中國對台灣選舉和台灣回應演變的影響 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文政治大 Master’s Thesis. 立. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 中國對台灣選舉和台灣回應演變的影響. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. China’s Evolving Influence over Taiwan’s Elections and Taiwanese Responses. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Sam Borgwardt 楊文心 Advisor: Professor Chung-min Tsai 蔡中民. 中華民國 104 年 11 月 November 2015 1.

(2) 中國對台灣選舉和台灣回應演變的影響 China’s Evolving Influence over Taiwan’s Elections and Taiwanese Responses 研究生：楊文心. Student: Sam Borgwardt. 政治大. 指導教授：蔡中民教授 Advisor: Dr. Tsai, Chung-min. 學. 國立政治大學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. n. al. y er. io. sit. Nat. 碩士論文. ‧. ‧ 國. 立. C h A Thesis U n i engchi. v. Submitted to International Master‟s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies 中華民國 104 年 11 月 November 2015 2.

(3) Acknowledgments. I would like to extend my deepest gratitude towards my advisor, Dr. Tsai Chung-min for his assistance and willingness to be my advisor. I would also like to thank all of my professors here in the IMAS department for opening my eyes to the wonderful field that is Asia-Pacific studies. Under their guidance I have gained an enormous amount of knowledge and am forever grateful for their help.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 3. i n U. v.

(4) Abstract. Beginning with Taiwan‟s transition to democracy in the late 1980s China‟s influence over Taiwan has begun to evolve. China, although still maintaining the right to use military force, has transition to a more economic way of dealing with Taiwan. China attempts to influence Taiwanese voting behavior by offering economic incentives for closer relations with the Mainland. This change has resulted in both of Taiwan‟s main political parties evolving their positions on China. The Kuomintang (KMT) views China as an opportunity and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) views China as a threat.. 立. 政治大. Keywords: China, Taiwan, Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 4. i n U. v.

(5) Table of Contents 1. Introduction Background………………………………………………………………………………..5 Purpose of Research……………………………………………………………………….7 Literature Review………………………………………………………………………….8 Research Hypothesis and Analytical Framework………………………………………....9 Election Case Study……………………………………………………………………...10 Conclusion..................................................................................................................…...11. 政治大 China‟s One China Principle…………………………………………………………….13 立 China‟s Evolving Approach, Taiwan Responds…………………………………………16. 2. China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Democracy and Elections. ‧ 國. 學. The Third Taiwan Straits Crisis…………………………………………….……………18 American and Taiwanese Response………………………………………………...……19. ‧. China‟s Continued Claim of Legitimacy……………………………………………...…21 3. Taiwan’s Political Parties. y. Nat. sit. The Democratic Progressive Party……………………………………………………….26. al. er. io. Chen Shui-bian and China..........................................................................................…...27. n. Business, Chen and China………………………………………………………………..29. Ch. i n U. v. Beijing‟s Response……………………………………………………………………….30. engchi. Ma and the KMT………………………………………………………………………....32 China: Threat or Opportunity?...........................................................................................33 KMT: China is an Opportunity……………………………………………….………….35 4. The 2012 Election Background……………………………………………………………………………....37 The 1992 Consensus…………………………………………………………………..…38 ECFA and Business………………………………………………………………...……42 Business Pressure……………………………………………………………………...…45 Internal DPP Factors, KMT Factors………………………………..……………………46 Procedural Moves………………………………………………………………………..50 5.

(6) TEDS Data National Identity…………………………………………………………….52 The 1992 Consensus……………………………………………………………………..53 ECFA…………………………………………………………………………………….54 Personal Economic Situation………………………………………………………….…55 Overall Impressions……………………………………………………………………...55 5. Conclusions. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 6. i n U. v.

(7) Chapter One Introduction I.. Background. Elections in Taiwan are very different from elections in other democratic nations, and yet they are very similar. They are similar in the fact that they are, by definition, democratic. They also share with other nations the feeling of unease regarding elections. That is to say every election in Taiwan as well as other democratic nations has the potential to change the political dynamic and bring new people into power in a relatively short amount of time. The similarities between. 政治大. Taiwanese elections and other nation‟s elections are that they share in the “brotherhood of democracy”. While these similarities are important, the far more important issues when it comes. 立. to Taiwanese elections are the differences.. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan is a special case in the lab of democracy. Since Taiwan is recognized on the international stage by only a smattering of smaller nations, Taiwan lacks the international recognition of its. ‧. democracy that most modern, democratic nations enjoy. This international isolation has affected how Taiwanese vote, especially when it comes to the economy. When trying to trace the source. y. Nat. er. io. Namely, that Taiwan is a wayward province of China.. sit. of this isolation, the trail is always led back to the Chinese government‟s position on Taiwan.. al. n. iv n C prominent issue when it comes to how Taiwanese h e n gpeople c h i castUtheir vote. The China factor. This Chinese policy towards Taiwan affects the elections on the island and is the single most. influences every other issue and factor that comes into play when Taiwan holds elections. China influences how people perceive the economy, becoming isolated, military issues, as well as a host of other factors. This perception of China has gradually evolved, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. On the Taiwan side China has been viewed through the guise of being an enemy during the Chen presidential period to being a potential opportunity during the Ma presidency. On the Chinese side of the issue is the all encompassing One China Policy. China‟s ultimate goal is a reunification of the two sides. Everything that Beijing does when it comes to Taiwan is done with the ideal of reunification, or at least denying Taiwanese independence. China must be very cautious when it deals with Taiwan as China‟s attitude and behavior can hold a major influence 7.

(8) over how Taiwanese vote. This interference in Taiwan‟s domestic elections on the part of China is a major, if not the major, variable when Taiwanese people are deciding to cast their vote. What this thesis will do is show China‟s evolving position on the Taiwan issue and how China attempts to influence Taiwanese elections. It will also show how the Taiwanese respond based off of their political ideology. There is a saying in the sciences that math is the handmaiden of science. If that is true; then we can safely say that in the social sciences money is the handmaiden of politics. If it is logical to claim that the China factor is the most prominent variable that influences the elections in Taiwan, than it is logical to conclude that this China factor will influence other prominent variables such. 政治大. as the economy. With China currently representing the second largest consumer market on the planet (soon to be the first), many Taiwanese businesspeople want access to this booming market.. 立. The way to access the Chinese market it bound to politics and how the Taiwanese vote. If an. ‧ 國. 學. average Taiwanese citizen is more concerned with China as a potential place to do business and make money, then this Taiwanese citizen will more than likely vote for a candidate or party that. ‧. also views China as an economic opportunity.. The two main political parties have seized on these two variables in terms of campaigning as. y. Nat. sit. well as policy. The Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party is more inclined to view China as a. al. er. io. potential opportunity for economic growth. The main opposition party, the Democratic. n. Progressive Party, tends to view China as a potential threat to not only Taiwan‟s political. Ch. i n U. v. systems but also the economy. The two main variables that the political parties always form their. engchi. platforms around are China and economic issues.. What this thesis proposes to do is show that the two most influential variables in Taiwanese elections are the China factor and economy. These two variables can be even further divided into three different actors, China, the U.S. and Taiwan. In the light of China, how does Taiwan react to marginalization on the international stage and how does this affect elections? How does China‟s behavior affect Taiwan‟s elections? How does the United States and its position in the triangle play into Taiwanese elections when viewed as a deterrent to China? When it comes to economic issues, how does China influence the Taiwanese economy and thus elections? How does Washington? By examining these two variables in Taiwanese elections and their subgroups. 8.

