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community, specifically the territorial sovereignty of Arctic States. Gao Feng has tried to counter several voices within China that believe there is a looming territorial war as well as foreign suspicion of Chinese Arctic intentions. Much of the suspicions of the international community regarding China’s entry into the Arctic stems from the fact that the Chinese government has not officially published its Arctic strategy. Current suspicions will likely continue until Beijing publishes such a document. In an attempt to assuage some of these concerns, speaking with Xinhua shortly after China was admitted as a permanent observer, Gao stressed that the Arctic is not unclaimed territory (“北极不 是无主之地”), thus there should be no worries about Chinese incursions into the region (Yao, 2013).
Becoming an observer to the Council is a successful step forward for China’s foreign policy. Establishing a position in the regime was a high priority action for China’s Arctic strategy, and will give China more influence in the direction of the Council in the future.
Chen Lianzeng, Vice-Minister of the SOA, gave some insight into China’s planned polar objectives for the years 2011-2015. China’s 12th 5-year plan included targets of deepening knowledge of the impacts of climate change on the polar regions, expanding exploration programs and taking an active role in polar affairs and strengthening China’s strategic position. In order to achieve these goals, Chen stressed the need to make breakthroughs in both soft and hard power (Pan, 2009). Becoming a permanent observer to the Arctic Council in 2013 was surely a success in this regard.
12. Official Chinese Position on Arctic Cooperation
The Chinese government has not yet published an official record of its position on the Arctic. An official Arctic strategy will likely not emerge until after 2016.17 Nevertheless, Chinese officials have given speeches and published writings outlining Beijing’s general policies on Arctic issues. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the lead organization regarding Arctic cooperation and thus the writings and speeches from MFA officials are crucial to our understanding of Beijing’s emerging strategy. Within the MFA, the
17 In 2012, the Chinese government commissioned a 5-year study to assess polar resources and governance.
The study is due to be completed in 2016 and will likely be followed by an official Chinese Arctic strategy.
See: Brady, 2014.
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assistant foreign minister is the highest-ranking official to address Arctic issues (Jakobson & Peng, 2012). Various PRC ambassadors as well as high-level officials from the MFA have also addressed China’s Arctic policy. There have been five important statements that have outlined the policy that China follows regarding Arctic cooperation.
Taken together, the following five statements form the most comprehensive, up-to-date outline of China’s thinking on the geopolitics of the Arctic and its role therein.
12.1 2009 – Hu Zhengyue (胡正跃)
The first substantial public discussion of China’s role in the Arctic came from Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Zhengyue in Norway on a ‘High North Study Tour’ in 2009. Hu gave the speech while attending an Arctic forum organized by the Norwegian government. In his speech Hu emphasized China’s wish to see disputes related to sovereignty settled through peaceful dialogue, stressed the importance of adhering to the rules espoused by UNCLOS, and acknowledged the rights that each Arctic state maintains in regards to its territory (Ning, 2009). Regarding delimitation of coastal states’ extended continental shelf, Hu said that “When determining the delimitation of outer continental shelves, the Arctic states need to not only properly handle relationships among themselves, but also must consider the relationship between the continental shelf and the international submarine area that is the common human heritage, to ensure a balance of coastal countries’ interests and the common interests of the international community” (Jakobson, 2010). His statement implied that China may dispute any claims to sovereignty in the Arctic waters beyond the 200-mile EEZ by countries that have signed UNCLOS. This speech set the foundation for future Chinese officials and began China’s habit of framing Arctic issues as global issues that affect non-Arctic states.
12.2 2010 – Liu Zhenmin (刘振民)
One year later, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin attended another ‘High North Study Tour’ in Norway. Like his predecessor, Liu gave a speech outlining Beijing’s position on Arctic cooperation. Liu’s speech was the clearest outline of official Chinese policy on cooperation with the Arctic states before China’s ascension to permanent observership of the Council in 2013. First, Liu gave three reasons why China
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is interested in Arctic cooperation: the geographical location of China relative to the Arctic, China’s need for Arctic scientific knowledge, and the potential impacts of future Arctic developments on China. Next, Liu gave his impression on the trend of Arctic cooperation over the past 20 years. First, there is a strong and practical need to strengthen Arctic cooperation. Second, the areas of Arctic cooperation are continuously expanding.
