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factors will be considered as intervening variables. Later transformations of the Council will also be studied. A major component of the transformation of the regime has been the shift of the Council to pursuing legally binding agreements, specifically, the 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement and the 2013 Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement.
3. Regime Theory: Approaches to Understanding Regimes
Regimes can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983). Each regime has a specific regime pattern – a style of collective management and lesson-drawing associated with regime creation, persistence and change – and a characteristic set of features that includes the political process by which it was created, the regime’s substance, compliance effects, and institutional learning (Haas, 1993). The political process of regime creation is defined by the way in which a regime was formed, whether by state leadership, bargaining or knowledge. A regime’s substance is the type of policies that are endorsed by the regime.
Policies espoused by regimes can be defined by their scope (the range of rules) and their strength (the enforcement of policy). Compliance effect is the ability of the regime to affect policy in member-states, also termed “effectiveness” of the regime.
Within regime theory literature there are three types of approaches to understanding regime formation: power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based. These three approaches to understanding regime formation generally correspond to the three prominent schools of international relations theory: neo-realism, institutionalism and cognitivism.
3.1 Neo-realism and power-based sources of regime formation
The distribution of power is the most important variable for neo-realist scholars. This group, exemplified by Kenneth Waltz (1979), begins with the view of the international system as made up of functionally similar actors (states) that interact in an anarchic environment. States are independent actors that make logical decisions based on self-interest. Power is defined in terms of material capabilities. Neo-realists take a positivist approach to understanding regimes, assuming that all human behaviour is based on
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mechanical laws. International systems are distinguished by differing distributions of power among actors, while the underlying structure remains the same. According to this view, states are assumed to act in their own self-interest and “seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (Waltz, 1979). State behaviour follows the actor’s self-interest in maximizing relative power and, therefore, depends on the distribution of power within the system; as the distribution of power changes, so too will behaviour. For structural realists, then, regimes ultimately have little or no impact on state behaviour (Strange, 1983).
Power-based theories of regime change revolve around the role of the hegemon. Neo-realists argue that in the absence of centralized authority, collective behaviour will be shaped by the strongest country in the system (Waltz, 1979; Haas, 1993). Regimes emerge when a concentration of material power exists and the hegemon creates the regime, which is then supported by other actors. The hegemon can take two different roles, that of a ‘benign’ hegemon or a ‘coercive’ hegemon. A benign hegemon, as the dominant actor in the system, supplies institutional arrangements for public good. A coercive hegemon, on the other hand, exercises structural power to impose international arrangements that are in its favour, regardless of the effects on others (Young &
Osherenko, 1993b). The hegemon will use the regime to impose its policies on other countries, or to weaken international obligations in line with its domestic interests. The substance of a regime, the policies it advances, is an extension of the hegemon’s interests.
The process of actors modifying policy in line with the hegemon is what Peter Haas (1993) calls the “follow the leader” approach. The dominant actor pressures weaker actors to accommodate its preferences. The level of effectiveness will depend on other countries’ policies vis-à-vis the dominant actor. Countries with weaker domestic regulations than the hegemon will be forced to improve regulatory standards. Countries with stronger domestic regulation will be forced to accept weaker standards to accommodate the hegemon’s interests. This process has been particularly present in the global environmental regime. The United States exercised significant influence during the negotiations of the 1992 climate change treaty and successfully pressured the European Community to water down the treaty’s strength. This was due to weaker US domestic carbon dioxide emission policies (Haas, 1993).
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3.2 Institutionalism and interest-based sources of regime formation The basic premise of institutionalists is that regimes arise from the interaction of self-interested parties who coordinate their behaviour in order to reap joint gains (Keohane, 1983; Young, 1983). Institutionalists, exemplified by Robert Keohane, begin with the same assumptions about the international system that neo-realists hold, namely a system of sovereign states seeking to advance their interests and maximize their relative power.
