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has also begun build an observatory in a small town in Canada’s most northern province (Wang, 2015).
Another an indication of China’s position on the NWP has been the protocol followed before Chinese ships have entered the NWP. Prior to the Chinese icebreaker Xuelong entering the NWP, it notified the Canadian government that it would be entering the waters, suggesting that China acquiesces to the Canadian position of sovereignty over the NWP (Huebert, 2011). Canada insists that when foreign ships enter its territorial waters they have the right of innocent passage but it maintains the right to govern shipping in its internal waters according to domestic regulations, including environmental provisions.
The passage through Canadian internal waters of the Chinese icebreaker indicates that China shares this view and has therefore been consistent with Canadian regulations.
It should be stressed that China’s official position on the status of the NWP has not yet been made clear, though the writings of Chinese Arctic scholars and the actions of China in the NWP suggest that China will not dispute Canada’s claim in the future.
Nevertheless, given China’s ambiguity, it will be an important area of focus for Canada’s relations with the PRC in the coming years.
China’s activities in in the Arctic from the early 1990s until the present have had three notable characteristics: China’s response in relation to its status as an “outsider” to Arctic governance, China’s general support for the Council’s transition from soft law to hard law, and China’s view of Canada’s maritime sovereignty claims in relation to its claims in the South China Sea.
14. Conclusion
As one of the most remote, desolate regions on earth, the Arctic has always been lacking governance, but this is changing. The Arctic Council has emerged as the regime fundamental to the future governance of Arctic activities. This Canadian initiative has cemented itself as a regime consequential in regulating scientific cooperation, Arctic shipping, resource development, and sustainable development across the entire Arctic region. The positive, engaging response of China to the regime is evidence of the central importance of the Arctic Council in future governance.
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The formation of the Arctic Council validates regime theory that argues middle powers can assume key roles in regime formation, and substantiates the claim that individual leadership is crucial to regime formation.
The formal establishment of the Arctic Council in September 1996 was the result of nearly ten years of activity by Canadian academics, scientists and officials. Individual leadership, whether entrepreneurial, structural or intellectual, acted as the catalyst in bringing an idea of peace and cooperation in the Arctic into reality. Canadian civil society actors, namely Franklyn Griffiths, Rosemarie Kuptana, John Lamb and Marie Simon, supplied valuable entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership in the early stages of the formation of the new regime by sketching out a vision for a comprehensive regime governing all aspects Arctic affairs and engaging their American, Soviet and Nordic counterparts to forge their support. Later, Joe Clark and Brian Mulroney provided the structural leadership needed to finalize the support of the other Arctic States by putting the diplomatic and material resources of the Canadian government behind the initiative.
This tandem of civil society and government actors provides a blueprint of how middle powers can significantly influence regime formation.
China’s response to the Arctic Council is both testimony to its importance in Arctic governance and revealing of China’s foreign policy goals as a rising power. After a decade of Arctic expeditions and capacity building, China joined the Arctic Council in 2007 and after some diplomatic relationship building with the Nordic states, became a permanent observer in 2013. During its brief time in the regional body, China has continued to stress the importance of international law regarding Arctic sovereignty, while simultaneously advocating a cooperative approach to Arctic governance with China having a greater input into how decisions are made. China’s stress on improving its influence on regional decision-making has been the overarching strategy in its Arctic affairs for the short-term. By improving its ability to influence the Arctic Council’s decisions, China hopes it can shape the region into one more conducive to its three key Arctic interests: climate change science, shipping, and resources.
An analysis of China’s response to the Arctic Council has also revealed three key findings of China’s Arctic cooperation. First, China’s response in relation to its status as an “outsider” to Arctic governance is very different from its stance on issues where China
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is an insider, notably the South China Sea. In its Arctic affairs China tends to frame Arctic issues as “trans-regional” in nature, which require the cooperation of Arctic and non-Arctic states. Moreover, given its status as an outsider and its perennial concern of exclusion by the Arctic States, China has sought for other ways to influence Arctic governance, most notably by building relations with Arctic indigenous groups in hopes that this will bring China more influence. Second, China’s response to the Arctic Council suggests a general support for the Council’s transition from soft law to hard law. This paper suggests that China may look to the transition of soft law to hard law in the Arctic, manifested by the 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement and 2013 Oil Pollution Agreement, as a model for the South China Sea. Finally, China’s activities in the Arctic, and its cooperation with Canada more specifically, suggests that China does not dispute the status of the Northwest Passage as Canada’s internal waters. This paper suggests that this view of Canada’s maritime sovereignty claims is directly related to China’s own disputed maritime claims in the South China Sea.
14.1 Suggestions for future research
By demonstrating Canada’s central role in the formation of the Arctic Council, this thesis should act as the starting point for future research into the ability of middle powers to influence regime formation. Is the individual leadership model applicable to other regimes? Future analysis of middle power effectiveness could examine the formation of other prominent regimes and the role of middle powers therein. Furthermore, another important question that came out of this thesis is the ability of middle powers to influence regime transformation. The transformation that took place in the Arctic Council in 2011, the shift from soft law to hard law, took place in a regime that had been established for fifteen years. Is there evidence that one state had a discernible impact on this transformation? Future research would do well to illuminate this unresolved question and the impacts of middle powers on regime transformation more generally.
An analysis of China’s response to the Arctic Council also reveals several areas for future research. Firstly, an assessment of the socialization impacts that the Arctic Council has had on Chinese Arctic policy is needed. One of the Arctic Council’s strengths is its ability to influence domestic policy in member states and policy positions Council stakeholders take to other relevant international organizations. Is there evidence that by
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participating in the Arctic Council, stakeholders within China have impacted domestic policy? As a state with very little Arctic knowledge before the formation of the Arctic Council, there may be some impacts of socialization on Chinese policymakers. Secondly, China’s view on the Northwest Passage is still unresolved, if only because Chinese officials have not publicly announced their position. An analysis of Chinese scholarly opinion on the status of the Northwest Passage suggests that China does not dispute Canada’s stance on the issue, but a more in depth study would be helpful not only for Canada-China relations but also in arriving at a more nuanced view of China’s stance on maritime disputes around the world.
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