5 Chapter : The voice of the people: a presentation of survey and focus
5.1 Analysis of relevant quantitative data
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Chapter 5
The voice of the people: a presentation of survey and focus group data
5.1 Analysis of relevant quantitative data
Since the studies of national identity and democracy gained greater popularity amongst the domestic scholarly community in Taiwan, multiple organizations have arisen alongside individual projects largely focusing on recording the development of these processes through the means of survey data. These institutions have provided valuable resources in regards to comparing the political and social transformations through defining moments in Taiwan’s history through to the present. The Election Study Center (ESC) of National Chengchi University in Taipei Taiwan was officially established in January of 1989 by Professors Lei and Chen (National Chengchi University, 2006). The data gathered through these surveys tracking the distribution of important political attitudes on the island has served as the research base for many scholars exploring the topic. Also crucial for tying together this study of democratization and Taiwanization in the more recent phase is the research gathered by Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS). This election survey data system was launched in the year 2000 and has since promoted academic cooperation on the island as well as provided large-scale data based on face-to-face election surveys (Taiwan Elections and Democratization Study).
These resources along with other more minor projects on the topic will be referenced not only to display the historic relationship between democratization and Taiwanization, but also to analyze the most recent trends which emphasize the continuing changes occurring in the field. The general trends which are visible from these sets of quantitative data include the growth in Taiwanese national identity, the desire of the population to maintain their status quo as opposed to unification or independence, and the decreasing satisfaction of the general population towards the country’s maturing democracy. These trends in data will be analyzed in connection with their linkage to the historical discussion above and the different events and policies promoted by the political elite influencing these shifts in society and politics on the island.
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In regards to the recent trend of national identity progression in Taiwan as viewed by the individuals on the island, the ESC has conducted survey data over the past twenty one years which gives tremendous insight into the drastic development of national identity leading up to the present day. Table 1 below is the ESC study recording the changes in Taiwanese and Chinese identity in Taiwan since 1992 based on people’s responses to the following question: “In our society, there are some people who call themselves ‘Taiwanese,’ some who call themselves ‘Chinese,’ and some who call themselves both. Do you consider yourself to be ‘Taiwanese,’ ‘Chinese,’ or both?” (Core Political Attitudes Trend Chart, Election Study Center, National Cheng Chi University) The interviewees were given the choice to respond Taiwanese, Chinese, or both Taiwanese and Chinese13, and the responses for the year 2011 vary drastically from those in the early to mid-1990s.
At the start of this study, prior to the island’s official achievement of democracy, 46% of the population chose dual identity, relating to being both Taiwanese and Chinese, while 25% of the people related to being Chinese and only 17% of the population viewed themselves as Taiwanese. The immediate effects of the early cross-strait policies and incidents on the general public are undeniable in Table 1, the first of which can be seen following the Taiwan Missile Crisis of 1995-1996. The percentage of people defining themselves as Taiwanese rose 5% from 1994 to 1995 and a total of nearly 17% from 1992 to 1997 reaching 34% of the population. Taiwanese identity in response to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis surpassed the number of people who defined themselves as Chinese which in 1997 only amounted to 19% of the population. The number of those choosing dual identity even experienced a sharp drop from 1996 to 1997 of almost 10%. This witnesses the first time Taiwanese identity was seen surpassing Chinese identity, and this trend has only continued through to the present, showing the strong, effect which China’s threatening tactic had on further distinguishing Taiwanese people apart from their Chinese counterparts. The year 1996 also marks the year during which Taiwan officially transitioned to a democratic political system, with the popular presidential election of President Lee Deng-hui. This milestone can also be viewed as
13 The concept of dual identity, being both Taiwanese and Chinese, became a popular choice in regards to national identity on Taiwan in the late 1990s and through the early 21st century (Chang and Wang, 2005).
