Xi Jinping and Taiwan

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order to survive politically.³⁵⁹ The second is the recent purges launched by Xi Jinping inside the CCP, which reduced the number of people susceptible, or daring, to oppose Xi Jinping, especially on such a hot issue. The third is that China’s closure of its communication channels with Taiwan because the CCP was unhappy about the election of Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 aggravated the problem of miscommunication and attendant misunderstandings between both governments.

As a result, China’s decision-making circles might be particularly subject to

“groupthink”, for Morgan a “powerful illusion of invulnerability” created by interactions among people from the same top-leadership positions, who tend to share the same opinion and misunderstanding of Taiwan, likely to self-convince themselves about the validity of their decisions. Groupthink creates excessive optimism and augments propensity for decision-makers to take the wrong decisions, or to take unnecessary risks. Morgan adds: “A deterrent threat would not likely prove effective against a leadership considering an attack while under the influence of groupthink”³⁶⁰. With the numerous misperceptions between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, China’s inexperience in dealing with war matters, the rigid character of its top leadership, and the extremely low turnover within its decision-making bodies, groupthink is real risk.

Groupthink could also mean that China’s decision-making could calculate and recalculate the odds of success and failure of a forcible attack on Taiwan until a satisfactory option emerges. At extreme levels, or during a crisis, it is therefore possible that Chinese decision-makers accept extremely high costs for taking Taiwan.

Imperfect decision-making combined to rife misperceptions means that leaders should never be too confident that they know exactly what they are doing and that they are in a position to control the situation. As a result, Taiwan should never feel reassured, even if policy-makers assume they have built a credible deterrence and a flawless defense because China’s understanding of Taiwan’s deterrence posture is likely to be weak.

5.2.5 Xi Jinping and Taiwan

Deterrence threats can also be directed to the leadership of a challenger state, and in the case of China, Xi Jinping himself, since he sits at the top of the PRC’s hierarchy. This would have the benefit of short-cutting the Chinese bureaucracy so that Xi’s judgment could be more impacted by Taiwan’s internal dynamics and commitment to defend itself.

359Yu, M., “Political and Military Factors Determining China’s Use of Force” in Tsang, S., “If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics”, Asian Security Studies, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, page 23, pp 17-34.

360Morgan, Patrick, “Deterrence – A conceptual analysis”, Sage Publications, 1977, ISBN 0-8039-0819-9, page 62.

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Morgan writes that, usually, nations’ leaders are brave, self-confident and that most of them, in order to climb the steps to the higher positions, had to demonstrate great intelligence. The everlasting selection process within political systems would eliminate non-sensible leaders.³⁶¹ So people in charge at the top are said to avoid war, be moderate, generally risk-averse, and to have the required bureaucratic knowledge to understand how governments work and relate to each other. Therefore, Morgan considers that most national leaders are wise and flexible, and that they usually consider deterrence threats from outside with the greatest attention³⁶².

It looks like Xi Jinping fits this image.

Xi Jinping, born in 1953, cultivates an image of rigor and so far has proved to be an agile politician, a skilled diplomat, and acquired the reputation to be a conciliator. Xi describes his own thinking as pragmatic and throughout his rise he has cultivated a down-to-earth image. He is calm, and does not seem to let his emotions take over or be prone to hasty decisions. He has also tried to appear friendly and closer to the people than its predecessors, with more relaxed images of him playing football, enjoying rest with his wife, or riding a bike with his daughter without his costume. Xi presents itself as strong and hard to break, but not out of reach or too tough.

Xi is often portrayed by international media as a confident person and by Chinese media as a man of compassion who has refreshed his country's political life. Osnos wrote: Xi is “five feet eleven, taller than any Chinese leader in nearly four decades, with a rich baritone and a confident heft. When he received a guest, he stood still, long arms slack, hair pomaded, a portrait of take-it-or-leave-it composure that induced his visitor to cross the room in pursuit of a handshake. (…) Xi projects an image of manly vigor. He mocks “eggheads” and praises the “team spirit of a group of dogs eating a lion."³⁶³ The rise of “Big Daddy Xi” stems from his conviction that it was the absence of firm leadership that allowed the Soviet Union to collapse. He reportedly declared: “When the Soviet Party was about to collapse, there was not one person who was man enough to turn back the tide".³⁶⁴

Confident, he has repeatedly showed his disposition to engage dialogue with South Korea, Japan or the United States. However, in the same time, Xi is tough in negotiations and did not hesitate to take hard measures against its opponents when their choices clashes with Beijing’s line, as is the case of Taiwan. During crises, such as the one over North Korea, Xi has proven remarkably psychologically stable and called for restraint and diplomacy whereas both Kim and Trump went ballistic without actually turning their words into deeds.

