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57 X. Personal Economic Situation
Because there is sometimes a discrepancy when it comes to how people feel about the nation‟s overall economic performance versus their own personal economic situation, the next question asked related to how they felt personally about ECFA. “Thinking about your own economic situation, do you think it has gotten better or gotten worse as a result of ECFA, or stayed about the same?”69 Below is the TEDS data from 2012.
Values Categories n percentage
1 get better 109 6.0%
2 get worse 173 9.5%
3 stay about the same 1387 76.0%
95 refuse to answer 8 0.4%
96 it's hard to say 12 0.7%
97 no opinion 16 0.9%
98 don't know 121 6.6%
Frequency : 1826 100%
(Source: TEDS)
It is clear that in 2012 out of the people TEDS polled the majority believed that ECFA had neither harmed nor helped their personal economic situation. It was perhaps still too early to fully appreciate the effect ECFA would have on Taiwan‟s economy. What can be said for sure from the data is that the debate over ECFA was split down party lines. Those falling into the pan-blue camp viewed ECFA as an important step in not only maintaining cross Strait relations; but also for Taiwan to avoid being economically marginalized. The pan-green voters were naturally skeptic of any agreements that, in their view, would bring Taiwan and China closer together.
XI. Overall Impressions
The overall impression I was left with when reviewing the TEDS data was how divided the electorate seems to be when it comes to how they view China. Most of the KMT supporters have a much more positive take on China and economic interaction with China. The majority view
69 TEDS http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/list.php?g_isn=63&g_tid=0&g_cid=9 accessed June 4, 2015
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China as an economic opportunity and feel that Taiwan should continue to improve relations with Beijing. Conversely, the DPP voters tend to all be more skeptical and suspicious of China and China‟s intentions. For the most part they feel as if China represents a potential threat to not only economic growth, but also stability. Well the KMT supporters view Taiwan‟s actions as the main destabilizing force in cross strait relations, the DPP voters tend to view Chinese aggression as more of a destabilizing force to cross straits peace. The KMT voters will always have the connection to China as many view it as their homeland. This naturally translates towards viewing China as an opportunity and a desire to further business ties with the Mainland. The DPP on the other hand does not have as much of a cordial connection with China and, as the TEDS data shows, DPP voters view China as more of a threat to Taiwan than an opportunity.
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59 Chapter Six Conclusions
The political situation of Taiwan, especially in how China attempts to influence Taiwan‟s democracy and elections, is very precarious. Taiwan can be considered a rump state in that the ruling government still claims the whole of China as its legitimate territory. However, since democratization has occurred on the island local politics has taken precedent. China was not happy about Taiwan‟s democratic development. Beijing would much more prefer to deal with the Taiwan issue in a way in which the average Taiwanese citizen does not have a vote. However, given the changing demographics and political winds in Taiwan, China has taken on a broader, more evolved approach to Taiwan. China has always reserved the right to reunite Taiwan by military force if necessary, but in recent years the tone has shifted more to economics. China has tried the “stick” when it comes to Taiwan and has been met with a great deal of opposition. They are now going to try the “carrot” approach of economics. If China can show the Taiwanese electorate that better relations with Beijing means better economic development in Taiwan then there may be greater incentive for Taiwan to better relations with Beijing. This shifting approach from Beijing has had vast influence in how the Taiwanese political system and the average Taiwanese voter views China.
The two main political parties view China differently. The KMT still views itself as a Chinese centric party, and this translates into how the party deals with not only China, but also Taiwan‟s foreign policy. The majority of the KMT believes that China represents an opportunity for Taiwan and Taiwanese business. This policy and trend of viewing China as an opportunity also has historical reasons. The KMT still holds out hope of reuniting with China. This hope
corresponds with their continued support for policies that further cooperation across the Straits, especially in regards to economic cooperation. Because of the friendlier policies the KMT employs in regards to China the party enjoys the support of Taiwanese citizens that also view China as an opportunity. If a Taiwanese voter sees China as an opportunity they will more than likely vote for a KMT politician.
