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37 Japan, Korea (1950-1), Vietnam (1972), and Iraq, but failed in the cases of Korea (1952-3), Vietnam (1965-68), and Germany.2 In a later article, he also argues that the integration of land and air power was successful in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq (2003), and Afghanistan.3 In addition, air power cannot succeed against guerrilla warfare—the type of warfare that most closely resembles how al Qaeda operates in Pakistan. In guerrilla warfare, “the ability of air power to substitute for ground power is significantly constrained by tremendous difficulties in identification of friend and foe from the air, however, which can be offset only partially by increasing loiter time over the target and coordination between air and ground units.”4 While drones have increased loiter time, unless a positive identification has been made with precise intelligence, it is very difficult to determine friend from foe. Pape (1996) further argues that guerrilla forces will resist the enemy at all costs, so they “should be largely immune to coercion.”5 With only air power in play in Pakistan, coercion in the form of drone strikes will fail to defeat al Qaeda.
3.2 U.S. Counterterrorism Goals and Drone Usage in Pakistan
Even though the theory of military coercion predicts a failure in Pakistan, it is both necessary and important to evaluate the drone program on a practical level by assessing the following four U.S. counterterrorism goals:
(1) disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents
The drone program in Pakistan has had mixed results in terms of casualties from drone strikes. From 2004 to 2015, drone strikes have killed between 2,274 and 3,617 people, of which 255 to 315 were civilians and 1,748 to 2,823 were militants.6 Table 3.1 outlines the number of
2 Pape, Bombing to Win, 86.
3 Pape, “The True Worth of Air Power,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2004).
4 Pape, Bombing to Win, 79.
5 Ibid, 74.
6 New America Foundation, “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” 2015.
http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan-analysis.html.
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drone strikes, number and types of casualties, and the civilian casualty rate. This study sets any civilian casualty rate above 10% as unacceptable for the U.S. Half of the years (2007, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015) is under that threshold, while the other half (2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011) is above 10%. This data shows that progress has been made in recent years (since 2012, the civilian casualty rate has been below 10%). From another perspective, overall 8.71% to 11.21% of all casualties were civilians. Initially, the U.S. failed under this premise, but it has recently made strides in accuracy..
As discussed in Chapter One, decapitation strikes will not lead to the destruction of al Qaeda. Strikes against HVTs have not had great success in eliminating the target. Despite claims of precision by U.S. officials, the statistics in Table 3.2 contradict apparent conventional wisdom.
*There is a slight difference between these totals and the overall numbers—“unknown” casualties were intentionally omitted.
**Civilian casualty rate range was calculated by dividing the minimum number of civilians killed by the minimum total casualties and by dividing the maximum number of civilians killed by the maximum total casualties. For example, in 2009, the rate was calculated by dividing 57 civilian casualties/358 total casualties and 67 civilian casualties/703 total casualties.
Table 3.1: Pakistan Drone Strike Statistics Year
Source: New America Foundation, “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis.”
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While most of the HVTs listed died as a result of the final strike, the list shows the inefficiency of drone strikes at eliminating specific people. Since the start of the program in Pakistan, at least 58 HVTs have been killed as a result of a drone strike (~2.0% of total casualties).7 These strikes do not diminish al Qaeda’s operational capacity—it absorbs them by continuing to train and recruit more members and moving to other locations.8 Al-Qaeda has not collapse and remains a threat in South Asia.Table 3.2: High Value Targets Killed in Pakistan, 2004 - 2015
Baitullah Mehsud Nek Muhammad Sheikh Abdul Bari Amir Moawia Qari Hussain Haitham al-Yemeni Nazimuddin Zalalov
Saifullah Mullah Sangeen Zadran Abu Hamza Rabia Saleh al-Somali Sheikh Fateh
Hakimullah Mehsud Abu Sulayman
Jazairi Zuhaib al-Zahibi Ali Marjan
Sadiq Noor Abdul Rehman Haji Omar Ibne Amin
Badruddin Haqqani Abu Haris Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim
Ratta Khan Mustafa Abu Yazid Khalid Habib Abdul Basit Usman Abu Zaid al-Iraqi
Ilyas Kashmiri Mohammad Omar Azmatullah Mawiya
Wali Mohammad Toofan Abu Khabab al-masri Abu Zubair al
Masri Waliur Rehman Atiyah Abd
al-Rahman Abu Kasha Abdullah Azzam al
Saudi Mohammad Qari Zafar Abu Hafs al-Shahri Abu Yahya Al-Libi Rashid Rauf Sadam Hussein Al
Hussami Janbaz Zadran
Abdullah Bahar
Mehsud Abdullah Haqqani Tariq Mehsud Ahmed Farouq
Mullah Nazir Osama al Kini Mullah Akhtar Zadran Taj Gul Mehsud Mohammed Usman Sheikh Ahmed
Salim Swedan Hamza al-Jufi Aslam Awan
Amir Hamza Toji Khel Abu Akash al-Iraqi Shah Faisal Badr Mansoor
Source: Spencer Ackerman, “41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed: US drone strikes – the facts on the ground,”
The Guardian, November 24, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147, and New America Foundation, “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis.”