361 Ibid. 159.

362 Ibid. 158.

363Osnos, E., "Born Red", The New Yorker, April 6, 2015, URL:

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/04/06/born-red.

364Phillips, T., "Xi Jinping: the growing cult of China's 'Big Daddy Xi'", The Telegraph, December 8, 2014, URL: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11279204/Xi-Jinping-the-growing-cult-of-Chinas-Big-Daddy-Xi.html.

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On the other side, since assuming office in late 2012, Xi strengthened the CCP’s power and his own position. He leads an economic power that is poised to surpass the American one and holds authority over the military, influences greatly the judiciary, the media, and businesses. He leads seven Central Committee groups, oversees government reform, cybersecurity, finance and security apparatus.

He is also tightening government control over China’s civil society, media and the Internet. Human rights activists, lawyers and even moderate intellectuals have been harassed, detained and jailed. He has launched an unforgiving anti-corruption campaign (in fact a purge of rival factions within the CCP), reorganized the PLA, and abolished the two-term limit for the Chinese presidency, meaning that he could remain in power indefinitely— as well as cultivated a cult of personality. References to Xi as China’s

“core” leader imply a status similar to that of former leader Deng Xiaoping or even Mao Zedong.³⁶⁵ Xi Jinping had his personal “Thought” added to China’s national constitution.

The CCP’s nature does not seem to encourage Xi’s understanding of foreign issues and international relations. Xi’s pedigree is one of a CCP prince, while his father was a very influential party cadre. Although he and his family were impacted by the Cultural Revolution (he was sent to work in the countryside like many teenagers of his generation), Xi himself has been a CCP cadre for decades and his rise has been gradual within the party – he is not an outsider nor has he spent a significant amount of time abroad. Consequently, his understanding of local politics on Taiwan or of Western thought cannot be overestimated. Accordingly, he doesn't speak English. All these elements combined increase the risks of misperceptions, misreading and misunderstanding of signals from abroad (from Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan).

As a consequence, while Xi has cultivated an image of cautious leader, we find that his likely lack of understanding of China’s adversaries bear significant risk of tensions.

Xi’s actions and newfound power status seem to imply a wish to make history. The Chinese people have grown accustomed to strong economic growth, but Xi did not initiate it so it won’t qualify him as a historic leader. However, since he and the CCP have tied their legitimacy to the long-term goal of subjugating Taiwan, “entering history”

could be achieved by delivering on this goal, a glorious prize for him and the CCP.

Precipitating a war against Taiwan for personal prestige seems like a remote possibility.

However, tied by its repeated commitments to advance on the goal of unification and the wish to enter history, together added to its strong personal character and probable misunderstanding of foreign interests, Xi is unlikely to ease pressure on Taiwan. We can expect that as long as Xi remains in power, he will keep an uncompromising line on Taiwan, while staying away from extreme positions as much as possible, although this will not preclude any use of force in the future. Xi Jinping has shown its ability to

365Fan, J, Zhang, T., Zhu, Y., "Behind the Personality Cult of Xi Jinping", Foreign Policy, March 8, 2016, URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/08/the-personality-cult-of-xi-jinping-china-leader-communist-party/.

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grab opportunities on the international front and to show audacity when confronted to opponents (as in the South China Sea, on Korea and on Taiwan). Also, power sometimes corrupts minds, and one is left to speculate what Xi’s behavior will be in five, ten year time when China will have grown even bigger.

Finally, there is also the fact that Xi Jinping’s entourage (in the higher levels of the CCP and the military hierarchy)is not particularly pacifist and that most are partisans of a hardline in foreign policy. Taiwan’s weakening defenses can induce these individuals to pressure Xi Jinping, himself quite nationalist, to take a harder line or to even to attack Taiwan as soon as they think that China really overpowers Taiwan militarily and that the U.S. will not intervene. Uniformity of thinking and the absence of counterweight at the top of China’s leadership may invite wishful thinking and groupthink³⁶⁶, both ingredients for bold decisions and subsequent deterrence failure.

Although overall Xi Jinping’s personal character and foreign policy record make him fit Morgan’s “sensible decision-maker” description, this is no panacea for Taiwan’s deterrence prospects, nor does it bear credible indication that Taiwan’s deterrence will obtain in the future if its flaws are not fixed very quickly.