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promoting the freedom to choose a national identity and no longer being legally bound to claim Chinese national identity, as well as a factor politically differentiating the two sides of the Strait. The policies of President Lee through the late 1990s with his promotion of Taiwanization and his “New Taiwan movement” beginning in 1998 can be attributed as factors influencing the continued rise in Taiwanese national identity from 36% in 1998 to 39% in 1999.
The rapid period of democratization culminating in the successful achievement of democracy on the island can be clearly viewed amid a decreasing Chinese identity and increasing Taiwanese identity, which continued through Chen Shui-bian’s very pro-Taiwan eight years in office. However despite the efforts towards greater pro-Taiwanization of the island, the majority of Taiwan’s first DPP President Chen Shui-bian’s two terms as president witnesses only a very gradual rise in Taiwanese identity, with the majority consensus on identity for the most part continuing to lean towards dual identity. Chen’s period as president exhibits an equal proportion of declining Chinese and rising Taiwanese identity. It seems that under President Chen’s government, as discussed in the historical analysis, the focus on ethnic identity and friction across the Strait was more detrimental than it was beneficial to both the quality of democracy and the localization of identity. However alongside the differing ethnic identities remained the civic identity which had emerged in the 1980s. The people on the island were therefore able to, although defining themselves as ethnically different, still be able to relate politically to their territory Taiwan, governed under a democratic political system. This allows everyone the right to express their multiple, diverging identities, leading to the continued majority of the population relating to dual identity during this period.
One of the most interesting transitions which can be viewed in Table 1 is the shift in national identity following the 2008 election of current President Ma Ying-jeou. Ma’s election represented not only the return of the KMT to power but also the restoration of a pro-China leadership, in which Cross-strait relations as elaborated in the above section very quickly and overtly shifted in favor of befriending the island’s giant neighbor. As the economic exchange and integration across the strait rapidly increased it was assumed by many scholars that logically, so would the national identity and political disposition on the island veer towards China and unification. Wu (2010) refers in this light to the
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“integration and spillover paradigm,” which predicts that the strategy of economic integration should gradually lead to a “‘spill over’ effect, manipulating other facets of society including, in Taiwan’s case, national identity and political sovereignty” (p. 7).
However one glance at the results in Table 1 shows that the integration and spillover paradigm clearly does not apply, at least not yet, to Taiwan’s case. The year 2008 actually marked a drastic shift favoring Taiwanese identity over dual identity, in which Taiwanese national identity rose nearly 5% to a majority of the population while dual identity declined to 43% and Chinese identity remained at a low 4%. Since then, through Ma’s increasing efforts to promote Chinese culture on the island, Taiwanese identity has continued to increase to nearly 60% of the population, with Chinese identity having continued its decline to now represent fewer than 4% of the population.
Table 1
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This data is distinctly contradictory to earlier assumptions that under a KMT government, especially alongside such pro-China policies as have been implemented over the past five years, the majority of the population would revert back to the previously imposed Chinese identity. This visual representation of the identity sentiment on the island throughout this recent historical period reiterates the previously mentioned conjecture that in the case of Taiwan, the strong complementary development of democracy and Taiwanese national identity seem to run contrary to the economic integration across the Strait. It therefore seems that at this present moment in time, there is little indication that national identity will veer towards a Chinese identity in the immediate future. The status of national identity, with a majority of the population strongly viewing themselves as Taiwanese and 40% still viewing themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese indicates that the current status of national identity, although ethnically still varying, has recently achieved a type of harmony or common understanding under the majority of the population’s desire to preserve their sovereignty and control their democratic political system. Danielson in 2012 writes that, “Despite this difference in the perception of the two groups’ identity in a possible future Taiwanese common identity, both groups agree that a decision about Taiwan’s future has to be decided by the Taiwanese themselves” (Danielson, 2012, p. 146). This democratic motivation which unites the Taiwanese people despite their differing ethnic national identities is further clarified in the second ESC survey presented below.
