Taiwan contingency, Japan may have no other choice than to take part in the
54 Chai, S., Hou, E., "Taiwan-Japan relations expected to continue to grow: official", Focus Taiwan, June 6, 2017, URL: http://m.focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201706060029.aspx.
55 Chung, L., "Japan backs Taiwan’s bid to take part in UN global health forum", South China Morning Post, May 9, 2017, URL: www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2093562/japan-backs-taiwan-taking-part-un-global-health-forum.
56 Chen, E., "Japan's practical Taiwan policy", The Diplomat, April 14, 2017, URL:
https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/japans-practical-taiwan-policy/.
57 Tierny, H., "Taiwan’s Budding Security Relationship with Japan", Taiwan Sentinel, May 16, 2017, URL: https://sentinel.tw/taiwan-security-japan-kuoyujen/.
58Bosco, J.A., "Watch Out, China: Taiwan and Japan Are Teaming Up", The National Interest, May 26, 2016, URL:http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-china-taiwan-japan-are-teaming-16358.
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ongoing struggle since a number of U.S. military assets are located on Japanese soil (Okinawa), very close to Taiwan, and that it would likely be in China’s interest to destroy them in order to clear the way for a successful invasion of Taiwan. This would obligate Japan to respond vigorously and defend U.S. forces under attack. In the end, there is a chance that if the U.S. enter the fight, they will be followed by the Japanese;
and at the same time the Japanese have their own reasons to support Taiwan in a conflict.
China, which fears more than anything an internationalization of the fight, is well aware of this possible development. This plays directly in favor of Taiwan’s deterrence.
Figure 2 US Military Bases in the Western Pacific, source: Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, p.262
Overall, all such developments have been poor of substantial changes in Taiwan – Japan security relations. This is not to say that they will not produce results at all, but rather that it remains to be seen whether closer contact, cordial declarations and symbolic moves will translate into something more significant. For most analysts, the rapprochement has just started so it would be premature to draw conclusions about the Taiwan – Japan rapprochement right now.
2.2.4 Limitations
The current Taiwan – Japan rapprochement remains constrained by the China factor against which Taiwan has a limited leverage over Japan.
Japan has good reasons to be worried that strengthening ties to Taiwan may alter the stability of its own relations to China, which are already very sensitive. Tokyo does not
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want to provoke Beijing by giving the appearance of creating an anti-China coalition, with even stronger security links with Taiwan and the U.S. For Chen, “Tokyo certainly understands the risks of approaching Taiwan” and “it would be farfetched to assume that Tokyo is ready to provoke Beijing by moving away from the One China policy.”59Beijing has kept its condemnations at a low level, but it clearly understands the trend at play between Japan and Taiwan, condemning Japan’s “passive move” on Taiwan and hinting that such rapprochement would be sanctioned by China if it went further.60
Internally in Japan, despite Shinzo Abe administration’s strong mandate and popularity, Japan’s bureaucracy and legislature tend to value stable relations with China, which is important for trade, more than an abstract security rapprochement Taiwan, likely to trigger economic sanctions from China. This acts as a road block for greater Taiwan / Japan cooperation. For Taiwan, China’s pressures may redouble if Beijing finds that the rapprochement is going too far.
Because of the China factors, Japan may also be reluctant to agree on technological transfers relevant to Taiwan’s burgeoning defense industry, let alone arms sales for which the Japanese don’t have any experience. In addition, for Kuo, Taiwan and Japan did not set up workable canals of communications yet – so talking about military exchanges of any kind remains a distant objective.61 This makes that Japan may not be able to assist Taiwan for developing its own weaponry, such as submarine, anytime soon. Trust between Japan and Taiwan has to be built first.
So right now, Japan and Taiwan’s actual cooperation remains very limited: cooperation in the area of defense industry, maritime security, intelligence sharing are all being discussed right now, but none has fully materialized yet. Meanwhile, both countries’
dispute in the East China Sea regarding respective fishing areas and quotas has not been resolved yet.
This reality contrasts with the perceptions of a greater partnership.62In the end, Taiwan and Japan are Japan may not be willing to sacrifice the stability of its relationship to China for the sake of supporting Taiwan in its quest for greater security and international space.
59Chen, E., "Japan's practical Taiwan policy", The Diplomat, April 14, 2017, URL:
https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/japans-practical-taiwan-policy/.
60Dickey, L., "Taiwan-Japan Ties Deepen amid Chinese Assertiveness", China Brief Volume: 16 Issue:
16, The Jamestown Foundation, October 26, 2016, URL: https://jamestown.org/program/taiwan-japan-ties-deepen-amid-chinese-assertiveness/.
61Tierny, H., "Taiwan’s Budding Security Relationship with Japan", Taiwan Sentinel, May 16, 2017, URL: https://sentinel.tw/taiwan-security-japan-kuoyujen/.
62Chai, S., Hou, E., "Taiwan-Japan relations expected to continue to grow: official", Focus Taiwan, June 6, 2017, URL: http://m.focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201706060029.aspx.