The DPP, born out of opposition to the authoritarian KMT regime, takes a different position when it comes to China. As a party that advocates for full independence, the DPP has a skeptical view of China and Chinese economic interaction. The DPP tends to view China as not only an
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economic threat but also a real, substantive military threat. Because of this differing view that the DPP takes towards China it is able to pool support from Taiwanese citizens who also view China as more of a threat than an opportunity. Although there has been some evolution in policy
positions in recent years, the DPP and voters that support the DPP still view China as a threat.
The reelection of Ma Ying-jeou in 2012 showed that, at the time, voters in Taiwan preferred the status quo versus something unfamiliar. President Ma represented the stability of the 1992 Consensus as well as continued economic development. Tsai was an unknown factor and the electorate was not sure how China would respond if she were to be elected. Looking back on Ma‟s reelection in the year 2015 it is easy to see how he was reelected. Analyzing the current dissatisfaction with Ma and the KMT in the 2015 political climate it is also easy to predict the future election results; however these results have yet to come to fruition.
In the final analysis, the Taiwanese electorate is continually changing. With more and more young voters joining the voting ranks it will be interesting to see how the KMT and other pro-China parties try and appeal to a demographic that tends to view themselves as purely Taiwanese.
The next few years will be very interesting in the development of Taiwan‟s democracy and how these developments will shake up the global political status quo.
Because more and more Taiwanese voters view themselves as only Taiwanese, especially younger voters, there is some apprehension in pan blue groups over future elections. One such election is the 2016 presidential election. With the Ma Ying-jeo‟s anemic approval numbers and image of being a “bumbler” so heavily ingrained in the public‟s eye, it will be difficult for a fellow KMT candidate to break free from this image. The KMT has currently nominated Eric Chu, the current mayor of New Taipei City. Mayor Chu will have a difficult time of changing the public perception that has arisen of the KMT under the leadership of President Ma. Currently in Taiwan there is a strong anti-Ma wave of sentiment running through the populace. This translates into anti KMT sentiment as well. One of the best examples of this sentiment was the Sunflower student movement in 2014. This movement was an argument against “black box” procedures and also an argument against closer economic relations with China. President Ma was also a target of the protesters and their supporters. Because of Ma‟s involvement in the Sunflower Movement many voters are strongly opposed to Ma and his policies. It is possible that the national sentiment is not necessarily anti-KMT or anti-China but only anti- Ma ying-jeou. However, either way the
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KMT does not fare well in its national image. All of this does not bode well for the KMT in the January 2016 election.
On the other side, running for the DPP, is the established Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai has the advantage of an electorate that is tired of eight years of KMT rule with not a lot of positive results for the country. There is a growing populist movement concerned about domestic issues in Taiwan such as stagnant wages, lack of opportunities and others. This works to Tsai‟s advantage. If she can keep the focus on domestic issues instead of being drawn into a debate about cross strait relations, she has the advantage. On the issue of China Tsai has also showed an ability to be more
pragmatic when it comes to dealing with Beijing. With China being a juggernaut powerhouse, it is all but impossible not to have dealings with Beijing. Tsai understand this, and has promoted policies of not only peace across the Taiwan Strait, but also furthering the relationship with China. This must all be done however with mechanisms to protect Taiwan‟s sovereignty. Tsai must also attempt to ease any angst Washington might have over being drawn into a conflict with China because of Taiwan.70 Because of Tsai‟s more balanced approach towards China and domestic issues taking more prominence in the election, the odds of her carrying the election in 2016 are quite high.
One interesting area of note is how the roles of established candidate versus something unknown have changed for the 2016 election. In 2012 Tsai was the unknown candidate and Ma was established. In 2015 and 2016 Tsai seems to be the more established candidate when compared to Hung. When the candidacy of James Soong is factored in, it appears there is a “perfect storm:
of variables similar to the situation in 2000 and 2004 to guarantee a DPP win. In the final analysis of all the domestic and international factors the main issue that will decide the election is whether or not the electorate views China as an opportunity or whether it is a threat. As this thesis has already shown; those that view China as an opportunity will more than likely vote pan blue. If in a voter‟s mind China is a threat they will vote pan green.
70Cole, Michael J. (2015) Two Myths about Taiwan’s DPP that Need to be Laid to Rest, The Diplomat
http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/two-myths-about-taiwans-dpp-that-need-to-be-laid-to-rest/ accessed online 10/05/2015
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