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and give them to Tsai Ing-wen; something unlikely since Soong was also a Pan-Blue candidate, she still would not have exceeded 49% of the vote. She did well in southern Taiwan though. The south of Taiwan is considered a Democratic Progressive Party stronghold because the area has more people who view themselves as Taiwanese in the south of the island. The south of Taiwan has always been an area that votes against the KMT.
The Democratic Progressive Party is certainly considered the minority party in Taiwan. It is the second largest in terms of size. It is, however, still vastly overshadowed by its main rival, the Kuomintang. Because of the shorter history that the DPP has, the lack of resources it has, it is not hard to imagine why this would contribute to Tsai Ing-wen losing the election. The DPP had less capital to spend on promoting Tsai; as such it is easier to understand why she lost. Imagine going to work every day and seeing twenty different campaign signs for President Ma versus seeing only one or two for Tsai. The DPP, in its existence, is major contributing factor to why Tsai lost.
The DPP is still conducting itself as a minority party. Even though they are a minority party, they do not seem to have the willpower to overcome this status. It is almost as if the DPP has become so accustomed to disagreeing just for the sake of it (in Taiwan some Kuomintang supporters, and one of my interviewees, say that the DPP disagrees just to disagree, (民進黨老是為了反對而反 對). The DPP needs to take charge of its future and debate the KMT more so on the issues than on personal politics. While I believe that Tsai did her best to try and accost Ma on issues that affect Taiwan and not just the DPP, her voice was overtaken by other DPP personal campaigning for her. If the DPP continues to see itself as representing only party backers instead of all of Taiwan they will continue to lose elections in the future.
II. The 1992 Consensus
Given the basic background of the Democratic Progressive Party and a general idea of the election results for the 2012 presidential election, we can begin to understand the reasons why Tsai Ing-wen did not fare better. One of the main reasons was that Tsai Ing-wen, supposedly, denied the 1992 Consensus or reinterpreted this 1992 Consensus (九二共識). The 1992 Consensus was, as the name suggests, a consensus reached between the People‟s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). What the consensus states is that there is only one
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China, and both China and Taiwan are a part of China. While both sides agree that there is only one China, they disagree as to which government represents that one China. This is a very purposefully ambiguous definition of China. It is ambiguous on purpose because neither side recognizes each other, but both claim to represent all of China. This Consensus also shuts down any debate about an independent Taiwan. 海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義
有所不同；臺灣固為中國之一部分，但大陸亦為中國之一部分.42This quote from the Chinese
news service Xinhua says “The Cross-Strait relations committee both supports and agrees on the One China Policy, but each side differs on their definition of this policy. Taiwan is a part of China, but the Mainland is still considered a part of China.” While not everyone agrees with the signing of the 1992 Consensus, especially the Democratic Progressive Party, it has been an important part of Cross-Strait relations since 1992. Even President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan‟s first DPP president, accepted the 1992 Consensus. Most Taiwanese citizens have been
comfortable with the consensus because it keeps the government in mainland China mollified while also continuing the de facto independence Taiwan enjoys. This status quo is important to the citizenry because it keeps the issue of independence versus reunification at a distance and allows people to keep living their lives undisturbed for the most part. Well this may be seen having the “kicking the can down the road” attitude, it keeps most Taiwanese placated.
According to the Republic of China‟s official government website: “At the heart of the 1992 consensus is the concept of "one China, respective interpretations." It is clear that as far as we are concerned, "one China" is the Republic of China stipulated in the ROC Constitution.”43 The ROC government believes that the consensus strengthens their constitutional validity in regards to being the representatives of China. While I believe that the consensus is ambiguous on purpose since both the ROC and PRC can claim that the consensus strengthens their respective positions, the official government position in the ROC is that there is no ambiguity when it comes to the interpretation of the consensus. “There has never been any "ambiguity" or
42 “九二共識,” 新華網, http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2006-04/05/content_4385932.htm accessed May 29, 2015
43 The 1992 Consensus: Foundation for Cross-Strait Peace and Stronger International Links, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canada (2011, September 7)
http://www.roc-taiwan.org/CA/ct.asp?xItem=219017&ctNode=150&mp=77&nowPage=4&pagesize=15 accessed May 29, 2015
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"concession of sovereignty" regarding the concept of "one China" in the 1992 consensus. To support the 1992 consensus is to support the Republic of China, and to support the ROC Constitution.”44 The official government position leaves no doubt about the importance of the consensus and how the consensus affects politics in Taiwan. When the debate is already framed in a way that shuts down any potential questioning or suspect in regards to the consensus and what it means for Taiwan. One of the purposes of the consensus was to make sure there would be no debate about an independent Taiwan. The government at the time under the KMT came to this consensus to shut down speculation or official discourse on the issue of Taiwanese independence. They also ingrained the consensus with the ROC constitution.