(9) I will show that China and the economy hold the most sway over Taiwan‟s elections and how the Taiwanese vote.. II.. Purpose of Research. The purpose of research will be to assess the current relationship between China, the economy and Taiwan‟s elections. These two factors are the most prominent actors in Taiwanese politics and hold the most influence over Taiwan. If we look at the China factor from Beijing‟s point of view we can see that China‟s position has. 政治大 viewed as a wayward province that needed to be liberated and brought back into the fold of 立 greater China. Beijing has always tried to use the proverbial stick when it comes to influencing evolved over time. Beginning with the founding of the People‟s Republic in 1949, Taiwan was. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan‟s elections and the general political situation in Taiwan. In recent years though there has been an evolution of attitude in how Beijing treats Taipei, especially when the KMT is in control.. ‧. China has realized that force has usually led to the opposite of what they intended. China now can be satisfied with something less than full reunification, as long as this system denies. y. Nat. sit. Taiwan‟s international space.1 This has shown how China has gone from overtly using military. er. io. force to influence Taiwan to a softer approach.. al. n. iv n C Taiwan‟s elections and how Taiwan‟s political h e nparties i U The KMT has a closer g c hoperate.. This evolution on the China issue from Beijing‟s point of view has had a direct influence on. relationship with the Beijing government. Both recognize and propagate the One China. Principle2 and both desire a unified China. This effects how Taiwanese vote. The opposition party, the DPP, also has had an evolution from being fervently anti-China (恐中) to becoming more tolerant of China and trade across the Straits. With the Chinese economy being the second largest in the world (the first if going by purchasing power parity), the DPP has realized that there can be tremendous benefits to Taiwan if there is careful economic interaction between the two sides. 1. Nathan, A.J. (1996) China’s Goals in the Taiwan Strait, The China Journal, No, 36, p. 88 The One China Principle is best described as both Beijing and Taipei recognize the existence of only one China. The legitimate government to represent that China is open to interpretation. The oral agreements between the two sides in the form of the 1992 Consensus are the best representation of the One China Principle.. 2. 9.

(10) In the world of politics, nothing is absolute. Situations are always changing and evolving. This evolution is best seen in the treatment of Taiwan by Beijing, especially when it comes time to hold an election in Taiwan. According to Andrew Nathan, China has gone from overtly threatening Taiwan and emphasizing reunification, to a more subdues tone of simply denying Taiwanese independence or international recognition of Taiwan. “Beijing can be satisfied with something less than full unification. It can accommodate Taiwan‟s international activity and so too any residual diplomatic activity that is part of the winding down of Taiwan‟s independent diplomatic posture.”3 This is an unprecedented shift from the times when Beijing would use brute military force and threats to attempt to influence Taiwan‟s elections. It shows that China has tried the “stick” and not gotten the desired outcome so now Beijing will attempt to use the. 政治大 to the “carrot” approach. Recently Xi Jinping has released his 地動山搖說 (Di dong shan yao 立. “carrot” to influence Taiwan. It should also be noted though that China has limits when it comes. shuo) policy. This policy dictates that any dealings China has with Taiwan must be done under. ‧ 國. 學. the pretext of both sides recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Xi and China value the 1992 Consensus above all and that any dealings China has with Taiwan must recognize Chinese. ‧. authority over the island.4 Well there has been an evolution on the side of China because Beijing. y. Nat. recognizes that the heavy handed approach has the opposite effect of what is desired; China still. er. io. Taiwanese elections.. sit. maintains the principles of Taiwan being a part of the nation. This has vast influence of. al. n. iv n C U actions. It will also be h evoter domestic elections and how the Taiwanese n greacts c htoi China‟s. Throughout this thesis I will attempt to show how China has attempted to influence Taiwan‟s. important to show how the average Taiwanese citizen views China and how this influences whom they vote for.. 3. Nathan, A.J., P.88. 4. 兩岸與國際》最怕地動山搖的其實是習近平, Liberty Times (2015, May 15) http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/1317512 accessed May 16, 2015. 10.

(11) III.. Literature Review. Before discussing the relevant literature on the issue of China‟s influence on Taiwan‟s elections it should be pointed out that there is a great deal of contradictory literature available on the topic, especially from Taiwanese authors. The literature that paints China as more of a threat to Taiwan‟s elections tend to favor less reliance on China and view Beijing as a threat. On the other side are those that believe that China should not be viewed as a threat, instead Beijing should be viewed as an opportunity. Wu Yu Shan in his paper 兩岸關係的理論詮釋 (The Theoretical Interpretation of the Cross Strait Relations) provides the basic background of the relations between China and Taiwan.. 政治大. He shows the evolution of China’s Taiwan policy, and how Taiwan has responded. The. 立. important background information of how China attempts to influence Taiwanese elections is. ‧ 國. 學. provided as well as how Taiwan responds on a national scale to China’s influences through “bandwagoning” and other measures. All of these terms and background information can apply to how Taiwanese people vote. The actions of China has a direct result on Taiwanese voters and. ‧. they tend to vote based off of their perceptions and opinions of China. The average citizen‟s. y. Nat. perception of China is an example of an independent variable. If China is viewed as more of a. io. sit. threat, the citizen will more than likely vote for a politician or party that takes a more cautious. er. approach to China. Conversely, if China is viewed as an opportunity, the citizen will vote. al. n. iv n C This view of China as an opportunity byhsome in Taiwan has e n g c h i Uled to the KMT accordingly.. increasingly becoming more amicable to Beijing. When President Ma was first elected in 2008 it was hoped that there could be a diplomatic “truce” between the two sides and that economic cooperation could eventually lead to political stability.5 The Taiwanese population was weary of eight years under President Chen and the animosity that had developed between the Strait during Chen‟s presidency. Taiwanese business people also began to want greater access to the Chinese market and President Ma and the KMT began to bring forth more China friendly policies. This marked a shift from the previous administration. Leading the charge in Ma‟s attitude and policy shift towards viewing China as an 5. “The Baoao Forum, One Small Step for Cross-Strait Dialogue,” Zhongguo Shibao (China Times), Editorial, April 8, 2008; “President-elect Ma calls for ‘Diplomatic Truce’”. 11.

