Introduction to Neorealism

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Notwithstanding, I will refer to another categorization of China’s tools of strategy, because there are certain important pieces of puzzle missing in Kurlantzick’s definition. I would divide these techniques into two main categories, according to Santasombat procedure mentioned above:

china’s economic statecraft, and China’s territorialization. The economic statecraft is defined by China’s money, which is continuously flowing into Cambodia. The category of territoriality includes the process of trans-nationalization, which is spreading the Chinese values in terms of culture, language, diaspora and controlled migration. Additionally, this category will also discuss diplomacy, which will further elaborate on ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0.’ in practice, and also it will tackle the China’s balance between unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism. All these subcategories will be further introduced in analytical framework. Collected data will be crucial in order to prove the rising involvement of China in Cambodia’s matters, because the trend will reflect the higher or lower power that China has already gained. To test China’s ability to translate power into influence, I will use the theory of Professor Goh, who introduced her own framework, which studies to what degree a certain country can control another one.

2.1.3. Introduction to Neorealism

In this thesis I will rely mostly on the theories that help to expand the main source of the school of neo-realism. In my viewpoint, the current international system is based on the material motivation, which is the true essence of the mutual engagement between various actors in the international arena. I am inclining to the ideas of realism, in which state, as the main actor in the international relations, seeks for the power in order to project its influence. Based on the classical realism, the international dynamics does not come from actions of individuals, or other organizations. It is the hunger of states for power which keeps the wheel spinning. Moreover, power is the tool which helps to keep the state’s population secure. With security comes the ability to survive, because, given the premise of realism from the beginning of the 20^th century, human nature is rather egocentric and men never act in accordance with moral and ethical priorities. The international system is driven by anarchy, because there is no real authority above states. However, their actions are rational, since they act so as to accumulate more power.

Therefore, realism absolutely objects any sources of moral behavior elements in international politics, in contrary to the former school of idealism.⁹

However, in this work we will pay attention to the more recent theories of realism. The key foundation of the realist revival is the book by the author Kenneth Waltz called Theory of International Politics (1979), which introduces the so-called structural realism, which is an interchangeable term with neorealism. The new way of realism rather builds on premise of international system than on the human nature itself. The core of this theory is the relation

9 The main works of classical realism as the opposition to school of idealism are by the authors of Carl von Clausewitz, Hans Morgenthau, E.H. Carr, and Reinhold Niebuhr. The foundation of realism was built upon works of Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes.

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between international system and the dominant structure (anarchy), “[…] defined by the interplay between its component units (states seeking survival) which are characterized by particular distributions of power (the capabilities of units)” (Booth 2011, 5). Therefore, other factors that shape the foreign policies are neglected at the expense of the real significance of the international system and its anarchic nature. In other words, the structural constraints of the system are decisive upon the state’s behavior. States have to face the pressure of international system which is self-led by its anarchic structure. Waltz in his work builds upon the classical realism, but also contributes to the theory with whole new motives such as polarity, balancing, alliances, security dilemma relative and absolute gains, and the grand strategy (2011, 17).

Similarly, another significant author from the school of realism is Stephan M. Walt with his theory of Balance of Threat. Professor Walt enlarges the discussion of neorealism into its defensive merits, and explains the position of countries that have to carefully react on the threat from a larger and more powerful entity. That is in my opinion very important tool in order to understand the nature of interaction between China, as a regional power, and Cambodia as a small state. In that case, it is important to clarify and define the terms of regional power and a small state.¹⁰ As for the small state, according to Handel (1990, 10), “[The] main characteristic of weak states is, indeed, their lack of power or strength, and hence they are continuously preoccupied with the question of survival.” He further elaborates that the question of size of the state should not be decisive, unlike its relative strength. However, the best criteria for a small state should be the small territory and lack of strength. Small state should be interchangeable with the term of a weak state, because weak states do not possess the necessary capacity to protect, maintain, or further their national interests (11). Furthermore, the definition of a small state is in a negative correlation towards to definition of the powers. That means what does not meet the criteria of a great power, for instance, goes lower in the hierarchy.

As for the definition of regional power – which at that time was not sufficiently introduced in Handel’s research yet – we will adopt the formulation from the viewpoint of Stefan Schirm.

