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In conclusion, Cambodia tries to apply the bilateral and multilateral institutional balancing;
however by doing so, it is facing several obstacles. One problem is divergence in goals, and competition among riparian states. Ho (2014, 20) stresses out that “[The] lower Mekong riparian states have not presented a united front towards China, due to the disagreements between upstream and downstream users throughout the Mekong and conflicts among them over one another’s dam building activities.” GMS countries should let the mutual conflicts aside and unify in the question of Mekong development to compel China to change its attitude and compromise.
However, it might be easier said than done, given the Cambodia’s experience of being under control either of Thailand, or Vietnam. However, times might change and if the actors were under the one roof with other ASEAN countries participating in the platform of ASEAN’s Mekong Basin Development, the situation might turn to be more balanced. Besides that, Cambodia can also rely on ADB GMS cooperation, and rising interest of the USA and Japan.
Second problem in terms of counterbalancing the Chinese presence in hydro-dam construction sector is the corruptive environment, which scares out relevant percentage of the potential investors from bringing their money to Cambodia. I think that Cambodia has plenty of options to balance the Chinese presence, however, the elites are definitely dealing with the dilemma, whether they should cut the ground from under their feet and adopt reforms to improve the rule of law in their own country in order to diversify the investments, or they should just keep going on with the status quo. The trend shows that certain improvement in diversification has taken place. Last but not least, even if the cooperation between countries of GMS worked out well, the main argument against the unilateral and unconditional hydro-dam construction on the Chinese part of the Mekong river would be terribly weaken, since these countries cannot criticize a country for something what they intend to do as well. The only way how to deal with this issue is further soft balancing through luring China more into intricate relations of ASEAN in order to make Beijing to compromise at least on some of the issues regarding the Mekong development.
4.3. Discussion on power, influence, and realism
To begin with the last one, the hunger for security and influence is considered as the main motivation of states in the discourse of realism. In terms of China’s unilateral and hegemonic river strategy in Yunnan, this would perfectly fit. However, how should we formulate the certain trends in cooperation in China’s policy as the main subjective of the ‘friendly neighbor image’?
The theory of institutional realism introduced in previous chapters might also not be sufficient, because the truth is that China inclines to cooperate on several matters with ASEAN, for instance; however, on the particular matter of hydro-dam investments, China’s engagement carries more sophisticated signs of balancing between cooperation and conflict. Biba (2014, 22-29) in his study states, that considering the China’s river-politics, there are certain disjunctions with realistic approach detected. First of all, it is the already mentioned partnership attitude,
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either bilateral or multilateral with its neighbors. Realist accounts, in general, show skepticism towards any prospects of cooperation, because there always should be an actor, who is primarily binding for regional hegemony, given the possessed material resources. China with its geographical location obviously holds this position; however, as I noted before, binding for hegemony or having this position creates unfavorable conditions for further expansions or even a threat that the periphery will unify to balance. Therefore, China has to adapt and send the signal that concerns of up-stream hegemony is not necessary. Such adaptation implies the second defect of realism, which is the dynamic nature of China’s policy. Beijing seems not to be reflecting the consistent and static picture of international relations based on realist paradigm. The strategy of
‘Peaceful Rise’ was created to show the China’s cooperative mask, which is consistently taken on and off, depending on who is China dealing with, and on what particular matter are the sides to be negotiating. For instance, the core interests will definitely not do, but cooperation on tourism, financial aid and economic development – that rings the bell. To label such process, Biba (ibid) suggests using the theory of desecuritization, which brings together the aspects of realism and structuralism. Realism-factor is represented by the existential security-driven objective, while the structuralism-factor is reflected in the dynamism of adjusting the existential agenda based on the other actors’ responses. To put it in other words, “[Desecuritization] is therefore about turning threats into challenges and security into politics” (Biba 2014, 28).
