巴基斯坦和葉門的無人機：在美國反恐戰爭中是有效或是破壞穩定的戰術？ - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Pakistan 政治 or大Destabilizing and Yemen: Effective Tactic in the立U.S. War on Terrorism? 巴基斯坦和葉門的無人機：在美國反恐戰爭中是有效或是破壞穩定的戰術？ n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Thomas Shattuck 善學 Advisor: Wen-Yang Chang 張文揚. May, 2016.

(2) Abstract The American use of unmanned aerial vehicles in Pakistan and Yemen has become the sole mechanism to combat al Qaeda and its affiliates. This study evaluates four U.S. counterterrorism goals to determine whether or not drone strikes in these countries can defeat al Qaeda. The four goals are (1) disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates; (2) eliminate safe havens; (3) build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities; and (4) counter al Qaeda ideology and its resonance and diminish the specific drivers of violence that al Qaeda exploits. Drones strikes in Yemen and Pakistan do not achieve any of these goals, and in some cases, work against them. They are not effective at eliminating the proper targets, increase antiAmerican sentiments and the desire for revenge, demonstrate Yemen’s and Pakistan’s incompetence at fighting al Qaeda, and provide al Qaeda with a reverberating message to exploit with propaganda. The U.S. must reform its use of drones in order to truly eliminate al Qaeda as a serious threat to its national security and interests abroad.. 政治大. Keywords: unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, counterterrorism, Pakistan, Yemen. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(3) 摘要美國只好在巴基斯坦和葉門使用無人機,做為打擊基地組織及其分支機構的武器。這本研究評估四個美國的反恐目標，是否在這些國家使用無人機攻擊基地組織。這四個目標是（1）破壞，降解，搗毀和擊敗基地組織及其附屬機構; （2）消除安全避難所; （3）建立持久反恐的夥伴關係，和能力; （4）對抗基地組織的意識形態和共振，減少暴力，基地組織攻擊的特定的驅動程序。無人機攻擊葉門和巴基斯坦,當他們不實現任何的這些目標時,以及在某些情況下,反對他們的工作時。無人機攻擊無法有效在定位和消除正確的目標，增加反美情緒和復仇的慾望，在與基地組織戰鬥中葉門和巴基斯的政府表現出無能，並為基地組織有迴盪消息，宣傳利用。美國必須改革使用無人駕駛飛機，才能真正消滅基地組織構成的嚴重威脅，衛護其國家安全和海外利益。. 政治大. 關鍵詞: 無人戰機, 無人機, 反恐, 巴基斯坦, 葉門. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(4) Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Wen-Yang Chang for serving as my thesis advisor. Without his advice and guidance, I would not have been able to complete this project. I also would like to thank Dr. Yeh-Chung Lu and Dr. Szu-Ning Ping for serving as committee members and providing me with valuable feedback to improve my arguments and conclusions. Receiving my degree in Taiwan would not have been possible without the support of the Ministry of Education and the Taiwan Scholarship. My family, friends, and classmates have. 政治大 and father for supporting me and my educational endeavors throughout my life. 立. made my time in Taiwan a memorable and fruitful experience. Finally, I must thank my mother. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(5) “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And if you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.” Friedrich Nietzsche. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(6) Table of Contents Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Background ........................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Research Importance and Implications............................................................................... 10 1.3 Research Limitations ........................................................................................................... 12 1.4 Research Methodology and Approach ................................................................................ 13 Chapter Two: Literature Review .................................................................................................. 16 2.1 The U.S. Drone Program: An Evaluation of its Effectiveness and Effects ......................... 16 2.2 The Legality of the U.S. Drone Program ............................................................................ 24 2.3 Practical and Theoretical Issues with the Program............................................................ 29 2.4 Military Coercion Theory ................................................................................................... 33 Chapter Three: Drones in Pakistan ............................................................................................... 36 3.1 Military Coercion and Drones in Pakistan ......................................................................... 36 3.2 U.S. Counterterrorism Goals and Drone Usage in Pakistan.............................................. 37 3.3 Evaluation of U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan.................................................................. 50. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter Four: Drones in Yemen ................................................................................................... 53 4.1 Military Coercion and Drones in Yemen ............................................................................ 54 4.2 U.S. Counterterrorism Goals and Drone Usage in Yemen ................................................. 56 4.3 Evaluation of U.S. Drone Program in Yemen ..................................................................... 71. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Chapter Five: Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 74 5.1 Recommendations for U.S. Drone Programs ...................................................................... 74 5.2 Policy Implications.............................................................................................................. 81 5.3 Further Research Suggestions ............................................................................................ 82. n. Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 84. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(7) List of Tables Table 1.1: U.S. Counterterrorism Overarching Goals .................................................................... 2 Table 1.2: Statistics by New America Foundation ......................................................................... 3 Table 1.3: Decapitation Strike Outcomes ....................................................................................... 9 Table 3.1: Pakistan Drone Strike Statistics ................................................................................... 38 Table 3.2: High Value Targets Killed in Pakistan, 2004 - 2015 ................................................... 39 Table 3.3: Attacks in Pakistan Conducted by Al Qaeda or Affiliate from 2004 to 2014 ............. 41 Table 4.1: Yemen Drone Strike Statistics ..................................................................................... 57. 政治大. Table 4.2: High Value Targets Killed in Yemen, 2002 - 2015 ..................................................... 58. 立. Table 4.3: Attacks in Yemen Conducted by AQAP or Affiliate from 2002 to 2014 ................... 60. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Table 5.1: Summary of U.S. Counterterrorism Goals in Pakistan and Yemen ............................ 75. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(8) List of Maps Map 3.1: Tribal Areas of Pakistan ................................................................................................ 36 Map 4.1: AQAP Influence in Yemen ........................................................................................... 53. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(9) List of Graphs Graph 3.1: Relationship between Drone Strikes and Attacks in Pakistan .................................... 52 Graph 4.1: Relationship between Strikes and Attacks in Yemen ................................................. 73. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(10) List of Abbreviations Central Intelligence Agency. CIA. Counterinsurgency Incorporating Counterterrorism. COIN. Federally Administered Tribal Areas. FATA. High Value Target. HVT. Joint Special Operations Command. JSOC. New America Foundation. NAF. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 立. United Nations. 政治大. U.N. U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. United States of America. TBIJ. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. UAV, drones. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(11) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.

