北極理事會形成的研究：加拿大的領導和中國的反應 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s 治政 Thesis. 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 北極理事會形成的研究：加拿大的領導和中國的反應. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. Ch. engchi. i n U. Student: Stephen Smith Advisor: Prof. Yuan I. 中華民國 104 年 7 月 July 2015. v.

(2) 北極理事會形成的研究：加拿大的領導和中國的反應 A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response 研究生：史智文. Student: Stephen Smith. 指導教授：袁易. Advisor: Prof. Yuan I. 政治大. 國立政治大學. 立. 學. ‧ 國. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程碩士論文. ‧. io. y. sit. Nat. A Thesis. n. al. er. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. Ch. i n U. v. e n g c University hi National Chengchi In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 104 年 7 月 July 2015.

(3) Acknowledgments This thesis is dedicated to my parents, whose constant support made my life in Taiwan possible for the past several years, as well as my sister, who is my constant source of inspiration and positivity. I’d like to thank my advisor, Professor Yuan Yi, who gave me the initial idea for this topic as well as his constant support this semester. His advice proved invaluable during the initial stages of my research. I’d also like to thank my committee members, Professor Dustin Wang of NTNU and Professor Alex Chiang of NCCU for. 政治大 to thank the faculty and staff at NCCU for all of their help, especially Grace, 立. their generosity in agreeing to be my committee members. I would also like one of the hardest working people I know. Finally, I’d like to thank. ‧ 國. 學. Veronica, who has been a never-ending source of support for the past two. ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. years.. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v.

(4) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. Abstract Thirty years ago the Arctic was a desolate region marked by territorial disputes, mutual suspicion between regional powers, and a complete lack of international cooperation. Today, the Arctic has become a hotbed of cooperation with a mosaic of international regimes governing regional affairs. The Arctic Council has emerged as the most important regime governing Arctic affairs. How did this transformation take place? This thesis argues that middle powers are crucial to regime formation. It examines the. 政治大 several Canadian individual leaders acted collectively to bring together the 立. role that Canada played in the formation of the Arctic Council. It finds that. Arctic states and overcome initial resistance in forming the Arctic Council.. ‧ 國. 學. This study shows that middle powers have the ability to significantly. ‧. influence regime formation. The second part of this thesis will examine China’s response to the Arctic Council. By surveying the statements of. Nat. sit. y. Chinese Arctic officials, it finds that China’s emerging Arctic strategy is to. er. io. continually stress adherence to international law in Arctic affairs to assuage. n. concerns about China’s a Arctic activities while at vthe same time advocating. l. i. C h role in Arctic for a greater decision-making U n governance for non-Arctic engchi. states. An analysis of China’s response to the Arctic Council also reveals three key findings of China’s Arctic cooperation: China’s response in relation to its status as an “outsider” to Arctic affairs, China’s support for the Arctic Council’s transformation from soft law to hard law, and China’s view on Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. Key words: Arctic, Arctic Council, Canada, middle power, leadership, regime theory, China, governance, sovereignty. iv.

(5) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 2. Hypothesis and Methodology ......................................................................................... 3 3. Regime Theory: Approaches to Understanding Regimes ............................................... 5 3.1 Neo-realism and power-based sources of regime formation .................................... 5 3.2 Institutionalism and interest-based sources of regime formation ............................. 7 3.3 Cognitivism and knowledge-based sources of regime formation ............................. 9 3.4 Contextual factors ................................................................................................... 10 3.5 Causal mix .............................................................................................................. 11 4. The Arctic ..................................................................................................................... 12 5. The Lead Up to the Arctic Council: 1987-1996 ........................................................... 14 5.1 Finland’s Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy .............................................. 15 5.2 The Canadian Initiative part 1: Pressure from below ............................................. 16 5.3 The Canadian Initiative Part 2: Official negotiations ............................................. 19 6. The Arctic Council is Established: 1996 ...................................................................... 21 6.1 Regime structure ..................................................................................................... 22 6.2 Regime governance................................................................................................. 24 7. The Arctic Council Transforms: Soft Law to Hard Law .............................................. 28 7.1 2011 SAR Agreement ............................................................................................. 30 7.2 2013 Oil Pollution Agreement ................................................................................ 32 7.3 Soft law to hard law ................................................................................................ 33 8. Canadian Leadership and the Arctic Council ............................................................... 34 8.1 Individual leadership in the Arctic Council’s formation ........................................ 35 8.2 Middle power effectiveness: Canada and the Arctic Council’s formation ............. 38 8.3 Post-1996 Canadian leadership ............................................................................... 40 9. China’s Arctic Interests................................................................................................. 42 9.1 Climate change........................................................................................................ 42 9.2 Shipping routes ....................................................................................................... 43 9.3 Arctic resources ...................................................................................................... 44 9.4 The Arctic Council and China’s key Arctic interests ............................................. 45 10. China’s Arctic Activities............................................................................................. 46 10.1 Expanding Arctic research capabilities ................................................................. 47 10.2 Developing Arctic strategic knowledge ................................................................ 48 10.3 Domestic Arctic actors.......................................................................................... 49 11. China and the Arctic Council...................................................................................... 51 11.1 Ad-hoc observer: 2007-2013 ................................................................................ 51 11.2 Building relations with Arctic states ..................................................................... 52 11.3 PRC admitted as Permanent Observer: 2013 ........................................................ 53 12. Official Chinese Position on Arctic Cooperation ....................................................... 54 12.1 2009 – Hu Zhengyue (胡正跃) ............................................................................. 55 12.2 2010 – Liu Zhenmin (刘振民) .............................................................................. 55 12.3 2012 – Lan Lijun (兰立俊) ................................................................................... 57 12.4 2013 – Zhao Jun (赵军) ........................................................................................ 58 12.5 2014 – Jia Guide (贾桂徳) & Shi Wuhong (石午虹) ........................................... 58 12.6 China’s emerging Arctic strategy ......................................................................... 60 13. Three Key Findings of China’s Arctic Cooperation ................................................... 62 . 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v.

(6) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. 13.1 China as an “outsider” .......................................................................................... 62 13.2 Soft law to hard law: A model for the South China Sea? ..................................... 66 13.3 Canada’s northern sovereignty, China’s southern sovereignty............................. 70 14. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 75 14.1 Suggestions for future research ............................................................................. 77 15. References ................................................................................................................... 79 . 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vi. i n U. v.

(7) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. List of Abbreviations AC – Arctic Council AEPS – Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy AMAP – Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations CAA – Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (China) CACPR – Chinese Advisory Committee for Polar Research (China) CCACD – Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament CICIR – China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China) CIIA – Canadian Institute for International Affairs CIIS – Chinese Institute for International Studies (China) DOC – Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone ICC – Inuit Circumpolar Conference IMO – International Maritime Organization MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China) NWP – Northwest Passage PAME – Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment PRC – People’s Republic of China PRIC – Polar Research Institute of China (China) SAO – Senior Arctic Official SAR – Search and Rescue SOA – State Oceanic Administration (China) SIIS – Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (China) UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vii. i n U. v.

