2.2 A Partnership forms
2.2.1 The initial signs of the democratic movement alongside its
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democratic rights. This encompassed not only the desire of the people of Taiwan for political power and democratic rule, but also the aspiration that under a democracy, people could be granted the freedom to finally represent their own chosen national identity, a privilege which the people of Taiwan had been denied for centuries. The key international as well as domestic events first arising in the 1970s are essential factors which not only gave root to the successful democratic political movement in Taiwan, but also act as a background for the incentives of the future policies of the leadership which confirmed the ‘marriage’ of national identity and democracy in Taiwan.
2.2.1 The initial signs of the democratic movement alongside its revival of the movement for national identity
The 1970s represents a drastic period of transition for Taiwan in regards to the international as well as domestic shifts which greatly affected the political stability on the island. This section will discuss these historical events in detail, examining their causes as well as the effects of these experiences on the political elite and the consequent path of democratic development and its relationship with national identity. There were four key incidents which occurred in Taiwan in the 1970s, two of which were international and two of which were domestic, which all contributed to the political transition on the island.
It is in large part as a reaction to these events that we can not only see the first glimmer of the true democratic movement, but also the reappearance of the movement for national identity alongside it.
The first major event to challenge the validity of the KMT’s rule over the ‘rightful China’ occurred in 1971, when the ROC lost its seat in the UN to its rival, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Henders, 2004). This decision held serious repercussions for Taiwan. Prior to this decision the ROC maintained to represent all of China, and the KMT’s ability not only to uphold this claim internationally, but also the benefits which this provided the country economically were a large stimulus for the legitimacy of their rule. This transfer of recognition therefore left Taiwan’s international status, as well as the government’s capability, in question. Haggard and Cheng in 1992 acknowledged that although the people of Taiwan initially supported their country through this shock, many soon understood the domestic implications of such abandonment, and as Wachman noted
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necessity of a Taiwanese national identity (p.16).The second formative experience under the latter period of martial law which occurred outside of Taiwan’s borders was in December of 1978, when US president Jimmy Carter announced that the US was revoking diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of the PRC (Hsiau, 2000, p.89). Since the early 1950s the US had been a strong supporter of the Republic of China, providing large funds to promote economic development as well as providing national security protection for the island against a possible invasion from the PRC. Although relations between the US and Taiwan continued under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 5, which was signed on January 1st of the following year, the severed diplomatic ties were still viewed by many on the island as a frightening outcome (American Institute in Taiwan). This transformation of Taiwan’s international environment further weakened the credibility of the authoritarian regime, providing greater incentive on the domestic front to strive for political progress and greater pressure for the ruling elite. Wachman makes it clear that the idea of ‘Taiwan Independence’ was still unheard of at this time, yet in true Cold War fashion the promotion of ‘self-determination’ as a basic democratic right entered into the ideology of the opposition (p.17). Taiwan’s international status directly affected the citizens in Taiwan, yet possibly even more provocative on the shifts of Taiwanese society were two major rebellions which occurred on the domestic front.
A clear reaction on the part of the political leadership on the island already became visible during the early 1970s. As the son of the first president of the Republic of China Chiang Ching-kuo gained power in the party, the authority of the KMT was feeling an initial threat from international as well as domestic disappointment. As a response, Chiang implemented the first reforms ‘relaxing’ authoritarian control over society, holding great importance for the future progress of national identity and democracy on the island. The main campaign being described here is Chiang’s “Taiwanization”
5 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed as an alternative form of agreement between the US and Taiwan following the transfer of diplomatic relations from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The TRA maintains that the US will “help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific,” which has continued to the present day to represent a vague security commitment to Taiwan should any attempts to unify the island with China using violence be attempted (American Institute in Taiwan, “Taiwan Relations Act,” www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html)
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campaign, which “on the one hand put Taiwanese KMT members into local party offices (and) on the other hand put young political elites who had been raised in Taiwan into leading party and government posts at the central level” (Dickson, 1996, p. 49-50). Local Taiwanese citizens were not supported to enter into the political sphere in Taiwan prior to Chiang’s reforms, and this early liberalization of authority while still under martial law reflects not only the reaction of the leadership to the obstacles presenting the island and the civil unrest challenging the party’s legitimacy, but also the important role which the leadership played in allowing and reinforcing political participation and recognition of the Taiwanese people.
