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Taiwan has always had investments in China. However, this was greatly increased with China‟s economic liberalization policies. After China adopted its Open Door Policy in 1979, Taiwan‟s trade with the mainland increased dramatically. Once China decided to reform its own domestic market and open up to foreign investments there was a flood of investment into China. This was particularly true of Western, namely American, investment. With the United States having global hegemony in the post WWII era there was a push by many in the U.S. to establish an
international system of trade and investment. This resulted in investment into Japan, then Taiwan and other Asian tigers, and eventually to China. Once Taiwan had reached a certain development point the trade with China expanded. This was also due to the fact that both countries have a shared history and ethnic background. Taiwanese investors had an advantage over their foreign counterparts when it came to doing business in China. The shared customs and traditions that Taiwan and China share proved to be an asset for the Taiwanese business community. Because of these shared similarities in was much more conducive for the Taiwanese business community to invest in China. These shared similarities also influence the legal and regulatory environment in China. Having the same regulatory customs and culture allowed Taiwanese businesspeople easier access when navigating the market as well.
VII. KMT: China is an Opportunity
One of the other allures that the Chinese market offered the KMT was the allure of investing in what many within the KMT saw as their homeland. The ethnic connection that the KMT has with China made it much easier to starting up operations in the mainland. This was in part because the KMT, even to this day, views its home as China. “Even today, both parties hold to the “one China” principle. The CCP sees the elimination of the ROC as unfinished business, and the KMT — and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) — claims that the territory of the ROC also includes China.”39 Because of this Chinese nationalist sentiment that is so prominent in the KMT and pan-blue political parties, there is a tangible connection to the mainland of China. This connection that the KMT has with China extends into how they see the mainland. The KMT believes that China is an asset to be used in the development of Taiwan‟s economy. The Chinese
39 KMT, CCP Both See Their Home in China, Taipei Times (2013, October 21)
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2013/10/21/2003574998 accessed May 28, 2015
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market is the second largest on the planet, soon to become the first. Because Taiwan has already reached a certain stage in economic development, it must begin to look for investment
opportunities abroad and one major opportunity is China. Having access to the vast market that is the PRC would, in theory, be a boon for Taiwan‟s economic development. For this reason the KMT has been very vocal and active it their support for increased trade ties with China. In recent years however the KMT has had to temper their support for increased economic ties to China against a public that is increasingly skeptical of ties with Beijing. However, the vast majority of KMT and pan-blue supporters still view China as an opportunity more so than a threat.
The allure of China‟s market proved to be too tempting of a target for the Taiwanese business community. This was a shift from the Lee era policy. Under President Lee there was trepidation when it came to investing into the Mainland. This was largely due to the fact that Lee was not the typical KMT president. There was initial trepidation at the idea of doing business with China, especially since China has consistently threatened Taiwan. However through the evolution of Taiwan‟s young democracy the KMT began to take a more open attitude when it came to China and Taiwan‟s economic development. The ultimate expression of Taiwan and China‟s growing economic interaction is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Signed in 2010, this pact between China and Taiwan increased trade and economic integration between the two sides. This agreement represented an important milestone in the KMT‟s policy evolution.
The KMT government of Ma was now willing to grant China greater access to Taiwan and further the interaction between the two sides. This agreement shows how the KMT views China as an opportunity. It also shows the steps the government is taking to increase relations between the two. ECFA was a central issue in the 2012 presidential election in Taiwan and will be dissected later on in light of the 2012 election. ECFA showed how serious the KMT was in promoting economic interaction across the strait and what concrete steps it would take to ensure the continued economic cooperation between China and Taiwan. Although ECFA remains controversial to this day it was never the less a major victory for the KMT and those that view China as an economic opportunity.
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Case study: The 2012 Election
The January 14, 2012 presidential election in Taiwan was carried by the Kuomintang Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou. With over 74% of the nation turning out to vote40 it is
surprising that the opposition candidate Tsai wen did not receive more of the vote. Tsai Ing-wen was met with a great deal of opposition during the 2012 presidential election, and there are a plethora of reasons as to why she lost the election. Of the many reasons that led to Tsai Ing-wen‟s defeat during the election, this chapter will examine a few prominent cases and examples.
Thorough the examination of these factors and reasons I will show how Tsai met a “perfect storm” of factors that contributed to her defeat and a KMT victory. Through these examples the reader will see how the election was won by the KMT as well as what were the reasons that the DPP and Tsai lost. It will also show the evolution of issues and issue based voting made a Tsai victory impossible, even though during the campaign Tsai and Ma were very close in the polling data.
I. Background
The Democratic Progressive Party gained the presidency in 2000 and again in 2004, they however lost the presidency in 2008. Ma Ying-jeou was elected in 2008 and reelected in 2012.
Ma had two challengers in the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen and a third party candidate, James Soong. Ma Ying-jeou won the election with 51.6% of the vote, or 6,991,139 votes. Tsai Ing-wen came in second with 45.6% of the vote, or 6,093,578 votes. James Soong received 2.77% of the popular vote which translates to 369,588 individuals voting for him.41 The results of the election indicate that Tsai Ing-wen lost by a large margin, much larger than
expected. Although President Ma only captured slightly more than half the vote, Tsai barely made it past forty-five percent. Even if you were to take all of the votes James Soong received
40 President of Taiwan Is Re-elected, a Result That Is Likely to Please China, The New York Times, (2012, January 14) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/asia/taiwan-presidential-election.html?_r=3&hp accessed March 30, 2015
41中選會公布第 13 任總統副總統及第 8 屆立法委員選舉選舉人數,” General Election Commission 中央選舉委 員會, http://web.cec.gov.tw/files/15-1000-17863,c4133-1.php accessed May 14, 2015
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and give them to Tsai Ing-wen; something unlikely since Soong was also a Pan-Blue candidate, she still would not have exceeded 49% of the vote. She did well in southern Taiwan though. The south of Taiwan is considered a Democratic Progressive Party stronghold because the area has more people who view themselves as Taiwanese in the south of the island. The south of Taiwan has always been an area that votes against the KMT.
The Democratic Progressive Party is certainly considered the minority party in Taiwan. It is the second largest in terms of size. It is, however, still vastly overshadowed by its main rival, the Kuomintang. Because of the shorter history that the DPP has, the lack of resources it has, it is not hard to imagine why this would contribute to Tsai Ing-wen losing the election. The DPP had less capital to spend on promoting Tsai; as such it is easier to understand why she lost. Imagine going to work every day and seeing twenty different campaign signs for President Ma versus seeing only one or two for Tsai. The DPP, in its existence, is major contributing factor to why Tsai lost.
The DPP is still conducting itself as a minority party. Even though they are a minority party, they do not seem to have the willpower to overcome this status. It is almost as if the DPP has become so accustomed to disagreeing just for the sake of it (in Taiwan some Kuomintang supporters, and one of my interviewees, say that the DPP disagrees just to disagree, (民進黨老是為了反對而反 對). The DPP needs to take charge of its future and debate the KMT more so on the issues than on personal politics. While I believe that Tsai did her best to try and accost Ma on issues that affect Taiwan and not just the DPP, her voice was overtaken by other DPP personal campaigning for her. If the DPP continues to see itself as representing only party backers instead of all of Taiwan they will continue to lose elections in the future.