(8) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. 1. Introduction In 1985, the Arctic was as desolate and remote as any place on earth. There were territorial disputes, overlapping maritime claims, and suspicious blocs that made the region completely devoid of any sort of international governance. The United States and the Soviet Union were still at the tail end of their Cold War and opening up governance of the region was unthinkable. The Arctic was used as a buffer zone between the two nuclear superpowers, making it averse to any sort of international cooperation. With such hostile conditions, it is no surprise that the region was left ungoverned, an isolated world of ice and snow at the northernmost reaches of the planet. Thirty years later the Arctic has gone through a veritable transformation and has become. 政治大. a hotbed of international cooperation. A mosaic of different international organizations. 立. has sprung up to deal with almost every issue facing the region. A multitude of states,. ‧ 國. 學. indigenous groups, scientists and non-state actors work together to assess and manage the impacts of climate change, negotiate and set goals for sustainable economic development, and cooperate to mitigate environmental catastrophes. The regime that has emerged as. ‧. the most important in the region has been the Arctic Council, a comprehensive regime. y. Nat. that covers all aspects of Arctic governance. Today, the traditional superpowers work. sit. alongside each other in the Arctic Council, sharing governance of the Arctic with small. er. io. Nordic states, Canada, and a collection of aboriginal groups who call the region home.. al. n. iv n C Arctic and have traditionally nothbeen involved in U e n g c h i regional affairs, notably China. How do we explain this change?. The hand of cooperation has even been extended to states that are not located in the. In many areas around the world, the Arctic being a perfect example, regimes have emerged in order to deal with issues that impossible for one state to solve individually. To properly manage the transnational issues facing the Arctic (climate change, sustainable development, environmental protection) states must work in tandem or else no progress will be made. In these areas where collective action is needed, international regimes have been established in order to enact rules that help us solve these collective problems. How do regimes emerge and who is most influential in their formation? Traditional approaches to understanding international relations view the Great Powers as the most important actors in the system. According to the traditional view, regimes are set. 1.

(9) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. up according to the interest of the most powerful states. This explains why so many postWorld War II institutions bear the mark of the United States. It is this author’s view, however, that Middle Powers have an important role to play in the formation of regimes. Middle Powers, although lacking the military capabilities possessed by larger powers, have other attributes that make them crucial to regime formation. An established community of scientists and other technical experts, as well as a large amount financial resources available for international activities, allow countries such as Canada to play an important role in the formation of international regimes. In an exhaustive research project regarding the factors that lead to regime formation, Young and Osherenko (1993a) found that the participation of a dominant actor, a. 政治大 find that there is “value of exploring the idea of issue-specific hegemony or the ability of 立 a single state to play a dominant role with regard to specific issue, even when it does not. hegemon, is not a definite factor in the success or failure of a regime. They did, however,. ‧ 國. 學. possess a preponderance of material resources across the board”. They went on to say that “middle powers can assume key roles in regime formation” (Young and Osherenko,. ‧. 1993a). What is it about middle powers that allow them to assume key roles in regime formation? As theorized by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal (1993), middle powers tend to. y. Nat. sit. exhibit behaviour based on - peace and conflict management, multipolarity, and rules-. al. er. io. building – and have a “tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international. n. problems, and a tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes […]. Ch. i n U. v. and middle powers can be significant in catalyzing the processes of reform and change –. engchi. especially those requiring considerable cooperation and collaboration – in a variety of issue areas on the international agenda.” The finding of Young and Osherenko sparked the interest for this thesis. Are middle powers influential in regime formation? To test this question, this thesis will examine the influence of Canada, a traditional middle power, in the formation of the Arctic Council. There is good reason to believe that Canada played a crucial role in the Arctic Council’s formation. The regime was established after a Canadian initiative to formalize existing relations in the Arctic, the regime’s declaration was largely written by Canadian diplomats and signed in Ottawa, and Canada has played a significant role in the expansion of the regime into a body that is today slowly gaining legal personality. To determine whether or not Canada was. 2.

(10) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. instrumental in the formation of the regime, the history of the Arctic Council will be examined. The first part of this thesis will explore the role of Canada in the formation of the Arctic Council. The second part will look at China’s response to the Arctic Council. 2015 marks the 30th anniversary of China’s fist polar expedition. Xinhua reported the anniversary momentously, noting, “As China prepares to mark 30 years of polar expeditions…it shows no plans of slowing down any time soon” (Song, 2015). China has learned a lot in these past 30 years and it has witnessed the formation and evolution of the Arctic Council first hand. From humble beginnings, China now has a deeper, more nuanced understanding of Arctic science and politics. Well on its way to becoming a Great Power, China has the impetus to get involved in issues that take place far away. 政治大 defined as having strategic importance to China’s future, the Arctic Council has become 立 the target of Chinese interest given its centrality to Arctic governance. Although China from its borders but are increasingly importance to China’s future. As the Arctic is now. ‧ 國. 學. has not released an official Arctic policy, statements by Chinese officials responsible for China’s Arctic activities can give us an insight into the emerging consensus in Beijing.. ‧. How China has responded to the Arctic Council and its resultant Arctic policy is the principal focus of the second half of this thesis.. y. Nat. sit. The significance of this thesis is two fold. Firstly, the process of an individual state,. al. er. io. particularly a middle power, influencing the process of regime formation has not been. n. studied enough. This thesis hopes to fill in that gap by looking at the role that Canada. Ch. i n U. v. played in the formation of the Arctic Council. Secondly, China’s emerging Arctic. engchi. strategy, and what it means for its future relations with the world, is not well understood. This thesis will fill that gap by being the first comprehensive study of China’s response to the Arctic Council as well as an analysis of China’s interests and emerging strategy in the Arctic. This study will act as a guide for academics and policymakers to infer how China will interact with other international regimes in the future.. 2. Hypothesis and Methodology This thesis is concerned with the role of middle powers in regime formation, specifically the formation of the Arctic Council, the most important regime governing Arctic affairs. It will examine the role of middle powers in regime formation by studying the role that. 3.