7 New America Foundation, “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis.”
8 Peter Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and al-Qaeda, (New York: Free Press, 2011), 332-3.
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40 From an operational standpoint, drone strikes do not have the desired effect on al Qaeda propaganda output or the prevention of retaliatory strikes. One study, conducted by Smith and Walsh (2013), contradicts Leon Panetta’s claim that “those operations [drone strikes] are seriously disrupting al-Qaeda . . . It’s pretty clear from all the intelligence we are getting that they are having a very difficult time putting together the kind of command and control, that they are scrambling. And that we really do have them on the run.”9 They concluded that strikes have a small effect on the output of propaganda videos, which is one of the best indicators to study because videos are available to the public and are the organization’s best available mechanism to reach the public and to criticize the U.S. Drone strikes do not prevent al Qaeda leaders from
“starring” in videos, and videos can still be produced, edited, and dispensed. Enhanced
technology works well for al Qaeda because it is now easier to disseminate their message on the internet.10 Also, drone strikes may increase the number of retaliatory strikes due to the
“accidental guerrilla” effect, in which civilians are radicalized or driven into the hands of al Qaeda due to errant drone strikes and dead family members. Individuals driven by revenge cause an apparent increase in attacks.11 While not all attacks were conducted in direct response to a drone strike, they show that drone strikes have not limited the operational capacity of al Qaeda during the years of highest frequency of drone strikes: more is not always better. Table 3.3 (below) outlines the number of attacks (suicide and non-suicide) and the number of deaths that they caused. These attacks include bombings, armed assaults, kidnappings, assassinations, etc. These attacks were carried out by various groups, but Tehrik-i-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Islam,
9 Smith and Walsh, “Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda?” 312.
10 Ibid, 313-317.
11 Hudson, Owens, and Flannes, “Drone Warfare,” 126-127.
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and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi are the main identified groups;12 there are dozens of affiliates within Pakistan carrying out attacks. Not every attack resulted in casualties. Al Qaeda is not as damaged and “on the run” as Leon Panetta claimed. These numbers are steady and slightly increasing despite the large amount of drone strikes. A truly weakened organization would have a harder time organizing and carrying out such a high number of attacks throughout the country.Al Qaeda and its affiliates may be weakened, but they still remain a threat to both the U.S. and Pakistan. Therefore, due to the overall civilian casualty rate, the failure of the decapitation policy, the continued propaganda output, and the retaliatory strikes, the drone program in
Pakistan does not fulfill the U.S. counterterrorism goal of disrupting, degrading, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda.
Table 3.3: Attacks in Pakistan Conducted by Al Qaeda or Affiliate from 2004 to 2014 Year Suicide
Attacks Casualties Bombings Armed Assaults
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database, 2013, retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
12 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Global Terrorism Database,” 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
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42 (2) eliminate safe havens
Safe havens are locations where terrorists settle down to organize future attacks, carry out every day operations, and are relatively safe from targeting. As discussed in Chapter One, the development of drone technology has limited places where terrorists feel safe from a drone strike.