(12) economic opportunity were businesspeople. These second track agents were able to successfully show the KMT that China. The business elite in Taiwan tended to have a more favorable attitude towards doing business with China and see the vast market in Chin as an avenue to increase profit. Shu Keng and Gunther Schubert in their paper Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration go into great detail about how businesspeople in Taiwan influence Taiwan‟s elections. One interesting aspect that they develop in the paper is the idea of “Dualism of Taiwanese public opinion on Cross-Strait relations.”6 This duality consists of the perception that closer ties with China provide economic advantages, but leads closer to unification. There is a trade off when it comes to dealing with China, namely a political price to pay. Wu Yu Shan also developed this idea of a. 政治大 ties, if they support independence they will vote for the opposition. This idea of closer economic 立. duality in Taiwanese voters‟ minds. If an individual supports unification they will vote for closer. ties with China leading to unification is nothing new. However, the idea that businesspeople can,. ‧ 國. 學. and in many cases, are leading the charge to closer economic ties with China have a direct influence on Taiwan‟s elections and how people vote. It is especially interesting given the recent. ‧. dealings between Eric Chu, the party leader of the KMT and current mayor of New Taipei City, and his counterparts in the CCP.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Research Hypothesis a and Analytical Frameworkv. n. IV.. i l C n hengchi U For this paper I will show how the influence of China plays a direct role on Taiwanese elections. How a Taiwanese voter views China also has an undisputable role to play in Taiwanese elections. My main hypothesis can most accurately be summarized by the following: 1. Because of China‟s claim to Taiwan, China has a direct role to play in how Taiwanese vote. Whether it is a direct threat of force or economic incentives, Beijing is always the most prominent factor in Taiwan‟s elections.. 6. Keng, S. and Schubert, G. (2010) Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration, Asian Survey, Vol, 50, No. 2, pp. 287-310. 12.

(13) 2. Taiwanese citizens voting behavior is based on their perception of China. If someone believes China is an opportunity, especially economically, they tend to vote Pan-Blue. Conversely, if China is viewed as a threat the voter will most likely vote Pan-Green. In order to best “tell the story” of China‟s role in Taiwanese elections I will be relying on academic research already done by others. To supplement this research and news reports will be data collected by National Chengchi University‟s (NCCU) election center. This TEDS data will help to prove the correlation between the voting practices of Taiwanese citizens and China. It will show the direct, enormous, effect China‟s influence exerts on Taiwan. When China speaks, especially when it comes to Taiwan, voters in Taiwan take heed and vote accordingly. This data. 政治大 further show how Taiwan is divided into two main camps; those that view China as an 立. will be helpful in showing how Taiwanese not only view themselves, but also China. It will. opportunity and those that view China as a threat.. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. V.. Election Case Study. y. Nat. sit. Once it has been established and shown the vast influence China holds over Taiwan‟s. al. er. io. elections, a direct analysis of certain elections in Taiwan will be done. The 2012. n. election marks a shift in Taiwanese elections and the voter‟s attitudes, especially when it comes. Ch. i n U. v. to China. Well it may be arguable that the victory of Ma in 2008 was to the fact that the. engchi. electorate was apathetic to having had eight years of DPP rule under Chen with such animosity across the Strait. The “incumbent effect” was a decisive variable in Ma‟s election victory in 2008. Ma came into office with a pledge of lowering tensions across the Taiwan Strait and improving relations, especially economic ones, with China. During President Ma‟s first term in office there were many breakthroughs in Taiwan‟s relationship with China. The crowning feature of Ma‟s first term was ECFA. This pact between China and Taiwan increased trade across the strait. It has also had a very describable impact on Taiwanese politics. The full effect of ECFA on Taiwan‟s economy has yet to fully come to fruition, however ECFA can be seen as a litmus test for Ma‟s reelection in 2012. President Ma was able to fend off the DPP‟s candidate Tsai Ing-wen in 2012. It is safe to say that voters were 13.

(14) more comfortable with a KMT presidency under Ma versus the unknown of Tsai. The majority of voters still believed that Ma and the KMT were the best to handle China and continue the bettering of the relationship between the two. The 2012 election in Taiwan showed how China and China‟s economic prestige had a direct affect on Taiwanese voting behavior. The analysis of these two elections will show that the majority of voters viewed China as more of an opportunity rather than a potential threat; at least in terms of the economy. As such, President Ma was given another four years to improve the relations between the two sides.. Structure of Thesis. 立. 1. Introduction.. 政治大. 2. The China Factor-China’s influence on Taiwanese politics and elections.. ‧ 國. 學. 3. Taiwanese electorate and their view of China- Threat or opportunity? 4. The 2012 election case study.. io. sit. y. Nat. Conclusion. ‧. 5. Conclusion.. er. The story of China‟s influence on Taiwanese politics is intertwined in history and money. The. al. n. iv n C h toeTaiwanese amount of influence on Taiwan in regards i U behavior. There has been a subtle n g c h voting very fabric of Taiwan‟s democracy is often put to the test by China, and China enjoys a vast. evolution in how China deals with Taiwan in order to affect elections. China still maintains its principles of Taiwan being a part of its territory; however there has been an evolution in how. China deals with Taiwan. China can now be placated with something less than full unification. As long as Taiwan does not take any provocative steps towards full independence, China has learned that a more hands off approach works better in China‟s favor. This evolution in attitude on Beijing‟s part also affects how the Taiwanese vote. If they are more supportive of closer relations with China they will vote for the KMT. If China is a treat in their mind they will vote for the DPP. The ideology of the electorate will also heavily influence future elections, especially the 2016 presidential election.. 14.

(15) Chapter Two China’s Influence on Taiwan’s Democracy and Elections. In China there is a notion that China, as a nation, has historically been ostracized and bullied by the developed world. One does not need to look far in Chinese textbooks and media to see the attitude of not only the government in China, but also the culture as a whole. This form of ethnocentrism and belief that unity is a necessity on display in China does have its roots in the historical treatment of China by foreign nations. China sees itself as being the victim throughout much of history. One of the byproducts of this historical attitude is the sacred belief and principle. 治政 and nationality as one in the same. That is to say, if one is of大 Han descent then one is Chinese. 立中華 (Chinese) identity. This “Chinese” identity bleeds into This person belongs to the greater that China, and the Chinese race, must be unified. Chinese have the tendency of viewing race. ‧ 國. 學. everything it comes into contact with, including politics. It is because of this belief that China must be unified that the government in the People‟s Republic of China is so adamant when it. ‧. comes to the issue of Taiwan. It is a very nationalistic position that the PRC holds when it comes to Taiwan and this nationalism is one of the main factors that holds sway over how the PRC. Nat. sit er. io. China’s One China Principle. al. n. I.. y. views and deals with Taiwan.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The sacred belief that China must be a unified nation and people has seeped into how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Taiwan and the issue of Taiwan‟s separation from China. The CCP has as one of its core principles the ideal of a unified China and Chinese race. The fact that, in the opinion of the CCP, that modern day China is not unified is very tragic to the government in Beijing. One of the main principles that Beijing holds steadfast to is the idea of uniting “greater China”. This unified China would be under the watchful eye of the CCP and China would finally be the united society that many deem desirable. This has evolved into what Beijing calls the “One China policy” or “One China Principle”. According to China‟s White Paper on “The one-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” which was released on February 21, 2000, Taiwan must always be viewed as a part of China. “The 15.

