5. Taiwan’s resilience and resistance
5.3 Taiwan’s Answer to China’s Limited-aims Strategy
5.3.3 Taiwan’s International Engagement and Communication
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5.3.3 Taiwan’s International Engagement and Communication
Safeguarding Taiwan's international space has therefore become a vital issue for Tsai, as China redoubles its efforts to deepen the island's isolation since the election of Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) in January 2016.
Confronted by China, Taiwan has always been eager to find solutions to its international isolation. The Taiwanese have to be ingenious to attract the attention of their global partners. On May 28th 2018, Taiwan’s MOFA declared that “The ministry will leverage the nation’s strengths and resources to tap into underdeveloped areas in diplomacy, even as China tries to suppress Taiwan on the world stage [and that] aside from striving to maintain diplomatic relations with existing allies, the ministry would also attempt to bolster Taiwan’s “substantial relations” with the US and other countries that share the nation’s values”.425
If Taiwan succeeds in strengthening its link with its international partners, it can have better hopes that such countries will voice their support to the island and call China to restraint. Taiwan has fully understood the challenge and has engaged in a wide campaign for attracting foreign support. Results have slowly materialized recently with more countries advocating for Taiwan’s presence at the World Health Assembly of 2018. This is a limited achievement but it shows that pushing against China’s marginalization strategy is possible.
This section is backed by a short case study of Taiwan’s international engagement in order to give an empiric perspective to the demonstration.
5.3.3.1 Improve Taiwan’s Soft-power and International Communication
For Nye, “Soft power” is the ability to influence the behavior of foreign countries not by coercive means but by taking advantage of a nation’s edge in culture, political ideals and particular policies. A well-crafted soft-power is able to attract and persuade other nations to adopt the same goals.
Taiwan’s soft power has traditionally taken the form of a moral argument valuing the democratic nature of the regime in order to gain visibility and respectability on the international stage. In order to target China and differentiate itself internationally, Taiwan's weapon has long been to promote its own political system, i.e. respect for human rights and the rule of law, the maturity of its democracy, and the tolerance of all forms of constructive criticism.
This policy is aimed at Taiwan’s key partners, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, which often display their attachment to the respect for democratic values and
425Peng, W.h., "Taiwan to invest in non-diplomatic allies: MOFA", Taipei Times, May 28, 2018, URL:
www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/05/28/2003693860.
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human rights. Therefore Taiwan has seized this opportunity to showcase its democratic governance internationally, a practice that goes back to Lee Teng-hui's famous speech at Cornell University in 1995. Tsai did not depart from this tradition during her inaugural speech in 2016, recalling that "the people of Taiwan have shown the world its commitment to freedom and democracy" and the sharing of democratic values as a basis for "the deepening of friendly relations with American, Japanese and European democracies”.426
While Taiwan's promotion of its democratic regime has been effective for a while, the idea faces a certain attrition.427 Tsai Ing-wen took office in a global context of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the performance of democratic governance practices (Trump presidency in the U.S., populist surge in Europe, popularity of Russian and Chinese authoritarian models) which does not spare Taiwan. Tsai mentioned such challenges in her inaugural speech with elements of language known to Westerners such as: democracy must become more "effective" and "pragmatic", as well as be able to establish a "closer contact with citizens.428 Internationally, the loss of prestige that democratic regimes suffer has damaged the strength of Taiwan's tactic to showcase the exemplary nature of its governance. Similarly, faced with their national interests, the growing pressure of China and its economic investments, many countries are now turning a deaf ear to the moral argument presented by the Taiwanese government.
Economic drawbacks in the west also meant that democratic countries have tended to refocus on their own problems, thereby paying less attention to the political situation overseas.
In the meantime, Taiwan’s inability to reach a global audience has real costs: the world grew ignorant of the situation the island is facing against China and this plays in favor of the latter’s propaganda effort to push for a policy of gradual abandonment of the Asian democracy. Taiwan’s democratic argument is important but it needs both revision and strengthening. Being a democracy is no panacea, many countries in the world have adopted democracy in various forms: democracy does not make Taiwan an exception.
So Taiwanese have to refine their arguments for attracting the world’s attention, and to shout out those new appeals much louder.