There are very few places where they can hide safely. The MQ-1 Predator has technology that allows for continuous surveillance and the use of deadly force.13 This technology has changed the way in which al Qaeda operates. Former CIA Director General Michael Hayden argued that the use of drones in Pakistan has made al Qaeda feel less safe: “By making a safe haven feel less safe, we keep al-Qaeda guessing. We make them doubt their allies; questions their methods, their plans, even their priorities. . . . We force them to spend more time and resources on
self-preservation, and that distracts them, at least partially and at least for a time, from laying groundwork for the next attack.”14 They have even fomented distrust amongst al-Qaeda members and their “hosts” causing witch hunts for potential spies both inside and outside the organization.15 The loitering time of a drone prevents members from congregating in large groups because a drone would be able to easily spot such a meeting. Members are constantly mindful that a strike could kill them at any moment.
In 2012, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released many al Qaeda documents that point to drone strikes affecting how the organization operates on a daily basis.
Letters from top officials discuss changes in meeting points, transportation methods, and moving to more remote areas of Pakistan. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned Atiyya Abdul Rahman, one of al Qaeda’s leaders in Pakistan who died in 2011, to move operations out of Waziristan into Kunar due to the change in geographic features: “Kunar is more fortified due to its rougher
13General Atomics Aeronautical, Predator B.
14 Bergen, The Longest War, 346.
15 Ibid, 332-3.
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43 terrain and many mountains, rivers and trees, and it can accommodate hundreds of the brothers without being spotted by the enemy. This will defend the brothers from the aircraft.”16 The fact that he mentioned “the aircraft” shows how great of an effect that drones have on al Qaeda operations. Also, bin Laden wrote explicit directions for transportation procedures to prevent targeting by constantly changing cars but only doing so under the cover of trees or tunnels so that drones cannot track the changes in personnel. Important communication must be handwritten, and never done by phone due to fear of tracking. Anything that could be tracked or bugged was eliminated from the day-to-day operations of al Qaeda.17 These letters from bin Laden show that the high casualty number for militants and the constant threat of a drone strike forced al Qaeda’s hand into changing their operational tactics.
While technological developments have enabled the U.S. to surveil al Qaeda more easily and for longer periods of time, other factors hurt U.S. chances of eliminating safe havens in Pakistan. The tribal people in the FATA abide by a code called Pashtunwali. This code has many facets, and the one most directly related to drone strikes is known as badal (revenge). The concept demands that families must avenge crimes or face the loss of honor. The revenge can take time: one proverb says, “I took my revenge after a hundred years, and I only regret that I acted in haste.”18 Such actions can take a long time to fulfill, and they can escalate as well. One simple wrongdoing can result in a blood feud. When a drone kills an individual in the FATA, the families can start to enact badal by giving refuge or money to al Qaeda members who are fighting against the U.S. The dead person could be a civilian or an al Qaeda member: it does not matter. The family must avenge the death. They also have the ability to join the organization to
16 Pam Benson, “Bin Laden documents: fear of drones,” CNN.com, May 3, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/03/bin-laden-documents-fear-of-drones/.
17 Ibid.
18 The Global Security, “Pashtunwali/Pashtuanwaali,” 2016,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/pashtunwali.htm.
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44 fulfill the custom and retain their honor. In one instance, a man rammed a car bomb into a
Pakistani convoy to avenge the death of four of his family members caused by a U.S. drone strike.19 In November 2015, former drone pilot Brandon Bryant said at a press conference that drone strikes create anger and a desire for revenge: “We kill four and create 10 [militants]. If you kill someone’s father, uncle or brother who had nothing to do with anything, their families are going to want revenge.”20 The concept of badal can cause a significant ripple across
communities—increasing the number of safe havens, not decreasing them. One victim, whose mother was killed by a strike and his children badly injured, said, “Our blood has been shed and my mother was killed and we are called terrorists. . . . I am angry at America and have become its enemy after the death of my mother. Thousands will become America’s enemy after such incidents.”21 His son, who was injured in the strike, said, “Drone strikes have turned all of Waziristan into enemies. We were not their enemy before the drone attack but now they have made us their enemy by killing us with drones.”22 Since so many people have died from drone strikes, it is impossible to know how many people are now motivated by badal and just waiting for the proper moment.*
Even though drone strikes have forced al Qaeda to change its tactics and operations to avoid detection, it is nearly impossible to know the true limitations of members in regards to safe havens. The move to more remote parts of Pakistan may have worked, but drone strikes
certainly pushed them out of their normal area of operation; al Qaeda adapted to survive. Drone
19 Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” 882.
