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neighboring giant. Lee’s cross-strait policies and shifting aspirations for Taiwan were carried out and further polarized by his successor Chen Shui-bian.
4.3 Growing tension under Chen Shui-bian
The election of Chen Shui-bian in the year 2000 marked a new phase of democratic progress and further shifts of national identity in Taiwan. This year is viewed by many as what Dafydd Fell (2012) declares a “democratic milestone” for the consolidation of democracy on the island for two key reasons (p. 75). Not only did this election represent a peaceful democratic transition of leaders, but also the first ever turnover of political parties since the arrival of the KMT to the island in 1949. The 2000 elections marked the beginning of two terms under the opposition Democratic Progressive Party President Chen Shui-bian, who like Lee, maintained a very controversial policy towards cross-strait relations and placed increasing prominence on the Taiwanization movement and the idea of sovereignty for the newly democratic Taiwan. Chu considers that with the “electoral victory of the DPP, the long-time opposition party that has adhered to a pro-independence platform since its founding years, the March 2000 presidential election dashed Beijing’s lingering hope that its leaders might put the genie back into the “One China bottle” in the post-Lee Teng-hui era” (2004, p. 488). In spite of the most controversial aspects of Chen’s leadership, of which there are many, this section will focus specifically on the effects which Chen’s policies, especially relating to cross-strait issues, had on further democratization and national identity development in Taiwan, for as Lee states in 2010, the initial victorious response towards Chen’s success at the polls “did not last very long”
(p. 1). National identity and democracy experienced transitional shifts, both re-enforcing and compromising, through Chen’s period of rule.
The Taiwanization movement which was initially promoted through Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Deng-hui received an even greater thrust under the Chen administration. According to Jacobs in 2008, “The Taiwanization of politics reached a new climax in March 2000 when Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the DPP, defeated the two main candidates of the divided Nationalist party and won presidency with a plurality
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of votes (Jacobs, 2008, p. 50). During his time as President, Chen further deepened the cultural and historical concepts related to Taiwan, with policies integrating “Taiwanese”
shifts into society to replace any previously taught and enforced Chinese practices: “The election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000 initiated new state efforts to promote a Taiwan identity. National funds have been redirected to support Taiwanese history and language education. Efforts to replace some China-oriented classes or class modules with Taiwan-based curriculum in public schools have caused quite a stir” (Stockton, 2008, p. 105).
Matsuda (2004) even relishes that Chen only managed to win his re-election through his support for Taiwanese identity and goes further to implore that “Chen Shui-bian has experienced, and his potential successors and opponents also witnessed, that Taiwanese identity was the ultimate weapon to win the election.” (2004, p. 12). Stockton in 2008 records the larger strategy of Chen in his final term, in which the President vocally announced his promotion of policies promoting Taiwanese identity, or what he refers to as “Taiwanese consciousness,” and democracy in his 2006 New Year address, stating that “democracy and Taiwan consciousness were vital to the country’s security”
(p. 106). Despite Chen’s supposed commitment to democracy as “vital” to the country, the President’s overbearing focus on ethnic identity, as well as other undemocratic practices are actually viewed by many as interfering with the process of consolidating democracy on the island.
Just as Chen in his eight years of rule went to great ends to promote the further integration of a local, “Taiwanese identity,” so is this emphasis on Taiwanese ethnic identity, focusing on culture, history and language, argued to have alienated the ethnic issue and created friction which is believed to have slowed or obstructed the further democratic consolidation on the island, proof of negative effects which have also arisen from the deeply integrated relationship between national identity and democracy on the island. The Atlantic Bulletin discusses some of the negative effects of the Taiwanese identity movement on the political elite’s promotion of democracy in Taiwan, writing that “The embedding into the political party system of conflicting perspectives on national identity and the broadening of public debate have made it harder to forge a consensus on national goals and policy, especially vis-à-vis the Mainland” (2003, p. 4)
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It is clear that at this point in Taiwan’s history, national identity and the democratic political system were already interdependent enough that issues and conflict of national identity during Chen’s presidency came to be viewed as a threatening factor for the island’s newly developing democracy. Aside from the very liberal views towards independent national identity, Chen’s era of presidency is also believed to have dampened the consolidation phase of democracy with excessive corruption, among which includes vote-buying. This alone violates many of the core principles of democracy, beginning with the essential “free and fair elections.” According to the American Bulletin (2003), although the buying of votes originally stemmed from the KMT, (it) began under Chen’s rule to extend to the DPP (2003, p. 2). The American Bullet goes further to express that “Not only does electoral corruption and vote buying subvert the democratic process, it also fosters links between politicians and organized crime syndicates” (p. 2).
