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people to pressure officials, and use business to constrain the government” (yimin biguan, yishang weizheng).33 This was a strategy employed by Beijing in the hopes of luring these taishang to the Mainland for political purposes. While the Taiwanese business were opening up plants and shifting a vast majority of production and R&D from Taiwan to China, the Beijing government was hoping that there would be political benefits as well. This desired political benefit was to flow from Taiwanese businesspeople using their influence in business to carry that influence into the political realm. China believed that allowing track II individuals; those without official ties to government, to benefit from increased relations with China, the government of Taiwan would have to eventually listen. The track II individuals and entities would lead the track I individuals and entities in the state towards closer relations with China. All of these business benefits and incentives that China used to lure the taishang into the mainland had one ultimate goal; the eventual reunification of Taiwan with that of Greater China. For this reason many Taiwanese voters in Taiwan who support the DPP tend to not have a very high opinion of doing business with China.
IV. Beijing’s Response
The two-pronged approach China took during the DPP administration of Chen Shui-bian showed how China has become more pragmatic when dealing with Taiwan. There were many in the business community that saw the opening up of China as an advantage when it came to doing business. Business would have a windfall of profits once Taiwanese business and enterprise could access the mainland. It is safe to argue that China took the approach of the famed
economist Frederic Bastiat who said “when goods cannot cross borders, armies will”. The spirit of Bastiat‟s quote would show the idea that trade and commerce helps prevent military
aggression between nations. China, however, also likes to use trade for political and military purposes. During the Chen administration this was particularly obvious. Chinese leadership made the conscientious decision to shift the attitude and approach employed when dealing with Taiwan. There was still the constant threat of force, and the leadership in China has always
33 Keng, Schubert, p. 296
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maintained the right to use force to settle the Taiwan issue. However the shift began to take shape in more economic terms.
President Chen was passive towards China in his first term. In fact, “In his first inaugural address, Chen pledged that as long as China had no intentions to use military force against Taiwan he would not declare Taiwan independence or change the country‟s name.”34 After Chen was
reelected to a second term in 2004, there was still the atmosphere of non-provocation with China.
In fact, Chen‟s second inaugural address set the tone of his second term as that of non-aggression against China. “In his 2004 inaugural speech, Chen mollified the United States and China by ruling out Taiwan independence for the next four years and saying any kind of relationship with China was possible with the Taiwan people‟s consent.”35 Any political leader in Taiwan is always placed in a precarious situation politically. They have to navigate an international
political system that has marginalized Taiwan, all the time making sure to not create tension with China. For President Chen this task was particularly grueling. Being the first DPP elected
president there were many in Taiwan that expected Chen to take a bold and definitive stance towards China. However Chen realized that in order for Taiwan to compete globally he should not provoke China. This led to the more subdued attitude in his term in office. Although there was still the desire to carry out full independence in accordance with DPP doctrine, it was largely empty rhetoric when faced with the reality of Taiwan‟s situation in the world.
The reaction in Taiwan under the DPP to the change in attitude of China towards Taiwan;
namely using business to direct politics, was negative. In fact, the terms “use people to pressure officials, and use business to constrain the government” were popularized by the DPP and Chen as a response to China. “The expression referred to the Chinese government‟s alleged attempts, both through trade and investment incentives and via political pressure, to use the taishang as agents of its unification project.”36 In the eyes of the DPP and their voters China was to be always seen as an economic, as well as a militaristic threat. The DPP would always be mistrustful of China and Beijing‟s intentions when it came to the future of Taiwan.
34Larus,E.F. (2012) Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election: Implications for Taiwan's Politics and Relations with Mainland China, Virginia Review of Asian Studies, p. 7
35 Larus, p. 8
36 Keng, Schubert, p. 296
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After the election in 2008 and the loss of the presidency to the KMT the DPP continued their advocacy of China as an entity not conducive to Taiwan‟s future. In an article published on the DPP official website in 2008 the party claims that China continues its belligerence towards Taiwan. “China‟s 2008 defense budget increased by 17.6%, military exercises by the People‟s Liberation Army staging a rehearsal of special combat procedures to take over airports, the Chinese government‟s refusal to remove the missiles directed at Taiwan.”37 With China modernizing rapidly there was a belief in the DPP that this rapid ascent onto the global stage would have negative consequences for Taiwan. One way that the rise of China was viewed as a threat was through the military buildup in China. In more recent years the angst that the DPP exhibited during the beginning of the Ma administration regarding the perceived threat of China may have been proven accurate. With China increasingly hostile to her neighbors and engaging in reckless actions in the South China Sea, many in Taiwan are apprehensive over the rise of China. Many in the DPP were quick to seize on what they perceived as failings of the Ma administration. They believed that Ma was not bringing about real change to Taiwan and the military threat that Taiwan faced.
China has always used the threat of military force to attempt to coerce Taiwan; especially during election seasons. After the election of Ma in 2008 there was some hope that the threat of military force by China against Taiwan would be toned down some given the fact that the KMT was in power again. Many in Taiwan believed that Ma‟s “three no” policy (no unification, no
independence, no war) would be enough to placate the Chinese leadership. This shift in government policy from Chen to Ma was not, however, enough to pacify the CCP. The DPP believed that China‟s insistence on continuing its military buildup proved that China‟s rise was a major threat to Taiwan‟s security. China‟s continued insistence for nations to recognize it‟s unilaterally declared nine dash line, Beijing‟s continued construction of manmade islands, as
37 DPP: China has never wavered on its belligerence towards Taiwan, Official Democratic Progressive Party Website (2008, July 05) http://english.dpp.org.tw/dpp-china-has-never-wavered-on-its-belligerence-towards-taiwan/
accessed May 28, 2015
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well as increased naval activity in the Pacific have given pause to people not only in Taiwan, but also throughout other nations in the region.