(12) Chapter One: Introduction 1.1 Background First used in October 2001 in Afghanistan, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, drones) did not become the preferred fighting method of the United States in the Middle East and South Asia until 2004—the first year of use in Pakistan. The first year that a drone killed an al Qaeda member in Yemen was 2002. Since 2004, the targeted killing program slowly expanded under the administration of President George W. Bush, but ballooned exponentially under the. 治政 either the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Joint Special 大 Operations Command (JSOC), 立 used the tactic of decapitation, or the elimination high value targets (HVTs), but have since leadership of President Barack Obama. In the early years of the drone program, U.S. operators,. ‧ 國. 學. expanded to a “pattern of life” targeting system, which is also called signature strike.1 The. ‧. pattern of life system monitors whom specific targets interact with, their daily schedules, and life habits. It does not attempt to identify the targets, but seeks to determine whether an individual is. y. Nat. io. sit. a threat based on how they live. These two tactics are the primary mechanisms in the U.S.. n. al. er. government’s targeted killing program.2 Targeted killing is defined as “the intentional killing of. Ch. i n U. v. a specific civilian or unlawful combatant who cannot reasonably be apprehended, who is taking a. engchi. direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the direction of the state, in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict.”3 The change in tactic caused the increase in drone use. On May 18, 2009, then CIA Director Leon Panetta said the following about U.S. drone strikes, “I can assure you that in terms of that particular area, it is very precise and it is very limited in terms of collateral damage and, very frankly, it’s the only game in town in terms Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter, “The Dronification of State Violence,” Critical Asian Studies, vol. 46, no. 2 (2014): 227. 2 Ian G.R. Shaw, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” Geopolitics (2013): 1-5. 3 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 538. 1. 1.

(13) of confronting and trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership.”4 Whether or not that is true is up for debate. The larger issue regarding his statement is should drone strikes be “the only game in town?” Should the U.S. use other options? Why do drone strikes have to be “the only game in town?” In June 2011, the Obama administration released a new “National Strategy for Counterterrorism.” This new policy has eight overarching goals that the U.S. government seeks to achieve to defeat al Qaeda and to eliminate it as a major threat to U.S. national security and. 政治大 Table 1.1: U.S. Counterterrorism Overarching Goals 立 Protect the American People, Homeland, and American interests. interests abroad.. 學. ‧ 國. 1.. 2. Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat [al Qaeda] and its Affiliates and Adherents 3. Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. ‧. 4. Eliminate Safe Havens. 5. Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities. Nat. sit. y. 6. Degrade links between [al Qaeda] and its Affiliates and Adherents. al. er. io. 7. Counter [al Qaeda] ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of violence that [al Qaeda] Exploits. n. iv n C Source: Barack Obama, “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” 2011, 8-10. h e n g c hJune i U 8. Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means. In order to determine whether or not the current tactical use of drones in Pakistan and Yemen can defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates, this study will evaluate the second, fourth, fifth, and seventh overarching counterterrorism goals. Every drone strike conducted against a target deals directly with the goals of disrupting, degrading, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates as well as eliminating safe havens. The strikes can kill members of the organization, and the fear of future strikes can result in civilians refusing to allow al Qaeda members to stay in the area. The Central Intelligence Agency, “Director’s Remarks at the Pacific Council on International Policy,” May 18, 2009. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/directors-remarks-at-pacific-council.html. 4. 2.

(14) after-effects of drone strikes and the opinion of the overall tactic relate to the ability to create and to strengthen partnerships with other states. How al Qaeda uses civilian deaths can harm the goal of countering its ideology and its resonance. As more civilians die from strikes, there is a greater chance that others may listen to or believe in al Qaeda’s message. This issue plays a pivotal part in the long term plan to win over the “hearts and minds” of the local population. The two leading organizations that cover U.S. drone usage are the New America Foundation (NAF) and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ).* This study uses. 治政大(8.71% to 11.21% of all killing 2,276 to 3,614 people of which 255 to 315 were civilians 立. statistics from NAF. NAF reports that 400 strikes have occurred in Pakistan from 2004 to 2015. casualties). President Bush ordered 48 strikes, and President Obama ordered 352.5 In Yemen,. ‧ 國. 學. NAF reports that 123 drone strikes (plus 15 air strikes, for a total of 138 strikes) have occurred. ‧. from 2002 to 2015 killing 901 to 1,159 people of which 87 to 93 were civilians (8.02% to 9.66% of all casualties). President Bush ordered one strike, while President Obama ordered 137.6. sit. y. Nat. Total Yemen Total. Number of Drone Strikes. al. Number of Deaths. n. Pakistan. io. Country. er. Table 1.2: Statistics by New America Foundation. Ch. Bush. Obama. 48. 352. Bush. engchi 378 - 558. 400 137 1 (including 15 airstrikes) 138 ( including 15 airstrikes). i n U. v. Number of Civilian Deaths. Obama. Bush. Obama. 1,899 - 3,056. 126 - 154. 129 - 161. 2,277 - 3,614 6. 895 - 1,153 901 - 1,159. 255 - 315 0. 87 - 93 87 - 93. Source: New America Foundation, “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” and “Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis,” 2015. *Information for TBIJ is available at The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present,” 2015, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/, and “US strikes in Yemen, 2002 to present,” 2015, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/. 5 New America Foundation, “Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis,” 2015, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan-analysis.html. 6 New America Foundation, “Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis,” 2015, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/yemen-analysis.html.. 3.