(11) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. Canada played in the formation of the Arctic Council. The hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis is: Canada significantly influenced the formation of the Arctic Council. It follows from a claim of middle power effectiveness – i.e. that a middle power matters significantly to solving specific problems, enabling political mobilization and aiding in regime formation – that simply observing change will not suffice. To substantiate this claim, the tracing of causal events must be related back to causal mechanisms that the middle power triggered. Substantiating causality requires an analysis of other factors that may have been working alongside the middle power that could provide alternative explanations. As with all claims of causality in the social sciences, hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of middle power leadership can either be observed inductively or. 政治大 the presence of causal mechanisms or, on the other hand, middle power effectiveness can 立 be deduced from a set of logical propositions and then tested through individual case. deductively. One can begin with a large set of observable cases and then investigate for. ‧ 國. 學. studies. An inductive approach to studying middle power effectiveness proves problematic given the ever-changing nature of the international system and the resulting. ‧. inability to control variables. A deductive approach is more suitable as a theory of effectiveness can be taken as a starting point and the theory can be empirically studied. y. Nat. sit. through the use of case studies.. al. er. io. To substantiate the claim that Canada significantly affected the formation of the Council,. n. a tracing of causal events must be related back to causal mechanisms that Canada,. Ch. i n U. v. through its diplomats, academics or other stakeholders, triggered. Substantiating causality. engchi. requires an analysis of other factors that may have been working alongside the middle power that could provide alternative explanations. Evidence for a particular causal account is brought about by analyzing the finer details of how an outcome came about through a series of linear events (Stokke & Honneland, 2007). Each of these smaller events has a causality that is less complex and thus easier to control. The linear history of the formation of the Arctic Council will be examined for the presence of Canada’s influence. The dependent variable in this case is the formation of the Arctic Council in 1996. The independent variable is the role of Canadian leadership in the negotiating process. Other factors such as the role of other states and contextual. 4.

(12) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. factors will be considered as intervening variables. Later transformations of the Council will also be studied. A major component of the transformation of the regime has been the shift of the Council to pursuing legally binding agreements, specifically, the 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement and the 2013 Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement.. 3. Regime Theory: Approaches to Understanding Regimes Regimes can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983). Each regime has a specific regime pattern – a. 政治大 persistence and change 立 – and a characteristic set of features that includes the political style of collective management and lesson-drawing associated with regime creation,. ‧ 國. 學. process by which it was created, the regime’s substance, compliance effects, and. institutional learning (Haas, 1993). The political process of regime creation is defined by the way in which a regime was formed, whether by state leadership, bargaining or. ‧. knowledge. A regime’s substance is the type of policies that are endorsed by the regime.. y. Nat. Policies espoused by regimes can be defined by their scope (the range of rules) and their. sit. strength (the enforcement of policy). Compliance effect is the ability of the regime to. al. er. io. affect policy in member-states, also termed “effectiveness” of the regime.. iv n and U knowledge-based.. n. Within regime theory literature there are three types of approaches to understanding regime formation:. Ch power-based,. approaches to understanding. interest-based e ngchi regime formation. These three. generally correspond to the three. prominent schools of international relations theory: neo-realism, institutionalism and cognitivism.. 3.1 Neo-realism and power-based sources of regime formation The distribution of power is the most important variable for neo-realist scholars. This group, exemplified by Kenneth Waltz (1979), begins with the view of the international system as made up of functionally similar actors (states) that interact in an anarchic environment. States are independent actors that make logical decisions based on selfinterest. Power is defined in terms of material capabilities. Neo-realists take a positivist approach to understanding regimes, assuming that all human behaviour is based on 5.

(13) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. mechanical laws. International systems are distinguished by differing distributions of power among actors, while the underlying structure remains the same. According to this view, states are assumed to act in their own self-interest and “seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (Waltz, 1979). State behaviour follows the actor’s self-interest in maximizing relative power and, therefore, depends on the distribution of power within the system; as the distribution of power changes, so too will behaviour. For structural realists, then, regimes ultimately have little or no impact on state behaviour (Strange, 1983). Power-based theories of regime change revolve around the role of the hegemon. Neorealists argue that in the absence of centralized authority, collective behaviour will be. 政治大 emerge when a concentration of material power exists and the hegemon creates the 立 regime, which is then supported by other actors. The hegemon can take two different. shaped by the strongest country in the system (Waltz, 1979; Haas, 1993). Regimes. ‧ 國. 學. roles, that of a ‘benign’ hegemon or a ‘coercive’ hegemon. A benign hegemon, as the dominant actor in the system, supplies institutional arrangements for public good. A. ‧. coercive hegemon, on the other hand, exercises structural power to impose international arrangements that are in its favour, regardless of the effects on others (Young &. y. Nat. sit. Osherenko, 1993b). The hegemon will use the regime to impose its policies on other. al. er. io. countries, or to weaken international obligations in line with its domestic interests. The. n. substance of a regime, the policies it advances, is an extension of the hegemon’s interests.. Ch. i n U. v. The process of actors modifying policy in line with the hegemon is what Peter Haas. engchi. (1993) calls the “follow the leader” approach. The dominant actor pressures weaker actors to accommodate its preferences. The level of effectiveness will depend on other countries’ policies vis-à-vis the dominant actor. Countries with weaker domestic regulations than the hegemon will be forced to improve regulatory standards. Countries with stronger domestic regulation will be forced to accept weaker standards to accommodate the hegemon’s interests. This process has been particularly present in the global environmental regime. The United States exercised significant influence during the negotiations of the 1992 climate change treaty and successfully pressured the European Community to water down the treaty’s strength. This was due to weaker US domestic carbon dioxide emission policies (Haas, 1993).. 6.

(14) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. 3.2 Institutionalism and interest-based sources of regime formation The basic premise of institutionalists is that regimes arise from the interaction of selfinterested parties who coordinate their behaviour in order to reap joint gains (Keohane, 1983; Young, 1983). Institutionalists, exemplified by Robert Keohane, begin with the same assumptions about the international system that neo-realists hold, namely a system of sovereign states seeking to advance their interests and maximize their relative power. Where institutionalists differ, however, is in the opportunity for regime building that comes with a change in the balance of power in the international system. Keohane, taking some of the fundamentals from hegemonic stability theory, believes that the more power is concentrated within a system (i.e. a stronger hegemon), the supply of regimes will. 政治大 With an increase in the 立 supply of regimes, there will changes in behaviour of states, as. increase.1 A smaller number of actors can lead to more durable regimes (Haas, 1993).. ‧ 國. 學. actors within the system tend to respond rationally to constraints and incentives (Keohane, 1983).. Within this school of thought, the role of regimes is to coordinate state behaviour to. ‧. achieve desired outcomes that may not have been possible without coordination. Keohane. y. Nat. proposes that regimes are formed when Pareto-optimal outcomes cannot be achieved. sit. though individuals pursuing actions based on self-interest (Keohane, 1983). In other. er. io. words, the function of regimes is to help states solve the classic prisoners’ dilemma. By. al. iv n C that is optimal for the collective. Environmental change h e n g c h i U is one example of an issue-area in which each state pursuing its self-interest would lead to an outcome that is not Pareton. adhering to principles, norms and rules, states can ensure that the end result will be one. optimal. Because of this problem, a global environmental regime has emerged to tackle this problem. Unlike neo-realists, institutionalists argue that regimes matter because they can affect both the capabilities and the interests of states (Keohane, 1993). Regimes can serve as a source of influence for states that are advantaged by regime decision-making procedures. These sources of influence are what Keohane and Nye term ‘organizationally dependent capabilities’ (Keohane & Nye, 2001). 1. The reason for this is that the more powerful a hegemon the more incentive it has to both provide collective goods and organize their provision. See: Keohane, 1983.. 7.