In their survey study on Changes in the Unification-Independent Stances of Taiwanese, which can be seen in Table 2, the ESC offers seven options for those being interviewed, including ‘unification as soon as possible,’ ‘independence as soon as possible,’ and ‘maintain the status quo’ either indefinitely, to decide at a later date, or to eventually lead to either unification or independence. This dissertation will not aim to address the complex controversy of independence vs. unification, however will analyze this data in regards to the implications that it has towards democratic practices and changing national identities on the island. In terms of Taiwan’s democracy and national identity, independence would offer the people on the island the means to maintain their political sovereignty and Taiwanese identity, whereas unification would threaten both the people’s freedom in expressing any identity aside from Chinese identity as well as their
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current democratic system and rights. For the most part, the majority of Taiwanese have responded that they prefer to ‘maintain the status quo, decide at a later date,’ which Chow analyzes as showing that the people in Taiwan “prefer to maintain the “status quo” so as to enjoy their freedom and democracy rather than be annexed with China and its authoritarian regime” (p. 5). Under Chen Shui-bian’s early years of presidency, there was an increase in Taiwanese wishing to maintain the status quo and decide at a later date and a decrease in those wishing to maintain the status quo indefinitely, however this trend gradually reversed during his two terms as president and the most unexpected shift, just as in the identity survey, can be witnessed in the most recent transition to and throughout Ma’s presidency.
Table 2
One of the very noticeable trends visible in Table 2 occurs between 2007 and 2008, continuing to the present day, in which an overall shift in the peoples’ preferences towards Taiwan’s future is visible, and again emphasizes the reality which challenges the
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expected shift towards unification. In fact, the number of Taiwanese expressing an interest in immediate unification has remained below 2% since Chen Shui-bian’s second term as president. The most dramatic change however which takes place following 2007, leading up to Ma’s election, is the steep incline of participants wishing to ‘maintain the status quo indefinitely,” and a gradual increase in those wanting to ‘maintain the status quo, move towards independence’ alongside a steady decrease in the majority view to
‘maintain the status quo, decide at a later date.’ The percentage of Taiwanese choosing the option to ‘maintain the status quo indefinitely’ increased from 18.4% to 26.2%
between 2007 and 2009, and despite a nearly 1% decline in 2010, the year in which ECFA was signed, this option has since then continued to rise approaching the falling majority choice to ‘maintain status quo, decide at a later date.’ This shifting resolution to maintain Taiwan’s “status quo” can be seen at least in part to be a product of the political sovereignty which has become ingrained in the political culture following the island’s ascent to democracy, resulting in less willingness among the people to give this freedom up.
In interviews of Taiwanese college students in 2010, Rodgers recorded that
“87.8% reject Taiwan as a part of China and 91.6% of the Chinese group14 supports that only citizens of the Republic of China should decide Taiwan’s future” (Danielson, 2012, p. 147). A recent trend in survey data has attempted to take away the difficult polarity in the independence vs. unification debate by asking participants under the best of circumstances, which they would prefer. For example, in the data set presented in Table 3 collected from the Global Views Survey Research Center between 2004-2011, Muyard (2012) presents the responses of Taiwanese citizens to unification if the political and social differences were less significant, with participants choosing either “No Need to Unify if both sides have similar conditions” or “Agree to Unification if both sides have similar conditions.” The results show an overall increase of nearly 29% with 67% of respondents now believing that even with similar conditions on both sides of the strait, unification is not wanted. This is paired alongside a simultaneous decrease in agreement
14 In his working paper, Rodgers separates his study into analyzing the different political responses from students claiming Taiwanese ethnic national identity and Chinese ethnic national identity, showing that despite claiming a Chinese ethnic identity, most college-aged students are still against unification with mainland China.
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to the latter question, with the most recent poll showing only 12.8% of people agreeing to unification under the best of cirucmstances. Therefore it is not only the deeply developed national identity, but also the strong attachment to democratic sovereignty which creates obstacles for the KMT and Beijing in promoting cross-strait relations towards any form of unification.