(15) Despite all of these deaths in Pakistan and Yemen, not a single American has been killed piloting a drone. They are flown remotely from many locations around the world. American pilots are not in any danger if a drone crashes or gets shot down. This one-sidedness makes it a very popular weapon. The MQ-1 Predator has the ability to receive commands from thousands of miles away. It was designed under the requirement “to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information combined with a kill capability to the warfighter.”7. 治政 Instead of one pilot flying past an area at a high speed once, a大 drone allows for several camera 立. A drone can travel anywhere in the world and can hover above a potential target for hours on end.. angles over the span of multiple hours giving people many views of the area and target. This. ‧ 國. 學. system allows for the CIA or JSOC to observe targets safely for many days at a time without. ‧. risking the lives of U.S. pilots. This extra time and safety can allow for better decision-making in regards to when to fire and when not to. The Predator B can fly for about 30 hours. y. Nat. and nighttime) along with a laser guidance system.8. n. al. Ch. er. io. sit. continuously at a maximum altitude of 50,000 feet; it is equipped with two cameras (for daytime. i n U. v. Since the U.S. government publicly denies the existence of the CIA drone programs,. engchi. there are many controversies relating to deaths, legality, effectiveness, and completion. It is impossible to know exactly how many strikes have occurred, how many people have died, and how many of the deceased are civilians without declassified documents. Table 1.2 above shows large ranges for total casualties and civilian deaths. Due to the location of the strikes and the Muslim tradition of burying the deceased as quickly as possible, reporters and data collectors. 7 8. Shaw, “Predator Empire,” 2. General Atomics Aeronautical, Predator B. 2015. http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php.. 4.

(16) cannot report exact numbers.9 It is often unsafe for people to travel to these areas. However, the sources and methodology of NAF provide the most accurate estimates. It uses information from local and international sources in order to provide the best possible numbers. The number of civilian casualties from drone strikes is one of the greatest areas of contention in the world due to the secrecy of the program. Organizations across the globe, especially Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, call for greater transparency and clarity about U.S. drones in the Middle East and South Asia.*. 治政大an important topic. Many war against Pakistan or Yemen, the issue of legality has become 立. Due to the unclear number of civilian casualties and the lack of a formal declaration of. scholars, such as Andrew C. Orr (2011) and Laurie R. Blank (2012), use three criteria under the. ‧ 國. 學. law of armed conflict to determine the legality of the programs in Pakistan. The same criteria. ‧. apply to Yemen due to similar circumstances. The three indicators are distinction, proportionality, and necessity.10 Different scholars call these three terms by different names, but. y. Nat. er. io. sit. they all have the same concept.** Distinction mandates that forces target only members of the enemy forces, not civilian populations. Proportionality calculates expected civilian losses to. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. anticipated military gains. The use of force cannot be excessive against civilians in favor of. engchi. small military victories. The principle of necessity says that forces are allowed to use any legal. Michael J. Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs, vol. 89, no. 1 (2013): 6. *Publications and reports on this issue include “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen” (Human Rights Watch, 2013), “Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan” (Amnesty International, 2013), “United States of America: ‘Targeted Killing’ Policies Violate the Right to Life” (Amnesty International, 2012), “Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy (The Stimson Center, 2014), “Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications” (Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School, 2011), and “Counting Drone Strike Deaths” (Human Rights Clinic, Columbia Law School, 2012). 10 Andrew C. Orr, “Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law,” Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 44 (2011): 738-752, and Laurie R. Blank, “After ‘Top Gun:’ How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 33 (2012): 681-682. ** Other terms used as substitutes include discrimination, discriminatory, military necessity, the principle of humanity, and the principle of unnecessary suffering. 9. 5.

(17) weapon that will lead to military victory.11 There is no general consensus on the legality of the program in terms of either jus ad bellum (the right to engage in warfare) or jus in bello (the laws of war). Although the issues of effectiveness and possible completion of the program relate to the legal issues of the drone program, they are even more important in military terms, specifically the theory of military coercion, which will be discussed at length later in the study. Effectiveness does not only mean the number of militants killed in any given strike, but it also. 治政 recruitment at the status quo or lower, and isolating militants大 from civilians limiting the number 立 means preventing terrorist organizations like al Qaeda from operating properly, keeping. of safe havens available.12 Most definitions of effectiveness only look at the number of dead. ‧ 國. 學. militants when determining a tactical success or failure, and until the U.S. expands the definition. ‧. to include all facets of combat, the program will continue indefinitely along with al Qaeda’s existence. Overall effectiveness of the drone program arguably has decreased since its expansion:. y. Nat. er. io. sit. more is not always better. With the increase in number of drone strikes, the number of HVTs killed has not increased. Also, the drone program is not effective because strikes help to increase. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. propaganda and recruitment as well as retaliatory attacks.13 The so-called “accidental guerrilla”. engchi. effect radicalizes moderates against the U.S. in favor of terrorist organizations. If drone strikes push civilians and militants closer together, then the drone program is not effective and will never end. If drone strikes do not hamper the organizational effectiveness of al Qaeda operations, then the drone program is not effective and will never end.. Blank, “After ‘Top Gun,’” 681-682. Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” 4-6; 13. 13 Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, and Matt Flannes, “Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War,” Middle East Policy, vol. 18, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 125-126. 11 12. 6.