In the end, Chen’s election as the first alternate political power to serve as president of Taiwan, although initially representing the further integration of democracy and Taiwanese consciousness on the island, appears to rather have presented an obstacle towards both the progression of national identity and democracy. The growing tension under Chen’s rule caused by the intensity of the Taiwanization movement in light of growing cross-strait tensions not only failed to solidify a larger conception of national identity on the island, but is also believed by many scholars to have threatened the effectiveness and progress of democracy. It is clear at this point in Taiwan’s recent history that by the year 2008, the notions of national identity and democracy were not only both equally engraved into political discourse, but also deeply resonated as important issues for the general population, and by the end of Chen’s period had far from reached their full potential of development. The cycle of the intertwined relationship of democracy and national identity in Taiwan has consequently continued to progress through the latest President Ma Ying-jeou’s first term and first half of his second term, arguably becoming even more clearly attached in response to the rising threat of China from increasing economic integration across the Strait.
4.4 Ma Ying-jeou’s great transition in strategy
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As current President Ma Ying-jeou stepped up to succeed the opposition party’s two terms of rule, it became visible very early on that this transition of power represented a rapid reversal of policies in regards to cross-strait relations. Since his inauguration in 2008, Ma’s administration has strongly shifted its strategy of national identity and democracy away from the trends previously promoted by his predecessors. In doing so, this leadership has managed to further highlight the distinct parallel which has developed between these two processes throughout history, especially in contrast to the growing economic investment across the Strait. Unlike the previous success of the political elite in guiding the development of democracy and national identity based on political strategies, the recent changes can be argued to be somewhat unexpected and divergent from the aspirations of the current political elite, which could be argued here in part to be due to the depth of this interdependent relationship that has been evolving for the past nearly fifty years. Ma’s presidency and this latter period of development is predominately characterized by the growing economic integration which has rapidly risen across the Strait, and this growing economic dependence on the Mainland will be shown to be separate, and arguably contradictory, to the latest trends in the relationship among democracy and national identity.
Before investigating the effects of specific policies and incidents under Ma’s period of rule, it is essential to outline the main motivation behind the drastic shift in cross-strait relations by providing a general illustration of the degree of economic exchange which had built up and then quickly progressed under the current administration. Despite the tense and at times hostile relationship with China under the Chen Shui-bian era, increasing economic exchanges across the Strait had already been expanding through Chen’s presidency and soared in the past five years. Yun-han Chu writes that by 2003, “China accounted for about 27% of Taiwan’s total exports, a historic record. Beyond this, Taiwanese companies held a total investment of at least US$70 billion in China, operating more than 60,000 projects and with more than half a million Taiwanese expatriates minding business on the mainland” (2004, 493). These numbers have been nearly doubled under Ma’s China centered policy. As of 2010, over 40% of Taiwan’s exports were directed to China along with 70% of Taiwan’s FDI, and over a million Taiwanese businessmen, known as taishang, relocating there for business
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opportunities (Muyard, 2012, p. 169). The increase in economic exchanges luring Taiwan closer to its giant neighbor across the Strait have raised many questions concerning the effects which this may have on the island, such as those posed here by Stéphane Corcuff in 2012:
“To what extent will economic interests of Taiwanese businessmen override the Taiwanese national identities? Or will Taiwanese national identity dictate the path of economic integration with China? What is the role of the rising national identity in Taiwan in the emerging economic integration between China and Taiwan? Will economic integration lead to political unification?” (2012, p. 5).
