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11. China and the Arctic Council
In 2004, China was approached by Iceland in order to solicit interest in joining the Arctic Council. Iceland’s Senior Arctic Official and then-chairman of the Arctic Council, Gunnar Palsson, who was a vigorous promoter of the global importance of the Arctic, traveled to Beijing and met with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Willis & Depledge, 2014). Palsson wanted to gauge whether or not China would be interested in applying for observership in the young council. Shortly after this trip by Palsson, China began actively seeking observership in the Council.
11.1 Ad-hoc observer: 2007-2013
China applied to be an observer to the Council in 2006. Since the Council could not reach consensus on accepting all applications for observership, China was granted ad-hoc observership starting in 2007 (Yao, 2013).15 After gaining ad-hoc observership, China began actively participating in the Council’s affairs. China sent three representatives to the 2007 Senior Arctic Officials meeting in Norway, with Gou Haibo of the MFA Department of Law and Treaty assigned as China’s Senior Arctic Official (AC, 2007).
China’s participation in SAO meetings has continued every year, with the PRC sending groups ranging from one to seven to attend the semi-annual meetings. Chinese representatives also attended the 2010 and 2011 meetings of the AMAP working group (Jiang, 2014). China sent two representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Deputy Ministerial Meetings, the second highest-level Council meetings, in May and November 2012.
At the most important Arctic Council meeting, the biannual Ministerial Meeting, China has attended since 2009, each time sending an ambassador accompanied by officials from the MFA Department of Law and Treaty. The PRC sent a large delegation to the 2009 ministerial meeting in Norway, led by Gao Jian, the then-PRC Ambassador to Norway (AC, 2009c). At the 2011 ministerial meeting in Greenland, the PRC only sent one representative. At the 2013 ministerial meeting, there were two Chinese representatives,
15 The application of China was a non-issue to the Council members. The most divisive issue was whether to allow the EU to join as a permanent observer. Canada was staunchly opposed to the EU joining due to their ban on the selling of sealskins, which Canadian aboriginals depend on for their livelihood. Since the Council could not come to agreement, all of the applicants were accepted as ad-hoc observers.
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led by Gao Feng, the MFA’s special representative for climate change16 and well as Shi Wuhong from the MFA Department of Law and Treaty (AC, 2013e).
Attending AC meetings, Chinese representatives have so far limited themselves to listening to meeting proceedings. Seldom do Chinese representatives offer public comments or suggestions during official Council proceedings.
11.2 Building relations with Arctic states
Once China was given ad-hoc observer status, it began courting the Arctic states in a bid to increase its chances of being admitted as a permanent observer. China began consciously building its bilateral relations with the Arctic states after 2007. Pushing for permanent observership to the Council, China held bilateral meetings regarding Arctic affairs with Canada (2008), Norway (2009 & 2010), the United States (2010, 2011 &
2012), Finland (2011), Iceland (2012), and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with their Russian counterparts to discuss Arctic affairs in 2012 (Jiang, 2014).
Russia and China have begun Arctic cooperation by developing Arctic offshore resources; China National Petroleum Corporation and the Russian Sovcomflot Group have signed an agreement covering the shipment of hydrocarbons to China through the Northeast Sea Route (Blank, 2010). Still, Russia’s support for Chinese entry into the Council has been described as “ambivalent”; in July 2011, Russia said that it did not “in principle” oppose China’s application (Jian, 2012).
Not finding support for its bid with the major Arctic powers, China instead turned its focus to the Nordic countries. In 2012, then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the Prime Minister of Iceland held bilateral talks on Arctic issues and signed two bilateral agreements: the Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation between the Chinese and Icelandic governments, and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Marine and Polar Science and Technology (Jiang, 2014). After Premier Wen’s 2012 trip, the Prime Minister of Iceland voiced her support for China’s accession to the Council as permanent observer (Jian, 2012). In 2014, the Government of Iceland gave Chinese state-owned oil company CNOOC license to drill for oil off its northeastern
16 Title in Chinese: 外交部气候变化谈判特别代表.
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coast (Johannesson, 2014). China has built financial ties with Denmark in recent years.
Two Chinese companies invested in mineral sites in Southern Greenland in 2009. After Chinese interest in developing the resources of Greenland, Denmark’s constituent country, the Danish government expressed support for China’s entry into the Arctic Council. In October 2011, Denmark’s ambassador to China stated that China has “natural and legitimate economic and scientific interests in the Arctic” (Martina, 2011). The Premier of Greenland announced in November 2011 that Greenland “would like to see China as a permanent observer” to the Council (Kleist, 2011). China also got the support of Sweden for its Council bid in 2011 (Jian, 2012).
Capping the partnership with the Nordic countries was the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre, a research institute dedicated to Arctic studies, which was inaugurated in 2013 partnering Chinese scientists with scientists from all five Nordic countries. The flurry of Chinese Nordic diplomacy after 2007 paid off. By 2013, China had earned the support of all the Nordic countries in their bid for permanent observership.
11.3 PRC admitted as Permanent Observer: 2013
After several years of participation, China was formally accepted as an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013. Gao Feng, who led the PRC delegation to the 2013 ministerial meeting in Kiruna, said as a result of the decision, “China will get to know the Arctic better, and then it is able to join effectively international cooperation” (Chen, 2013). With its formal acceptance in 2013, China will interact more with the Council regarding Arctic governance.
China was admitted as an observer in 2013, the year that Canada took over the chairmanship of the Council. Canadian and Chinese interests in the Arctic overlap in many areas, including marine scientific research, Arctic regulation and the regulation of maritime shipping and Canada’s chairmanship offered a good opportunity to voice its opinion on Arctic cooperation. Moreover, Canada likely wants to secure Chinese support in their dispute with the United States over the Beaufort Sea maritime boundary.
Canada’s desire for China’s support in their dispute with the United States was a likely factor in admitting China to the Council in 2013 (Wodiske, 2014).
After China was admitted as a permanent observer in 2013, Chinese officials have generally kept to reassuring statements about issues that have worried the international
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community, specifically the territorial sovereignty of Arctic States. Gao Feng has tried to counter several voices within China that believe there is a looming territorial war as well as foreign suspicion of Chinese Arctic intentions. Much of the suspicions of the international community regarding China’s entry into the Arctic stems from the fact that the Chinese government has not officially published its Arctic strategy. Current suspicions will likely continue until Beijing publishes such a document. In an attempt to assuage some of these concerns, speaking with Xinhua shortly after China was admitted as a permanent observer, Gao stressed that the Arctic is not unclaimed territory (“北极不 是无主之地”), thus there should be no worries about Chinese incursions into the region (Yao, 2013).
Becoming an observer to the Council is a successful step forward for China’s foreign policy. Establishing a position in the regime was a high priority action for China’s Arctic strategy, and will give China more influence in the direction of the Council in the future.
Chen Lianzeng, Vice-Minister of the SOA, gave some insight into China’s planned polar objectives for the years 2011-2015. China’s 12th 5-year plan included targets of deepening knowledge of the impacts of climate change on the polar regions, expanding exploration programs and taking an active role in polar affairs and strengthening China’s strategic position. In order to achieve these goals, Chen stressed the need to make breakthroughs in both soft and hard power (Pan, 2009). Becoming a permanent observer to the Arctic Council in 2013 was surely a success in this regard.