(15) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. If regimes arise because of states coordinating behaviour in order to achieve joint gains, how exactly is state behaviour coordinated? The answer is through a process of institutional bargaining. Oran Young defines institutional bargaining as “the setting in which regimes are created and maintained through bargaining between several distinct types of actors, including states and NGOs, in an organizational context and subject to uncertainty about the costs and benefits of cooperation” (Young, 1989). States bargain with each other within an institutional framework and eventually arrive at cooperative agreements (Gehring, 1992). As actors may not be fully aware what their preferences are, through the process of institutional bargaining states are less likely to be concerned with power distribution. States enter regime negotiations with a contract zone in which regime. 政治大 (state interests in certain areas of course differ), institutionalists assume that between 立 states there exists a common area of interest where cooperation is possible. The. formation is in their interest. Although each state does not have an identical contract zone. ‧ 國. 學. opportunity for mutual gains is more important than increasing relative power. Within a process of institutional bargaining, individual leadership is a necessary. ‧. condition for regime formation (Young & Osherenko, 1993a). Individual leadership can take the form of a savvy diplomat who has the ability to bridge gaps in the decision. y. Nat. sit. making process or a negotiator with a respected background in a certain issue-area.. er. io. Individual leaders help find solutions that are satisfactory to all parties.. al. n. iv n C U the role of individual leadership in h e ntheory An important recent finding of regime h ibeen g c has Individual Leadership. regime formation. When Young and Osherenko (1993a) talk about leadership they. include two types of leadership: leadership on the part of states and leadership on the part of individuals. Leadership by individual states is important to regime formation and is covered under power-based arguments of regime formation. Leadership in the powerbased sense usually comes from the hegemon, the strongest country in any issue area. This type of leadership is important, but not necessary to regime formation. Regimes can be formed without the support of a hegemon. Leadership on the part of individuals, on the other hand, is necessary to regime formation. Leadership in this case is not vaguely exercised by states, but by active individuals with a stake in the new regime. While states are critical to regime building, 8.

(16) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. state representatives must negotiate with each other and sign declarations; state actions are driven in part by the push of various stakeholders. In this way leadership is not amorphous exercise of state power, but can be the state supporting the position of its scientists or academics that find an opportunity to erect a new regime. Leadership typically takes three different forms: structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual (Young & Osherenko, 1993b). A structural leader is an individual who acts in the name of a party (usually a state) in the bargaining process and uses that party’s structural power as bargaining leverage. A party’s structural power is usually measured in material resources. Structural leadership, then, is an individual using the power of the state’s resources to reach an agreement. An entrepreneurial leader (who may or may not represent a state). 政治大 mutually acceptable solution. An intellectual leader (may or may not represent the state) 立 depends on the power of ideas to shape the way participants think about certain issues uses negotiating skills to influence the way issues are presented in order to arrive at a. ‧ 國. 學. and how to conceptualize different solutions to the problem. Intellectual leadership is more central in earlier stages of regime formation, before explicit or public negotiations. ‧. begin (Young & Osherenko, 1993a).. It is important to note that leadership is a crosscutting factor. That is, it can impact and be. y. Nat. sit. impacted by power relations and it is also impacted by the values and ideas discussed in. er. io. knowledge-based theories.. n. 3.3 Cognitivism andaknowledge-based sources iofv regime formation l. Ch. n engchi U. The cognitivist approach views behaviour in the international system between states bound not only by the balance of material power or self-interest but also by norms, values, and beliefs (Haas, 1990). Moreover, knowledge and values not only impact power and shape the interest of actors, but also play a direct role in regime formation. Cognitivists posit that there are two alternative sources to regime change based on knowledge: scientific convergence and epistemic communities (Young & Osherenko, 1993b). The first alternative, scientific convergence, suggests that cooperation comes quickly once a common or widely agreed upon understanding of the problem, its causes, and solutions arises. The second alternative, epistemic communities, first stresses the important role that knowledge and shared values play in regime formation, but goes further by explaining the causal mechanism by which shared knowledge gets transmitted 9.

(17) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. to policy makers in relevant issue-areas. For a regime to form, a group of interconnected, international scientists or experts with a common understanding of the problem, causes and available solutions, emerges to communicate their ideas to policy makers. This group is an important force in regime formation. This group of experts, the epistemic community, serves to give reliable advice to poorly informed policy makers, thus driving regime formation. In this way, regimes will naturally come to reflect the beliefs of the scientific community as epistemic communities are spread out among nations. Nations, thus, adopt policies similar to the epistemic communities, depending on the level of penetration by the epistemic community. Both leaders and laggards (states with relatively weak domestic policies) will adjust domestic policy in line with the suggestions of the. 政治大 If members of the epistemic community occupy key positions in the bureaucracy, 立 scientifically informed policy-making is more likely to occur. Knowledge creation may scientific community. Learning comes from the knowledge of the epistemic community.. ‧ 國. 學. lead to a new understanding of issues, linking issues that were previously seen as distinct. In addition to power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based sources of regime factors.. ‧. formation, the literature provides one other factor crucial to regime formation: contextual. y. Nat. sit. 3.4 Contextual factors. er. io. These are factors unrelated directly to the regime in question but nevertheless have an. al. n. iv n C U suitable. Obviously, a regime governing was unlikely to emerge in h e n gcarbon c h i emissions impact. Regimes form when the ‘time is right’, that is, when the context for formation is 1943, at the height of World War II, because the contextual factors would not permit it,. there were other more pressing issues in the world at the time. A global emissions standard is much more likely today, given that there is worldwide concern regarding the effect of humans on climate change and there is a greater will among governments to tackle the climate change issue. This is what is called a “window of opportunity” in regime theory (Young & Osherenko, 1993). Regimes have a greater opportunity to form when contextual factors are suitable. Contextual factors are important to regime formation as issues far removed from specific issues may impact the timing and content of regime formation. When the initial proposals for the Arctic Council were being discussed in Ottawa and Washington, the election of Bill Clinton in 1993 proved to be an 10.