Liu noted that the Arctic Council began by governing environmental protection and scientific research but is now expanding into one of China’s key interests: shipping.
Third, Arctic cooperation is increasingly institutionalized and the model is becoming mature. Recognizing China as a ‘non-Arctic state’, Liu said that China is ready to cooperate with the Arctic states and that cooperation between Arctic states and non-Arctic states should be based on four points:
1. States should recognize and respect each others’ rights under international law;
2. Cooperation should be based on mutual trust and understanding;
3. Trans-regional issues require research to be done cooperatively; and
4. Peace, stability and sustainable development of the Arctic region are the most important goals for the region (Liu, 2010).
It is apparent that Liu’s first point regarding nations respecting each others rights under international law was not only directed at the rights of Arctic States, but also the rights of non-Arctic states under existing international law. China stresses that while UNCLOS gives Arctic states sovereign rights and jurisdiction over their respective Arctic territories, non-Arctic states still have rights of scientific research and navigation. As Liu said,
In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the Arctic region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation […] Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other’s rights under the international law (Liu, 2010).
In addition to UNCLOS, China points out that non-Arctic states also maintain rights to Arctic activities through the Svalbard Treaty. Liu’s second point stressed that non-Arctic states have legitimate interests in the Arctic and that Arctic states and non-Arctic states should look for areas of mutual interest instead of focusing on areas of potential conflict.
‘Mutual trust’ means less suspicion of Chinese activities by coastal states. The third
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point, one that is used very often by Chinese officials, is that many Arctic issues are trans-regional in nature. Issues like shipping and climate change affect not only the Arctic states, but also the international community as a whole, and thus require research to be done cooperatively. By involving non-Arctic states in joint research the Council, China argues the Council can more effectively complete its objectives. Framing Arctic issues as
‘trans-regional’ gives Chinese activities in the region legitimacy. The fourth point noted that although the different parties have different rights, interests and specific concerns in the region, peaceful development is the common interest of all the parties involved. In this way, Arctic states and non-Arctic states “are partners, not competitors” (Liu, 2010).
Unsurprisingly, an important issue for Beijing and the thread running through Liu’s speech is how China can get involved in decision making in the region. Speaking about his third point, Liu was very frank, “the issue for Arctic Council members now is how to involve non-Arctic states in relevant research endeavors and discussions at an early stage and in depth” (Liu, 2010). Being involved in decision making is seen as the best way to influence the Council in China’s interest (Jakobson & Peng, 2012).
12.3 2012 – Lan Lijun (兰立俊)
At the meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers in 2012, China’s Ambassador to Sweden Lan Lijun addressed the Council to outline Beijing’s Arctic policies. Lan began his short statement by saying that China views the Arctic Council as the most important institution in the Arctic. Like Hu and Liu before him, Lan stressed that China places importance on the “recognition of Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic” (Lan, 2012). After noting that some Arctic issues are regional and should naturally be dealt with by the Arctic nations, Ambassador Lan also reiterated that China views some issues as trans-regional, namely climate change and international shipping. In these trans-regional issues Beijing believes it should be part of the governing process as China is a “near-Arctic state” (近北极国家), a new phrase that China has begun using to describe itself (Lan, 2012). Describing itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ affords China more legitimacy in being involved with Arctic governance.
