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82 drones in future conflicts and wars. As it currently stands, there are no international norms or guidelines specifically dealing with drone usage. Each country has the ability to create its own manual for drone use and warfare as long as it abides by the normal laws of war. The precedent that the U.S. has set for others is unsettling—no transparency, virtually complete denial of existence, inefficient targeting methods, borderless warfare. In the future, other countries with different interests and objectives than the U.S. could use drones to fulfill their desires all while using them in the same way that the U.S. has used drones in the Middle East and South Asia.
“To some extent, this world is already being ushered in by the United States, which has set a dangerous precedent that a state may simply kill foreign citizens considered a threat without a declaration of war. . . . Given this precedent, there is nothing to stop other states from following the American lead and using drone strikes to eliminate potential threats.”9 This dangerous game will, without a doubt, escalate due to the U.S. carte blanche use of drones. Notwithstanding, the U.S. has shaped the future of warfare in its failed attempt to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates in the region by only using unmanned aerial vehicles.
5.3 Further Research Suggestions
Although this study’s scope only addresses whether or not drone strikes can defeat al Qaeda by achieving U.S. counterterrorism goals, several new topics arose in the discussion that should be explored further in other studies. The role of traditional customs and revenge in the tribal areas of Yemen and Pakistan play a key role in creating more enemies for the U.S.
However, no comprehensive studies have yet to be conducted on this link. Christopher Swift’s field research in Yemen is the best information available to date, but he only interviewed 40 men of very similar backgrounds. Such a study would be difficult and dangerous to conduct because
9 Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” 25.
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83 it would require interviewing drone strike victims’ families as well as members of al Qaeda or one of its affiliates. Despite these obstacles, it would benefit the conversation about the effect of drone strikes on these communities and overall U.S. strategy. Limited personal interviews and general customs point to a link between an increase in recruitment and drone strikes, but something more complete is needed. Also, the role of state-building in the prevention of terrorism (i.e. policies other than drone strikes) must be further explored. Current U.S.
counterterrorism strategy favors short term, cheap successes over long term, meaningful development. Drone strikes will never defeat terrorism or al Qaeda, but could elevating the quality of life and standard of living in these countries make a difference? Would it take away from al Qaeda’s message or ideology? Further exploration into other areas, like state building, is necessary to develop a better counterterrorism strategy.
Finally, because the U.S. keeps its drone program under wraps and rarely ever releases any information to the public, there is no research conducted on the mental state or capabilities of drone pilots. The authors of the letter cited in this study risked imprisonment by writing about the drone program so openly. Their criticisms, if true, bring a troubling reality to light: pilots are not trained properly, superiors encourage killing targets for the sake of revenge, and the military does not provide suitable care for the pilots. Receiving permission to interview and evaluate these pilots would be extremely difficult, but if the U.S. wishes to improve its drone program, then it is a necessity. These are only a few topics that were briefly mentioned in this study which should be further explored.
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