(18) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. important “window of opportunity” for the formation of an Arctic environmental regime. Clinton was much more focused on climate change than his predecessor, which gave a greater likelihood for an environmental regime in the Arctic to be agreed to.. 3.5 Causal mix In reality, regime formation is likely to be spurred on by a combination of all three processes: power, interest and knowledge more broadly, with individual leadership contextual factors as intervening variables. Moreover, each of these processes interacts with each other in complex ways. Some of these interactions can be relatively straightforward. In most cases, however, these interactions between sources of change are. 政治大. extremely complex, and are not easily studied. In the end, as Oran Young (1999) explains, “many – perhaps most – changes in international regimes are products of a. 立. number of forces that operate simultaneously.” Nevertheless, given that individual. ‧ 國. 學. leadership is necessary to regime formation, we should expect to see individual leadership in the formation stage of the Arctic Council. Putting the aforementioned. ‧. processes into a flowchart we get the following result:. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 11. i n U. v.

(19) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. 4. The Arctic In recent decades the Arctic2 has been a region undergoing both natural and man-made transformations. Climate change is acutely felt in the icy north, where scientists at the National Research Council (2015) estimate the seas are warming at twice the global average. This warming is no doubt caused by actions of humans, with increasing carbon emissions being the most obvious factor. As greenhouse gases accumulate in the Arctic atmosphere, more heat is trapped near the surface, which melts surface ice. Moreover, since open water absorbs more heat than snow or ice, the melting ice leads to a vicious circle of more rapid and more extensive melting of polar ice. The changing Arctic climate has destructive effects in some areas and potentially beneficial effects in others. On the. 政治大. one hand, the effects of a changing Arctic climate are not limited to the Arctic Circle.. 立. Melting ice has the potential to raise sea levels, alter ocean currents, and have. ‧ 國. 學. unpredictable effects on global food chains, especially fish. These changes affect even those countries located far south of the Arctic Circle. As a recent National Research Council (2015) report aptly put it, “What happens in the Arctic doesn’t stay in the. ‧. Arctic”. On the other hand, melting sea ice has the potential to open new areas for. y. Nat. resource extraction as well as new shipping lanes cutting through the Arctic Circle that. sit. would drastically cut the shipping time from Asia to Europe. Using the Northeast. er. io. Passage, the shipping route that runs across the top of Russia, the distance from Shanghai. al. n. iv n C 2010). Utilizing Arctic shipping h lanes i Uin reduced shipping times, reduced e n gcanc result h transit fees, and ironically, reduced carbon emissions from a lower consumption of fuel.. to Rotterdam, one of the busiest routes in the world, is nearly 40% shorter (Lasserre,. The gradual opening of these new Arctic routes is very attractive to countries that are dependent on shipping for trade. Besides natural changes, there are also manmade changes that are reshaping the region. The Arctic is undergoing a transformation in regional governance. The increasingly acute effects of climate change have led to a demand for greater governance over the fragile Arctic region. Without proper governance, there exist possibilities for misunderstanding, conflict, as well as continual environmental degradation. Where there previously were 2. There is no universally accepted definition of the Arctic. Recently, most scholars prefer to define the Arctic as the area above 66 degrees north (the Arctic Circle), which encompasses the Arctic Ocean as well as parts of Alaska, Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.. 12.

(20) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. none, we are now witnessing the emergence of rules and norms governing all kinds of activities in the Arctic, from scientific cooperation to resource extraction. Since the end of the Cold War the need for greater governance has been met and the Arctic has become a hotbed of international cooperation (Young, 2005). A mosaic of different governmental and non-governmental organizations has appeared to deal with the myriad issues facing the Arctic. Eschewing ‘hard’ security issues such as arms proliferation, most regimes have been established to deal with softer issues, particularly environmental pollution and cooperation in climate change research. Some of these regimes have been intergovernmental agreements between states, such as the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Others have been regimes established by. 政治大 reside, which is the case with the Northern Forum. Still others have been regimes 立 established by non-governmental actors to address region-specific issues, such as the sub-national actors that have goals that are different from the nations in which they. ‧ 國. 學. International Arctic Science Committee and the University of the Arctic. These networks of cooperative activities have turned the polar north into a distinct region with a policy. ‧. agenda of its own (Young, 2009).. The organization that has emerged as the most important forum for discussing Arctic. y. Nat. sit. affairs has been the Arctic Council (‘Council’). The Arctic Council was established in. al. er. io. 1996 and its members are comprised of the eight states that lay claim to Arctic territory:. n. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. It. Ch. i n U. v. was originally set up as a “high-level forum” for international cooperation and has since. engchi. become the most consequential regime dealing with Arctic governance. The scientific studies that have come out of the Council’s working groups have been instrumental in advancing what we know about environmental change currently underway in one of the world’s most ecologically sensitive areas. The Council’s reports have been used in the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Reports (Koivurova & Vanderzwaag, 2007), in helping craft the 2001 Stockholm Convention on POPs (AC, 2002), the 2013 Minamata Convention (AC, 2013a), and the Council’s expertise is currently being used in the negotiations taking place within the International Maritime Organization regarding a future Polar Code (Molenaar, 2012). The Council has changed the discourse on the Arctic from one of a ‘frozen desert’ to one of a region being. 13.

(21) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. transformed by climate change (Koivurova, 2010). Besides progressing scientific knowledge of the region, the Arctic Council has been instrumental in ‘framing’ Arctic issues and bringing attention to them to policy makers both in Arctic states and internationally (Young, 2009). Moreover, in recent years the Council has moved from producing scientific knowledge to taking on specific issues and setting legally binding commitments. There are now rules governing search and recue in the region, new rules for ships that transport oil and gas, and there are emerging rules governing the future increase in Arctic shipping and travel groups. The trajectory of the Arctic Council from a mere ‘high-level forum’ to a more typical international organization that sets rules and binds its members to collective decisions has. 政治大 to be put forward take place in a forum that is not always uniform in its thinking (Dodds, 立 2013). Taking a step back and examining the history of the formation of the Council will not been linear, however. Debates on the direction of the Council and the policies that are. ‧ 國. 學. help us to understand the important forces behind the Council’s transformation.. ‧. 5. The Lead Up to the Arctic Council: 1987-1996. y. Nat. In October 1987, the Soviet Union’s then-Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev gave a. sit. speech in a port city near Russia’s border with Norway and Finland that would open the. er. io. door to future international cooperation in the Arctic. Presenting the Order of Lenin to. al. iv n C military confrontation in the region “let U h e nstating, i the North of the globe, the Arctic, h c g become a zone of peace” (Gorbachev, 1987). Arctic governments, with the exception of n. Murmansk, the largest city in the Arctic Circle, Gorbachev proposed a reduction in. Finland, did not pay much attention to the speech as they saw it as empty rhetoric coming from the nuclear superpower (Griffiths, 2011). Environmental scientists in Finland, and arms control and disarmament academics and scientists in Canada, however, saw an opportunity in Gorbachev’s proposition. Gorbachev’s 1987 speech set off two parallel tracks of potential cooperation, one in Finland and the other in Canada. Finnish scientists began exploring the idea of regionwide cooperation based solely on environmental issues. Canadian academics began exploring the idea of a regional council that could manage all Arctic affairs, including security affairs.. 14.