Where institutionalists differ, however, is in the opportunity for regime building that comes with a change in the balance of power in the international system. Keohane, taking some of the fundamentals from hegemonic stability theory, believes that the more power is concentrated within a system (i.e. a stronger hegemon), the supply of regimes will increase.1 A smaller number of actors can lead to more durable regimes (Haas, 1993).
With an increase in the supply of regimes, there will changes in behaviour of states, as actors within the system tend to respond rationally to constraints and incentives (Keohane, 1983).
Within this school of thought, the role of regimes is to coordinate state behaviour to achieve desired outcomes that may not have been possible without coordination. Keohane proposes that regimes are formed when Pareto-optimal outcomes cannot be achieved though individuals pursuing actions based on self-interest (Keohane, 1983). In other words, the function of regimes is to help states solve the classic prisoners’ dilemma. By adhering to principles, norms and rules, states can ensure that the end result will be one that is optimal for the collective. Environmental change is one example of an issue-area in which each state pursuing its self-interest would lead to an outcome that is not Pareto-optimal. Because of this problem, a global environmental regime has emerged to tackle this problem.
Unlike neo-realists, institutionalists argue that regimes matter because they can affect both the capabilities and the interests of states (Keohane, 1993). Regimes can serve as a source of influence for states that are advantaged by regime decision-making procedures.
These sources of influence are what Keohane and Nye term ‘organizationally dependent capabilities’ (Keohane & Nye, 2001).
1 The reason for this is that the more powerful a hegemon the more incentive it has to both provide collective goods and organize their provision. See: Keohane, 1983.
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If regimes arise because of states coordinating behaviour in order to achieve joint gains, how exactly is state behaviour coordinated? The answer is through a process of institutional bargaining. Oran Young defines institutional bargaining as “the setting in which regimes are created and maintained through bargaining between several distinct types of actors, including states and NGOs, in an organizational context and subject to uncertainty about the costs and benefits of cooperation” (Young, 1989). States bargain with each other within an institutional framework and eventually arrive at cooperative agreements (Gehring, 1992). As actors may not be fully aware what their preferences are, through the process of institutional bargaining states are less likely to be concerned with power distribution. States enter regime negotiations with a contract zone in which regime formation is in their interest. Although each state does not have an identical contract zone (state interests in certain areas of course differ), institutionalists assume that between states there exists a common area of interest where cooperation is possible. The opportunity for mutual gains is more important than increasing relative power.
Within a process of institutional bargaining, individual leadership is a necessary condition for regime formation (Young & Osherenko, 1993a). Individual leadership can take the form of a savvy diplomat who has the ability to bridge gaps in the decision making process or a negotiator with a respected background in a certain issue-area.
Individual leaders help find solutions that are satisfactory to all parties.
Individual Leadership
An important recent finding of regime theory has been the role of individual leadership in regime formation. When Young and Osherenko (1993a) talk about leadership they include two types of leadership: leadership on the part of states and leadership on the part of individuals. Leadership by individual states is important to regime formation and is covered under based arguments of regime formation. Leadership in the power-based sense usually comes from the hegemon, the strongest country in any issue area.
This type of leadership is important, but not necessary to regime formation. Regimes can be formed without the support of a hegemon.
Leadership on the part of individuals, on the other hand, is necessary to regime formation. Leadership in this case is not vaguely exercised by states, but by active individuals with a stake in the new regime. While states are critical to regime building,
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state representatives must negotiate with each other and sign declarations; state actions are driven in part by the push of various stakeholders. In this way leadership is not amorphous exercise of state power, but can be the state supporting the position of its scientists or academics that find an opportunity to erect a new regime. Leadership typically takes three different forms: structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual (Young
& Osherenko, 1993b). A structural leader is an individual who acts in the name of a party (usually a state) in the bargaining process and uses that party’s structural power as bargaining leverage. A party’s structural power is usually measured in material resources.