(18) As mentioned above, the U.S. has two primary tactics for targeting individuals: decapitation and pattern of life. Decapitation theory states that the capture/death of an organization’s or state’s leadership will lead to its destruction.14 However, history has shown that this theory does not work, yet military strategists and advisors still believe in its usefulness. The eventual death of Osama bin Laden did not cause the collapse of al Qaeda or its affiliated groups. Other al-Qaeda leaders and key contacts, such as Abu Yahya al-Libi (in 2012), Anwar al-Awlaki (in 2011), Atiyah Abd al-Rahman (in 2011), and Ilyas Kashmiri (in 2011), were all. 治政大 al Masri (in 2008), and Saleh Abu Laith al Libi (in 2008), Osama al Kini (in 2009), Abu Khabab 立 considered HVTs, and they have all been killed by drone strikes.15 Saad bin Laden (in 2009),. al Somali (in 2009) were HVTs killed by drone strikes in Pakistan.16 All of these men were part. ‧ 國. 學. of the leadership of al Qaeda and orchestrators of various attacks across the world. However, al-. ‧. Qaeda did not collapse and still remains a threat. Bureaucratization and community support allow for the continued survival of terrorist organizations after successful decapitation strikes.17. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Bureaucracy, especially in the modern internet age, allows for members to remain in contact with each other and have a decentralized command structure. With drone strikes, terrorist. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. organizations like al Qaeda must decentralize command structures or face catastrophic results.. engchi. An imbedded bureaucracy allows for an easier transition between leaders.18 The group will have a replacement in the event of a leader’s death. The death of bin Laden demonstrates this fact: the. Jenna Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” International Security, vol. 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 7-9, and Bryan C. Price, “Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,” International Security, vol. 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012), 9. 15 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” 8. 16 Brian Glyn Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 33, no. 10 (2010): 878. 17 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 31-32. 18 Austin Long, “Assessing the Success of Leadership Targeting,” CTC Sentinel, vol. 3, no. 11-12 (November 2010): 19-20. 14. 7.

(19) bureaucracy in al Qaeda allowed for a smooth transition, the organization did not collapse, and it created a greater bond between members. Furthermore, the age of a group aids in its continuation after a successful decapitation attempt—older is better,19 and al Qaeda, created in 1988, is one of the oldest terrorist organizations functioning today. “No previous terrorist organization has exhibited the complexity, agility, and global reach of [al Qaeda], with its fluid operational style based increasingly on a common mission statement and objectives, rather than on standard operating procedures and an organizational structure.”20 Moreover, terrorist organizations require the. 治政 support of local communities in order to survive decapitation大 attempts. This support allows 立. members to live with civilians and to blend into society, provides potential recruits, and deepens. ‧ 國. 學. the relationship between militants and civilians through constant interactions. These bonds are. ‧. even stronger when the organization is religious based.21 Al Qaeda has both the bureaucracy and community support required to survive decapitation strikes. Table 1.3 explains the relationship. y. Nat. er. io. sit. between bureaucracy, community support, and survival—al Qaeda is high in both categories (square I) leading to retaliation. This data proves that decapitation has actually created a more. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. unified and somewhat stronger al Qaeda. Greater sympathy from the community allows. engchi. members of al Qaeda to further blend into society making it harder to target them. Finally, decapitation provides very few “tangible effects,” and it is difficult to determine the actual benefits of a successful strike especially when retaliatory strikes and increases in recruitment are considered. People who think that decapitation strikes severely damage an organization believe that these groups are “meritocratic system[s] in which the leaders are the most talented rather Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” 9, and Long, “Assessing the Success of Leadership Targeting,” 19-20. 20 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International Security, vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 33. 21 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” 11-12. 19. 8.

(20) than the most ideologically committed; in actuality, their replacements could turn out to be more talented and more skillful leaders.”22 Table 1.3: Decapitation Strike Outcomes23. 立. 政治大. Before 2008, the U.S. government sought to only kill HVTs through decapitation strikes,. ‧ 國. 學. but in 2008, the program expanded to include the pattern of life tactic, which targets individuals. ‧. based on actions not identity. “We might not always have their names but . . . these are people. sit. y. Nat. whose actions over time have made it obvious that they are a threat.”24 This tactic has led to the. io. er. targeting of many low level operatives and subsequent civilians in the surrounding area. These targets may not even pose an imminent or direct threat to the U.S., but they are still targeted. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. based on their actions and interactions. These targets are people who live inside the communities. engchi. and hold close ties to the people in villages. Killing them affects the civilian population. Targeting them leads to the death of civilians. NAF shows that the number of drone strikes in Pakistan increased sevenfold from 2004-2008 (48 strikes) to 2009-2015 (352 strikes). This increase can be directly attributed to the pattern of life tactic. More strikes do not always lead to greater efficiency. More strikes, especially those targeting low level members, lead to more Noel Sharkey, “Death Strikes from the Sky: The Calculus of Proportionality,” IEEE Technology and Society, vol. 28, no. 1 (Spring 2009), 19. 23 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” 21. 24 Christian Enemark, “Drones over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics, and Counterinsurgency,” Asian Security, vol. 7, no. 3 (2011): 232. 22. 9.

(21) civilian deaths. More civilian deaths lead to greater alienation from the government and population for allowing the strikes to take place, greater hatred of the U.S. for killing family members and friends, and a greater desire for revenge. These deaths do not occur in a black box. There is a ripple throughout the entire community. “Every one of these noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.”25 The expansion of the drone program under the pattern of life tactic has not helped in defeating al Qaeda,. 治政 difficult to win the hearts and from this specific consideration). It has become increasingly大立. especially in Pakistan (since only 1 drone strike occurred in Yemen before 2009, it is omitted. minds of the local population in these areas.. ‧ 國. 學. 1.2 Research Importance and Implications. ‧. The way in which the U.S. has used drones in Pakistan and Yemen has upset civilians,. sit. y. Nat. allies, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions. If the U.S. truly wishes to. io. al. er. win over the “hearts and minds” of the civilian population of Yemen and Pakistan, then it must. iv n C U it stands, the U.S. does not have against al Qaeda finding safe places to plan h efuture n gattacks. c h i As n. take steps to limit civilian casualties and regain their trust. They are the number one deterrent. the trust of these people. As mentioned above, every civilian killed by a drone strike represents a new threat to the U.S. The deceased’s family will not look favorably upon the U.S. and could potentially either join al Qaeda or aid the organization in some other way. The support of the civilians in these areas is pivotal in preventing al Qaeda from obtaining or retaining a foothold. Community support is a key factor in the survival of any terrorist organization. This study will David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” The New York Times, May 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?utm_source=affiliate&utm_medium=ls&utm_campaign =PPkX79/c*b0&utm_content=357585&utm_term=177&siteID=PPkX79_c.b0-YctiYQ7UFIErZ6b1vI.vCg&_r=0. 25. 10.

