3.2. Territorialization
3.2.1. Migration
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Chinese migration, then about education, land concessions, and last but not least, about Chinese diplomacy engagement with Cambodia.
3.2.1. Migration
Chinese diaspora is one of the biggest in the world, estimating over 50 million ethnic Chinese spread throughout the world, and 30 to 40 million out of this figure reside only in SEA (Sung 2015, 40). Although these masses cannot be regarded as one homogenous group, where all are striving for the Party’s success, it represents a considerably important cultural clout, which can be of help under certain circumstances in certain countries, especially when it is deliberately projected as a tool of foreign policy. Also here it follows the equation that the poorer country is, the easier for Chinese government to play the card of national sentiment upon the old descants, and it is even easier to spread this word by taking advantage of the new comers. Cambodia perfectly fits the example, considering that even Cambodian PM Hun Sen himself publically admits that his family has Chinese roots, and the Chinese cultural influence is hard to stop.27 In general, Chinese diaspora in SEA is divided into old Chinese migrants and new Chinese migrants. Old Chinese, or Khmer-Chinese (Chen in Khmer) refers to people who moved to Cambodia centuries ago, decided to settle for good and currently they are Khmer citizens.28 These people have “[…] strong links with Chinese ancestors and traditions, especially in the use of their language.” They generally used to be “[…] poor farmers, who came primarily from poor rural areas of China looking for their livelihood outside China; they were poorly educated and spoke only regional dialects” (Touch 2015, 209). According to Cambodia’s Social Economic Survey, in 2013 the population acknowledging such Chinese origin estimated only 14 000 (Table number seven). At the first glance this estimation might seem insignificant in comparison with 97.6% of ethnic Khmer population. But, this number might not be as accurate, given the process of integration and assimilation, which has taken place throughout the centuries, when several waves of Chinese migration reached SEA. Key part might also be played by Khmer Rouge and subsequent Vietnamese occupation in 80’s, when ethnic Chinese did not have a favorable position in the society. William Willmott (1967, 15) estimated that 420 thousand of Chinese-Cambodians were living in Cambodia by the end of 1966. Current account of 0.1% of total population is probably what is left after the decades of heavy turmoil and bloodshed in Cambodia. Or a mistake in data collection by Cambodian authorities, since some sources suggest that Khmer-Chinese population is much bigger. For instance, according to article in The Phnom
27 Quotation from nationalistic anti-Cambodian-government blog, more sources regarding this public claim are available probably just in Khmer language: “Cambodia is under Chinese cultural influence: Hun Xen’s confession”, Online:
https://sokheounpang.wordpress.com/2012/02/01/cambodia-is-under-chinese-cultural-influence-hun-xens-confession/, [accessed 3rd-Aug-2016].
28 Three large waves of Chinese emigration see more in: Zhuang and Wang, 2010, Migration and Trade: The Role of Overseas Chinese in Economic Relations between China and Southeast Asia, 175-176.
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Penh Post, there is around 700 thousand ethnic Chinese living in Cambodia.29 In 2012 Chinese owned Khmer Economy Magazine went even further in its estimations of 1 million ethnic Chinese (Touch 2015, 202). Vannarith (2009, 14) claims that population with Chinese ethnicity estimates 350 thousand or 3-4% of total.
More notable is the second group of Chinese currently residing in Cambodia, also called new migrants. They are the result of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 70’s, as the new approach of CCP of economic opening. In case of Cambodia, the real boom has started in 90’s following the restoration of kingdom and withdrawal of Vietnamese army. In contrast with old migrants, these people are mostly well-educated, and their primary motivation is to seek the business opportunities and engagement in commercial sector (Sung 2015, 41). Again in terms of real time numbers the estimations of new Chinese migrants differ. Inaccuracy might be caused by the floating system of new incomers, who often come and return back to China in handling their business affairs. Another aspect is the high proportion of illegal workers crossing the borders as the result of vast corruption environment both in China and Cambodia, but also thanks to the improving diplomatic ties between these two countries (Touch 2015, 198). That is reflected in the very wide-range calculation in Touch’s (ibid) study – somewhere between 50 and 300 thousand of new Chinese migrants to Cambodia. This proportion has been constantly changing as it is shown in the figure number ten, which draws the trend of number of dispatched temporary labor in the period of four years, comparing the countries of GMS region. There we can see that the number of Chinese labor is more or less steady with a slight growth by 13.7%. In 2014 approximately 7 thousand Chinese citizens worked in contracted projects and labor services in Cambodia. In comparison, only one GMS country estimated higher growth. It is Laos with 86.6% increase over four years from 8 thousand to almost 15. That is partially given by geographic proximity, where Laos locates right at the border with China; but there is no doubt that it also a reflection of priority in contracted projects, which are given to Laos, if we take into account that 35% of Chinese labor power in GMS was dispatched to its poor neighbor. Either way, these figures represent just the drop in the ocean of new migrants.
Table 7: Distribution of Ethnicity in population of Cambodia in 2004-2013 (%)
Ethnicity 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Khmer 96.0 97.7 97.8 95.8 96.2 97.4 97.2 97.6
Cham 2.0 1.2 1.1 2.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.2
Chinese 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Vietnamese 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.1
Thai 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0
Lao 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - -
29 “Chinese New Year: family, food and prosperity for the year ahead”, Available Online: http://www.phnompenhpost.com/post-plus/chinese-new-year-family-food-and-prosperity-year-ahead, [Accessed 4th-Aug-2016].
