國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
71 greatest complaint about drone strikes is that Yemen does have not the ability to fight AQAP on its own. A member of the Muslim Brotherhood said, “No one resents a drone strike if the target was a terrorist. . . . What we resent is the fact that outsiders are involved. . . . The problem is not killing people like [Anwar] al-Awlaki. . . . The problem is when the U.S. ambassador goes on television and takes credit for it.” 47 This particular message is a part of what AQAP preaches:
U.S. violation of Yemeni sovereignty as a Western aggressor. The difference between AQAP and these tribal leaders is that the tribal leaders understand the damage that AQAP does to Yemen’s economy and people as well as the Muslim faith. Even if there is truly a change in public opinion about the efficacy of drone strikes in Yemen, the U.S. can do very little right now to successfully counter al Qaeda’s ideology and resonance and diminish the specific drivers of violence that al Qaeda exploits. Doing such a thing would require a functioning national government and a safe environment for international aid workers to help those in need. If eliminating rampant poverty in Yemen is the key to meeting this counterterrorism goal, then the U.S. has a long way to go before achieving it.
4.3 Evaluation of U.S. Drone Program in Yemen
Before the recent crisis and state failure of Yemen, the country had an opportunity to test the theory of military coercion and potentially eliminate AQAP as a major threat to U.S. national security and interests. That test never materialized because the national government collapsed as a result of the Houthi rebellion. Now, other than resistance efforts by a small coalition of Arab nations, some tribes, and the Houthis, AQAP has very little in its way from gaining more power and territory in Yemen. The drone program in Yemen does not meet any of the four
counterterrorism goals evaluated in this study: (1) disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al
47 Swift, “The Drone Blowback Fallacy.”
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
72 Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents, (2) eliminate safe havens, (3) build enduring
counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities, and (4) counter al Qaeda ideology and its
resonance and diminish the specific drivers of violence that al Qaeda exploits. Graph 4.1 shows that drone strikes have not prevented suicide and non-attacks attacks from increasing over time.
After the change from decapitation strikes to signature strikes in 2009, attacks have increased in number significantly. The situation in Yemen is worse than the one in Pakistan due to the civil unrest and failure of the national government. Drone strikes have killed many militants, but civilian deaths, AQAP members’ local ties, and targeting inefficiency when it comes to HVTs prevent any overall gains. These same factors feed into the Yemeni custom of revenge creating even more safe havens for AQAP. The unsafe situation in Yemen caused by the civil war prevents the U.S. from developing any worthwhile counterterrorism partnerships.
AQAP has grown and thrived in this atmosphere—empowered by the country’s disarray and the brewing hatred of the U.S. This al Qaeda branch pushed aside the normal operating procedures of conquering territory and preaching a global jihad; AQAP localized the struggle by aligning with tribal leaders, setting up and delivering social services, and preaching a nation-centric message. For these reasons, AQAP is the most dangerous branch of al Qaeda in the world. Some of its members are even U.S. citizens with the ability to travel back to the U.S. to attempt attacks like the infamous “underwear bomber.”48 AQAP leader Anwar al-Awlaki and his son were also American citizens, and both of them died in drone strikes in 2011.49 The organization has grown exponentially since its creation in 2009, partially fueled by anger from drone strikes. If al Qaeda expands this localization model to other countries, then its message will only to continue to spread. The U.S. should freeze its drone program in Yemen until a new
48 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Investigators scrutinize Yemeni American cleric’s ties to plane suspect,” The Washington Post, January 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/31/AR2009123101524.html.
49 Raghavan, “In Yemen, U.S. airstrikes breed anger, and sympathy for al-Qaeda.”
‧
functioning and capable government forms because drone strikes alone will do more harm than good in a country that cannot afford any more instability.200
Graph 4.1: Relationship between Strikes and Attacks in Yemen
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
74
Chapter Five: Conclusion
The U.S. has engaged in drone warfare since 2002, and with the current geo-political situation in the Middle East and South Asia, it will most likely continue indefinitely. If the U.S.
manages to successfully eliminate al Qaeda or one of its affiliates, then that absence creates a new opportunity for another organization to grow and flourish. Drone warfare is equivalent to applying a small bandage to a serious wound: its ability to solve the problem is very limited in scope, and the problem will only continue unless something more is done to fix it. If drone strikes are ever successful in one particular region, al Qaeda, or any terrorist organization for that matter, will simply re-emerge elsewhere where its ideology can take root and spread. Air power alone cannot solve the problem of terrorism, so the U.S. must reform its counterterrorism
policies and strategy in order to truly have an impact in the never-ending War on Terrorism.