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Just as in the formation of an ethnic-based identity when Taiwanese viewed themselves in stark contrast to the Mainland Chinese oppressing them, so in the more recent shift of national identity did the focus of people’s national identity become
‘redefined’ in terms of differences in their democratic political and social system (Chow, p.104). Civil society, according to Yun-han Chu, between 1983 and 1988 emerged as a trend by which there was a steady growth in social protest on all kinds of issues, affirming that “once democratization had gathered momentum the development of social movements quickly followed suit” (Shiau, 1999, p. 107-108). The evolution of social and political change in Taiwan shows a tremendous interdependence connecting the two processes. There appears to be a sort of ‘give and take’ tendency in Taiwanese progress in which a political reformation spurred by social unrest subsequently configured a new spirit of nationalism which then supported the democratic political system. In their famous research on Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1989) stipulate that a “civic culture” is crucial to sustaining a stable democracy. It can therefore be argued that for Taiwan’s case, democracy opened the door for a civic identity to form and this new identity in turn helped guarantee the successful achievement of democracy.
3.4 Conclusion
This period in Taiwan’s history from 1980 – 1995 represents a drastic and rapid shift in the political and cultural setting on the island. Aside from the apparent political liberalization and promotion of the “Taiwanization movement” during these fifteen years, it is clear that it is difficult to discuss democratization during this period without also discussing national identity, and vice versa. The effect of democratization on the ideology of the Taiwanese as promoted by the civic society and opposition party and then developed under Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Deng-hui, is well expressed by Chu and Lin, in which they comment that “Recurring political participation under a democratic regime helped develop a sense of collective consciousness among the people, transforming the term “Taiwan” from a geographic unit to a political community and the term “Taiwanese”
from an ethnic term for native Taiwanese to a civic term for citizens of Taiwan” (p.123).
As seen here, the commencement of a democratic transition in Taiwan also marks the shift from ethnic identity to a politicized ‘state’- centered national identity for Taiwanese.
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David Brown (2004) poses the dilemma of whether ethnic conflict promotes or inhibits democratization (p.43). The analysis of this historical period seems to prove that for the case of Taiwan, “ethnic conflict,” if the island’s dilemma of ethnic identity may be labeled as such, fell on the optimistic side of the equation, in the end promoting and aligning with democratization. As professor Wang of Academia Sinica testified in 2009, the period between 1980 and 1991 was “the first open and organized campaign of which Taiwanese identity began to emerge along the process of democratic transition in Taiwan”
(p.17). Wang’s statement along with the analysis provided throughout this chapter portrays the relative parallel between the process of Taiwanization and democratization that continues through this stage in Taiwan’s history. Not only was Taiwanese identity representing an alternative national identity to that previously being imposed by the Chinese, and which in the past had been imposed by previous colonial rulers, but so did democracy propose an alternate form of government to that imposed by the KMT. The roles of the educated middle class, opposition party and KMT leaders all played a part in the onset of this crucial political transition, and this political transition then played a large role in the evolution of a civic national identity while this new form of identity helped support the success of democracy on the island. The subsequent chapter will continue the historical analysis of this relationship in Taiwan bringing this study up to the most recent advancements.
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Chapter 4
1996 – Present day: consolidating democracy, “Taiwanese” identity, and the return of the China factor
This final period of analysis witnesses the achievement and consolidation of democracy alongside a growing trend of Taiwanese national identity on the island, however with one distinct feature differentiating the development in this stage from those previously examined, and that is the China factor. In the concluding words of the 2001 work
“Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan,” Yu-han Chu and T.J. Cheng provided an anecdote predicting the issues which they perceived would be prominent for Taiwan in the 21st century. Although this statement precedes first-hand knowledge of Taiwan’s imminent predicament, the authors provide a very succinct and accurate illustration of the transition of key influences which have affected the development of and relationship between democracy and national identity in the most recent era in Taiwan:
“Into the next century, the people of Taiwan will continue to wrestle with competing claims to their political allegiance and cultural identity. The deepening of economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China, the settlement of an increasingly larger number of Taiwanese businessmen and migrants in the mainland, and the emergence of a Mandarin-based media industry across the Straits will certainly complicate the consolidation of Taiwanese identity” (p.129).