From neorealist point of view, Chinese actions and rhetoric has made the issue over Mekong River a security issue. China built the dam cascades without any prior discussion or coordination, which was negatively influencing the riparian states. That means unilateral actions protecting the national interests have affected multilateral community. Securitization is a common tool in international relations in order to move the national interest matters to the arena, where in the name of protection the tools of force are legitimately applicable (ibid). However, such action creates the sense of insecurity among other states, and that is in case of China essential, because wearing the mask of a hegemon has negative impact on its quest for economic expansion and modernization. Therefore, China had two options how to balance this threat and create the environment, where riparian states would not consider the Yunnan hydro-dams development as a sign of raising hegemony. According to Goh’s (2016, 13-14) theory of influence, in that particular situation, first option is the ‘discursive persuasion’, where wielder provides “[…]
evidences that its own beliefs are more accurate and desirable – propagation of dominant beliefs, which once accepted , constrain and align the preferences of the subjects.” Second option was to influence the indeterminate target through institutions by ‘institutional shaping’. Since China is reluctant to discuss its dams-policies on any multilateral channel, it seems that the accumulated power has not yielded the necessary state to shape other actors’ preferences, or China simply does not need to use the institutional approach. Goh (2016, 11) claims that actors can mobilize similar preferences into collective action by enabling “[…] similar-minded regimes to carry out preferred strategic projects, which these other actors otherwise could not achieve.” Cambodia’s originally could not find any other investors to its hydro-dams projects, who would be eager to take the risk of doing business under such corruptive and patron-driven environment. China took
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advantage of that and killed two birds with one stone, by desecuritizing its own Mekong development and profiting from new projects in Cambodia at the expense of local population. In result, the promotion of hydro-dam development as the source of clean energy and symbol of progress has successfully created the ‘Preference Multiplier’ situation, which comes along with temporal desecuritization of Mekong River dynamics. In order to achieve that, china took advantage of tools of territorialization, where it promoted the successful story of China’s hydro-development as the solution to Cambodia’s energy shortage. Problem is that such propaganda has appealed only among Cambodia’s political and business elites, whereas local river population was excluded from economic benefits; moreover their livelihood was destroyed and degenerated.
According to Goh (2016, 15), in order to understand the efficiency of the influence wielder it is firstly necessary to study the strategic areas of bilateral relations. Diplomatic situation was described in the previous chapter. To review, Cambodian political elite’s main goal is to develop the infrastructure, but not at the expense of regime turbulences. Beijing offers this kind of package with declaration of non-intervention into target’s state affairs. In addition, Cambodia’s business and political class is tightly bounded with CCP as the result of territorialization. The only problem arises among local communities and ordinary population, who are often excluded from the projects’ outcome. Secondly, it is necessary to determine the preferences of both actors. Preferences are divergent, mixed or convergent. In case of Cambodia, I reckon that preferences were mixed, or not particularly determined, mainly from the Cambodia’s side. The first issue is the China’s unilateral development on its part of the Mekong River, which was not acknowledged positively by riparian states, including Cambodia. However, the hydro-energy potential is widely considered to be a good idea to deal with energy insufficiency, mainly in Cambodia’s situation, since it has to import expensive energy from abroad. Such solution has been promoted both by western institutions and by Beijing, which realized that the best way to relieve the tensions is to ‘identifying common imperatives’. Last but not least, states’ main objectives also should be explored. Both China and Cambodia need the cheap and clean energy to satisfy its hunger for economic development. Consequently, Hydro-dam development has also become the Cambodia’s core interest, despite the heavy impact on its population’s livelihood, and economic burden given by unequal treaties with China’s SOE. The process of wielding the influence on certain target consists of causality, intentionality, and goal attainment (Goh 2016, 6). The casual relationship over the hydro-dam construction in Cambodia might be understood from different perspectives. I interpret the events as following: 1) Unilateral hydro-dam development in Yunnan; 2) Bad environmental impact on downstream countries; 3) Condemning the Beijing’s action by riparian states; 3) Promotion of hydro-development by China along with western institutions; 4) Cambodia accept the common imperative with promise of China’s foreign assistance in form of concessional loan and tied-aid; 5) Hydro-dam becomes the core national strategy – achievement of aligned preferences; 6) issue no longer poses as security threat. The intentionality by wielder – China – is shown in purposive promotion of successful clean energy by using the tool of territorioalization, mainly given by the business connections
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between CCP and CPP. And finally, the matter of goal attainment, which means that effect must be in favor of the influence wielder. In this case China not only silenced the official concerns of Cambodia’s elite, it also controls almost the whole hydrology energy sector in Cambodia for next couple of decades, while Cambodia bounded itself to carry the risk of the investments on its shoulders.
