3.2. Territorialization
3.2.3. Diplomacy
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To sum up, it is obvious that Chinese strategy of economic expansion has met with success in the case of Cambodia, which brings us to the second perspective of raise of Chinese power in this country in terms of ELC. On the one hand, there is no doubt that Chinese companies contribute to improvement of living standards of Cambodian poor labor. On the other hand, China also contributes to exclusion of local habitants from their natural way of living, and to widening wealth inequality. Although Beijing stresses out the factor of mutual benefit, it is often the notorious 1% of population who really profit from these transactions. That means that political ties might be at the peak, but at the expense of China’s image among certain share of rural population. McInnes (2015, 1) claims that more than 400 000 people were negatively affected by granting concessions, since the government usually does not take into account the needs of local communities and takes decisions regardless of any environment or other impacts on living conditions of these people (2015, 2). Do such activities affect China’s cause? Probably to certain extant, in terms of projected goodwill; however, in my opinion under the patronage of current Cambodian regime China does not have to be worried that it will not get what it wants. Most likely, the old migrant communities consist of upper ranks of the society and with the China’s support they are probably well-off; therefore, I do not think that it hurts the geopolitical plans of territorialization and promotion of further regionalization. Most importantly, land concessions are inseparable part of China’s foreign policy, promoted in the good neighborhood rhetoric to fuel “[…]national ambitions that factor in other countries land to meet the interest of key actors of that particular political economy of development (e.g. bureaucrats, industry) in resources, exports markets, international economic integration, and political alliances” (Goetz 2015, 15).
3.2.3. Diplomacy
According to theory of offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001, 179-185), China’s ultimate goal is to become the hegemon, if not the world one, at least the regional one. The motivation behind such behavior is the security of its own existence. World order is just the playground, where every state struggles for sustaining its own existence. Before, China was bidding for hegemony through projecting the goodwill and soft power, and this attitude persists even after Xi Jinping has taken the office; however now it has become more obvious, that if it comes to the topic of China’s core interests, China will put even its image at stake to protect it. Not necessarily in the military way though. Looking at the historical records, only hegemon who bade for hegemony and actually made it was the USA. Japan, Germany, Soviet Union – those are the failures of 20th century. Kirshner (2012, 471) points out that bidding for hegemony differs from being a hegemon. If the security is the ultimate goal of realists’ world, why would country deliberately choose the path of self-destruction? In fact, China has decided to follow the different path, more resembling the strategy of balancing the carrots and sticks. Neoclassical realist suggest that security is not the sole motivation for states, rather, states “[…] use their power to direct the international system toward their own goals and preferences”, so as they could shape and control
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their environment (Rose in Santosombat 2015, 25). In case of China, the main drivers for influencing the surrounding area are the ‘vulnerability to threats’ and historical experience of the
‘century of Chinese humiliation’ (Nathan and Scobell in Santosombat 2015, 27). Such culture of victimization encourages China to rational political pragmatism and obligation to learn from its mistakes, because who does not influence others will be influenced by others. In fact, China’s foreign engagement is linked with foreign aid, which by using the optics of realism could be understood as a sufficient instrument of persuasion to exert its influence; however, aid is just the one category of the much more sophisticated strategy that intends to create the interdepend environment – the community of a common destiny.