The last decade has been filled with works by both domestic and international scholars such as Stéphane Corcuff (2012), Peter C.Y. Chow (2008, 2012), Yun-han Chu (2004), Naiteh Wu (2012) and Michael Danielsen (2012) discussing the most recent challenges confronting democracy and national identity on the island, including anxiety specifically towards the influence of the “China factor”. Danielson expresses concern that growing economic interdependence across the strait has already caused “A continued deterioration in Taiwan’s democracy” (2012, p. 135). Shelley Rigger in 2011 considered two impending challenges to the deepening of democracy on the island, “First, the rate of progress toward democratic deepening has slowed, both in the institutional sense and in the popular views of democracy. Second, Taiwan’s democracy faces significant external
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threat: Beijing’s determination to integrate Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” (p. 5).
Matsuda however also gives credence to the influence which democracy and national identity in Taiwan have on cross-strait relations, in 2004 stating that “Political changes in the Taiwan Strait have been mainly initiated by Taiwan’s democratization and localization” (p. 11). This could suggest a differing viewpoint that the democratic ideals and growing Taiwanese identity which have developed over the years may actually affect China’s ability to coerce unification across the strait. The “China factor” plays a prominent and influential role throughout this final period of analysis, with differing policies under each of the three leaders of this era drastically shifting the relations across the strait and directly impacting both national identity and the continued process of democratic consolidation. The influence of cross-strait relations will therefore be treated here as a strong factor affecting the discussion of the continued development of these two processes, but the relationship of these two processes as promoted under Taiwan’s political elite will also prove to act as influential and dynamic factors impacting the continued progression of cross-strait relations.
To clarify, this is not to say that the mainland was not an important issue to Taiwan’s political elite previous to the 1990s. Since the relocation of the KMT to Taiwan in 1949, the contention across the strait never fully dissipated, and the issue of reunification, as pressed by the authoritarian KMT rule and fought by the opposition.
However Taiwan’s democratization and growing discussion of the island’s sovereignty sparked a renewed interest from China resulting in a transition in cross-strait relations.
Just as the strong policies and decisions of the political elite were essential in influencing the paths towards democracy and a localized and civic identity in the 1980s to early 1990s, so will this most recent period trace the roles of the recent political figures and their influence on the consolidation of democracy and increasing shifts in national identity as can be largely seen in their response to cross-strait relations.
4.1 Tracing the final chapter of development
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The major themes evoked through this final phase of analysis for the parallel of democracy and national identity in Taiwan can be largely symbolized through the divergent scenario surrounding the first year of this section of study. The year 1996 on the one hand marks the first popular presidential election, which is endorsed by many political scientists as the “clear and definitive” realization of democracy (Rigger, 2011, p.
1). On the other hand, 1996 also marks the third Taiwan Missile Crisis, representing a huge shift in cross-strait issues, which as prescribed above, have proved greatly influential to political policies and domestic sentiments leading up to the present day.
These two major instances are representative of the transitioning and conflicting characteristics present in this latter stage of study which have become prominent factors rendering the changes in strategies of the political elite. As Chu asserts, “In the end, the state became the arena. The competing forces strove to gain control of the governing apparatus and use its power to steer cross-strait relations, erect a distinct cultural hegemony, and impose their own vision of nation-building…” (2004, p. 499).
York Chen in 2012 outlines three different paradigms of strategies towards the further development of democracy and national identity on the island in response to the threats from cross-strait relations, differentiating from “Two- Chiang, Lee-Chen, and Ma—and their constitutive elements, values, beliefs, and methods” (Chow, 2012, p. 10).