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12.4 2013 – Zhao Jun (赵军)
The fourth speech came in September 2013 when China’s ambassador to Norway Zhao Jun outlined China’s interest in Arctic affairs while reiterating China’s respect for the sovereign rights of the Arctic states. Zhao also put emphasis on building relations with Arctic indigenous peoples. This was the first time that the topic of support for Arctic indigenous peoples was emphasized in Chinese speeches. Zhao stated:
China respects the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants. China is most willing to further enhance the relationship with indigenous peoples’ organizations, promote its understanding of the concerns of the indigenous peoples, and actively participate in relevant projects and explore possibilities for cooperation so as to make contributions to the benefits of the indigenous peoples in the region (Zhao, 2013).
Around the same time as Zhao’s speech, Arctic scholars in China have also begun to stress the importance of improving the livelihood of Arctic indigenous peoples.18 Building relations with the Arctic’s indigenous groups may be seen by Beijing as one way to get around influence of the Arctic Eight. Indigenous groups have more decision-making authority in the Council given their status as permanent participant. China may be able to use this increased authority to further their influence over the Council’s workings.
Arctic indigenous groups also have significant rights over how their land is developed.
Building relations with these groups may bring economic benefits to Chinese companies in search of resources. Zhao’s speech evidenced that China realizes Arctic indigenous groups may provide another way for China to exert influence on the Council’s activities.
Also notable in Zhao’s speech was his stress on the importance of legally binding rules in the region, suggesting that Beijing accepts the evolution of the Arctic Council to more legally based body.
12.5 2014 – Jia Guide (贾桂徳) & Shi Wuhong (石午虹)
The most comprehensive discussion on China’s Arctic policy has come in the summer of 2014, one year after China’s ascension to the Arctic Council as a permanent observer.
Writing in the SIIS-published journal Guoji Zhanwang ( 国 际 展 望 ), the MFA’s
18 Yang Jian at SIIS, a couple months before Zhao’s speech in Norway, writes, “China is also deeply concerned about the indigenous people’s wellbeing in the Arctic” (Yang, 2013).
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Department of Law and Treaty Assistant Deputy Director-General Jia Guide and First Secretary Shi Wuhong gave an updated view of China’s position on Arctic cooperation.19 The two MFA officials offered their thoughts on the future of “China’s Arctic participation under new circumstances” (Jia and Shi, 2014).
Jia and Shi laid out China’s perspective on the legal structure of the Arctic. Specifically, China views six legal documents or arrangements as the foundation of governing Arctic activities:
• UNCLOS;
• Svalbard Treaty;
• Various international environmental treaties (e.g. UNFCCC);
• Polar Code;
• Arctic Council legal agreements; and
• The domestic law of Arctic States.
Beijing’s stress on the Svalbard Treaty is likely due to the fact that the treaty allows Chinese commercial activities in the Arctic region.20 The Svalbard Treaty gives China the right to develop Arctic infrastructure and to develop Arctic resources in the Svalbard archipelago and is used as a foundation for China’s right to participate in Arctic affairs.
Interestingly, Jia and Shi spend an extended amount of time discussing the “deep-seated conflicts and complex sensitivities that each party has, that will not be solved in the short-term.”21 One of the most deep-seated conflicts, in China’s opinion, is the exclusion of non-Arctic States from substantive decision-making. Regarding the two legally binding agreements signed in 2011 and 2013, the Council “shut the door” while the Arctic States negotiated among themselves, and did “not seek the opinion of those non-Arctic states that use the waterways or develop the resources” (Jia and Shi, 2014). This statement suggests that China will insist on being part of the negotiations of future legally binding
19 The statement by Jia and Shi has been the highest-level official statement addressing China’s Arctic position since China became a permanent observer in 2013. Jia was China’s top Arctic official, and representative to the Arctic Council, in 2013 and 2014. Shi was China’s representative to the Deputy Ministerial Meeting in 2012. To my knowledge, their views have not yet been published in English commentaries.
20 The Svalbard Treaty was signed in 1920 and gave full sovereignty of the Spitsbergen Archipelago to Norway, but allowed all contracting parties access to the archipelago’s resources including fishing and hunting, and the unconditional right to undertake any kind of maritime, industrial or mining activity. China became a contracting party in 1925.