The ‘Quaternity Model’ of Chinese foreign aid was already discussed above, but here I need to put the emphasis on the last element of this system – the element of economic cooperation, because creating the situation of regional interdependency, that is in my opinion the real nature of China’s strategy. Such interdependency could be easily cultivated by economic expansion; but there must be something else, some kind of platform, where leaders would be able to voice their message, to prepare the background for the opportunity to sell Beijing’s ideas – institutions and cross-national frameworks. That is the reason why the institutional realism has its place in this work. According to Kai He (2009, 1-10), the expansion of multilateralism is the weak point of realists’ account, because it is not clear why regional powers would voluntarily bind themselves to institutions, where they have to limit themselves by obeying the common rules suggested by weaker countries. First of all, weaker countries have just two options in dealing with hegemony, either hard balancing – military alliances – or soft balancing, by seeking the security under the institutions with clear set of rules. With regards to policy of ‘Peaceful Development 2.0’, it is not surprising that for Beijing the institutional balancing is much more favorable. And what happens if a country can establish its own institutions with its own rules? Goh (2016, 14) calls it
‘institutional shaping’, which means that China can influence others by setting up is own institutional positions, agendas, and norms. Through these institutions China is able to translate its development expansion into economic regionalism, which eventually helps to accumulate the interdependence in the region and influence leverage (ibid). Kai He (2009, 9) adds that “high economic interdependence makes states choose an institutional balancing rather than traditional military alliances to cope with threats or pressures from the system.”
Since the end of the Cold War we have been witnessing the expansion of multilateral institutions in the Asian sphere, mainly led by ASEAN initiative. At the beginning China played the role of outsider, primarily given by outcomes of Tiananmen issue, but also by lack of reforms in the China’s foreign policy, which at that time was still mainly driven by ideological ballast from the Mao’s era. That has dramatically changed after the Asian Crisis, when Beijing understood that friendly sugar-coated approach might bear its fruit, and eventually has started to carry on the image of a good neighbor, who does not only wish to participate in the multilateral relations, it would also like to set up its own institutions in the region to make sure that the future bid for hegemony will be executed in the most peaceful way. Although two-side meetings and dialogues
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have been much preferable, Beijing did not hesitate to also become the co-founder and initiator of multilateral frameworks, such as ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus three, East Asia Summit, BAO Forum for Asia, or Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership Bejing has kicked off so far the most ambitious project called ‘One Road, One Belt’, which is supposed to create the transfer corridors in order to connect Asia, Africa and Europe by developing and modernizing the infrastructure, and also by improving political and economic relations between countries in these regions. The goal of this framework is to facilitate the trade and investments, to promote the settlements in local currencies and enhance the interpersonal contacts. In other words, it promotes the further regionalization and interdependency in the global system. Such a huge project demonstrates the China's future geopolitical vision on its position within the global world, and proves the shift from the low-profile to the more pro-active stance, where China would be able to declare its rightful superior position. Most importantly, it will be in the peaceful way, through the institutions. OBOR is still in a form of a draft, and most likely it will not progress in the nearest future. However the AIIB, as the side-project supporting this plan, has already become the real institution, whit real members, with real budget and real set of rules drafted by China. In my point of view, I consider AIIB being the first challenge for Western institutionalism in the context of the Peaceful Rise 2.0.
In order to make this challenge successful, China should make sure that it can rely on the foundations from its regional position utilized by its economic statecraft and territorialization.
Goh (2016, 11) observes that Beijing has managed to gain its power level in two ways: 1.
promotion of Beijing’s way of modernization in the least developed countries of Mekong Region; 2. mobilizing the developed parts of ASEAN through boosting investments to close trade relations with China. Naturally, creating the economic leverage in the Asian region is indeed much easier in underdeveloped countries, so Beijing drew the plan of a free trade agreement between China and ASEAN which was implemented in 2010, eventually in 2015.43 ACTFA is thus another recent example of China’s multilateral approach. It intends to eliminate the tariffs and achieve the easier flow of commodities, labor, and traders by creating the largest free trade zone of 1.7 billion people (Zhuang and Wang 2010, 182). China needs two approaches in ASEAN, because despite to proclaimed unity, it is not a cohesive community of countries; on the contrary, they with different preferences and goals. Goh and Simon (2008, 12) describe the cultural, political and economic diversity in ASEAN. These differences divide ASEAN into two parts, the continental one - CLMV44; and the maritime one – BPMIS45, with Thailand occupying the position in between. China has to maneuver between these blocks in order to shape the regional politics, and achieve the secure sea lines of resources import, which is besides the factor of actual proximity the most tangible reason of China’s high-level commitment in this area; but also let’s not forget about the SCS – the source of escalating tensions in this area (2008, 70).