(16) One-China Principle has evolved in the course of the Chinese people‟s just struggle to safeguard China‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its basis, both de facto and dejure, is unshakable.”7 The Chinese government has as one of its core principles the reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland. This doctrine is an intrinsic part of how the CCP deals with Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan‟s status has been given prominent status in Chinese politics and how the Chinese deal with Taiwan. It also factors greatly into how the Chinese view Taiwan‟s democracy and election system. China bases its views and actions on Taiwan‟s elections off of the principle that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory, a part that must eventually be reunited with Beijing. One of the most prominent examples of how the CCP has decided to deal with Taiwan is through the above mentioned White Paper that was released in 2000. Through examination of this paper. 政治大 with Taiwan. The paper has a historical component to it that traces the origins of the One China 立 it is clear what the CCP‟s goals are and principles it wishes to uphold when it comes to dealing. Principle to a point of origin that predates the People‟s Republic of China. China believes that at. ‧ 國. 學. the end of the Second World War Taiwan was returned to China (at the time the Republic of China) under the guise of the Cairo Doctrine. The CCP believes that since Taiwan and all other. ‧. territories ceded to Japan by the Qing dynasty were returned upon Japan‟s defeat and that the Postdam proclamation solidifies the legitimacy of the CCP to govern Taiwan. This is a curious. y. Nat. sit. case for the PRC to make given the fact that the PRC as a nation did not exist until 1949. The. al. er. io. idea that the current government in Beijing can claim Taiwan as part of its territory can be traced. n. back to the belief that the PRC is a continuation of the Republic of China (ROC). The PRC. Ch. i n U. v. claims that since the ROC has been defeated, the PRC has inherited the entire sovereign. engchi. territory of China, which in their view contains Taiwan. For the PRC to even entertain the notion of Taiwan being a separate nation outside of the jurisdiction of Beijing would be anathema. The ROC is no longer in existence and to even entertain the idea that the PRC and the ROC can exist separately without the ROC in Taiwan recognizing Beijing as the central government is not possible. Taiwan is an issue at the core of the PRC‟s existence, China needs to. 7. Xu, Sh. Origin of the One China Principle, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC (2001, December 18) http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/OneChinaPrinciple/201103/t20110317_1790075.htm accessed May 15, 2015. 16.

(17) resolve the Taiwan issue in order to be legitimized; especially since the PRC as a nation state is still relatively young. With the founding of the PRC in 1949 all of the territory of the ROC was ceded to the PRC. “On October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the PRC was proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena.”8 The government in Beijing sees itself as the continuation of China; it is the next incarnation of the “Middle Kingdom” and the true representative of the Chinese people. The PRC believes that any diplomatic relations and treaties held by the ROC were transferred to the PRC on its founding in 1949. Although the ROC does still exist as a rump state to this day, the PRC believes that the ROC is no longer a. 政治大 Beijing. It is this ingrained belief in the PRC that only the government in Beijing can represent 立 recognizable entity and that any representation of China must be done and recognized through. China that has led to China being very adamant in the international arena when it comes to how. ‧ 國. 學. the international community deals with the Taiwan issue. This idea of China being only represented by the PRC is one of the most sacred principles the PRC affirms and holds onto. This. ‧. principle has to do directly with the PRC‟s legitimacy as a government as well and is one of the reasons why the PRC attempts to influence Taiwanese elections. It also speaks to Chinese. y. Nat. sit. legitimacy on the claim of Taiwan. China needs to maintain the principle of a unified China, with. al. er. io. Taiwan as an important part of China. If China were to relinquish the principle, the CCP and. n. China as a whole would have a legitimacy issue when it comes to other hot button problems. Ch. i n U. v. facing Chinese leadership. Hypothetically, if China were to resolve the Taiwan issue by allowing. engchi. Taiwan self determination this would set a dangerous precedent for other issues of sovereignty that China faces. If China were to follow this line of reasoning it would be dangerous since it sets a precedent for people in Tibet, Xinjiang and other areas within China that take issue with being under the jurisdiction of Beijing. Especially given the recent Umbrella movement in Hong Kong, China finds itself in the precarious position of a lack of maneuverability when it comes to the Taiwan issue. The appearance of any system without Taiwan recognizing that Taiwan is a part of China and Beijing as the central government would not be acceptable by Beijing since it has invested heavily in claiming Taiwan as a part of China.. 8. Xu, S. Origin of the One-China Principle. 17.

(18) II.. China’s Evolving Approach, Taiwan Responds. Having established China‟s historical view on the issue of Taiwan being a part of Chinese territory and how China believes that Taiwan must be reunified, by use of force if necessary, the next step is to examine how China goes about achieving this goal and how this affects Taiwan‟s democracy. “On Comrade Deng Xiaoping's initiative, the Chinese government has, since 1979, adopted the policy of peaceful reunification and gradually evolved the scientific concept of “one country, two systems."9 After Mao brought China to its knees via the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China received a leader that was strikingly different than Mao. Deng Xiaoping, who himself was persecuted by Mao. Under Deng, China not only embarked on. 政治大 began to see a shift in how China dealt with Taiwan. China would no longer insist on full 立. economic reforms but also on how China dealt with Taiwan. Beginning with Deng the world. unification as being the only available option, although this is still the most desired outcome by. ‧ 國. 學. Beijing. The PRC could be content with something less than full unification. A system similar to that of what modern day Hong Kong has would be acceptable to Beijing in the modern era. This. ‧. system would still grant Taiwan an aura of independence while at the same time still being under the rule of the PRC.. y. Nat. sit. The evolution of Chinese policy regarding Taiwan‟s unification; going from being very staunch. al. er. io. in demanding full reunification to a more workable one state two system model has had great. n. influence on the Taiwanese voter. One way that China has pursued to influence the Taiwanese. Ch. i n U. v. voter is through the politicians in Taiwan. The best example would be that of former President. engchi. Lee Teng-hui. “In 1988, after Lee Teng-hui became the leader of the Taiwan authorities, he publicly stated time and again that the basic policy of the Taiwan authorities was that "there is only one China, not two.”10 Lee was the first popularly elected president in the ROC after the lifting of martial law, and as such there was a vast amount riding on Lee‟s election. China desperately desired to have a president that would be more inclined to Beijing‟s overtures win the election in 1996. Well the above quote and commentary may seem to support the notion that Lee would be the preferred candidate for Beijing, this was not the case. Lee, even though he was nominated by the KMT, turned into a divisive candidate rather quickly from the perspective of 9. (2000) White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, Taiwan Documents Project, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.htm accessed May 17, 2015 10 White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.. 18.

