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the previously discussed actors involved, can also be analyzed in regards to the influence which political policies and the opposition movements during this period had on the trend towards a new, ‘civic’ national identity on the island. The next section of this chapter will therefore turn its focus to the transition of national identity which occurred in reaction to as well as in support of the democratization movement, analyzing the characteristics of the evolving “civic” national identity and its influence on and relationship with the democratization of Taiwan.
3.3 Civic national identity emerging in Taiwan
Hans Stockton in 2008 discusses the Constructivist perspective in analyzing national identity, explaining how it differs from the Realist and Liberalist perspectives which take for granted the “actor-identity construction and the subsequent effect of that construction on state interests” (p. 100). Smith in 2010 states that “change is built into the definition of national identity” (p. 22), and according to Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, when identities change, so do the political interests, state interactions and national security policies (1996, p. 33 – 75). According Anderson, a nation is an “imagined community” defined by their own conceptualized boundlessness (1991), and Stockton describes the movement of democratization as an “appropriate and embraced expression of Taiwan’s civic nationalism” (2008, p. 100). Many argue that during the period of rapid democratization, national identity in Taiwan changed towards what Brown labels as “civic national identity.” According to Brown, the base for civic national identity is not concerned with ethnicity, but rather creates a community heavily joined by their shared nation-state and their equal treatment under the state’s political system, which only occurred in Taiwan through democratization. “The civic nationalist vision stresses that all citizens are granted equal status irrespective of ethnic attributes, on the sole condition that they grant loyalty to the public institutions to the territorial community” (Brown, 2004, p. 52).
It has also been argued by many scholars (Kohn 1944; Landa 1995; Knack &
Keefer 1997; Gibson & Gouws 2000; Alesina & La Ferarra 2002) that “civic nationalism promotes tolerant and inclusive attitudes,” and according to Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli (2009), many “Democratic theorists have also emphasized the value of tolerant
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citizens as crucial for a stable democratic state” (p. 3). There is actually an extensive amount of literature discussing the relationship between a “civil society” and a successful democracy (Almond and Verba 1963, 1989; Inglehart 1988, 1990; Barry 1978; Smitter and Karl 1991), and Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson (1994) actually argue for the mutual influence of a “civic culture” among the people of a nation leading to democratization and democratization influencing civic culture. This dissertation will not address the argument of which process instigates the other, but will rather utilize such discourse to highlight the continued and deepening parallel which has persisted between national identity formation and democratization in Taiwan. Returning to the statement made by Ernest Gellner in 1964, if “Nationalism…invents nations where they do not exist” (p.168), it may be fair to assume that the politicization of nationalism as instigated alongside democratic progress, for the first time in history truly distinguished Taiwan from its colonial rulers.
Chang Maukuei (2004) recounts that “In fact, I did not hear the term “Taiwanese nation” (Taiwan minzu) until the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident” (p.70). Stockton in 2008 stated that “In the case of Taiwan, democratization and localization have allowed for public consideration of what defines the nation-state of the Republic of China on Taiwan (p.104).” If it were not for the liberalization afforded society through democratization, a civic identity would not have been able to form. Therefore the return of the Taiwanese identity movement as strongly promoted by the political elite under the growing opposition followed by the ‘localization’ efforts conceded by the authoritarian leadership all assisted in the transition of national identity on the island. Tien has contended that
“Taiwan’s experience suggests that civil culture tends to evolve synchronously with democratic transition and to mature during democratic consolidation” (1995, p. 46).
Once the legitimacy of the authoritarian leadership began faltering, pressures from the opposition motivated the political elite not only to focus on democratization but also on promoting a “Taiwanese” identity in order to gain support from the majority of people on the island and create an atmosphere to support peaceful political reform. It was still illegal in Taiwan to openly discuss national identity or infer Taiwan independence until 1992 when the treason article under the Criminal Act was officially revoked (Henders, 2004, p.85), yet Chiang Ching-kuo’s introduction of the Taiwanization movement while
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martial law was still in place, and President Lee Deng-hui’s continued promotion of a local identity, displayed a clear effort on the part of the political elite to promote national political unity and invoke a sense of “cultural identity” disregarding place of origin (Stockton, 2008, p.105).
Hansen and Hesli (2009), argue that merely presenting a dichotomy of ethnic and civic national identity is not fairly representative of the forms of identity felt throughout a nation. This dissertation does not wish to argue this transition of national identity in Taiwan as a simple and clear shift from ethnic to civic identity, for the concept of national identity in itself is nothing near simple. According to Anthony Smith, “it is very difficult to differentiate civic and ethnic identity as the two not only are in constant flux and can shift at any time, but also, as it is simply difficult to separate the two” (2010, p.44). It would rather be argued here that the experiences of the people during this rapid period of democratization and the role of political discourse during this period prompted a trend towards a civic national identity of the people on the island which did not exist during colonial periods. In Naiteh Wu’s 1993 paper on provincial origin, political support and national identity, he acknowledged that “now that Taiwan independence is a clear and important topic for society … (we are) unable to distinguish adequately between ethnic identity and national identity” (p. 34). It is understood here that the civic national identity which emerged through the process of democratization on the island did not do away with ethnic national identity, as the politics in Taiwan and people to this day still draw upon the island’s different ethnicities. However under a democratic political system people openly have the right to proclaim their unique ethnic identities alongside a similar civic identity, and according to Almond and Verba (1963, p. 8), “civic culture” is defined as “a culture of consensus and diversity.” It is therefore argued here that a greater civic national identity arose during democratization, encompassing a larger portion of the island under their shared relation to their home territory and experience living in Taiwan and their democratic political system, despite differing ethnic identities. This has in turn maintained and strengthened the interconnected relationship between national identity and democracy on the island.
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Just as in the formation of an ethnic-based identity when Taiwanese viewed themselves in stark contrast to the Mainland Chinese oppressing them, so in the more recent shift of national identity did the focus of people’s national identity become
‘redefined’ in terms of differences in their democratic political and social system (Chow, p.104). Civil society, according to Yun-han Chu, between 1983 and 1988 emerged as a trend by which there was a steady growth in social protest on all kinds of issues, affirming that “once democratization had gathered momentum the development of social movements quickly followed suit” (Shiau, 1999, p. 107-108). The evolution of social and political change in Taiwan shows a tremendous interdependence connecting the two processes. There appears to be a sort of ‘give and take’ tendency in Taiwanese progress in which a political reformation spurred by social unrest subsequently configured a new spirit of nationalism which then supported the democratic political system. In their famous research on Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1989) stipulate that a “civic culture” is crucial to sustaining a stable democracy. It can therefore be argued that for Taiwan’s case, democracy opened the door for a civic identity to form and this new identity in turn helped guarantee the successful achievement of democracy.