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Other 1.4 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.9
Not stated 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 -
Population
(000’) 12,657 - 13,396 13,729 13,958 14,155 14,376 14,678
Source: Cambodia Social Economic Survey
Figure 10: Share of all China’s temporary labor migrants among GMS 2011-2014 (%)
The total estimations of new Chinese migrants are not as important as the context beyond the process itself. Sung (2015, 43-44) recognizes three main reasons for the current drive of new Chinese migration to SEA: first one being the diplomatic transformation of China’s image in SEA as the result of ‘Peaceful Rise’ strategy from a threat to the friendly neighbor, who stands for the common good; secondly, it is the accelerating mutual trade expansion between ASEAN and China; and lastly, it is the China’s commitment in construction projects further fueling labor and skilled technicians. Naturally, the first reason is the most crucial for the cause of this thesis.
This context is part of the shift in China’s interests from domestic to international aspects of China’s modernization, and Chinese identity has played a very important role in this transformation (Barabantseva 2011, 101-111). In order to plant the seed of Chinese sentiments even among the old Chinese descants, it is necessary to define the right ideological formula, which would create the real connection unifying the old and new diaspora basing on its
‘Chinesesness’, and which would be diminishing the territorial aspect of the Chinese nation.
Such process is called ‘transnationaliation’, and basically it employs a deliberate utilization of the Chinese diaspora as the “[…] ethnic and cultural extension of the territorial Chinese nation through popularizing Chinese sentiment, and through introducing practices associated with modernity and advanced capitalism in China” (ibid). It is also often referred as the ‘decentralized nationalism’, which gives legitimacy to sort of delusion of Beijing’s self-accepted right to incorporate all Chinese people to the notion of the Greater China. Barabatseva (ibid) describes this approach as sophisticated institutionalization with both economic and political intentions. In order to reach the diaspora, spread throughout the world, Beijing has established five
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40%
2011 2012 2013 2014
Cambodia Myanmar Laos Thailand Vietnam
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook
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governmental bodies – five bridges – that are responsible for the outreach.30 Secondly, China does not approach overseas people only from within; it also mobilizes them in the countries they are currently residing. The PRC adapts so-called three pillars to revive the ‘Chinese consciousness’, namely: overseas Chinese organizations, schools, and periodicals (Liu Hong in Barabatsenva, 125). These should bring the migrants back home in their minds, and arouse the feeling of belonging to the Chinese culture represented by CCP.
In the case of Cambodia, the proposed situation has been already achieved, and it was not that difficult. Nyiri (2012, 99) describes the current commercial environment as heavily controlled by wealthy Chinese-Cambodian tycoons, who “[…] cultivate clientelistic relations with the party-state elite and have privileged access to natural resources.” Further, such groups of people consist of the highest-rank-titled men in Cambodian society – oknha (lords) – and even of senators with connections reaching right to the PM Hun Sen, and other top military leaders (ibid). The Khmer-Chinese activities are backed up by Association of Chinese in Cambodia (ACC), organization formed in 90’s which has absorbed all other organizations across the country, and also being recognized as the highest leadership organ of ethnic Chinese in Cambodia with commonly known connections to the leading party (Qiu in Nyiri 2012, 103).
While ACC unifies the old migrants, investments coming from mainland made by newcomers are upheld by the Cambodian Chinese Chamber of commerce, which is “[…] seen as speaking for the investors from mainland China, including state-owned as well as private companies”
(ibid). Speaking of which, new migrants do not need any further indoctrination as much as old ones. Their sense of belonging is still very strong, therefore, there are encouraged to make the contact with local Chinese, spread the Chinese spirit and unify them through the organizations under the promise of some sort of advantage in chasing their success. As Christiansen points out (in Barabatsenva 2011, 126), “[The] PRC reaches out to the overseas Chinese communities through the leaders of the overseas Chinese organizations, who are incorporated into the political institutions in the mainland, and influences the ways their identities are shaped.” In other words, Beijing is presented as the main entity which promotes the reunification of the Chinese nation, mainly addressing to the Taiwan issue. In fact, although overseas Chinese have literally become the stable part of the plan of rejuvenation (ibid), it is necessary to emphasize that Beijing does not intend to create this national clout in a sense of a PRC citizenship, and even more enlarge its already huge population. Rather it goes beyond the territorial integrity limits of PRC, and treats these people as notional members of the greater Chinese nation (123).
To sum up, migration is an intentional tool of China to exert its influence by taking advantage of the Chinese diaspora. It promotes the interaction between old and new Chinese migrants, and subsequently enhances the cooperation between these unified communities and China. Such process could be addressed as successful in the case of Cambodia, where Chinese associations
30 These are: The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, All-China’s Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, National People’s Congress Overseas Chinese Commission, Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and a special party Zhigongdang (Barabantseva 2011, 113).
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actively engage in the transnationalization, and “[…] maintain close relations with the Chinese embassy, and deploy references to a Chineseness infused with the state symbols of the contemporary PRC” (Nyiri 2012, 104). Deliberate expansion of sense belonging to Greater China might also be dangerous for Cambodia’s sovereignty in terms of inclination of taking decisions in China’s favor and at the expense of Khmer population due to mushrooming spider-web of influence among Cambodian business elites with direct connections to CCP.