21 Original quote as it appears: “各方深层次矛盾和冲突复杂敏感，短期内难以消除” (Jia & Shi, 2014).
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agreements. As a country that uses Arctic resources and shipping lanes, China views itself as having the right to participate in regional decision-making.
Jia and Shi make clear that as a rising power one of China’s greatest problems is that its participation in international organizations is constantly met with suspicion, and in many cases, undue scrutiny.22 In the face of both opportunities and threats to regional participation, Jia and Shi write that as a near-Arctic state China will persist in three key areas:
• Continue to respect the sovereignty, sovereign rights, and administrative rights of the Arctic States;
• Insist on using UNCLOS and other establish international laws to solve regional problems; and
• Continue to advocate multilateral cooperation in scientific and environmental research, shipping, and sustainable development.
The essay by Jia and Shi suggests a more assertive Chinese presence in Arctic governance in the coming years. Being a part of creating governance mechanisms, not just observing them, is a clear goal of MFA officials. This goal is also shared by Chinese scholars; Cheng Baozhi (2011), of SIIS, writes:
China supports the UNCLOS and other international conventions governing the Arctic. At the same time, it is fully aware that the current governance system has not resolved disputes in the Arctic and takes the position that many aspects of the system need to be amended in light of specific problems in the region…In terms of redressing defects in the current Arctic governance system, China will play a critical role given its extensive interests in Arctic research, environmental protection, resource exploration and navigation.
The statements of MFA officials and Arctic scholars both point to an accommodation of China’s interests as one of the Arctic ambitions of China. Playing a constructive role in making amendments to the system is a key part of China’s emerging Arctic strategy.
12.6 China’s emerging Arctic strategy
Although Beijing’s official position on Arctic issues has not been published, the aforementioned writings and speeches by Foreign Ministry officials outline China’s
22 Jia and Shi also reproach some of the more hardline commentaries by Chinese writers and officials whose articles have titles such as “Chinese sovereign rights in the Arctic” and “The Arctic should belong to all of mankind”, saying these only add to foreign suspicions of Chinese foreign policy.
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evolving position. It can be summarized as follows: China stresses the importance of adhering to international law regarding Arctic sovereignty in order to assuage concerns about China’s Arctic activities, while at the same time advocating a cooperative approach to Arctic governance with non-Arctic states (i.e. China) having greater input into how decisions are made. The last part is an important insight that has emerged from the above analysis of Chinese MFA officials’ speeches and writings. An overarching theme has been improving the role of non-Arctic states in decision-making. China’s recent public support for Arctic indigenous groups fits in with this theme.
The above analysis suggests the most important short-term strategic goal for China in the Arctic is having greater influence on decision-making in the region. The Arctic Council, as the most important regional governance body, is an obvious target for China’s strategy. By having a larger effect on the legal output of the Council, which the first section of this thesis suggests will be a growing trend, China can better influence the regional governance structure of the Arctic and shape the region into one more in line with its three key interests of climate change science, shipping, and resources.
Beijing’s emerging strategy, as inferred from statements from MFA officials, is consistent with the actions China has taken in the region, including a push to develop Arctic knowledge, expanding development of Arctic resources, increasing bilateral ties with the Arctic States, joining the Arctic Council, and furthering support for Arctic indigenous groups.
Beyond a discussion of China’s strategic goals for the Arctic, what does China’s response to the Arctic Council tell us about Chinese foreign policy or Chinese national interests more broadly? There are three important findings that have emerged from an analysis of China’s response to the Arctic Council: China’s response to the Arctic Council in relation to its status as an “outsider” to Arctic governance, China’s general support for the Council’s transition from soft law to hard law, and China’s view of Canada’s maritime sovereignty claims. The first two findings directly relate to China’s relations with the Arctic Council, while the third relates to the views shared between China and Canada on maritime territorial sovereignty.
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