(22) help to determine if drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan are running counter to the goal of winning over the local populations. This important issue will determine whether drone strikes are an effective or destabilizing tactic in the U.S. “War on Terrorism.” Obviously, the issue of upmost importance both to this study and U.S. counterterrorism strategy is determining whether or not the drone strikes are effective at achieving their desired goals. If this study concludes that these drone programs meets the four goals, then the U.S. government may look to expand its success to other locations. If this study concludes that the. 治政大 strategy would have to be course or stop drone strikes immediately. A new tactic and revised 立 drone program does not achieve these goals, then the U.S. government should either alter its. implemented as a result. The results will have ramifications for the future of U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. counterterrorism strategy in the Middle East, South Asia, North Africa, and anywhere else that al. ‧. Qaeda tries to spread its influence. The final victory of the “War on Terrorism” is at stake because drone strikes have become the prominent (and in many areas only) method of fighting al. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Qaeda and its affiliates. The end goal of this study is to determine whether these drone strikes are moving towards the elimination of al Qaeda as a serious threat to U.S. national security and. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. interests—preventing al Qaeda from orchestrating large scale attacks anywhere in the world and. engchi. controlling large swaths of territory. Achieving this objective (by meeting the aforementioned counterterrorism goals) will lead to victory in the War on Terror. The way in which the U.S. conducts drone strikes may create an uncertain future with wider use of drones by other great powers across the world. The eventual widespread use of drones will lead to their expansion beyond the Middle East and South Asia. Currently, there are no international norms, standards, or laws in place to regulate their usage—all the international community has is the U.S. example of arbitrary use with no rules. It is entirely possible to. 11.

(23) imagine a future where Russia or China or any other state uses drones to stop dissident movements before they gain momentum.26 The parameters for legitimate targets are nonexistent, which makes anyone a possible target in the future as long as they are some sort of threat. The final issue that the U.S. must navigate is the race for drone technology. Current U.S. law forbids the sale of drones and drone technology without Congressional approval.27 U.S. companies can only sell drones and drone technology to 66 states, while other countries, such as Israel and China, do not have such strict requirements for companies to sell drones to foreign states.28 After seeing the “success” of the U.S. drones in the Middle East and South Asia, a new. 治政 edge in the industry by having market has opened for drones, and the U.S. must not lose its 大立. archaic rules. Once China develops high quality drones, it will push the U.S. out of the market. ‧ 國. 學. before it even enters it. These issues are areas in which the U.S. is faltering and must address in. sit. y. Nat. 1.3 Research Limitations. ‧. order to create a positive future for drone technology and usage.. io. al. er. This study is limited mainly by geographic and linguistic boundaries as well as the. iv n C FATA in Pakistan, the author was unable htoeconduct h i U interviews and observations on the n g cfirsthand n. inability to read classified documents. Due to the location and unsafe nature of Yemen and the. effects of drones. Field research is generally helpful, but other organizations with the proper means have conducted many visits to these areas. Therefore, the author will rely on the data collection of other organizations like The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, New America Foundation, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch, among others. Whatever limitations these groups face, the author faces as well. Furthermore, the author cannot speak or Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” 26. Council on Foreign Relations, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” Council Special Report No. 65, (2013): 19-20. 28 Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” 22-23. 26 27. 12.

(24) read any of the languages used in the Middle East and South Asia, specifically Arabic and Urdu. Newspapers and television reports use these languages when discussing local events, such as a drone strike in a particular location. The author relies upon translations by others in order to read or to listen to them. Finally, the greatest limitation of this study is the lack of transparency of the U.S. government and military. The U.S. has confirmed or acknowledged very little in regards to its targeted killing program. It is virtually impossible to know the exact number of strikes and related deaths without proper confirmation. Few government documents have been released;. 治政大 publicly comment on these issues in order to avoid prosecution. 立. some have been leaked, and not many currently-employed government workers and officials. This study will only use the cases of Yemen and Pakistan when developing the argument.. ‧ 國. 學. The U.S. does have a drone program in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but the U.S. used. ‧. ground troops in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and against insurgents in Iraq. Also, NAF and TBIJ do not have suitable datasets for Syria or Somalia.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. There is very little information on the program in Syria since it is in its infancy, and there have not been enough drone strikes conducted in Somalia to develop any proper conclusions. The. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. cases of Yemen and Pakistan have existed since 2002 and 2004, respectively. The programs in. engchi. Yemen and Pakistan have the data, time, and commitment that do not exist yet for Somalia or Syria when it comes to U.S. drone strikes.. 1.4 Research Methodology and Approach While many scholars have addressed the significance of drone strikes in the Middle East and South Asia, this study’s methodological use of the theory of military coercion and the four counterterrorism overarching goals is a new approach. In order develop a proper argument and subsequent conclusions, this study uses Robert A. Pape’s theory of military coercion as 13.

(25) explained in his book, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (1996). This theory addresses the use of air power in war and its proper role in achieving victory against an enemy. Drones are the future of air power, and this theory will apply to how the U.S. conducts itself in the Middle East and South Asia with drones. Pape’s theory of coercion addresses the history of air power, where it has succeeded and failed, and how militaries should use air power to their advantage. It breaks down the different types of coercion, which will help to determine where drones stand in the future of U.S. counterterrorism operations.. 治政大existed for the longest amount of programs in Yemen and Pakistan. These drone programs have 立 This study uses qualitative research methods with two case studies: the U.S. drone. time, and these countries have the highest number of strikes conducted in them. As mentioned. ‧ 國. 學. above, other organizations, such as Humans Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have. ‧. written studies on these countries. The Global Terrorism Database provides statistics on attacks conducted by al Qaeda and its affiliates. This study uses the cases of Yemen and Pakistan. y. Nat. er. io. sit. because the U.S. is not engaged in a conflict with either state/government; the drone programs here exist in an effort to protect these states and their citizens against terrorist organizations like. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. al Qaeda and its affiliates. Also, only drone strikes have been conducted in these two states; the. engchi. U.S. has not sent in ground troops in an effort to eliminate the threat (excluding the raid that killed Osama bin Laden and piloted air strikes in Yemen). Military coercion theory relates directly to whether or not a state can properly defeat an enemy with just air power. These are the only cases in existence with the proper time length, available data, and situations. In order to determine the effectiveness of drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan, this study will determine whether or not they help the U.S. to fulfill four of its eight overarching counterterrorism goals: (1) disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates and. 14.