The turning point in Taiwan’s domestic political and social make-up became more evident in the latter half of the 1970’s, as local unrest began to emerge in the form of political rebellion. Chu and Lin in 2001 write that “By the late 1970s, a new cohort of post-war generation political opposition emerged. Unlike most of the previous independent candidates…..the new opposition established political identity as well as built electoral support on a platform emphasizing democratic reform and Taiwanese identity” (p.120). Many scholars including I-chou Liu have contributed the following events to the elites in Taiwan, also known as the sizable “new” middle class which developed from the economic success on the island over the last forty years and compiled the majority of opposition leadership as well as their supporters (1992, p. 68). The year of 1977 is critical as it signifies the first violent political uprising since the onset of martial law, a shift in the KMT’s political policy, as well as the role of the elite in organizing opposing political parties, by this time congregating into a single most prominent opposition party under the title Tangwai, meaning “outside the party” (Haggard and Cheng, 1992, p.12).
The Zhongli incident of 1977 arose from local voters in Taoyuan County fearing government tampering in the 1977 elections, in which non-partisan candidates were becoming increasingly popular and winning elections against KMT candidates. In order to send the government a message, the people involved protested and set fire to the police station in Zhongli. This event not only illustrates the transition in the attitude of the people of Taiwan, but also a crucial shift in the political environment on the island. Such rebellion would have previously drawn violent suppression from the authoritarian
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government, however the leadership’s approach here was surprisingly tolerant, as the police did not take severe or violent action against the local citizens of the city. It is clear through this movement in history that the political elite forming the opposition movement gained a form of political leverage or influence over the ruling party, shifting the strategy of those in power. According to Yun-han Chu, the 1977 Zhongli Incident for the first time since the declaration of martial law “tarnished” the seemingly invincible rule of the KMT, therefore setting into motion a new drive to form an “island wide alliance among the opposition candidates” (1992, p. 38). This incident was followed by the official naming of the opposition party as the Tangwai, the formation of the island-wide campaign organization the Taiwan Tangwai Campaign Corps (Lee, 1987, p. 130) and the creation of the Formosa magazine as well as its expansion to further circulate the opposition stances (Chu, 1992, p. 38-39). Hsiau (2000) credits the Zhongli Incident for bringing the Tangwai “the power of a mass movement,” which provided impetus for the ruling elite to re-think their approach and objectives (p.89).
The final and possibly most influential event in the late 1970s was the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident. This controversial altercation between the opposition and ruling party arose on December 10th, 1979, when the political magazine Formosa, (Mei-li-tao), organized a rally in the southern city of Kaohsiung to promote human rights on the newly founded international Human Rights Day (Hsiau, 2000, p.89). The rally soon erupted into a confrontation between the opposition party and the police, leading to a number of civilians and policemen being injured, as well as a large number of main opposition leaders being arrested (Hsiau, 2000, p.89). Yet rather than damage the progress of the opposition party, the KMT crackdown resulted in public sympathy towards the jailed opposition and their families, further compromising the KMT’s popularity as well as their ability to use violence in order to suppress political opposition (Haggard, 1992, p.13). It also resulted in the removal of hardliners in the KMT party such as General Wang Sheng, which set a precursor for the shift of the party towards political liberalization.
The success of these early political movements for democratic transition demonstrate the atmosphere surrounding the initial conception of the democratic movement, promoted through both opposition and changing political elite strategies in Taiwan, however equally significant, especially in regards to this study, is the inclusion
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of national identity as a platform in the rebellion against authoritarian rule. A separate movement focused on a Taiwanese national identity would not have been possible at this period in history, not only due to the persistent fear from the painful memories still associated with the 2-28 Incident, but also the fact that any promotion of Taiwanese identity was still punishable by law up until 1992 (Henders, 2004). Henders however points out that the issue of national identity still remained very prominent among the political activity, and was “hidden” under many other issues, primarily the political push for democracy (2004, p. 83). Henders goes further to explain that “This made for two intertwined movements, one for democratization and the other for nationalism. Although closely allied with each other neither one has completely absorbed the other” (1994, p.