For Cole, Taiwan should design a workable propaganda in order to make the island both interesting and relevant to foreign audiences.429 He writes: “The term “propaganda”
tends to have a negative connotation but in reality it is nothing more than a sustained
426 Inaugural discourse of Tsai Ing-wen, 2016: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201605200008.aspx.
427 Shane Lee, "A New Interpretation of “Soft Power” for Taiwan", Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-23, Summer 2005 / 台灣國際研究季刊第 1 卷第 2 期頁 1-23 2005 年/
夏季號, URL: http://www.tisanet.org/quarterly/1-2-1.pdf.
428 Jacques deLisle, "Taiwan’s Quest for International Space: Ma’s Legacy, Tsai’s Options, China’s Choices, and U.S. Policy", FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs, ORBIS Volume 60, Number 4, Fall 2016, doi:10.1016/S0030-4387(16)30046-1, page 20.
429 Cole, J. M., “Convergence or conflict in the Taiwan Strait – the illusion of peace?” Routledge, 2017, page 202.
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public relations strategy meant to shape the perceptions of an “other” who needs convincing.”430
Among creative solutions, maybe Taiwan could invest in a much stronger communication machine able to launch a broad scale semantic offensive against Beijing’s political warfare as well as to promote Taiwan’s achievements widely. This government structure could be in charge to provide material and immaterial support to all potential emitters of Taiwan’s soft power.
Taiwan stands out in several fields due to its multicultural identity and the social liberalization that has taken place on the island for more than a decade. Taiwan has achieved impressive results in the implementation of progressive laws and such achievements have made headlines in the west. Other progresses encompass the de facto legalization of the gay marriage, the defense of ecology as well as equal rights between men and women, and a rejection of social conservatism. These advancements contrast sharply with the social conservatism and the renewal of neo-Confucian values in China.
Changes in Taiwan are influenced by the youth and third-force political parties.
Although social conservatism is the rise in the world, Taiwan stands out as an exception where progressivism is scoring points in every realms of the society, and this development is interesting for the country’s communication overseas. Western societies are globally more sensible to issues regarding human rights than others. This western tendency has a bad side as soon as it obstructs these countries’ understanding of other cultures where human rights and democracy are not seen as universal values, such as Russia, China and Middle Eastern nations. But it is surely an advantage when it comes to Taiwan, which shares a lot with the west when it comes to political norms and values.
Therefore, even if Taiwan’s government has troubles attracting the attention of its counterparts in the west, it could appeal directly to the population. The western public is an interesting target for Taiwan’s soft-power, but right now few people know about the island. So Taiwan has every incentive to increase the scale of its communication effort to let more people know about Taiwan by showcasing the island’s democratic achievements and concomitant goal of self-determination in the face of a survival threat from its giant authoritarian neighbor. After all, it is because some western individuals have come to know Taiwan better at the occasion of studies or work on the island that a part of them became outspoken supports of the island when back to their home countries (among many others, this is my case). Hit western people’s consciousness and Taiwan can become in their minds a place worth to be talked about, and ultimately supported. If Taiwan succeeds in spreading the word enough within western societies, governments may find the issue harder to ignore.
Taiwan could take example on the Kurd experience. Although the knowledge about Middle Eastern geopolitics is very scarce in Europe, the Kurds have successfully raised the awareness of a majority of Europeans regarding their national claim. With little money and support, and without a government, they were able to influence the opinion
430 Ibid. 200.
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of a whole continent, making great publicity of their fight against ISIS, in which women took a significant part, which triggered admiration in Europe where gender equality has become the norm. Now, European governments are calling Turkey to restrain in its attempts to deny the Kurds a political existence. Taiwan, comparatively, has both more resources to alert foreign opinions and a much easier case to defend: the country is already de facto independent, is in peace, and is socially and economically advanced.
Outlining Taiwan’s alterity to China is another way. Opinions in the west sometimes suffer from a black and white vision of international relations, which is a strong impediments for them to understand other countries’ political cultures. However, for Taiwan, this weakness can be turned into an advantage, with the same spillover effect on governmental action we have seen above. No western people like the idea of a small country being threatened by a stronger one for political gains, the method being simply too aggressive. This idea can be reinforced by presenting Taiwan at sitting at the frontline of a more global struggle between authoritarianism and democracy, something Taiwanese organizations such as Taiwan’s Foundation for Democracy has been doing lately.431For this Taiwan needs to publicize more widely its achievements. Following this idea, Taiwan MOFA recently had its first consultation about Human Rights with the European Union and European delegates advised their Taiwanese fellows to advertise more on Taiwan’s human rights record. There is also the website “leave no one behind” that came out recently following Taiwan’s exclusion from WHA, and the proposition to donate $1 million to the WHO for fighting against Ebola.