(22) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. 5.1 Finland’s Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy Finland began negotiations in 1988 regarding the possibility of intergovernmental cooperation on environmental issues facing the Arctic. Finnish negotiators explicitly told the other seven Arctic nations that this new group would not deal with military issues (Axworthy, 2013). After the Fins received positive reception from the other countries they began preparations for the new circumpolar organization. In order to draft the declaration, preparatory meetings were held in Canada in April 1990, in Sweden in January 1991, and at Rovaniemi, Finland in June 1991. At the Rovaniemi meeting, the eight nations met at the ministerial level and signed the Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi Declaration). The Rovaniemi Declaration contained. 政治大 To protect the Arctic 立 ecosystem including humans;. five objectives (AEPS, 1991):. To provide for the protection, enhancement and restoration of environmental. 學. •. ‧ 國. •. quality and the sustainable utilization of natural resources, including their use by local populations and indigenous peoples in the Arctic;. ‧. •. To recognize and, to the extent possible, seek to accommodate the traditional and. y. Nat. cultural needs, values and practices of the indigenous peoples as determined by. er. To review regularly the state of the Arctic environment; and. io. •. sit. themselves, related to the protection of the Arctic environment;. al. n. iv n C All five objectives dealt with environmental none of which were contentious. Due h e n g cissues, hi U •. To identify, reduce, and, as a final goal, eliminate pollution.. to its domestic experience in dealing with environmental protection in its northern. territories, Canada played a key role in the drafting of the Rovaniemi Declaration. In the years leading up to the formation of the AEPS, the Canadian government had significant experience in Arctic research. In the late 1970s, Canadian scientists began to realize the problem of high levels of pollutants in the Canadian Arctic and informed the government of action that needed to be taken. Heeding their alarm, the Canadian government commissioned a study on the effects of contaminants in the Arctic in 1985.3 On the basis 3. In 1985, the Government of Canada initiated the Inter-Agency Technical Committee on Contaminants in the Northern Ecosystems and Native Diets. It was comprised of several different governmental organizations and was later expanded to include indigenous groups. The Committee found that there was a need for further study of the extent of contamination in the Arctic. See Huebert, 1998.. 15.

(23) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. of this study, the Canadian government created a committee to develop a long-term strategy to deal with the issue of Arctic pollution, also known as the Northern Contaminants Programme (Huebert, 1998). Through its undertaking of the Northern Contaminants Programme and the research into Arctic environmental issues that it entailed, Canada came to the 1991 AEPS negotiations as one of the most experienced in Arctic research of the eight states. This prior experience put Canadian representatives in a key position when it came time to design the structure of the new AEPS regime (Fenge, 2013). A Canadian official, Garth Bangay, was “chiefly responsible” for the drafting of the Rovaniemi Declaration and the accompanying strategy (Huebert, 1998). As such, the Declaration contained many of the. 政治大 “strongly reflects Canadian thinking” (Huebert, 1998). While AEPS was a step forward 立 in Arctic cooperation, it was a regime with a somewhat narrow scope. It was solely. concerns that were identified in Canada’s Northern Contaminants Programme and AEPS. ‧ 國. 學. focused on environmental issues and intentionally excluded other areas of potential cooperation such as sustainable development. There were movements taking place within. ‧. Canada for a more comprehensive regional organization.. y. Nat. 5.2 The Canadian Initiative part 1: Pressure from below. sit. At the same time as the Finnish scientists were formulating AEPS, there were parallel. er. io. developments underway within Canadian civil society. Although the official proposal for. al. n. iv n C government in 1991, the originsh ofe the council were n g c h i Unot in the government, but rather in an international council in the Arctic would ultimately come from the Canadian Canadian universities and think tanks.. The Gordon Foundation On the heels of Gorbachev’s 1987 speech, representatives from the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, a Toronto-based public policy think tank focused on arms control and disarmament, met with George Ignatieff (a well-known Canadian diplomat), John Polanyi (a Nobel Prize winning physicist) and Anatol Rapoport (a world-renowned mathematician) to discuss new initiatives to reduce tensions in the Arctic and open it up to cooperation (Axworthy, 2013). The Foundation created the Arctic Security Project (which was operational from 1988 until the Arctic Council was formed in 1996) whose. 16.

(24) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. objective was to “encourage the development of a Canadian security and demilitarization policy for the Arctic which is successfully integrated with related social, scientific, environmental, developmental, legal and other Canadian Arctic policy goals, and which complements and supports international circumpolar cooperation” (Axworthy, 2013). The Gordon Foundation, through its Arctic Security Project, funded several projects for the Canadian organization Science for Peace, including a conference to discuss Arctic cooperation, which took place in October 1988, a year after Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech. Held in Toronto, 70 academics and scientists from the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States and Europe participated in what was the first step in bringing the academic and scientific community together (Science for Peace, 1988). Franklyn Griffiths, a senior. 政治大 key member of the Gordon Foundation, chaired the conference. Since any Arctic 立 organization would govern Arctic indigenous people and their traditional homeland, policy advisor to Canadian Minister of External Affairs Joe Clark from 1987 to 1988 and. ‧ 國. 學. Canadian academics involved with the conference insisted that Arctic indigenous peoples be included in any future Arctic regime (Axworthy, 2013). This focus on including. ‧. aboriginal peoples’ participation in the Council would become a Canadian priority in the subsequent negotiations.. io. sit. y. Nat. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. er. Building on the momentum of the Science for Peace conference, the Canadian Centre for. al. n. iv n C h released regarding Arctic arms control and e n g ca report h i Uentitled “Security Cooperation in the. Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD) held meetings through the summer of 1989 Arctic: A Canadian Response to Murmansk”. The report called for the traditional perspective of East-West in the Arctic to be replaced with a perspective of the Arctic as a circumpolar issue as well as the establishment of an ongoing multilateral conference on Arctic security that would advise on science, the environment, economic development, cultural preservation and indigenous peoples (Lamb, 2010). Shortly after, the Canadian Institute for International Affairs (CIIA) released a report calling for the creation of an Arctic Basin Council and took the idea to several international conferences (Axworthy, 2013). Advocates found an opportunity in the fall of 1989 when Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was to visit Leningrad. John Lamb, head of the CCACD, encouraged 17.