(26) adherents, (2) eliminate safe havens, (3) build enduring counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities, and (4) counter al Qaeda ideology and its resonance and diminish the specific drivers of violence that al Qaeda exploits. Drone strikes have the ability to fulfill these four specific goals, but if they do not, then they cannot be considered effective. Every tactic that the U.S. uses in the War on Terrorism, specifically in Yemen and Pakistan against al Qaeda and its affiliates, must work towards meeting these overarching counterterrorism goals.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 15.

(27) Chapter Two: Literature Review This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section, “The U.S. Drone Program: An Evaluation of its Effectiveness and Effects,” reviews literature from both sides of the drone argument. Sources explaining why the drone program needs to change, to stop, or to continue are used in order to understand the problem from every angle. In the second section, “The Legality of the U.S. Drone Program,” the sources explain the legal ramifications of the use of. 治政大this study makes no bellum (the right to engage in warfare) are addressed. Although 立 determination of the legal status of drone strikes, these issues are important to properly. drones in Yemen and Pakistan. The questions of jus in bello (the laws of warfare) and jus ad. ‧ 國. 學. understand the possible biases that people or governments may have against the drone program.. ‧. The third section, “Practical and Theoretical Issues with the Program,” reviews the issues of decapitation theory, U.S. grand strategy, propaganda, and the types of “blowback” from the. y. Nat. er. io. sit. drone program. The final section, “Methodology and Approach,” uses the theory of military coercion by Robert A. Pape as the primary theory to evaluate the drone program.. al. n. iv n C h e n gofcitshEffectiveness 2.1 The U.S. Drone Program: An Evaluation and Effects i U In “Those costs and consequences of drone warfare,” Michael J. Boyle (2013) explains. how the U.S. drone program negatively affects counterterrorism policy around the globe. He argues against the beliefs that the use of drones to fight terrorism is both efficient and effective. The prevalence of drones in U.S. policy favors short term goals over long term strategy and gains. Depending on the source used, the number of strikes conducted and the number of militants or civilians killed differs greatly. Boyle (2013) cites NAF and TBIJ as the most reliable sources, and he argues that the U.S. government’s definition of “militant” artificially inflates the accuracy 16.

(28) of a strike. Drones now attack people with very loose associations with terrorists, which angers the civilian population and increases anti-American sentiment and terrorist recruitment for the purposes of revenge.1 “Drones are only ‘effective’ if they contribute to achieving US strategic goals in a region, a fact which is often lost in analyses that point only to body counts as a measure of their worthiness. More generally, arguments in favour of drones tend to present only one side of the ledger, measuring the losses for groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban without considering how many new recruits they gain as a result of the escalation of the drone strikes.”2. 治政大 wars. These attitudes directly governments because they show their inability to fight their own 立 The programs in Pakistan and Yemen undermine the authority and credibility of the national. contradict the U.S. long term goal of building up the capacity of governments to deal with. ‧ 國. 學. terrorists on their own. In addition, Boyle (2013) examines the psychological and international. ‧. effects that the drone program has on individuals and the international system, respectively. Drone strikes create an atmosphere of distrust between neighbors as well as an atmosphere of. y. Nat. er. io. sit. fear of carrying out everyday necessities.3 These stresses create an environment in which terrorist organizations successfully portray the U.S. as the enemy. The wide use of drones. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. creates the future problem of international use of drones. There are currently no international. engchi. legal guidelines for the use and implementation of drone strikes. This technology has the ability to interrupt currently accepted norms and practices of the international system. Other countries will most likely imitate the U.S. by targeting individuals indiscriminately.4 Without formal guidelines, the current U.S. drone program will continue to diminish its counterterrorism goals and create an uncertain future for the use of this technology.. Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” 1-11. Ibid, 13. 3 Ibid, 15-21. 4 Ibid, 24-26. 1 2. 17.

(29) Brian Glyn Williams (2010) uses many of the same sources as Boyle (2013), but he focuses on the history of the drone program and its effects on the ground in Pakistan. He evaluates whether or not drone strikes in Pakistan will help to win “arguably one of the greatest battles of the War on Terror, the battle for the hearts and minds of 160 million Pakistanis.”5 This program evolved from surveillance to the use of armed drones. The first armed drone was used on June 18, 2004 to kill Taliban commander Nek Muhammad; the U.S. only used armed drones to kill high value targets from 2004 to 2007 after which the program expanded its targeting. 治政 strikes for 8 months to let antinot for a strike that killed 18 civilians—the U.S. halted drone大立. methods to all levels of al Qaeda and the Taliban. The expansion may have occurred sooner if. American sentiment cool down.6 In 2007, the JSOC started conducting its own drone program in. ‧ 國. 學. addition to the CIA’s causing an increase in the number of strikes conducted in Pakistan’s FATA. ‧. region. The drone program is the most effective and efficient means to kill terrorists in Pakistan’s hard-to-reach areas, and these strikes have greatly destabilized the terrorist. y. Nat. er. io. sit. organizations operating in those areas. The militants are now isolated from civilians due to fear of an attack, hunt down potential spies, fear new recruits, and cannot remain in one place for. al. n. long.. 7. Ch. i n U. v. However, drone strikes undermine the authority of the Pakistani government for many. engchi. reasons. The local newspapers publish exaggerated civilian casualty numbers to promote their anti-American agenda, and the deaths of civilians from a strike further push neutral Pakistanis to hate the U.S.8 The civilian deaths prevent the U.S. from winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Furthermore, the strikes show civilians that their own government is not powerful enough to fight terrorism or to force the U.S. to stop the strikes. Despite these. Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” 872. Ibid, 874-876. 7 Ibid, 879-880. 8 Ibid, 881. 5 6. 18.