The latter two paradigms, “Lee-Chen” and “Ma”, refer to the leadership in this final period of analysis, which can refer to the interaction between these leaders and opposition during their rule, as well as the interaction and shifting trends within each political party.
Aside from the domestic factors of competition and changing political interests during this period, many of the shifts in political policy during this time were “shaped by particular conceptualizations of the relationship between Taiwan and China.” (Chow, 2012, p. 10). This historical analysis will follow Chen’s paradigm to examine these
“particular conceptualizations” of the leaders of this period, and in particular explore how these projections have influenced and altered the continuing processes of democratic consolidation and national identity formation in Taiwan.
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4.2 The shifts in policy under the first Taiwanese, democratically elected president, Lee Deng-hui
As introduced above the year of 1996, which is the opening juncture of this third and final stage of analysis, is viewed by many as a “landmark in Taiwan’s democratization”
(The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2003, p. 2). Lee’s re-election through a democratic process is not only a milestone for the success of the island’s transition to a democracy, but is also major for the Taiwanese on the island as the first popularly elected president was a native Taiwanese. This in its own right is monumental and exemplifies the strong bond filled through the achievements up to this point in both politics and national identity on the island. According to Francoise Mengin (1999, p. 120), “The fact that the result obtained by Lee was higher than that of his party – both at the elections of the National Assembly (49.68%) held the same day, and at the Legislative Yuan elections (46.06 %) held a few months earlier – is significant of the link uniting national identity with political changes, in this case the democratization process.” As discussed in the former chapter, Lee Deng-hui, prior to being popularly elected had already established a strong stance promoting democracy and “Taiwanization” on the island. Lee’s approach leading up to and following his election, although maintaining and furthering its localization efforts, also shifted towards reconfiguring the island’s policies towards cross-strait relations. According to Lin and Tedards, “Lee clearly understood that he must obtain and keep the support of the Taiwanese people. His use of democracy and public opinion to resist the pressure from China also ensured his easy victory in the first direct presidential election” (2002, p. 96).
In the midst of Lee’s election and this great transition for democracy, the Taiwan Missile Crisis was altering not only cross-strait relations but also the national identity and the domestic outlook towards the Mainland. With the reaction that was triggered from the general population on the island and the growing demands of the opposition party, Lee opened up the discussion of a policy unlike the previous “One China” framework, instead promoting concepts of “Taiwan sovereignty,” demonstrating a new era of KMT discourse and influence on the people of Taiwan. The slogans promoted under Lee Deng-hui during this period and his effort to shift the notion of sovereignty in Taiwan reflect Lee’s
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determination to “distance the country” from the previous colonial governments, which Lee called “a regime that came [to Taiwan] from the outside (wailai zhengquan)” (Jacobs, 2008, p. 50). The following section will therefore deliver an in-depth examination of the events which affected Lee’s second term of presidency from 1996-2000 along with the leader’s political rhetoric and efforts in respect to cross-strait relations, the effects of his policies on the early stages of democratic consolidation, as well as the more drastic manipulation of national identity on the island framed against mainland China.
4.2.1 The 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis
In order to fully comprehend the impact which the 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis had on the future cross-strait policies as well as on the shifting domestic environment of the island, it is imperative to first elaborate on the details of the incident. This missile testing was a strategy of the PRC to use force to intimidate the island of Taiwan, and also evoke response from the United States, by conducting a series of missile tests and military exercises across the strait. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) first launched ballistic missiles over the strait in July 1995, initially in response to President Lee Deng-hui’s visit to his alma-mater Cornell University in the United States which was viewed by China as “a display of independence-minded sentiments” (Project on National Security Reform). The missile testing then advanced closer to Taiwan and continued through to March 1996 in anticipation of the first democratic elections on the island (Matsuda, 2004, p. 4). Scobell suggests a greater overall message from the mainland through this “show of force”, which was “to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence from China” (1999, p.