Table 3. Surveys on Unification under Similar Level of Political and Economic Development, 2004–2011 (in %)
No need to unify if both sides have similar conditions
Agree to unification if both sides have similar conditions
Table © F. Muyard 2011. Source: Global Views Survey Research Center, “Survey on President Ma Ying jeou’s Approval Rating and People’s Views on the Unification-Independence Issue,” April 25, 2011.
http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/eng/index.asp.
Despite the survey results from ESC, Rodgers, and Muyard that suggest that the democratic base remains strong in Taiwanese society as an influential factor guiding peoples’ views towards the future political status of the island, the literature review under the historical analysis shows an increasing amount of anxiety which has recently grown over a believed decline in democratic consolidation in Taiwan. Though a greater “civic consciousness” or “civic identity” has been attributed as a predominant identity which flourished through and supported the democratization process, and is also seen by Almond and Verba as essential to sustaining democracy, it is feared by many scholars that the recent development of civic society in Taiwan has weakened. This alongside the slowing of democratic consolidation as promoted among the recent leadership can lead one to conclude that Taiwan’s democracy is clearly not fully consolidated and is possibly in danger. J.W. Garver remarks that “It is too easy for people raised and living in stable democracies to forget that history is littered with democracies that proved incapable of
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meeting the challenges confronting them” (2011, p. 5). To verify and discount some of these fears and their viability it is important to acknowledge relevant data such as that presented by TEDS which helps to review the efficiency and recent status of democracy on the island. TEDS has conducted surveys asking a variety of questions surrounding the issue of democracy as it functions in Taiwan today and the general affinity which people on the island hold towards a democratic political system, which help to better determine the current status of democracy on the island today.
According to Almond and Verba’s theoretical discourse on civic culture, citizens hold either a “parochial,” “subject,” or “participant” role in society, depending on their level of political involvement, and these roles are viewed as essential in analyzing the efficiency of a democratic political system. The people in Taiwan have shown to have a high “subject competence,” in which the citizen understands his/her rights under the rules, and a fairly low participant or “citizen competence,” meaning confidence in his/her ability to influence politics (p.169). TEDS data shows that in 2008, while 46% of voters believed that they ‘have a say’ in government decisions, 40% of voters also believed that
‘public officials don’t care much about what people like me think.” In addition, 59% of voters agreed that politics are ‘too complicated’ for them to understand, showing that the majority of Taiwanese voters don’t believe themselves to be ‘participants’ in the political system, yet rather sit comfortably in the seat of the ‘subject’.
The data in Table 4 poses the question “How much of a democracy is Taiwan today?” and illustrates the discontent which the people of Taiwan have most recently felt towards the status of their country’s democracy. Despite Taiwan fulfilling the requirements of a fully consolidated democracy as previously outlined by the theories of Huntington and Diamond, as of 2008, only 7.9% of the population believed Taiwan to be a full democracy. Table 4 shows that 37.4% of respondents believe Taiwan to be a democracy with minor problems while 41.2% believe Taiwan’s democracy to still have major problems. These statistics initially seem quite worrying, however below 4% of the people deny that Taiwan is a democracy, therefore despite peoples’ discontent with the recent political leadership, they still believe that the system is democratic enough to be called a democracy. Diamond’s definition (1999) for what constitutes a consolidated democracy emphasizes that a democracy is successfully consolidated once there is no
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political rhetoric strongly preaching against it, which is currently and has been for some time, the case for Taiwan. Despite the issues which people have with the way in which the democratic system is functioning in their country today, the mass majority of the Taiwanese people still believe that Taiwan is a democracy and people would not care so deeply about the functions of their democracy unless they had strong feelings towards their democracy. Therefore the general populations’ discontent with Taiwan’s democratic system can actually be viewed to be a strong influence over peoples’ assessments.
Table 4. How much of a democracy is Taiwan today?
A full democracy 7.2 %
A democracy with minor problems 37.4%
A democracy with minor problems 37.4%