(25) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. Mulroney to include a reference to an Arctic Council on his upcoming trip (Lamb, 2010). Prime Minister Mulroney took to the idea and during his speech in Leningrad told his Soviet audience, “And why not a council of Arctic countries eventually coming into existence to coordinate and promote cooperation among them?” (Graham, 1997). To keep pressure on both state actors, the CCACD then organized a Soviet Union-Canada Conference on the Arctic in October 1989 and another one in Moscow and Leningrad in 1991 (Axworthy, 2013). Representatives from the Gordon Foundation also briefed Russian officials on their ideas for an Arctic Council prior to Boris Yeltsin’s trip to Canada in 1992, and they also held meetings with representatives from the State Department in Washington (Axworthy, 2013).. Griffiths and Kuptana report. 立. 政治大. After the initial overtures were made to the Arctic governments, the following. ‧ 國. 學. discussions in Canada revolved around the specifics of what this formal body would look like. In 1990, Franklyn Griffiths and Rosemarie Kuptana, the vice-president of the Inuit. ‧. Circumpolar Conference, co-chaired a panel in 1990 to propose the finer details of what this international body would look like. In May 1991 they published a report entitled “To. sit. y. Nat. Establish an International Arctic Council” that detailed the structure of such a council, which even included a draft declaration (Griffiths & Kuptana, 1991a). The report. io. er. suggested that the Canadian government take the idea of a formal council to the AEPS. al. n. iv n C It also included calls for greaterhindigenous e n g cparticipation h i U in Arctic affairs. Griffiths and. ministerial meeting in Finland in June 1991 to seek the consent of the other Arctic states. Kuptana took to Canada’s national newspaper, writing an op-ed in the Globe and Mail after their report was published: The Arctic, its people and their environment require an institution built on a vision equal to the problems the region faces [...] certainly an Arctic Council should not consist of the eight Arctic States alone. It must also allow for the direct and meaningful participation of northerners, especially aboriginal peoples. It must have an open agenda, a broad mandate to be determined through consensus, but with nothing proscripted from the outset (Griffiths & Kuptana, 1991b). The committee took its report to Ottawa and presented it to the Prime Minister’s office, and it encouraged the Mulroney government to enter formal negotiations with the other. 18.

(26) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. Arctic states (Axworthy, 2010). The Griffiths and Kuptana report, as well as the reports of John Lamb at the CCACD and the CIIA, collectively put pressure on the government to approach the other Arctic states to establish a formal organization in the Arctic. Of the many reports written between 1988 and 1993, they all had four points in common. They proposed that the Arctic Council be focused on: • Expanding contact between the peoples of the Circumpolar North; • Improving environmental protection for the ecosystem of the Arctic; • Reducing the military footprint in the region; and • Securing broad recognition of the economic, political, and social rights of aboriginal people in the region (Nord, 2006).. 政治大 Canadian government’s 立 official proposal to the other Arctic states.. These four recommendations by various civil society actors were largely present in the. ‧ 國. 學. 5.3 The Canadian Initiative Part 2: Official negotiations In November 1990, the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Joe Clark, spoke at a. ‧. Canada-Soviet Conference and announced, “Canada intends to propose an Arctic Council to the seven other Arctic countries [...] Canada is willing to host a small secretariat and. sit. y. Nat. contribute to sustaining it from the outset” (Clark, 1990). The proposals by various academics and scientists that began in 1988 had become official Canadian government. io. n. al. er. policy. The Canadian government then began pushing for the establishment of a formal. i n U. v. institution that would subsume the Finnish AEPS as well as take on a broader scope of. Ch. engchi. issues such as economic development and maritime issues. In January 1991, Joe Clark wrote a letter to the foreign ministers of all Arctic nations outlining Canada’s idea of an Arctic council. Six months later, in June 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote a similar letter, this time addressed to the leaders of the Arctic states, and invited them to send representatives to a “low key officials meeting of the Arctic countries in Canada” that would take place the following year (Axworthy, 2013). In May 1992 every Arctic state sent negotiators to Ottawa, except the United States. The United States had particular reservations about the creation of a formal organization. Two main concerns of the United States were regarding security and indigenous participation. The U.S. Navy was concerned with the security issues that the new organization would deal with; they continued to operate submarines under the Arctic ice 19.

(27) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. and were wary of any deal that would limit their activities (Axworthy, 2013). The U.S. Bureau of the Interior, the agency responsible for American indigenous policy, was also wary of the new organization, but for a different reason; they did not want indigenous peoples attending an international meeting (Bell, 1992). At this point there was already consensus among the other Arctic states that indigenous peoples would be present in the council as permanent observers. By May 1993, all the other Arctic states except the United States had agreed to a draft declaration and terms of reference for the organization (Huebert, 1998).. Mary Simon. 治政 American counterparts. The Canadian government created 大 the position of Circumpolar 立 Mary Simon to the position. Simon was the long time Ambassador and appointed. Despite the reticence of American officials, Canadian officials continued to pressure their. ‧ 國. 學. president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, making her the top representative for Canadian indigenous groups, as well as a key member of the Gordon Foundation. Simon,. ‧. now the top Canadian official in charge of Arctic affairs, went to Washington in early 1995 to present a report on the proposed regime and to see if an agreement could be made. sit. y. Nat. with the American side. She argued that an organization with a broader mandate than the AEPS was needed, one that could deal with northern economic development and Arctic. io. er. transportation (Krauss & Hussey, 1995). During Mary Simon’s trip to Washington, she. al. n. iv n C h edoes demand. The paper stated: “Canada h i Uthe Arctic Council as an appropriate n gnotcforesee submitted a new discussion paper on the Arctic Council that gave into a key U.S.. body to resolve strategic military issues” (DFAIT, 1995). This proved to be the key to unlocking American support. After receiving this assurance, President Clinton and. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced in February that they had come to agreement on the establishment of the Arctic Council (Huebert, 1998). A compromise was reached whereby a regime to govern the Arctic would be created, though it would be an informal regime, without legal personality. The Canadians agreed to explicitly exclude security issues from the Council’s mandate, while the Americans agreed to include indigenous peoples in the Council (Axworthy, 2010). The decision to establish the regime was codified with the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration) signed in Ottawa on September 19, 1996. 20.