(30) sentiments, as of 2009, Pakistani public opinion has begun to shift in favor of drone strikes to kill terrorists. Several surveys across the country have shown that noncombatants in the FATA are more pro-U.S. and pro-drone than civilians outside of the area. These people understand the benefits of the attacks, and as terrorists push deeper into Pakistan, the rest of the population will witness the carnage that accompanies them.9 While Pakistanis keep their anti-American sentiments, they understand the necessary evil of drone strikes to eliminate these threats. As the Pakistani government and military develop and purchase armed drones and can conduct their. 治政大 has caused more damage to Mahmood Ahmad (2014) argues that the U.S. drone program 立. own strikes, the public opinion may shift even further in support of drone strikes.. counterterrorism in Pakistan than it has produced positive outcomes. Citing NAF and TBIJ to. ‧ 國. 學. demonstrate the inconsistencies with available data for the number of casualties caused by the. ‧. program, Ahmad (2014) verifies many of Boyle (2013)’s claims about the lack of effectiveness and efficiency of the current drone program. Since 2004, drone strikes have only killed 49 high. y. Nat. er. io. sit. value targets, or 2% of all casualties; the other 98% are either civilians or low-to-mid level militants. While the strikes have caused terrorist organizations to constantly move around. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Pakistan, many of them flee the country to fight elsewhere. Instead of restricting the damage. engchi. caused by these groups, drone strikes have actually scattered members—further amplifying the problem to other parts of the Middle East and South Asia. Furthermore, drone strikes undermine the Pakistani government’s ability to sway the people away from terrorist organizations. The drone program directly contradicts U.S. counterterrorism policy in this respect: instead of building up the capacity and strength of the government, these strikes undermine these governments’ authority and weaken them. With 90% of the population unhappy with government policies, the Pakistani—and U.S.—government cannot afford to further alienate the 9. Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” 884-886.. 19.

(31) people.10 “The foremost strategic objective of U.S. counterterrorism should have been to prevent local militants abroad from aligning themselves with Al-Qaeda that threaten the interest of United States.”11 It appears that the drone program has done the opposite—attracting more recruits than the U.S. would ever have liked. While Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter (2014) condemn the drone program, they take a very different approach by chastising the “dronification of state violence,” the “individualization of state violence,” and the bureaucratic nature of the program. This article traces the history of the. 治政大 of territorial gains to targeting The Obama administration shifted from Bush’s policy 立. drone program and argues that it is the natural progressive use of technology by the U.S. military.. 12. specific individuals in order to sidestep issues of sovereignty. The U.S. does not attack a nation. ‧ 國. 學. or seek to make territorial gains, but it does target dangerous individuals.13 The path to the. ‧. current drone program was first initiated by President Clinton in 1998 when he signed a Memorandum of Notification allowing the CIA to capture terrorists, and in the immediate. y. Nat. er. io. sit. aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), President Bush “formally expanded the CIA’s power to include the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists when engaging in global. al. n. counterterrorism activities.”. 14. Ch. i n U. v. He enabled the CIA and military to hunt down militants anywhere. engchi. in the world based on their life patterns, not their identity. In addition, Shaw and Akhter (2014) argue that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between the drone program and bureaucracy. Bureaucracy allowed for the creation of the drone program along with the development of new technology, but the drone program has created a new form of bureaucracy. Mahmood Ahmad, “The United States Use of Drones in Pakistan: A Politico-Strategic Analysis,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, no. 41 (2014): 22-26. 11 Ibid, 23. 12 Shaw and Akhter, “The Dronification of State Violence,” 222. 13 Ibid, 213. 14 Ibid, 221. 10. 20.

(32) that has expanded the program from a temporary one to an indefinite one. Several U.S. officials have stated that the program is so ingrained that it is impossible to stop.15 Shaw and Akhter (2014) accept the notion that the drone program cannot and will not end due to its embedded bureaucratic nature which further limits individual accountability. In an article written one year earlier, Ian G.R. Shaw (2013) wrote a very similar article with almost the exact conclusion, but instead labelled the issue of the increase in drone strikes the “Predator Empire.” He focuses on the increased use of drones domestically, the alienation of Pakistanis due to civilian deaths from. 治政 In “The Foreign Policy Essay: Is this How to Win the大 “War on Terrorism?” Audrey 立. drones creating a possibly permanent war, and the violation of state sovereignty.16. Kurth Cronin (2014) follows a similar path as Boyle (2013) and Williams (2010), but focuses on. ‧ 國. 學. the overall war, not just the drone program. The original goal of preventing another 9/11-like. ‧. terror attack in the U.S. has been replaced by the goal of the elimination of terrorism. Also, she compares the War on Terrorism to Fred Ikle’s statement on the perils of the Vietnam War:. y. Nat. io. sit. “More absorbing than the final outcome are the perfection of the tools and the mastery of the. n. al. er. components and maneuvers that form part of the undertaking.”17 In addition, Anthony H.. Ch. i n U. v. Cordesman (2006) expands these points in “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism:’ The Need for a. engchi. Fundamentally Different Strategy,” which emphasizes the need for the use of local Islamic forces to fight against terrorist organizations.18 While Cronin (2014) and Cordesman (2006) focus on the big picture of the War on Terrorism, two articles by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann (2010 & 2011), “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in. Shaw and Akhter, “The Dronification of State Violence,” 222-228. Shaw, “Predator Empire,” 17-18. 17 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The Foreign Policy Essay: Is this How to Win the “War on Terrorism?” Lawfare Blog, (September 14, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-fail. 18 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism:’ The Need for a Fundamentally Different Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, (September 18, 2006), 2-3; 6. 15 16. 21.