To sum up, it seems that China’s influence has shown its efficiency. The current situation only proves it, since in 2010 PM Hun Sen (in Ciorciari 2013, 28) himself “[…] denied charges that the hydroelectric dams China had built on the Mekong River in PRC territory had disrupted the river’s flow and caused harm to the riparian communities in the lower Mekong” In addition, he assured that “[…] dams posed “no problems,” he said, instructing his diplomats not to complain about the issue in regional forums despite assertions from NGOs that Chinese dams were partly responsible for depressed water levels that endangered downstream species and the livelihoods of local fishermen” (ibid). Moreover, other Chinese neighbors’ governments also have throughout the last decade remained most likely subtle towards the hydro-power dam construction in Yunnan province (Ho 2014, 20), or they were simply ‘stripped’ from any moral right to condemn the China’s activities (Biba 2012, 617). Based on the new curse of events, condemning the China development in Yunnan would be hypocritical, since riparian states not only have engaged in the same plan; they also sign the check with Chinese money. On the other hand, winning the heart of target’s leadership does not mean also winning the heart of local public voice. To complete the picture of China’s leverage, it is again very useful to bear in mind who benefits and who pays. Cambodian authorities obviously bend over for the sake of personal gain, among other reasons; however, civic society who has the face the environmental and other impacts keeps voicing its disobedience. Especially, Yepohantong (2013) portrays an increasing influence of civil actors, who challenge the authorities by establishing various NGOs to express protest against the course of events around the dam-construction in Cambodia. Such NGO mobilization gives place to a significant source of anti-china sentiment. The problem for China is that even if it improved its attitude towards better compensation of the local communities, it is often jeopardized by corruption and incompetence of Cambodian authorities, and lack of communication between Chinese actors and relevant representatives from local population. It is therefore challenge for China, to promote the sustainable growth and modernization through hydropower without degradation of livelihoods and ecosystems (Yepohantong 2014, 723). For instance, in 2011 the things got so far that Chinese investor – China Southern Power Grid – did not manage to face the localized escalating resistance anymore and backed off from all proposed hydropower dams (Yeophantong 2013). Such result is a sign that civil organizations are not absolutely silenced and have the weight to challenge the state or a foreign investor. Wen and Tan suggest (2013, 147) that if Beijing wants to continue in creating the positive goodwill, the engagement with locals and civic society groups, along with better communication is inevitable;
because working just on the premise of government-to-government linkage might result in contrary effect. However, from the perspective of efficiency, it is evident that China is able to achieve maximum benefits by carrying out the coherent strategy, which connects the positive
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outcomes in terms of economic development, trade expansion, resource security and increasing position in SEA.
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o sum up the thesis, I will approach the research questions one by one accordingly to the order. First of all, I was studying the China’s power projecting strategy towards Cambodia. In its path to fulfill the new objective of China’s ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0.’ strategy, Beijing is promoting the ideas of regionalism and cooperation to fuel to the economic growth;
because if the neighbors do well, China accelerates its economic performance too. By selling the story of successful modernization, Beijing attempts to create a political environment, where countries would be interdependent on each other; however, preferably in the way as China wants – the concept is called ‘Community of a shared destiny’. The first tool of Chinese strategy is the expansion of economic statecraft, which uses the premise of China’s state capitalism to achieve the economic expansion and create the conditions for China to shape the international order in a peaceful way. Second tool, addressed as territorialization, consists of social, cultural and national penetration into the targeted country in order to further generate the positive goodwill and power yield. This kind of expansion is the most effective in the weaker underdeveloped states, which desperately need investments and foreign aid. Cambodia is a perfect example of such country.