(19) Beijing. Beijing believed that Lee, if elected in 1996, would pursue and implement policies that would promote Taiwanese independence and a unique Taiwanese identity. Beijing‟s view of Lee can best be summarized as follows: “In ideology and culture, the Taiwan authorities have endeavored to obliterate the Chinese awareness of Taiwan compatriots, especially young people, and their identification with the motherland.”11 China could not accept a presidential candidate that had any potential of disrupting Beijing‟s one China policy. As such China attempted to sway influence on Taiwan‟s 1996 election through military force. China believed that any Taiwanese citizen voting for Lee Teng-hui in 1996 would be a vote against China and the eventual reunification of Taiwan. For many in Beijing, particularly in the People‟s Liberation Army (PLA), Lee‟s „pragmatic diplomacy‟ constituted „splittism‟ or. 政治大 Because of this belief China decided to pursue military action in order to influence Taiwanese 立. „disguised independence‟ and was a direct threat to the PRC‟s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. voters. This led to the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis. Well there is still debate as to China‟s actual. ‧ 國. 學. motives behind the crisis; it is safe to say that the Chinese military action had a decisive impact on the 1996 election. “Some viewed the exercise as motivated by Beijing‟s desire to influence. ‧. Taiwan‟s 1996 presidential elections-the first direct elections of a Chief of State in Chinese history.”12 The Straits Crisis is a pivotal point in China‟s relationship with Taiwan and how. y. Nat. sit. Beijing believed it could influence over Taiwan‟s elections.. al. er. io. Because of China‟s belief in the One China principle, Beijing believed that they were justified in. n. using the threat of violence to influence Taiwan‟s 1996 election. China maintains that any action. Ch. i n U. v. by China when it comes to dealing with Taiwan is a domestic issue; and the 1996 election was. engchi. by extension a domestic issue for Beijing. The historical significance of the 1996 election cannot be ignored either. This was the first time an open and democratic election was held in a Sino ethnic nation. This development in Taiwan of a democratic election was historically significant because it also represented a turning point in how the ruling KMT party treated elections. Since the KMT lifted martial law and instituted reforms, they took a risk of the Taiwanese electorate voting for non KMT candidates and parties. This happened in 2000 and again in 2004. This marked a shift in how the CCP dealt with Taiwan as well. Although the CCP believed, and still does to this day, that Taiwan is a part of China, they never the less realized the great. 11 12. White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.. 19.

(20) ramifications a direct democratic election could potentially have on the issue of reunification. This caused great stagnation in the CCP and led to the saber rattling of the third Taiwan Straits crisis. It speaks to the principle of China maintaining that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. China is willing to risk military confrontation over this principle.. III.. The Third Taiwan Straits Crisis. In order to fully appreciate the actions of China in the Third Taiwan Strait crisis it is important to first understand what transpired. “China conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait between July 1995 and March 1996.”. 13. These military tests. were a continuation of China‟s use of military coercion when it comes to Taiwan. The only. 政治大 too much to lose by allowing a more 立 independent leaning candidate to win the presidency. “The difference was that this time there was an election about to take place in Taiwan, and China had. military exercises of the summer of 1995 were meant to signal China‟s displeasure at the visit of. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui to the United States that June.”14 China was displeased that a presidential candidate, especially one with a chance of victory, would visit the United States.. ‧. From Beijing‟s perspective this represented a possible weakening of Beijing‟s legitimacy over. y. Nat. Taiwan. Lee was a very outspoken candidate when it came to the relationship between China and. sit. Taiwan. This represented new and untested ground for the PRC. They were concerned that a Lee. al. er. io. administration would take drastic steps that would further the separation of Taiwan from China.. v. n. Any potential separation or appearance of separation of Taiwan from China through electoral. Ch. i n U. means could not be tolerated by Beijing. This was a potential threat in Beijing‟s perspective that. engchi. had to be dealt with in a timely manner. As such, the government in China decided to use a show of force to attempt to sway Taiwanese voters to choose a candidate more amicable and receptive to Beijing. This was also meant to be a warning to Taiwanese politicians and political elites that there would be consequences for not agreeing with Beijing, and that said consequences could result in violence. China has always maintained this threat of force and said it reserves the right to use force to reunite with Taiwan. However, what makes the Third Taiwan Straits crisis different from the previous ones is the election.. 13. Scobell, Andrew. Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. http://iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/10091/scobell.pdf accessed online June 28, 2015 14 Scobell, 2. 20.

(21) After Beijing conducted the initial military tests in the straits, they continued with their military exercises and drills in order to send a clear message to Taiwan. “Further military exercises were conducted in mid-November to the south of the Strait, including joint operations involving air, land, and naval arms of the PLA.”15 China‟s goals in the Third Crisis were very clear. They wanted to send the message to Taiwanese voters that casting a vote for a candidate that the PRC did not have a favorable view of could be dangerous and have deadly consequences. “Clearly, China‟s decision to resort to military coercion was due largely to its rising concern that Taiwan‟s democratization and diplomatic offensives were rendering its strategy of national unification ineffective.”16 There was great amount of consternation in China when it came to the first open election for president. It was a litmus test for China and Chinese policy that had up until the. 政治大 crossroads when it came to how it was going to deal with the issue of Taiwan. Beijing believed 立 point of the first democratic election been geared toward unification. China now stood at a. that they needed to act in order to prevent what could possibly be the first of many elections in. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan that did not go their way. This resulted in a very direct show of force and was meant to intimidate the Taiwanese into voting a certain way. It was also meant as a deterrent to. ‧. international actors, such as the United States.. er. io. American and Taiwanese Response. sit. y. Nat. IV.. al. n. iv n C U outside actors causes great Beijing, Taiwan is domestic territory andhany e ninterference g c h i from. China believed that if it wanted to reunite with Taiwan, it must be done on Chinese terms. To concern in China. “The message for Washington was that Beijing was deadly serious about Taipei and was prepared to use force if necessary to unite Taiwan with China, American intervention notwithstanding.”17 The United States had a lot invested in the Taiwanese election as well. American policy towards Taiwan has always been one that favors stability across the Strait. This desire to see stability would lead the U.S. to favor the current status of the Taiwan Straits; namely maintaining the status quo. The first democratic election had influence on the U.S. and its often chaotic Taiwan policy. Ever since the U.S. decided to recognize Beijing as the 15. Scobell, 2 Yu, T. (1997) Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, PP 7-36. P. 8. 17 Scobell, 6. 16. 21.

(22) legitimate administrator of Taiwan the U.S. has still maintained close relations with Taipei. This has included sales of weapons to Taiwan to deter a possible Chinese attack on the island. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was also meant to show the U.S. that China was serious about its claim to administer Taiwan. China needed to send a clear message to the United States and other nations that any perceived assistance to Taiwan from the outside would be seen in a very negative light in Beijing and put China in a precarious position to attempt to solve the issue. China could not allow any perception of foreign interference in Taiwan. Foreign meddling in the Taiwan issue would be a blow to China‟s legitimacy of administration rights over Taiwan. China needs to avoid any international interference in Taiwan, especially when it comes to Taiwan‟s defense and elections in the island. By using the military drills in the Straits to show that China. 政治大 Taipei and Washington the extent it was willing to go to deal with Taiwan. 立. was serious about the use of force when it comes to the Taiwan issue, Beijing showed both. ‧ 國. 學. The United States initially did not want to use military force to respond to China‟s aggressive actions in the Third Straits Crisis. However, once the use of missiles by China was detected, the. ‧. U.S. believed that it had to act. “Initially the Clinton administration did not use force to defend U.S. policy against Chinese coercion. The missile tests, however, challenged the commitment of. sit. y. Nat. the United States.”18 As has been stated before, the United States has had the policy of desiring stability across the Taiwan Straits. That stability has been the priority of the U.S. when it comes. io. er. to dealing with China and Taiwan. However, when China made a direct use of force in an. al. n. iv n C h Chinese decided to use U.S. forces to deter further e n g aggression. c h i U From Washington‟s perspective, attempt to influence Taiwan‟s election and send a message to Washington; President Clinton. the U.S. had a duty to protect security partners in the region from Chinese aggression, and that included Taiwan.. The U.S. responded by sending warships into the arena. “Secretary of State Warren Christopher, accusing China of "reckless" military provocations against Taiwan that "smack of intimidation and coercion," announced Sunday that the United States is responding by moving warships closer to the island.”19 The United States could no longer tolerate Beijing‟s use of military force 18. Ross, R. S. (2000) The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force International Security vol. 25, No. 2 P. 89 19 Risen, James. (1996) U.S. Warns China on Taiwan, Sends Warships to Area. Los Angeles Times, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-11/news/mn-45722_1_taiwan-strait accessed July 25, 2015. 22.