85). Chu and Lin also emphasize this relationship in 2001, in which they write that by the end of the 1970s, “the new opposition had established political identity as well as built electoral support on a platform emphasizing democratic reform and Taiwanese identity”
(p.120).
These early stages of development after the arrival of the KMT to Taiwan, the initial yet brief outburst of national identity as seen in the 2-28 Incident followed by the political activism in the 1970s do not merely represent two individual developments, but the marriage of two key processes which remain interconnected to this day. It was as a result of the political activity during the late 1970s that two key concerns were able to join together as some of the most controversial issues on the island to the present day: the idea of an independent Taiwan and a Taiwanese national identity. The 2-28 Incident and the political events occurring in the 1970s, both international and domestic, brought about an initial connection between democratic progression and national identity in Taiwan.
This period in Taiwan’s history marks the early stages of development for both national identity and democratic progress, however we will see through the next chapter that the relationship formed here only continued to deepen through the following periods of the country’s development.
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Chapter 3
1980 – 1995: The first signs of democratic progress and a transition of national identity
The 1980s and early 1990s are infamous in Taiwan as a period of rapid democratization on the island, transforming the country from an authoritarian state under martial law to a transitioning democracy. This era is viewed by many to be one of the miracles of Taiwan, as successful transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic rule has been a controversial and much studied subject in recent years. Many academics such as Lucian Pye (1985) have even gone so far as to recommend Taiwan as a possible example for developing countries endeavoring on the same transition. However this period is not solely important for its political development. Aside from the progression of democracy during the 1980s and early 1990s, a remarkable shift of national identity is also evident as a result of democratization on the island, and therefore this period marks an important stage in the relationship between the processes of democratization and national identity formation in Taiwan.
Brown argues that in Taiwan’s case, “…democratization should be understood as a transition in the character of national identity (2004, p. 43). Hsiao further endorses this theory, stressing that “the political movements of the 1980s and 1990s were fundamentally catalytic in creating Taiwanese nationalism” (2000, p. 449). Chu and Lin (2001) give a more detailed analysis, stating that “Recurring political participation under a democratic regime helped develop a sense of collective consciousness among the people, transforming the term “Taiwan” from a geographic unit to a political community and the term “Taiwanese” from an ethnic term for native Taiwanese to a civic term for citizens of Taiwan” (p.123)
.
As democratization progressed in Taiwan and democratic practices increased, the growing political roles developed by the people on the island had direct effects on peoples’ national identity, shifting them from the previously felt “ethnic”identity which was mainly focused at differentiating Taiwanese people from their Chinese oppressors to a new sense of “civic” national identity, which as Alan Wachman explains (1994) “evinced a shared identity and feelings of affinity, transcending though
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but rarely eliminating allegiances based on locality, ethnic group, religion, or class’” (p.
24). The civic identity which arose during this period of rapid democratization will be defined and discussed in great detail later in this chapter.
This chapter will maintain the agent- and structure-centered theoretical framework applied to this study, focusing on analyzing the historical events and key agents which impacted the process of democratization as well as how these events and actors also contributed to the shift in national identity felt around the island. In discussing the factors influencing the democratization process in Taiwan, this chapter will also present the shortcomings and continued relevance of theoretical remedies that have previously been attributed to Taiwan’s political development. This theoretical overview will then lead into an in-depth analysis of the process of democratization as seen in Taiwan according to the key historical events and influence of the actors involved. The accumulation of these factors is argued here to have shaped the development of democracy, providing great influence on shifting trends in national identity towards a civic national identity, which then further reinforced the progression of democracy on the island.