13. Three Key Findings of China’s Arctic Cooperation
13.1 China as an “outsider”
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13. Three Key Findings of China’s Arctic Cooperation
13.1 China as an “outsider”
As a non-Arctic state, Chinese officials understand that China is not in a favourable position to directly assert its interests in the current regional governance structure.
Chinese officials involved with the Arctic Council are well aware that the Arctic States are still suspicious of non-Arctic states having significant relations with the Council (Jia
& Shi, 2014). A non-Arctic state actively pursuing a role in Arctic affairs is inevitably going to lead to consternation among traditional regional powers. Because of this suspicion, China has had to advance its interests incrementally and carefully. The MFA’s special representative for climate change, Gao Feng, has stated that as China has only just formally entered the Arctic Council, it “must act prudent” as to not attract the ire of the Arctic States (Yao, 2013). As an “outsider” to Arctic affairs, China’s behaviour in the region is markedly different than in areas where it is an “insider”, or where it has clear rights to participate in regional affairs. China’s dealings with the Council are marked by caution. Chinese officials continually stress an adherence to international law, reminding coastal states that China makes no claim over Arctic territory or resources, and have tended to stress issues of cooperation over confrontation. China’s status as an outsider to Arctic affairs has led to the foundation for China’s Arctic activities: stressing the trans-regional nature of Arctic issues, especially climate change and shipping, and thus the need for China to play a role in regional governance.
A prevailing view of many Chinese scholars is that when one looks at the world, every region is already governed by Western powers, except for the Arctic.23 The governance structure in the Arctic has not been fully established, but it is emerging. This has given impetus to China’s emerging Arctic strategy. At the same time, Chinese scholars and policymakers have begun to worry that the eight Arctic states are using a Monroe Doctrine policy to assert dominance over the region. Xiao Yang, of the Beijing-based think tank CICIR, described the exclusiveness of the Arctic States in this way:
Although China’s status as a formal observer to the Arctic Council indicates that it has an acknowledged status as a major player in the Arctic governance architecture, it has not fundamentally changed the aspect of China’s
23 Interview with a Taiwanese Arctic scholar.
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marginalization in Arctic affairs, which is due to the Council’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ logic being extended into the Arctic (Xiao, 2014).
The perception of a Monroe Doctrine in the Arctic makes China’s early participation in Arctic governance very important. As an outsider, being excluded from the Arctic Council’s decision-making has been a perennial concern of China, but has taken on increasing importance in recent years. Being a part of the governance structure and being able to influence the rules of the region is crucial to China’s future role in the Arctic.
China’s perception, which seems validated by looking at the current structure of the Arctic Council, is that the eight Arctic states currently have a monopoly on the governance of Arctic climate change research, Arctic shipping, and the development of Arctic resources. Rules promulgated by the Council have the ability to directly impact these three key Chinese interests. Given China’s key Arctic interests, it has become imperative for China to weaken to monopoly position of the Arctic states. As Gou Haibo, former director of the MFA’s Department of Law and Treaty and Chinese representative to the Arctic Council’s 2009 Ministerial Meeting, wrote in 2011:
The Arctic states have generally expanded their sovereign and jurisdictional rights within the Arctic…Inter-regional issues like shipping, resource exploration, and environmental protection have required cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states, which could potentially lead to the weakening of Arctic states’ monopolistic position within the region. Given that cooperation is required with non-Arctic states, it is impossible for non-Arctic states to simply be the passive users of Arctic sea routes. Nor can non-Arctic states simply be the end consumers of the region’s energy and resources. Rather, they need to actively participate in the decision-making processes and governance regimes within the Arctic region (Jakobson & Lee, 2013).
Becoming a permanent observer to the Council in 2013 is seen as the first step to improving China’s influence on the regional governance body.
Framing Arctic issues as trans-regional
The rhetoric that Chinese officials use to describe Arctic issues matches China’s status as an outsider. Chinese officials tend to frame Arctic governance as a global concern, not just a regional one. As Zhao Jun said in 2013, “the Arctic issues also include trans-regional ones, such as climate change, maritime shipping and so on, which need to be addressed with the joint efforts of the international community” (Zhao, 2013). To China,
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a solely regional approach is deemed insufficient to manage current problems because
“regional arrangements are also unable to solve trans-regional environmental and climate issues or global issues concerning the Arctic, including navigation and energy” (Cheng, 2011). Yang Jian of the SIIS argues that the inclusiveness of the Council has detrimental impacts on its workings.
In an era of globalization, as transnational problems predominate in matters of governance, the Arctic Council needs to adopt a more inclusive attitude. It should not exclude large countries outside the region from having their say, which is tantamount to denying their legitimate rights, relieving them of their responsibilities and taking away from them the opportunity to make a valuable contribution. In doing so, the Arctic would be denied the good governance it must have. (Jian, 2012).