Taiwan has not quite abandoned its attempt to highlight the democratic functioning of the island, since the progressive character of Taiwanese society in certain subjects allows it. Recently, Taiwan has de facto legalized same-sex marriage– thus being the first country in Asia to do so432 - and Reporters Without Borders (RWB) has ranked the country number 1 in Asia in the field of freedom of the press.433 In 2017, the Freedom House has also ranked Taiwan ahead of many western countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties.434
In addition, increase Taiwan’s presence in the cultural and artistic realms will augment foreign sympathy to the island. We hear a lot in Taiwan that the country is almost unknown overseas, an impression highlighted by a certain passivity of Taiwan diplomats when it comes to strengthening the cultural influence of the island, this even though the arts, music and literature in Taiwan are flourishing sectors. It is true that Taiwan’s cultural edge has lost of its currency compared to South Korea or Japan – the
431Shih, H.c., "Taiwan a frontline state against authoritarian influence: official", Focus Taiwan, May 28, 2018, URL: http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201805280028.aspx.
432Emily, R., "In historic decision, Taiwanese court rules in favor of same-sex marriage", The
Washington Post, May 24, 2017, URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-milestone-decision-
taiwan-court-rules-in-favor-of-same-sex-marriage/2017/05/24/bf7aa370-405b-11e7-9851-b95c40075207_story.html?utm_term=.0d53ac3753ab.
433Han Cheung, "Taiwan’s press freedom No. 1 in Asia", Taipei Times, April 27, 2017, URL:
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/04/27/2003669485.
434Chung, J., "Taiwan ranks ahead of the US in freedom report", Taipei Times, February 2, 2018, URL:
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2017/02/02/2003664178.
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island has no Pokémon or influential musical scene like K-pop. This might look like a trivial argument but in fact it is not – for Japan, South Korea, or France, cultural soft power is considered a strategic sector which greatly assists these countries prestige and reputation overseas. Taiwan possesses all the potential for exporting cultural goods overseas, and renewing its influence in the cultural domain would surely strengthens the international standing of the island.
The communication efforts may also need to directly push back against China’s political warfare by making the publicity both domestically and internationally of the existing consensus among the Taiwanese population over the independence of the island from China, in order to strengthen the image of a unified nation and, as Cole put it, debunk China’s narrative that “one’s ethnic origins should serve as a determinant of his or her identity.”435 This also goes through reinforcing the fact that Taiwanese do not define their national identity as Chinese and that Taiwan’s nationalism has little to do with China’s nationalism (as we explained in chapter 4) so as to strengthen Taiwan’s obvious difference. Taiwan should also continue its effort to appear as a peace-loving nation (to the opposite of China) by not engaging in earth breaking moves or official declarations detrimental to cross-strait peace. In addition, for Cole, Taiwan should explain why its quest for difference has nothing to do with any “anti-China” sentiment, a belief Beijing has sought to encourage, but rather reflects a legitimate case for self-determination.436
5.3.3.2 Asymmetric International Participation
Taiwan's international room is extremely constrained by its external environment. The island does not have a chance to win a diplomatic war against China, at least not in a conventional fashion. Most of Taiwan's international actions go unnoticed by the world’s media so the global public is rarely aware of them. Therefore, Taiwanese policy makers need to think about how best to engage global players.
Taiwan makes use of innovative tactics to make its participation essential on certain international issues that directly affect the island, or regarding which blocking its participation would be counterproductive. In other words, Taiwan attempts to create
"win-win" situations in some international settlements to maximize its visibility.
Taiwan justifies its full participation on the international stage by scrupulously observing international law and norms, by “showing the example” so it can better denounce China’s systematic blocking as being illegitimate. To succeed in the exercise, Taiwan does "as if" the country was fully integrated on the world stage, therefore acting as responsible international stakeholder. This way, Taiwan reduces China's ability to block its participation, and augments its international visibility and respectability.
435Cole, J. M., “Convergence or conflict in the Taiwan Strait – the illusion of peace?” Routledge, 2017, page 201.
436Ibid. 201-203.