Before, however, it is firstly necessary to distinguish the meaning between ‘middle powers’ and

‘regional powers’, since these two concepts are easily misinterpreted. According to Keohane (1969, 293), “[A] great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can alone exercise a large, perhaps decisive impact on the international system.” The weaker the state is, the less capacity for projecting its influence on the international system it has, and simultaneously the greater impact of the great powers has to be confronted. That means the middle power does not achieve such an influence on the global matters, because it lacks the political, economic and military resources. Despite their position, they are considered to stand right by the side of great powers and super powers, since they have certain abilities to impact the international system on the

10 According to distribution of international power hierarchy we recognize super powers, great powers, middle powers, weak states, and mini-states. For further elaboration see more in HANDEL (1990), The Inequality of States:

a Study of Small Power in International Relations.

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ground of international institutions.

On the other hand, the ‘regional powers’ concept plays its part on the whole new playground, because it is incorporated in the different context. The determinant in this case is a certain geographic region and interaction between the states within this region. A status of regional power belongs to the state, which is capable of projecting its influence in regional affairs the most in comparison with other states, which geographically belongs to the given region.

Likewise, such a state is able to defend its position against any coalition of states in the region.

Last but not least, it belongs to a state which, unlike ‘middle power’, might be able to occupy higher ranks on the hierarchic scale in addition to its regional standing (Osterud in Neumann in Nolte 2010, 889). Therefore, regional power also can be at the same time a super power, or a great power, because then we are talking about different level of analysis. For the regional power the main goal is to keep the region in stability, which also goes in line with responsibilities towards this region.

To draw the better picture of such power I will introduce the definition by Professor Schirm (In Nolte 2010, 892), who helps us to recognize the regional power in general by combination of power resources with the perception of the regional power by other states. Regional power has:

• The articulated claim for leadership as rule maker, which is part of the state’s own role definition and is communicated to other actors/states.

• The material and organizational resources for regional and international power projection (power over resources).

• Activities to honor the claim of leadership and to mobilize power resources.

• The recognition and acceptance of leadership status by other actors/states in the region and outside of the region.

• Real political influence in the region (power over outcomes).

To put it simply, “[…] any distinctiveness in small state behavior arises not from any qualitative difference between small states and others, but from the limitations their smallness places upon their capacity to implement significant decisions in foreign policy” (Handle 1990, 38). Though, being weak does not necessarily mean to give up of any attempts to shape the global order, and it is in these countries national interest to adopt such foreign policies, which eventually lead to improvement of their global position.

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That is why Professor Walt’s defensive theory of balance of threat is so significant. Mr. Walt studies the reaction of smaller countries on the rising regional power. These countries in order to secure their self-existence either chose to balance this threat, or they cooperate with obedience – so called ‘bandwagonning’. Moreover, Walt brings up new definition of threat to the neorealist discourse. We distinguish between four factors, which determine the level of threat to a certain weaker state. Those factors are aggregate power (total resources of a state like population, technological advance, and military), proximity (nearby states pose a greater threat than states far away), offensive power (large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke opposition), and offensive intensions (the state’s ambitions might also provoke an alliance). For instance, if we take the case of Cambodia, the nearest threat might be posed by Thailand or Vietnam, since it is clashed between them and the historical experience suggests that Cambodia must be cautious in the future. Hence, it bends to China. Problem with such explanation might be the power capability of China, since according to Walt’s theory; the weaker states should align against the bigger power. Though, China in this case cannot be taken as a weaker state, since it is considered to be the regional power.

Therefore, as for the situation in Asia security, the theory of balancing threat is not sufficient enough. According to Kai, neorealism is often criticized for its intentional neglecting of the role of multilateral institutions. Moreover, the balancing is explained in its hard nature, or military terms. For neorealist institutions represent a secondary phenomenon, out of the main discourse.

National security in Asia is the case of “configuration” in the larger regional and global system (2009, 4). To challenge this notion, Kai He introduces the whole new framework called institutional realism. This theory suggests that (9):

• High economic interdependence makes states choose a new realist balancing strategy – institutional balancing – rather than traditional military alliances to cope with threats or pressures from the system,

• The distribution of capabilities in the regional system indicates how states conduct institutional balancing, either inclusively or exclusively.

If we look on the case of Sino-Cambodia relations, questions would stand how Cambodia chooses institutions to seek security. The good example is ASEAN, which is the primary choice of countries in this region. It can be understood either as inclusive balancing, where Cambodia deals with the pressure against Thailand and Vietnam, who also are the members, or it can be exclusive where Cambodia deals with the pressure from outer threat, for instance, from China or USA. What is good about this theory is that it takes into account the economic interdependence variable, which reflects the plan for SEA according to China’s strategy. In such set up the hard power is the least possible way of handling security issues, therefore it must seek for influence by adopting different means. According to Kai, the distribution of power and economic interdependence are the main guidelines policies of China in Asia Pacific to gain the influence at

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the expense of other regional powers.