(23) to try and influence Taiwan‟s domestic election. Washington also wanted to send a message to both China and Taiwan that Taiwan was worth defending. The aircraft carrier groups under the USS Nimitz and USS Independence were dispatched to Taiwan to show Beijing how gravely Washington took the situation. The U.S. also wanted to reassure the Taiwanese voter that Washington took any threat to Taiwan‟s democracy seriously and was willing to defend Taiwan. Because of the action taken by the United States in the Third Taiwan Straits crisis China eventually ceased military drills and actions in the Straits. One of China‟s main goals throughout the military actions was to attempt to influence Taiwan‟s 1996 election and show its disapproval of Lee Teng-hui. The results of the election showed that China failed in its goals. Taiwan not. 政治大. only elected Lee in the first democratic election in a Sino centric nation, showing China that it would not allow external pressure to influence Taiwanese elections; the United States also sent a. 立. message to China that foreign interference in Taiwan‟s elections would not be tolerated.. ‧ 國. 學. The third Taiwan Straits Crisis is a concrete example of China attempting to influence Taiwan‟s elections. In order to fully appreciate why China is so invested in influencing Taiwanese. ‧. elections it is important to fully understand the amount of legitimacy the CCP has invested in the Taiwan issue. One way of examining how the CCP has vested a substantial amount of legitimacy;. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. theories of Max Weber.. sit. and why China tries to influence Taiwan‟s elections, is to examine this legitimacy through the. V.. Ch. engchi. China’s Continued Claim of Legitimacy. i n U. v. Max Weber propagated his three theories of legitimacy in an essay originally published in 1922. In his essay Weber proposed three different types of rule that garner legitimacy with the ruled. Basically, the politicians and or government will employ three different forms of ruling to maintain their legitimacy. The Chinese Communist Party has used these three types of legitimacy as well in order to claim Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory. The issue of Taiwan is entrenched in the CCP‟s legitimacy. Weber‟s first form of legitimacy is legal authority. According to Weber, legal authority is “based on a system of rules that is applied administratively and judicially in accordance with known principles. The persons who administer those rules are appointed or elected by legal procedures. Superiors are also subject to rules that 23.

(24) limit their powers, separate their private lives from official duties and require written documentation.”20 When looking at Taiwan‟s role in international space as well as the CCP‟s continued insistence on its one China principle in the international arena; this form of legitimacy begins to become clearer. Taiwan once enjoyed this legal authority in the international community, but the situation has evolved since that time to a point where the international community by large recognizes China‟s claim over Taiwan. China will utilize this form of legitimacy to reinforce the claim that Taiwan must never be separated from China or Chinese identity. Weber‟s second form of legitimacy is called traditional authority. Traditional authority,. 治政 existed". People in power usually enjoy it because they have 大 inherited it. Officials consist either 立 of personal retainers (in a patrimonial regime) or of personal loyal allies, such as vassals or. according to Weber “is based on a system in which authority is legitimate because it "has always. ‧ 國. 學. tributary lords (in a feudal regime). Their prerogatives are usually similar to those of the ruler above them, just reduced in scale, and they too are often selected based on inheritance.”21 The. ‧. CCP uses this form of legitimacy in conjunction with legal authority. I will call this the fusion of traditional authority with legal characteristics. The CCP uses traditional Chinese characteristics. Nat. sit. y. to claim legitimacy in the eyes of the governed. And, according to CCP doctrine, since Taiwan is a part of China; this traditional authority extends over the island as well.. io. n. al. er. China has always been a society that has valued tradition and a continuation of authority. “China. i n U. v. is one of the oldest civilizations. There were twenty-five dynasties, and more than four hundred. Ch. engchi. kings or emperors. During the period of the last two and half millenniums, Chinese philosophers and political thinkers developed many elaborated and sophisticated theories of political legitimacy.”22 This system of governance is very important in Chinese society and especially when enforcing legitimacy. To the untrained eye, Chinese society may appear chaotic and dysfunctional, but everything in the society has a purpose. The issue of government is no exception to this rule. Traditional Chinese government has always relied on a bureaucratic system. Well this is not endemic to only China, after all governments all around the world tend. 20. Bendix, R. (1977) Max Weber: an intellectual portrait, University of California Press, p. 294 Bendix, 295. 22 Guo, BG. (2003) Political Legitimacy and Taiwan’s Transition, Journal of Chinese Political Science , vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2, p. 3 21. 24.

(25) to be bureaucratic and inefficient, the Chinese concept of order is unique. The CCP is well aware of this need for order and bureaucracy, and they have staked a large part of their legitimacy on establishing this traditional order, this traditional bureaucracy, over the people of China. This traditional appeal to legitimacy also extends to how the CCP views Taiwan as an integral part of China that cannot be separated from the greater whole no matter what. It is also for this reason that China exerts a vast amount of political and economic capital in an attempt to influence Taiwan‟s domestic policies and elections. The Chinese government strongly believes that because of this traditional authority over Taiwan, any attempt to influence elections in Taiwan is legitimate because Taiwan is a part of China. The CCP can play semantics with this form of legitimacy to solidify their claim over the jurisdiction. 政治大 One fruition that this principle of Taiwan belonging to China; and why the CCP invests heavily 立 of Taiwan.. in Taiwanese elections, is a phenomenon that shall be referred to as the “New Mandate of. ‧ 國. 學. Heaven”. According to scholar Guo Baogang, the “Mandate of Heaven” is “based on the following principles: heaven grants a ruler‟s right to rule; there is only one Heaven, therefore,. ‧. there can be only one ruler.”23 This historic approach to power is not necessarily a phenomenon unique to Chinese culture. However, when viewed in the light of Weber‟s theory of traditional. y. Nat. sit. legitimacy, this new Mandate of Heaven makes more sense on the claims of the CCP.. al. er. io. “Historically, legitimization of authority involved the use of abstract and religious ideas. The. n. notion that a ruler‟s right to govern is derived from a supernatural force is as old as human. Ch. i n U. v. civilization. Beginning in the West Zhou Dynasty, ancient Chinese emperors always legitimized. engchi. their political power by “tian” or Heaven.”24 CCP doctrine has always extended the party‟s legitimacy over Taiwan. Even though the CCP was founded on doing away with the “olds” (traditional culture) in China, it still follows the new Mandate of Heaven. The CCP will appeal to Chinese people‟s sense of culture and historical tradition in order to show that under the new Mandate of Heaven Taiwan should be seen as under the legitimacy of the CCP in Beijing. The CCP has been very successful in their public relations campaign as to date in their claim to Taiwan. They have international recognition as well as traditional authority on their side of the fence. Another way that the CCP, and by extension individuals within the CCP, invest legitimacy. 23 24. Guo, p. 4 Guo, p. 4. 25.