(28) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. 6. The Arctic Council is Established: 1996 The Ottawa Declaration marked the shift from the strictly environment focused AEPS to a comprehensive regime that took into consideration all issues of Arctic governance: climate. research,. environmental. protection,. economic. development. of. Arctic. communities, and sustainable development of Arctic resources. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration announced the formal establishment of a new regional “high level” forum, which was named the Arctic Council. The Declaration laid out the four focus points of the regime, namely that the Council would: •. Provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among. 政治大. the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues 4 , in particular issues of. 立. sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic; Oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS;. •. Adopt terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable. ‧ 國. 學. •. •. ‧. development program; and. Disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic. sit. y. Nat. related issues (AC, 1996).. The Ottawa Declaration effectively announced that the Arctic Council would subsume. io. er. AEPS and there would be a broadening of the regime’s mandate to include sustainable. al. n. iv n C h e n gthecCouncil establishment of the Ottawa Declaration, h i Uset about in formalizing the rules of. development of the Arctic’s plentiful natural resources. In the two-year period after the. procedure and terms of reference of the regime, which are listed in the Iqaluit Declaration. The rules of procedure and terms of reference limit what actions the Council can take, the programs that can be undertaken, and the roles of each of the members. The membership of the Arctic Council includes three different kinds of entities: member states, permanent participants and observers (which can be states or organizations). Each category of membership has different rights and responsibilities in the Council. Member states have the most rights, permanent participants have the same rights as member states 4. Regarding military security, the Ottawa Declaration explicitly states, “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security” (AC, 1996). The exclusion of military issues from the Council’s agenda was an important factor in getting the support of the United States to create a new regime in the region.. 21.

(29) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. except voting rights, and observers have the least rights and generally limit themselves to observing Council proceedings.. 6.1 Regime structure Members The eight members of the Arctic Council are the eight states that have territory in the Arctic. These eight states make up the core decision-making body of the Council. According to the Ottawa Declaration, the eight members of the Arctic Council are Canada, Denmark5, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America (the ‘Arctic States’) (AC, 1996). Since having Arctic territory. 政治大 Council; voting rights will not be extended beyond these eight Arctic countries. The 立. is a prerequisite of membership, it is obviously not possible to add new members to the foreign ministers of the eight states meet biannually to approve of any Council initiatives.. ‧ 國. 學. The eight members range in their Arctic presence. Canada and Russia together account for around 80% of the Arctic’s total landmass, the United States only accounts for 4%. Of. ‧. the almost 4 million people that live in the Arctic, approximately half of them are in Russia. Canada and Russia both lay claim to potentially lucrative Arctic shipping routes,. y. Nat. sit. the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage, respectively. The five Arctic States. al. er. io. that directly border the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United. n. States) claim a greater responsibility for managing Arctic affairs given their geographical. Ch. i n U. v. proximity to the Arctic. Despite their ranging Arctic presence and expertise, all Arctic. engchi. States are afforded equal weight in Council proceedings and all decisions are made by consensus.. Permanent Participants The Ottawa Declaration also created the status of ‘permanent participants’ in the Council, a unique feature among international organizations, which was created “to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council” (AC, 1996). The Ottawa Declaration listed three indigenous 5. Denmark’s Arctic territory is comprised entirely of Greenland, which is an autonomous country within the Kingdom of Denmark. As Greenland moves towards independence, it will pose problems for Denmark’s participation in the Arctic Council; Denmark does not have any Arctic territory besides Greenland.. 22.

(30) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. groups that were to be designated as permanent participants: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AC, 1996). The status of permanent participation is open to other indigenous groups provided that: 1) the majority of their membership is made of up of indigenous people, and 2) they are comprised of one indigenous group resident in more than one state, or more than one indigenous group represented in one state. The Ottawa Declaration stipulated that the number of permanent participants must never exceed the number of member states (AC, 1996). There have been three additional groups given permanent participant status. The Aleut International Association, a body that represents the Aleut peoples of Northern Alaska, was added as a. 政治大 Gwinch’in Council International, both representing peoples of Northern Canada and 立 USA, were also approved as permanent participants to the Council in 2000 (AC, 2000).. permanent participant in 1998 (AC, 1998). The Arctic Athabaskan Council and the. ‧ 國. 學. These six Permanent Participants have the right to participate in the decision-making process, to attend Council meetings and propose projects, but they do not have the right. ‧. to vote on Council actions. They are entitled to raise a point of order at any time during Council meetings and propose supplementary agenda items (AC, 2013c). The position of. y. Nat. sit. indigenous groups sitting at the same table with nations in the Council is unique in. al. er. io. international organizations and has been a point of pride for the Council.. n. The six permanent participants have had significant impacts on the Council’s output. One. Ch. i n U. v. of the most obviously ways in which they make their impact is in the working group. engchi. reports, which incorporate modern scientific data with indigenous knowledge. They have also brought the attention of the Council to sustainable development of Arctic indigenous communities.. Observers The Ottawa Declaration also opened the Council up to observers. Observership is open to any non-Arctic state, inter-governmental or non-governmental organization that the Council determines can contribute to its work. Observers are limited to observing the activities of the Council, but they are also encouraged to actively participate in the working groups, including funding projects. Observers can commit funds to projects that they would like to support and participate in research. Currently, the Council has twelve 23.

(31) A Study on the Formation of the Arctic Council: Canadian Leadership and China’s Response. non-Arctic Observer states: Germany, Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore and China (AC, 1996, AC, 2013a). Nine intergovernmental organizations 6 and eleven non-governmental organizations 7 also maintain observer status. The membership of the Arctic Council is summarized below: Fig 1. Arctic Council Membership Member States. Permanent Participants.        . . Observer States (year joined).  Germany (1998)  Netherlands (1998)   Poland (1998)   UK (1998)  France (2000)  Spain (2006)   China (2013)  India (2013)   Italy (2013)   Japan (2013)  Korea (2013)  Singapore (2013) The observers vary in their participation rates. Some observer states are not very active Canada Denmark Iceland Finland Norway Russia Sweden United States. Inuit Circumpolar Conference Saami Council Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North Aleut International Association Arctic Athabaskan Council Gwinch’in Council International. 學. ‧. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. (the European states) and maintain observership in name only, while some observer states. y. Nat. are increasingly active in meetings as well as projects (China).. io. sit. 6.2 Regime governance. n. al. er. The Arctic Council was intentionally created as an organization without a legal. i n U. v. personality, thus it is not an “international organization” as defined by international law. Ch. engchi. (Bloom, 1999).8 Its lack of legal personality has an important impact on how states interact with it. Because the Council operates on the consensus rule, similar to ASEAN, 6. International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation, North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations Development Program, and United Nations Environment Program. Source: AC, 2015b. 7 Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, Arctic Institute of North America, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar Conservation Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar Health, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Northern Forum, University of the Arctic, and World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program. Source: AC, 2015b. 8 The establishment of the Arctic Council as a “high-level forum” without legal personality was an important consideration of the United States (Bloom, 1999). This insistence for an informal forum is consistent with trends in American diplomatic practice to prefer regimes that do not legally restrict the United States from taking any future military actions.. 24.