5). This incident is not only significant for its threat against Taiwan, but it is also the first
‘show of force’ from China towards Taiwan since the years of the civil war (Scobell, 1999, p. 6), signifying a sudden and drastic shift in a new era of cross-strait relations.
Unfortunately for the Beijing government, these aggressive tactics resulted in an unfavorable outcome for the PRC, most likely contrary to the intended effect.
China’s threatening strategy resulted in negative responses from both the United States as well as from the domestic population of Taiwan. First, the United States responded to the 1995-1996 Missile Crisis by sending a severe and clear message to China, dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Strait to protect Taiwan from
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any further military force. Second, aside from the implications of the stern stance taken by the United States, China’s efforts to intimidate the people of Taiwan also seemed to fail. Not only did people on the island continue to follow through with their first popular presidential elections to re-elect President Lee Deng-hui, but the missile threat from the mainland also seemed to push popular sentiment away from relating to China and further towards Lee’s promoted ‘Taiwanese’ identity. Shen and Wu (2008) attribute a considerable rise in Taiwanese identity from 1994 to 1996 as an effect of the PRC missile exercises and the survey data presented in the following chapter further supports this theory (p. 123). This coercion tactic therefore instigated a contradictory reaction to that intended, which in part with affecting the future political rhetoric on the island, also created a larger drift in the minds of the people between China and Taiwan, inducing a greater shift towards a pro-Taiwan attitude and Taiwanese national identity which will be clearly seen in the policies promoted by President Lee from 1995-2000.
4.2.2 “Special State- to-State” relations and the “New Taiwanese”
Following the 1995-1996 Missile Crisis, Lee Deng-hui’s policies can be viewed as clearly representing a diverging trend in respect to cross-strait relations, with his signature programs clearly promoting a very localized and pro-Taiwan approach stimulated by deepening democratic ideals and a reflection of the changes in national identity. There are a strong set of themes visible in Lee’s latter term as president that can be viewed as arising from the tensions across the Strait. The newfound policy objectives clearly shifted towards appeasing the people and protecting Taiwan from an ominous China by raising the strength of the people’s local identity as well as increasing concentration on the country’s sovereign stability. The major guiding principle of cross-strait relations throughout Lee’s second term as president was fostered under his tenet
“Go Slow, Be Patient,” which despite growing discontent among Taiwan’s business community, ensured a distance to be retained between China and Taiwan and
“strengthened the view in Beijing that economic carrots were not enough” (Chu, 2004, p.
488).
During the 1998 Taipei city mayoral elections, President Lee Deng-hui began campaigning for his concept of the “New Taiwanese” identity, which according to Hans
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Stockton represents the leader’s “effort to find a vehicle for national political unity on the island with which to induce people to localize their sense of cultural identity regardless of place of origin” (Stockton, 2008, p. 105). Even prior to implementing this policy, Lee preaches the necessity of building this connection between an island-wide, civic national identity, or “consciousness”, for which the people could attach themselves specifically to their common place of residence under a common democratic government:
“Among the 21 million people in Taiwan, there are aboriginals, and there are the compatriots who have come from the mainland over several hundred years.
Between us, there should be no argument about ethnic division…Only identify with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are Taiwanese.”9
Not only did the policy of “New Taiwanese” as described above aim to use the newly achieved democratic political system to create a more unified “Taiwanese” identity detached from ethnic roots, but it also encompassed the objective of forming a larger
“Taiwanese” identity which could help promote political unity under the new democratic system and support the elected leadership.
In the same party speech mentioned above, President Lee promotes the concept of the ‘sovereignty’ among the people of Taiwan’s grounded on the island’s newfound practices:
“The establishment of the ideal of sovereignty in the people is to stir up every citizen to use his consciousness of being master of his own country [guojia], contributing his wisdom and strength, realizing the respect that should be given to
“The establishment of the ideal of sovereignty in the people is to stir up every citizen to use his consciousness of being master of his own country [guojia], contributing his wisdom and strength, realizing the respect that should be given to