43 The implementation of agreement in Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam were scheduled to 5 years later term.
44 Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar.
45 Brunei, Philippines , Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore
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In my opinion, since China has already jumped into wagon of more progressive and assertive policy of sticks and carrots, the most difficult part is to estimate, when will be the right moment to finally use those sticks. For example, although Beijing has been patiently pumping money into ASEAN countries for a decade to make them believe that peace is the one and only motivation of China’s raise, as soon as concerned countries hear the song of the ‘core interests’ they immediately brace themselves and not only ally together, they also balance against Beijing by knocking on the USA door. Using the strong nationalistic rhetoric does not help the China’s credit; quite contrary, it undermines the achievements of ‘Good Neighborhood’ and ‘Peaceful Development 1.0.’, such as results in Taiwan issue, where all of the ASEAN countries strictly stick to the One China Policy. Therefore, issues over territorial claims require more patience, more bilateral meetings, and more money, because so far the accumulated economic power is not enough in terms of the real influence.
Getting under the surface of Cambodia political direction, situation might not be as negative as it seems. From multilateral perspective, there are three notable mechanisms crucial for the local dynamic: ASEAN Mekong Basin program; ADB GMS pregame; and Mekong River Commission. The GMS46 is the program established by ADB, which brings about whole new set of mechanisms supporting the cooperation, such as GMS Summit, GMS Ministerial Conference, GMS Economic Corridors Forum, GMS Business Forum (Vannarith 2013, 4). China, mainly through Yunnan and Guangxi regions, plays a significant role in this initiative and also contributes by relevant sum of money and other technical and training support47, mainly because the development goals are perfectly aligned with the goals of China’s foreign policy. According to ADB strategic plan (in Vannarith 2013, 3) for 2012-2022, those are:
1. Developing the major GMS corridors as economic corridors;
2. strengthening transport linkages, developing an integrated approach to deliver sustainable, secure, and competitive energy;
3. improving telecommunication linkages and information and communication technology applications among the GMS countries;
4. developing and promoting tourism in the Mekong as a single destination;
5. promoting competitive, climate-friendly, and sustainable agriculture;
6. enhancing environmental performance in the GMS;
7. and supporting human resources development and initiatives that facilitate the process of GMS integration.
All these goals support China’s drive for more economic interdependency and regionalization. In addition, it is beneficial for economic development of western part of China, which has always been behind the eastern provinces. Similarly, very important regional initiative is the Mekong
46 The GMS countries are Cambodia, the People's Republic of China (PRC, specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam (ADB website available online: http://www.adb.org/countries/gms/main, [accessed 11th-Aug-2016]).
47 More about China’s involvement in GMS: in Zhu 2010, 8-9.
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River Commission (MRC), consisting of Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. However, China is represented only as a dialogue partner, mainly due to MRC’s fundamental purpose, which is to establish the effective framework of management to limit the chaotic development on the Mekong River48. No wonder China does not want fully commit itself to this institution, given its own internal set of developmental strategies on this river. That might pose as a little setback in terms of China-Cambodia relations, since mainly downstream countries have been concerned about Chinese dam construction on the river handled just by unilaterally or bilaterally means.
Goh (2004, 10) states that as for the river development “[There] are no formal or regular multilateral meetings to exchange information, to consult, or to coordinate projects.”
In terms of Chinese national interests it is reasonable that in certain issues Beijing prefers the bilateral talks. Dealing with a weaker country without support of other is much easier in terms of reaching the consensus. The bilateral approach is by Feng and Huang called China’s strategic partnership diplomacy. To put it simply, it is the China’s answer to the world ‘multidimensional diplomacy’ in ‘multipolar and globalized’ world (2014, 7). It is the sort of diplomatic label for countries, which are usually important for China’s interests, and also the other way around. The motivation to establish such partnership varies based on the role of the second country in eyes of the China’s foreign interest. Overall, partnership with more powerful countries reflects the defensive motivation to protect China’s core interests, and partnership with weaker states reflects the intention of shaping the favorable environment to facilitate China’s rise (2014, 12-14).