In response to this line of questioning, Chow (2012) writes that “Democracy appears to reinforce a common Taiwanese identity… (and) although most Taiwanese support closer economic relations with China, they distinguish such policies from their Taiwanese identity” (p. 8-9). This section will therefore present the development of these processes throughout Ma’s pro-China period of rule up to their current state, presenting the different voices expressing concern over China’s growing influence while also contemplating the validity of these fears alongside the actual trends apparent on the island.
4.4.1 “Chaiwan”11 forming under President Ma?
Ma Ying-jeou’s “landslide” victory in 2008 of 58.45% of the popular vote (USC US-China Institute, 2011), aside from representing what Huntington refers to as the “second turnover” of power12, a milestone in democratic consolidation (Rigger, 2011, p. 3), also
11 The term “Chaiwan” has been suggested by those such as by Johnny Neihu of The Taipei Times to have been coined in 2007 by a South Korean paper called The Chosun Ilbo. “Chaiwan,” although originally referred to in South Korea for the impending challenges which the growing relationship of China and Taiwan has on their competitive edge, this term has been adopted by many news agencies in Taiwan as well as both local and international scholars to represent the growing economic integration and its consequences to the future outcome of cross-strait relations in light of Taiwan’s increasing economic dependence on the mainland. (schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/chaiwan/)
12 The first turnover of power occurred in 2000, when the political opposition party the DPP, won the election for the first time since the KMT took rule in 1949. In 2008, the KMT reclaimed the political power
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showed a shift in the response to the years of tension with China from Lee Deng-hui all the way through the two terms under Chen Shui-bian. According to Hwang (2012), the China policy was a top priority of President Ma Ying-jeou’s agenda beginning from his official inauguration into office on May 20, 2008. Seeing that Ma received such an impressive proportion of the majority vote, it seems fair to assume that Ma’s cross-strait policy was at this time also desired by the people as an alternative to the previous policies of the political elite from both parties (KMT and DPP) which resulted in tension across the Strait, however this interest has more recently appeared to have been overshadowed by the growing concern at the speed at which cross-strait relations have progressed. The rapid shift towards relations with China can be seen in Chow’s (2012) breakdown of the island’s cross-strait policy following Ma’s inauguration:
“After President Ma Ying-jeou took power as the president of Taiwan in May 2008, his party, the Nationalists or the Kuomintang, pursued rapprochement with Beijing by adopting a series of pro-China policies meant to enhance the relations across the Taiwan Strait. Direct flights were organized between China and Taiwan, investment ceilings were lifted to further liberalize Taiwan’s trade with and investment in China, and fifteen trade pacts with China were signed…Among the latter, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) of June 2010”
(p. 99).
Although this can be regarded as a list of accomplishments in terms of Ma’s rapprochement strategy with Beijing, it is viewed by many academics and citizens alike as a threat to Taiwan’s established autonomy and growing distinct national identity.
Since Ma Ying-jeou first took office, the issue of regressing or declining democratic practices due to the growing influence of the “China Factor” in Taiwan has arisen, with the earliest critique coming during Ma’s first year in office in the course of a visit from top Beijing officials. Scholars such as Rigger (2011) and Corcuff (2012) have written about the questionable actions during this official visit which impeded on Taiwanese peoples’ democratic rights in order to consent to and appease the Beijing of the island through Ma Ying-jeou’s election, concluding the second official turnover of ruling political parties on the island.
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government. Shelley Rigger in 2011 discusses the reaction of Ma’s mentor, Cohen, from the president’s studies in the United States. Cohen characterized some police actions towards the demonstrators as “brutality” and discussed the limitation of people’s speech at this time. Cohen criticized authorities not allowing Taiwan or Tibetan flags to be shown in order to avoid offending the Chinese as going “beyond the limits of a free society.”