Structural leadership, then, is an individual using the power of the state’s resources to reach an agreement. An entrepreneurial leader (who may or may not represent a state) uses negotiating skills to influence the way issues are presented in order to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. An intellectual leader (may or may not represent the state) depends on the power of ideas to shape the way participants think about certain issues and how to conceptualize different solutions to the problem. Intellectual leadership is more central in earlier stages of regime formation, before explicit or public negotiations begin (Young & Osherenko, 1993a).
It is important to note that leadership is a crosscutting factor. That is, it can impact and be impacted by power relations and it is also impacted by the values and ideas discussed in knowledge-based theories.
3.3 Cognitivism and knowledge-based sources of regime formation
The cognitivist approach views behaviour in the international system between states bound not only by the balance of material power or self-interest but also by norms, values, and beliefs (Haas, 1990). Moreover, knowledge and values not only impact power and shape the interest of actors, but also play a direct role in regime formation.
Cognitivists posit that there are two alternative sources to regime change based on knowledge: scientific convergence and epistemic communities (Young & Osherenko, 1993b). The first alternative, scientific convergence, suggests that cooperation comes quickly once a common or widely agreed upon understanding of the problem, its causes, and solutions arises. The second alternative, epistemic communities, first stresses the important role that knowledge and shared values play in regime formation, but goes further by explaining the causal mechanism by which shared knowledge gets transmitted
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to policy makers in relevant issue-areas. For a regime to form, a group of interconnected, international scientists or experts with a common understanding of the problem, causes and available solutions, emerges to communicate their ideas to policy makers. This group is an important force in regime formation. This group of experts, the epistemic community, serves to give reliable advice to poorly informed policy makers, thus driving regime formation. In this way, regimes will naturally come to reflect the beliefs of the scientific community as epistemic communities are spread out among nations. Nations, thus, adopt policies similar to the epistemic communities, depending on the level of penetration by the epistemic community. Both leaders and laggards (states with relatively weak domestic policies) will adjust domestic policy in line with the suggestions of the scientific community. Learning comes from the knowledge of the epistemic community.
If members of the epistemic community occupy key positions in the bureaucracy, scientifically informed policy-making is more likely to occur. Knowledge creation may lead to a new understanding of issues, linking issues that were previously seen as distinct.
In addition to power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based sources of regime formation, the literature provides one other factor crucial to regime formation: contextual factors.
3.4 Contextual factors
These are factors unrelated directly to the regime in question but nevertheless have an impact. Regimes form when the ‘time is right’, that is, when the context for formation is suitable. Obviously, a regime governing carbon emissions was unlikely to emerge in 1943, at the height of World War II, because the contextual factors would not permit it, there were other more pressing issues in the world at the time. A global emissions standard is much more likely today, given that there is worldwide concern regarding the effect of humans on climate change and there is a greater will among governments to tackle the climate change issue. This is what is called a “window of opportunity” in regime theory (Young & Osherenko, 1993). Regimes have a greater opportunity to form when contextual factors are suitable. Contextual factors are important to regime formation as issues far removed from specific issues may impact the timing and content of regime formation. When the initial proposals for the Arctic Council were being discussed in Ottawa and Washington, the election of Bill Clinton in 1993 proved to be an
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important “window of opportunity” for the formation of an Arctic environmental regime.
Clinton was much more focused on climate change than his predecessor, which gave a greater likelihood for an environmental regime in the Arctic to be agreed to.
3.5 Causal mix
In reality, regime formation is likely to be spurred on by a combination of all three processes: power, interest and knowledge more broadly, with individual leadership contextual factors as intervening variables. Moreover, each of these processes interacts with each other in complex ways. Some of these interactions can be relatively straightforward. In most cases, however, these interactions between sources of change are extremely complex, and are not easily studied. In the end, as Oran Young (1999) explains, “many – perhaps most – changes in international regimes are products of a number of forces that operate simultaneously.” Nevertheless, given that individual leadership is necessary to regime formation, we should expect to see individual leadership in the formation stage of the Arctic Council. Putting the aforementioned processes into a flowchart we get the following result:
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