Defensive logic brings about assurance of continuity of the peaceful development as long as its core interests will be respected; on the other hand, the assertive logic brings about the long-term plan of Beijing to achieve the capacity to declare the rightful superior position in the world – in other words this is the Peaceful Rise 2.0. Strategic partnerships are supposed to introduce the new school in the international relations, which would prove that China is adapting to international community, but at the same time it tries to change the world order from within (2014, 12). Cambodia is more likely the first case of China’s assertive strategic engagement;
however, very important one as the table number eleven suggests. Among the GMS countries it is only Cambodia who has made it to the Strategic Partnership level.
48 According to official website, available online: http://www.mrcmekong.org/about-mrc/vision-and-mission/, [accessed 11th -Aug-2016].
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Table 11: China Strategic Partnership Diplomacy and China's interests in Cambodia
comprehensive
Economic Secure Natural Resources Medium
Expand Export Market Low
Myanmar 2011 - Ideological Spread Chinese Culture High
Source: table adopted from Feng & Huang 2014, 18, and Heng 2012, 72.
That is not as surprising if we consider the China’s national interests in Cambodia. The second part of the table number eleven implies the level of priority of China’s policy goals in Cambodia.
Having examined almost all tools of this mutual engagement, it could be concluded that
‘Peaceful Rise 2.0.’ is rather effective. Cambodia does not have such a huge amount of natural resources, and if it does, they have not been discovered yet. Although in 2008 there was estimation of 400 million barrels of crude oil 3 trillion cubic feet of gas (EIC in Heng 202, 73), import of energy and minerals from Africa and Middle East is more important. Cambodia also does not have such an enormous market as Thailand or Vietnam, so Chinese OFDI and trade flows mainly focus on those countries. What makes Cambodia a strategic partner are the political and ideological means. As for political ones, Cambodia sticks with China in terms of security.
Cambodia is located in the heart of ASEAN region49, so it is reasonable that extensive military connections are undergoing. According to Phnom Penh Post article50, in 2013 China funded a military institute in Kampong Speu for Cambodian army, which even more underlines the China’s military cooperation with Cambodia. For example, there are many military officers obtaining the training at China’s defenses university, and Phnom Penh asks for even more military assistance and training opportunities.51 China also cooperates with Mekong countries in terms of cracking down on the crime such as drugs and human trafficking. Further, Cambodia is one of the strongest followers of One China Policy among ASEAN. For instance, the recent news tackles the problem of 21 Taiwanese criminals being deported to PRC despite protests of R.O.C. government, which did not meet with success, since Cambodia strictly recognizes Taiwan as the province of one China.52 From the strategic perspective, Cambodia has been deeper and deeper embraced by China’s economic assistance, mainly because help from the USA is constantly conditioning the PM Hun Sen regime. To draw the more detailed picture, Ear (2013, 18) concludes that whenever “[…]Cambodia falls under pressure from international
49 Look for ‘String of Pearls’ geopolitical strategy in Heng, 2012, 73-74.
50 “China steps up military aid”, Available online: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/china-steps-military-aid, [Accessed 11th-Aug-2016].
51 More about military involvement in Heng 2013, 66-67.
52 China Daily: “Cambodia to deport Taiwan fraud suspects to mainland”, Available online:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2016-06/21/content_25782344.htm, [Accessed 11th-aug- 2016].
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bodies to reform its human rights abuses, corruption, oppression of its own people, or misuse of power, it turns to china for financial support.” Therefore, given the nature of its leadership, Cambodia does not really have enough maneuvering space in terms of balancing China by leaning to the USA.
The last point dashed down the nature of interdependency between these two countries. Because Beijing needs the back up of Phnom Penh in political matters, mainly as supportive voice within
The last point dashed down the nature of interdependency between these two countries. Because Beijing needs the back up of Phnom Penh in political matters, mainly as supportive voice within