(26) in Taiwan is through charismatic authority. This is the third type of legitimacy propagated by Max Weber. According to Weber, charismatic authority “is based on the charisma of the leader, who shows that he possesses the right to lead by virtue of magical powers, prophecies, heroism, etc. His followers respect his right to lead because of his unique qualities (his charisma), not because of any tradition or legal rules. Officials consist of those who have shown personal devotion to the ruler, and of those who possess their own charisma.”25 This third and final type of legitimacy is also very important when it comes to the CCP‟s investment of legitimacy into the Taiwan issue. The issue of personal charisma and charm should not play any role at all in the politics of the People‟s Republic. After all, the elevation and charisma of one individual over the whole plays in the exact direction of what the party, and state, were founded on. Reality however. 政治大 are very important when it comes to building and investing legitimacy. Xi Jinping is a leader that 立 is a different matter. The charisma of leaders within the party, and by extension the party itself,. has developed a personal charisma. He has branded himself as the representation of the CCP, and. ‧ 國. 學. of all of China. When Xi speaks, whether he is talking about corruption or Taiwan, the people mist listen. Xi has developed this persona about him that is very similar to the one Mao Zedong. ‧. developed around him in the early years of the People‟s Republic. This shows that Xi has grand plans not only for himself, but for China as a whole. This planning and setting up a cult of. y. Nat. sit. personality affect Taiwan and how the Taiwanese perceive China. Because of the charisma of Xi. al. er. io. groups of Taiwanese; particularly those that have attachment to China, may vote for more. n. favorable China candidates in Taiwanese elections. Xi is, if you will, “spreading the Chinese. Ch. i n U. v. Gospel” by his actions and especially by establishing his personality in the media. This form of. engchi. charismatic legitimacy could influence how Taiwanese voters view China as a whole and by extension influence the candidate that they choose to cast their vote for. These three form of legitimacy propagated by Weber show how the CCP views Taiwan and how the CCP has invested a majority of its legitimacy in solving the Taiwan issue. These forms of legitimacy also extend to how the CCP attempts to influence Taiwan‟s elections. The CCP must exert influence on Taiwan‟s elections because it has invested too heavily in Taiwan and has rested the legitimacy of the CCP on solving the Taiwan issue. In conclusion it should be noted how China has taken an evolutionary approach to Taiwan and how to resolve the issue of Taiwan. Beginning with the founding of the People‟s Republic in 25. Bendix, p. 295. 26.

(27) 1949, reclaiming Taiwan has always been a priority for Beijing. China has however evolved in its approach to dealing with Taiwan. Beginning with a very staunch attitude towards Taiwan, Beijing has slowly evolved to a more patient one. This evolution has changed how China deals with Taiwan. The CCP is willing to play the waiting game when it comes to Taiwan and reunification. Beijing believes that economically there is only one way for Taiwan to go, and that is furthering reliance on China. Beijing simply has to wait for this reliance and dependence on the Mainland to come to full fruition. China no longer has to constantly threaten Taiwan with military force to achieve its objectives. China now uses economics and the promise of continued economic growth to attempt to win over influence in Taiwan.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 27. i n U. v.

(28) Chapter Three Taiwan’s Political Parties. Having established how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Taiwan and what methods China uses in an attempt to influence Taiwanese elections; it is important to analyze how the voters in Taiwan and how the two main political parties in Taiwan react to China‟s attempts to influence elections. There is, naturally, a considerable difference between the Kuomintang (KMT) led pan-blue coalition and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led pan-green coalition. Although in recent years, when faced with a rising China, the DPP has become more accepting of slightly closer relations with China; there is still no doubt that the DPP views China as. 政治大 led to apprehension about the future of Taiwan‟s political and economic system when it comes to 立 somewhat of a threat. This view of China as more of a threat than an opportunity by the DPP has. a rising China. This concern over China has become more prominent, especially in recent years. ‧ 國. 學. given the growing reliance of Taiwan‟s exports on the mainland; as well as the continued financial integration between the two sides. The DPP has continued to view mainland China as. ‧. more of a threat to Taiwan than an opportunity.. er. io. The Democratic Progressive Party. sit. y. Nat. I.. al. n. iv n C be skeptical of any KMT proposal. Thath being i UDPP administration that has ever e nsaid, g cthehonly. The DPP has its roots in historic opposition to the KMT. As such it is natural that the DPP would. been in power in Taiwan was that of Chen Shui-bian ; and Chen began his first term with a more conciliatory tone towards China. Chen‟s initial China policy can be described as one of pursuing peace and democracy. “Ever since May 2000, Taiwan‟s China policy of the Chen Shui-bian administration could be characterized by three pillars, which can be abbreviated as the DPP principle: democracy, peace, and prosperity.”26 This conciliatory approach did not come lightly. The DPP has as one of its core principles Taiwanese independence, or at the very least a separate identity from China. President Chen however realized that in order to promote peace and security. 26. Chen, Y.Y. (2005) The Evolution and Prospects of Cross-Strait Relations in the Chen Shui-Bian Administration, The Inistitute for Far Eastern Studies, p. 2. 28.

(29) across the Taiwan Strait he needed to have a more balanced approach when it came to China. The government in Beijing did not return the courtesy. China has always maintained that all parties in talks regarding the status of Taiwan must adhere to the One China principle. However, during the Chen administration China made minute concessions in an attempt to bolster the KMT. “In August, 2000 China went so far as to alter its definition of the One China principle in an attempt to bolster the Kuomintang after Chen Shuibian took office, with the Kuomintang handing over power.”27 The fact that the Chinese would be willing to make any small changes would be significant in and of itself. However, the fact that the PRC would make changes to attempt to benefit the KMT shows an evolution in PRC attitude. 政治大. towards Taiwan. This change in attitude reveals how the CCP has come to view the KMT as more of a opportunity instead of a challenge. “The new Chinese concept of “one China” is that,. 立. “There is only one China in the world, the Mainland and Taiwan are both parts of China, and. ‧ 國. 學. China‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be separated.”28 This showed a shift in the leadership of the PRC when it came to the issue of Taiwan and how best to deal with it.. ‧. Chen Shui-bian and China. sit. y. Nat. II.. al. er. io. When Chen came into office there was great unease in Beijing since Chen was the first DPP. n. president Taiwan elected. This resulted in Beijing taking a more pragmatic view towards the. Ch. i n U. v. KMT. Beijing began to come to the realization that when engaging Taiwan it was in their best. engchi. interests to have the KMT in political power. In the recent years of the Ma administration this has become even more true and a visible issue that the KMT must deal with. As such, when Chen assumed office, there was a slight evolution in Beijing‟s position when it came to the One China principle. To make inroads with the KMT and to show the disdain for the Chen administration China changed the principle from outright claiming “Taiwan is a part of China” to “China and Taiwan are both parts of China” in order to make it consistent with the expression once espoused by the Kuomintang that both sides should be treated as equals.”29 This shift in 27. Matsuda, Y. (2004) PRC-Taiwan Relations under Chen Shui-bian’s Government: Continuity and Change Between the First and Second Terms, The Brookings Institute, Pg. 3 28 Matsuda, p. 3 29 Matsuda, p. 3,4. 29.