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The field of international security is one of the most favorable, especially with regards to the dispute in the South China Sea between China, Taiwan, their neighbors and the United States. In this case, Taiwan’s participation was called for and recognized by other powers because it was relevant to the settlement of the issue. Therefore, it is in such niches that Taiwan has the best chance to make its voice heard.437During Ma’s terms, the island could appear as a quasi-official collaborator in the negotiations regarding the East and the South China Seas, first in 2012 with the East China Sea Peace Initiative (ECSPI) and then in 2015 with the South China Sea Peace Initiative (SCSPI).438On these issues, while Taiwan based its position on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Charter, its conciliatory attitude contrasted with China’s bellicosity.
Augmenting Taiwan’s international engagement also means greater military exchanges with partners. This goes through Taiwan’s attempts to attract military experts in Taiwan and to integrate security dialogues, HA/DR operations and seminars, workshops and exchanges as well as international military drills such as the U.S. Rim of the Pacific (by taking advantage of China’s eviction of the drill) in order of course to acquire new knowledge and improve the training and readiness of Taiwan’s armed forces but also to establish closer contacts Taiwan’s international partners.439 Accordingly, Taiwan’s stated objective in the 2017 QDR is to: “deepen the relations and solidify the friendship with them, participate in international cooperation activities.”440Sign that the policy is working, a bill was recently passed at the U.S. Senate, calling for the U.S. to send troops to participate in Taiwan’s military exercises and vice-versa. It remains to be seen if the Trump administration will endorse it.441
Another area in which Taiwan conducts this policy is the protection of the environment.442While Taiwan was excluded from Paris Climate Conference (COP21), Tsai declared that its government would enforce new environmental policies in order to meet the objectives set during the conference.443
437Ide, W., Huang, J.,“Taiwan Looks for Role in South China Sea Dispute,” VOA, November 26, 2015, URL: http://m.voanews.com/a/taiwan-looks-for-role-insouth- china-sea-dispute/3074622.html.
438Delisle, J., "Taiwan’s Quest for International Space: Ma’s Legacy, Tsai’s Options, China’s Choices, and U.S. Policy", FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs, ORBIS Volume 60, Number 4, Fall 2016,
doi:10.1016/S0030-4387(16)30046-1, page 10.
439Chin, J., "US drill a ‘superb’ opportunity: minister", Taipei Times, May 31, 2018, URL:
www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/05/31/2003694028.
440 Quadrennial Defense Review Editing Committee, Ministry of National Defense, “2017 Quadrennial Defense Review of the Republic of China”, Ministry of National Defense, ROC (Taiwan), 2017, ISBN:
978-986-05-2059-0, page 88, URL: http://www.ustaiwandefense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2000/01/2017-Taiwan-Quadrennial-Defense-Review-QDR.pdf.
441 Chiang, C.y., Low, Y.F., "U.S. Senate passes bill calling for troops to join Taiwan drills", Focus Taiwan, June 19, 2018, URL:
http://m.focustaiwan.tw/news/aipl/201806190006.aspx?platform=hootsuite.
442Loa, I.s, “Tsai Ing-wen asks Environmentalists to Stand with Her,” Taipei Times, April 22, 2016, URL: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/04/22/2003644544.
443 Malovic, D., "Exclu de la COP21, Taïwan se bat aussi pour le climat", La Croix, Décembre 1, 2015, URL: https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Exclu-de-la-COP21-Taiwan-se-bat-aussi-pour-le-climat-2015-12-01-1387346.
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By adopting the international rules and cultivating cooperation with its global partners, Taiwan is gaining sympathy. In some occasions, Taiwan partners will agree to discreetly solidify their links with Taiwan, as it is increasingly the case between the island, Japan and the U.S.
5.3.3.3 Taiwan’s Track-two Diplomacy and Think-tank Exchanges
This case study was extracted from one of the author’s previous work on Taiwan’s diplomacy, published in French (see the corresponding footnote below).444 I found interesting to add this empirical observation to feed the analysis, so I translated it and added it here as an example of Taiwan’s diplomatic action.
The island-state has been trying since the election of Tsai Ing-wen to highlight its strategic importance, sitting at the heart of the first island chain around China, between Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania.
For this, and according to the Taiwan’s MND, the island has sought to organize
For this, and according to the Taiwan’s MND, the island has sought to organize