Framing Arctic issues as ‘trans-regional’ in nature opens the door to non-Arctic states’
(i.e. China) participation in regional governance. China’s approach to international cooperation in the Arctic contrasts with their approach to issues where they are the
‘insider’. An illustrative example is China’s behaviour in the South China Sea.
China’s has tried to make the South China Sea a regional issue rather than a global one.
In the South China Sea, China advocates for a regional approach to governance, rather than framing the issues as ‘trans-regional’ ones. China “does not want to
‘internationalize’ the South China Sea disputes and insists on bilateral negotiations with other claimants” (Kao 2012b). China has asserted that issues in the South China Sea should be resolved through negotiations “between sovereign states directly involved in the disputes” (Wang, 2014). This approach stands in stark contrast to China’s multilateral approach to the Arctic, where the issues are described as transnational and require the combined input of both regional and non-regional actors. The nature of the governance issues in the South China Sea make China’s stance even more conspicuous. The South China Sea is one of the most important bodies of water in the world, and is host to ships carrying goods to and from the biggest markets in the world. Shipping lanes through the region are much more trans-regional in nature than those in the Arctic. But, framing these issues as trans-regional would justify the participation of non-regional actors, e.g. the United States, in South China Sea governance, which is inimical to Beijing’s interests.
Comparing Beijing’s approach to cooperation in the Arctic and its approach to cooperation in the South China Sea brings China’s strategy into clearer focus.
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Of interest to China is also how the United States (and other foreign powers) have managed to insert themselves into the South China Sea dispute while being outsiders to the conflict. The US maintains that freedom of navigation is of upmost importance in the South China Sea and uses the protection of free and open maritime navigation as a way to assert its interests in the region. China could learn from this strategy in its pursuit of greater Arctic influence. Indeed, China’s insistence on the trans-regional nature of Arctic shipping and the freedom of navigation through the Arctic sea lanes allows it to insert itself into regional decision-making, a nearly identical strategy to that of the United States in the South China Sea.
China’s status as an outsider means that its desire to exert greater influence in Arctic affairs will be met with resistance. Moreover, becoming an observer to the Arctic Council seems to be the limit of formal participation that China can achieve as a non-Arctic state (as non-Arctic states cannot become voting members in the Council). Joining the Arctic Council as an observer and framing the narrative of Arctic issues as trans-regional issues that require the participation of all stakeholders has given China more legitimacy in participating in regional governance, but this may not be enough for Beijing. Besides this strategy there is also another strategy to increase its influence in the Arctic that China seems to be pursuing: increasing cooperation with Arctic indigenous groups.
Indigenous groups China’s key to greater influence?
Arctic indigenous groups may provide China with another way into greater participation in Arctic affairs. Several of the largest and most influential indigenous groups are permanent participants to the Arctic Council, meaning they have more influence over the Council’s workings than observers do. Moreover, as devolution of power and control of resources from state capitals to Arctic regions and Arctic peoples has taken place in Alaska, Canada, Greenland and the Nordic countries over the past several decades, indigenous groups in the Arctic have ownership of large swathes of Arctic territory and the right to decide how to develop the resources located therein (Koivurova, Tervo, &
Stepien, 2008).
Chinese scholars began mentioning Arctic indigenous peoples around 2013 (Yang, 2013).
As a sign of Beijing’s support for this new strategy, the idea of Chinese support for indigenous groups has made its way into MFA officials’ statements. In 2013, China’s
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ambassador to Norway Zhao Jun stated that China is ‘most willing’ to explore possibilities for cooperation with the Arctic’s indigenous peoples. High-level officials have stated that by using their position as permanent observers to promote the rights and interests of Arctic indigenous groups will “strengthen China’s influence over Arctic affairs” (Jia & Shi, 2014). Some cooperation is already taking place. Chinese resource projects in the Arctic, notably in Greenland, where the majority of the population is Inuit, have received the support of indigenous groups (Jun, 2011). In 2013, China hosted the 5th Annual World Reindeer Herders Congress in Inner Mongolia. The Association of World Reindeer Herders is a group representing 100,000 reindeer herders from 20 different indigenous peoples scattered over nine different states including China that maintains close ties to the Arctic Council.24 The conference helped elevate China’s cooperation with Arctic indigenous groups and “illustrated China’s willingness and capability to contribute to the rights and interests of Arctic indigenous peoples” (Jia &
Shi, 2014). Building better relations with Arctic indigenous groups may give China a different door to influencing Arctic affairs.
China’s approach to international cooperation in Arctic governance, namely, stressing the
‘trans-national’ nature of Arctic issues and thus the need for China to be a part of decision-making in the region, is a direct product of its status as an “outsider” in Arctic affairs. China’s recent approach of strengthening relations with Arctic indigenous groups is likely related to China’s attempt to increase its Arctic influence given its “outsider”
status.