China’s operates on the base of mutual benefit with no strings attached. Such engagement certainly appeals to Cambodia’s authoritarian regime, which finds itself constrained by conditionality approach of western countries.
In the mutual engagement China employs the so-called ‘Quaternity Model’ that brings together trade, investments, and foreign assistance wrapped in the plastic bag of foreign economic cooperation. That part actually underlines the hidden conditional nature of partnership with China, for example in the matter of One China policy. Such partnership is like a cycle, where one aspect is subsequent to another, and everything is equally interconnected. Once has Cambodia became the partner, the aid has started flowing in form of the large-scale infrastructure projects carried out by Chinese SOE and financed by concessional loans provided by EXIM bank. These projects fuel the mutual trade and demand for Chinese products. Better infrastructure attracts more investments and more tourists visiting the Cambodian top sights, where they keep spending their money. Since Chinese foreign aid is deployed mostly in a form of concessional loans, the debt raises as well; however, the negative current account could be balanced by commodification of the country’s assets, including the Cambodian land. More Chinese investors buying out the land to build the garment factories result in raising importance of Chinese language, as the job opportunities at Chinese businesses grow. Mobilizing of the old Chinese diaspora plays a significant role in terms of mediating the contact with new Chinese migrants, who are encouraged to go to Cambodia to teach Chinese, establish CI, or take the more sophisticated jobs, since Cambodian labor does not qualify. That is the story of mutually escalating modernization, where both countries need each other. China needs to sustain its growth, and Cambodia needs to get a chance to create one – the win-win situation.
On the other hand, such approach may be a threat for Cambodia from the perspective of its sovereignty. Based on the collected data, China is the Cambodia’s biggest investor, goods and services importer, source of tourists, creditor, land purchaser, and diplomatic partner. On the other hand, in terms of the economic statecraft, it is not true that there are no other actors having
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good relations with Phnom Penh. For example, Japan is the biggest and most generous donor, given the fact that most of the help comes un-tied in form of grants. Likewise, the neighbors like Vietnam and Thailand also play a significant role in Cambodia’s trade. USA is the largest importer of Cambodia’s goods. All of these countries are also source of FDI, and tourism. In addition, Cambodia is the member of ASEAN, which is supposed to guarantee the peaceful development of SEA. Actually, even though Chinese aid definitely comes with attached strings and side-agenda, whose financial aid does not? From the perspective of ruling Cambodia’s elite, who primarily deal with China, they can choose between restraining the power by improving the rule of law, and other good-governance indicators; or they can sacrifice this free will (meaning sovereignty) in political matters like Taiwan, South China Sea, Tibet or other prevalent topics from the current discourse. In my opinion, in a position of one of the poorest countries in the world, Cambodia will always have to give up a certain part of its freedom to make things better, at least on the surface.
However, when it comes to relations with China, there are certain aspects of China’s policy, which other countries might find at least controversial, especially in the part of territorialization, where accelerating involvement has real impacts on the China’s position in Cambodia. Process of decentralized nationalism intends to cultivate the deeply embedded feeling of leaning the Greater China, where Beijing would grant it-self an implicit notion of control over such
However, when it comes to relations with China, there are certain aspects of China’s policy, which other countries might find at least controversial, especially in the part of territorialization, where accelerating involvement has real impacts on the China’s position in Cambodia. Process of decentralized nationalism intends to cultivate the deeply embedded feeling of leaning the Greater China, where Beijing would grant it-self an implicit notion of control over such