Corcuff in 2012 described the incident as a “serious attack of the freedom of speech in Taiwan” (p. 99). Corcuff goes further to pronounce the political elites’ handling of the situation as “self-renouncement to sovereignty” (2012, p. 99), which not only had been a strongly pursued principle under previous presidents in this era but is also in ways strongly connected to the democratic political system in Taiwan, especially as it is distinct from the PRC’s government and communist rule. This confrontation between Ma’s extreme pro-China policy, which was clearly immediately implemented, and the progress of democratic consolidation on the island seemed to exhibit conflicting interests, and as Chow in 2012 writes, “Though détente with a regime that had been denying Taiwan’s sovereignty reduced tensions on the Taiwan Strait, many observers concerned the sustainability of a self-governing Taiwan recklessly integrating and normalizing relation with its neighbor across the strait had caused much apprehension among the Taiwanese people” (Chow, 2012, p. 4).
The greatest of initiatives increasing cross-strait interaction which has occurred under Ma’s presidency, and which has attracted great international attention, is the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in July 2010, which Peter C.Y. Chow labels as the “the most significant in the drive toward economic integration between the two economies” (2012, p. 4). The ECFA can be best described as a framework agreement for limited free trade and investment across the Strait, “with tariff cuts for the “early harvest” list of products starting in January 2011” (Muyard, 2012, p.
175). With Taiwan’s inability to embark on FTAs with other countries and this risk of being “left behind” in the increasing global trend of FTAs, President Ma’s ruling party promoted this strategy as essential to the island’s economic recovery (Corcuff, 2012).
Although the signing of this initial framework agreement between Taiwan and China, the
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first of its kind, can be viewed as a highlight of Ma’s Beijing rapprochement strategy, the details and processes underlying the 2010 signing have been criticized by many scholars as to the validity of its democratic procedure, questioning Ma’s influence on further democratic consolidation of institutions and political practices during his presidency and therefore also leaving open the question as to whether Taiwan’s democratic system is at risk.
Many works and articles published in the last few years such as those by Wu (2012), Rigger (2010, 2011), Danielson (2012), Muyard (2012), have all disclosed anxiety towards the political motivation behind the signing of the ECFA, and more worryingly, the democratic validity of the document. According to a report published by the Taiwan News in 2010, “On the democracy front, the public and the opposition party, DPP, had not been informed about the ECFA negotiations until it was signed.” Danielson comments that “The negotiations between SEF and the ARATS ran in parallel with private meetings between the KMT and the Chinese Communist party, which included cross-strait policy topics” (2012, p. 144). Danielson goes further to write that “Two attempts to hold a referendum on ECFA have been blocked by the KMT-controlled Referendum Review Committee, despite the fact that a majority of the population supports a referendum,” and it seems that the secrecy and monopolization over the signing process and discussions controlled by the KMT “run(s) counter to normal procedures in a democratic society where openness and debate are pivotal for the development of policymaking” (2012, p. 144). Jau-yuan Hwang in 2012 remarks on the legality concerning the democratic management of the ECFA, explaining that “in the formal sense, the ECFA was the first such agreement to be deliberated and approved by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan before entering into force. However, the current legal mechanism governing legislative supervision over the cross-straits agreements has been incomplete and ineffective” (Chow, 2012, p. 6).
Although Ma has been very successful in his pledge to rapidly appease and normalize cross-strait relations, the institution of the ECFA in 2010 followed by its means of regulation seem to have strayed away from further embedding democratic institutionalization on the island. This is not to say that the recent discrepancies in
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democratic procedures will result in the island reverting back to authoritarian rule, however fear has been expressed over the most recent mistreatment of the democratic political system by the political elite of both the KMT and DPP and the impact which this could have not only on the island’s current sovereignty, but also on national identity, especially in light of the island’s increasing economic dependence on the mainland.
Danielson expresses just such anxiety in his excerpt in Peter Chow’s 2012 book, writing
Danielson expresses just such anxiety in his excerpt in Peter Chow’s 2012 book, writing