(30) rhetoric was directed at Chen and the DPP. China did not want the DPP to hold any political power over Taiwan, and this minor shift in policy was one way in which Beijing believed it could show its willingness to accept KMT, and only KMT, political power. President Chen believed that his moderated position towards China would be accepted by Beijing. However, after it was clear that China would not accept a DPP administration Chen began to harden his stance towards Beijing. “In August 2002 Chen Shui-bian used the characterization “one country on each side” (yi bian yi guo) to describe cross-Strait relations.”30 This declaration by Chen showed how that he believed that Taiwan and China were separate. This change in attitude resulted after his overtures were repeatedly rejected by Beijing. This type. 政治大. of treatment of Chen by China revealed that China would only accept KMT power and any DPP administration would be pushed further towards a more Taiwan independence stance. This. 立. changing of the Chen administration‟s stance on China came about as a direct result of the CCP‟s. ‧ 國. 學. treatment of Chen and his young administration. Because of China‟s strict ideology and unwillingness to meet Chen halfway, this led to Chen embracing and advocating a more. ‧. independence oriented cross strait policy. This change in attitude by Chen and the DPP shows how the party evolved in its dealing with China and how China was solidified as more of a threat. sit. y. Nat. than an opportunity for the DPP. The laissez-fare attitude that Chen came into office with regarding China was quickly replaced with a more hardened, staunch response once it was clear. io. al. n. administration.. er. that China; at least politically and diplomatically, was not willing to engage a DPP. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. With President Chen‟s initial overtures towards Beijing rejected by the government in China; Chen became increasingly more determined to push for Taiwanese independence and full international recognition. Chen did this in a way that was consistent with not overtly provoking Beijing; however there was still a shift in attitude when it came to China. It is true to say that there was a shift in attitude, but there was also a cautious approach as to how to implement the desired changes the DPP wanted, all done with great care as to not provoke a hardened response from China. This evolution of policy for Chen was more in line with the historical understanding of Taiwan that the DPP has. “In the DPP‟s party charter, ratified in 1991, there is a clause. 30. Lu, Yan. (2001) Minjindang zhizheng yu haixia liang’an guanxi, Taiwan yanjiu, Peking, No. 3, p. 38. 30.

(31) advocating the development of Taiwan as an independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan”31 For Chen to begin his administration with overtures towards China went against the history and fundamental principles of the DPP. After he was rejected by China he became more staunchly independent. This rejection by Beijing also helped ensure that the DPP would not be an acceptable political party that China would deal with when it came to the issue of Taiwan. China would only be content with a KMT administration, and even if the KMT was the party in power there would still be certain conditions that would have to be met in order to placate Beijing.. III.. Business, Chen and China. 政治大. Given the fact that China was very skeptical of a DPP president; and that the CCP attempted to. 立. ostracize President Chen, it should still be noted that the Chinese government still attempted to. ‧ 國. 學. use economics to attract Taiwan. This was part of the Hu regime‟s continued evolution on Taiwan and how best to reunite with Taiwan. China offered many benefits to the 台商 taishang,. ‧. the Taiwanese businesspeople working in China. The Chinese government believed that they could use these taishang to direct politics back in Taiwan, even though the island was under DPP. sit. y. Nat. rule. “Even during the Chen Shui-bian era, Hu‟s Taiwan policy included offers such as loans reserved only for taishang, direct Charter flights across the Taiwan Strait, duty-free agricultural. io. er. imports from Taiwan to the mainland, etc.”32 During the early years of Chen was when the “three. al. n. iv n C U in many Taiwanese of easing business restrictions across thehTaiwan i assisted e n gStrait c hand. mini links” between China and Taiwan were established as well. These links served the purpose. businesspeople setting up operations in China. These links also were used for political purposes as well by China in an attempt to lure the taishang into setting up more operations in the mainland. China‟s policy at the time of the DPP may seem on the surface to be contradictory. On the one hand Beijing is very anxious about a DPP president. Politically, China was very cold and sometimes openly hostile towards Taiwan under the DPP. On the economic side of things China can be seen as treating Taiwan very well. This was all part of the Hu strategy in China to “use 31. Ding, A. S. (2013) Turning tension around in the Taiwan Strait; Taiwan Policy under Hu Jintao Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Pg. 2 32 Keng, Schubert, p. 295. 31.

(32) people to pressure officials, and use business to constrain the government” (yimin biguan, yishang weizheng).33 This was a strategy employed by Beijing in the hopes of luring these taishang to the Mainland for political purposes. While the Taiwanese business were opening up plants and shifting a vast majority of production and R&D from Taiwan to China, the Beijing government was hoping that there would be political benefits as well. This desired political benefit was to flow from Taiwanese businesspeople using their influence in business to carry that influence into the political realm. China believed that allowing track II individuals; those without official ties to government, to benefit from increased relations with China, the government of Taiwan would have to eventually listen. The track II individuals and entities would lead the track I individuals and entities in the state towards closer relations with China. All of these business. 政治大 goal; the eventual reunification of Taiwan with that of Greater China. For this reason many 立. benefits and incentives that China used to lure the taishang into the mainland had one ultimate. Taiwanese voters in Taiwan who support the DPP tend to not have a very high opinion of doing. ‧ 國. 學. business with China.. ‧. IV.. Beijing’s Response. sit. y. Nat. The two-pronged approach China took during the DPP administration of Chen Shui-bian showed. io. er. how China has become more pragmatic when dealing with Taiwan. There were many in the. al. n. iv n C U business and enterprise business. Business would have a windfall hofeprofits h iTaiwanese n g conce. business community that saw the opening up of China as an advantage when it came to doing. could access the mainland. It is safe to argue that China took the approach of the famed. economist Frederic Bastiat who said “when goods cannot cross borders, armies will”. The spirit of Bastiat‟s quote would show the idea that trade and commerce helps prevent military aggression between nations. China, however, also likes to use trade for political and military purposes. During the Chen administration this was particularly obvious. Chinese leadership made the conscientious decision to shift the attitude and approach employed when dealing with Taiwan. There was still the constant threat of force, and the leadership in China has always. 33. Keng, Schubert, p. 296. 32.