20 Murtaza Hussain, “Former Drone Operations Say They Were ‘Horrified’ by Cruelty of Assassination Program,”
The Intercept, November 20, 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/11/19/former-drone-operators-say-they-were-horrified-by-cruelty-of-assassination-program/.
21 Brave New Films, Unmanned: America’s Drone Wars, 2015. [Time: ~47:45-50:00]
22 Ibid.
*More information on the effect of drone strikes on local communities can be found in Amnesty International, “Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” 2013, London: Amnesty International Publications: 5-74.
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45 technology has pressured the organization to eliminate spies and to change tactics, but due to its evolution and the concept of badal, there can be no definitive determination in the success or failure of the U.S. counterterrorism goal of eliminating safe havens—though drones do make al Qaeda members feel less safe.
(3) build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities
An important part in eliminating al Qaeda as a serious threat to U.S. national security and interests is the incorporation of the directly-affected states in the fight against the terrorist
organization. The U.S. cannot defeat al Qaeda by itself: Pakistan is needed. However, as it currently stands, the U.S. does not take advantage of Pakistani forces. It conducts drone strikes throughout the country despite constant protests by the civilian population. Such actions do not help to build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities. They do the opposite by showing the people and the world that Pakistan cannot solve the problems inside its borders.
One resident summed up the issue quite succinctly: “I still want the drones to end . . . But if my government wants to do something they should do it themselves, without foreign help.”23
Unfortunately, from 2004 to 2014, the U.S. has not successfully integrated Pakistani forces in the fight against al Qaeda or built up Pakistan’s ability to conduct the war more independently.
This pattern has great ramifications for a democratic nation like Pakistan as well as for Pakistani public opinion of the U.S. By unilaterally conducting drone strikes, the U.S.
undermines the sovereignty of a democratic state. What message does that send to the civilian population? Their own country cannot protect its borders or prevent a state from conducting attacks inside its borders. Former President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari said, “continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in the loss of precious lives or property, are
counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating
23 “Drop the pilot.”
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46 a credibility gap.”24 The chief of a state must explain to his people why and how these strikes are allowed to happen, especially when public opinion is so drastically against them. Another Pakistani official supplemented Zardari’s point:
What has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government.
Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a
resolution against drone attacks in parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.25
Despite these public statements of anger and resentment towards the drone program, the Pakistani government has given the U.S. its secret blessing to conduct drone strikes. The U.S.
flew drones out of a base within Pakistani borders, and the government even occasionally requests targets. This two-faced nature has angered U.S. officials: “For them to look the other way, or to give us the green light privately, and then to attack us publicly leaves us, it seems to me, at a very severe disadvantage and loss with the Pakistani people.”26 The Pakistani
government gets to reap the benefits of the U.S. eliminating its domestic threats. If anything ever goes wrong, they have plausible deniability and can blame the U.S. This lack of respect for Pakistani borders and its apparent undermining of the government along with Pakistan’s
confusing stance on drone strikes weakens relations between the two states.
In 2014, the Pew Research Center conducted many polls in Pakistan related to U.S.-Pakistan relations with an emphasis on drone strikes. When asked to complete the statement
“Drone strikes…,” 67% agreed with the statement “kill too many innocent people,” while 9%
disagreed. Forty-one percent agreed with “are being done without Pakistani government
approval,” while 23% disagreed. Only 21% agreed that they “are necessary to defend,” while 46%
24 Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” 15.
25 Ibid.
26 Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” 882-883.
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47 disagreed.27 In 2012, the opposition to the Pakistani army’s ability to fight extremism surpassed its support (35% to 32%).28 The people in Pakistan have very little faith in their own military’s
47 disagreed.27 In 2012, the opposition to the Pakistani army’s ability to fight extremism surpassed its support (35% to 32%).28 The people in Pakistan have very little faith in their own military’s