After the election results became known, Xiao Shixin 蕭師信, a reputable political commentator at the 中華日報, The Chinese Daily, offered these comments as to why Tsai Ing-wen lost the election. 如果蔡英文打內政牌，在兩岸關係方面稍具彈性，應該是很有勝算的。但是，她 堅決否認“九二共識”，使選戰的焦點從內政轉為兩岸關係，馬蔡幾次辯論也集中在兩岸 關係上。45This journalist said that “if Tsai Ing-wen had focused more on domestic issues, and a little less on Cross-Strait issues, she would have had a strong case to make. However, she
(allegedly) denied the 1992 consensus, and moved the focus of the election away from domestic issues and moved it towards Cross-Strait relations, most of the debates that Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen had also focused on cross-strait relations.” Xiao Shixin hit the nail on the head when he said that Tsai had the upper hand on domestic issues. If she had focused on domestic issues and shied away from cross-strait relations, the results of the election might have been different. In fact, during one of the presidential debates President Ma asked Tsai Ing-wen if she would comment on Taiwanese independence.46 Tsai did not give an answer. She understood that if she maintained her position of independence it would alienate the majority of Taiwanese voters who want to maintain the status quo; de facto independence. It would possibly provoke China, and if Tsai were to be elected, it could impair her relations with China. To try and understand how important this consensus is to the political stability of Taiwan, one could compare the consensus to some important document in US history, such as the Constitution.
44 Taipei and Economic Cultural Office in Canada
45分析稱蔡英文落敗關鍵因堅決否認九二共識.”敏捷新聞, http://cn.agile-news.com/news-555109.html accessed May 24, 2015
46分析稱蔡英文落敗關鍵因堅決否認九二共識
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While to compare the 1992 consensus to the US Constitution is a bit of a stretch, it is important to realize that if someone were to deny the US Constitution, they would be seen as unpatriotic in the US political landscape. Likewise, a candidate denying the 1992 Consensus in Taiwan is seen as very suspicious. Tsai Ing-wen claimed that she never denied the consensus, but that she supported a “Taiwanese consensus” which took parts of the 1992 Consensus and added
important factors such as strong pro-independence language. Regardless of whether or not Tsai Ing-wen denied the consensus the damage was done to her campaign and she would not recover from that point.
Tsai Ing-wen herself said that she has never denied the 1992 Consensus. Tsai believes in a Taiwanese consensus instead of the 1992 Consensus. What she, and the DPP, believes is that Taiwan is already an independent nation. They also believe that when Taiwan and China hold diplomatic conferences that China should treat Taiwan as an independent nation. This is part of what the DPP calls the “Taiwanese consensus”. This position is highly controversial, especially to the majority of older Taiwanese. The older generation came with their parents and relatives to Taiwan after China was taken over by the Communists under Mao. When the DPP and Tsai scream at the top of their lungs for a Taiwanese consensus, many of these older Taiwanese feel somewhat uncomfortable. They still view China as home and want both sides to work for a peaceful solution to the China-Taiwan independence issue. Because Ma used Tsai‟s issues with the 1992 Consensus and her own Taiwanese consensus, many voters were distracted and preferred Ma over Tsai. And even that preference for Ma over Tsai could be seen as simply preferring stability and knowing what Taiwan already head in President Ma versus what could possibly happen under a hypothetical Tsai presidency. The older generation also has the majority of wealth in Taiwan. These factors, combined with others, ensured Tsai Ing-wen‟s defeat in the election.
It can be argued that the results of the 2012 presidential election solidify the Taiwanese electorate‟s acceptance of the 1992 consensus. Since President Ma was reelected and the
consensus was such a hot button issue in the campaigning it can be inferred that the electorate in Taiwan is more or less comfortable with the consensus and that they want to maintain the status quo, much to the chagrin of the DPP base. The 1992 consensus can also be seen as being more representative of overall cross strait stability.
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The electorate in Taiwan may not have known exactly what the 1992 consensus actually meant at the time of the election; however it may be seen as simply representing cross-strait stability.47 People in Taiwan wanted to continue the stability under President Ma that was once lost under former President Chen. Most Taiwanese did not enjoy the undercurrent of a threat from China during Chen‟s two terms. When Ma was elected in 2008, there was more stability returned to the cross straits and the electorate awarded Ma a second term for this perceived stability. “Therefore, it would be more accurate to say that Ma‟s win is an endorsement of cross-strait stability,
whereas Tsai fails to convince people that she can.”48 The electorate wanted a more stable relationship with China and thus awarded President Ma a second term in office. The 1992 Consensus and issues surrounding it did not go away in 2012. The consensus still plays a pivotal role in Taiwanese politics to this day and will play a role in the 2016 election. This will be developed further when the 2016 election will be discussed.