(33) Pakistan” and “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 20042010,” focus specifically on how drones in Pakistan negatively affect the U.S. effort to defeat al Qaeda. In the first article, they argue that only one in seven strikes kill an HVT, while the rest kill low-to-mid level members or civilians. These strikes are ineffective and have led to an increase in violence in the country (150 attacks in 2004 to 1,916 in 2009).19 Their second article is the primary source used by most scholars conducting research on drone strikes. It makes the same conclusions as their previous article, but provides the statistics that they calculated with NAF.. 治政大 makes the case for the On the other side of the argument, Daniel L. Byman (2013) 立. continuation of the U.S. drone program. Drone strikes have a cheap cost and a high level of. ‧ 國. 學. safety. Using data from NAF, he argues that 3,000 militants have been killed in Pakistan and. ‧. Yemen since 2008, including more than 50 HVTs. Killing HVTs helps to destabilize the organization because newer, less experienced members who rise through the ranks due to HVT. y. Nat. io. sit. deaths will not be as effective in leading the organization. Osama bin Laden once warned of “the. n. al. er. rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders.”20 Conversely, others do. Ch. i n U. v. not appreciate the importance of low level members with special skills that are hard to replace.. engchi. A drone strike is much safer than sending U.S. ground forces to capture or eliminate a target. The physical presence of U.S. soldiers can lead to unwanted U.S. casualties, but drones remove that risk. State sovereignty is protected more under drone strikes than by sending in forces or conducting an air strike. There is greater potential for collateral damage (civilian death) from an Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/201107-01/washingtons-phantom-war. 20 Daniel L. Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Brookings (July/August 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorismbyman. 19. 22.

(34) air strike than a drone strike. There are other options available to eliminate terrorists, but drones are the best option when faced with difficult-to-reach and unsafe places in both Pakistan and Yemen.21 In “Drop the pilot,” (2013) the unnamed author discusses an interesting phenomenon: civilians living in the FATA are generally in favor of drone strikes. While no residents in the area would reveal their names due to fear of reprisal, one civilian said, “No one dares tell the real picture . . . Drone attacks are killing the militants who are killing innocent people.”22 Residents. 治政大 and they believe that the strikes Pakistani military. The strikes do not cause them as much harm, 立 in the area prefer a focused, limited drone strike to inaccurate artillery bombardments by the. kill the correct individuals. Some people actually wrote and signed the “Peshawar Declaration”. ‧ 國. 學. showing their support for drone strikes in FATA, but the signatories had to flee Pakistan for. ‧. some time afterwards.23 Similarly, in “The Drone Blowback Fallacy,” Christopher Swift (2012c) explains how during a trip to Yemen he interviewed 40 Yemeni men, very few of which believed. y. Nat. er. io. sit. that drone strikes helped al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen. Swift (2012c) says that his subjects were older, religious, conservative, and from the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. rural provinces of Yemen (i.e. those most affected by the drone strikes). Only five of the 40. engchi. questioned truly believed that drones aided AQAP in recruitment; the main factor is economic. AQAP lifts poor men out of poverty and provides social services to the very poor parts of the country. “Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country . . . A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption.”24 The interviewees understood the importance of drone strikes in defeating al Qaeda; the problem that Byman, “Why Drones Work,” “Drop the pilot,” The Economist, October 9, 2013. 23 Ibid. 24 Christopher Swift, “The Drone Blowback Fallacy,” Foreign Affairs (July 1, 2012), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2012-07-01/drone-blowback-fallacy. 21 22. 23.

(35) most people in Yemen have with these strikes is that they kill civilians and that they are conducted by a foreign state. They would not have problems with drone strikes conducted by the Yemeni government because “drones remind us that we don’t have the ability to solve our problems by ourselves.”25 These two articles show that people living in the areas directly affected by drone strikes and terrorism are generally in favor of the strikes because they see the positive impact that they have in defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates.. 2.2 The Legality of the U.S. Drone Program. 政治大 carrying out drone strikes and to立 determine whether or not they should continue in Pakistan. The Christian Enemark (2011) uses three indicators to judge the ethical justification for. ‧ 國. 學. three indicators are benefits, discrimination, and proportionality, with particular emphasis on the final two. They are a part of the U.S. strategy in Pakistan called counterinsurgency incorporating. ‧. counterterrorism (COIN). With current evidence and little transparency, it is not possible to. sit. y. Nat. determine how much the U.S. benefits from using drones. The strikes do considerable damage to. io. al. er. the functionality of the targeted groups, but when it comes to winning the hearts and minds of the. iv n C does suggest that the tactic of decapitation—targeting h e n g c hHVTs—does i U not aid in causing n. local noncombatants, the evidence does not favor the continuation of the program. Evidence. organizations to fall apart, especially fervent religious ones. The decapitation strategy assumes that HVTs are more capable than lower level targets and not just more religious.26 The discrimination indicator, or the fact that combatants are targeted and not noncombatants, is also inconclusive. Drones are more accurate in theory due to better technology, but without official data for people killed in strikes, it is impossible to determine whether drone strikes are. 25 26. Swift, “The Drone Blowback Fallacy.” Enemark, “Drones over Pakistan,” 222-226.. 24.

(36) discriminatory.27 The final indicator, proportionality, tests whether “anticipated harm resulting from using force in pursuit of a legitimate military objective must not be excessive in relation to the expected military benefits.28” Once again, Enemark (2011) cannot give a definitive answer. The COIN philosophy seeks out higher quality targets over a greater quantity of targets, but with the expansion of the drone program to target people who meet certain pattern-of-life standards, the U.S. cannot claim that the CIA follows suit. Until the U.S. releases information on judging the value of targets or the standards used to determine whether someone is dangerous, drone strikes cannot be considered proportionate.29 The inconclusive nature of the drone program’s. 治政大 in Pakistan to “portray their benefits, discrimination, and proportionality allows terrorist groups 立 opposition [the U.S.] as unethical by the opposition’s own standards.”30 This doubt helps the. ‧ 國. 學. combatants gain more recruits by claiming that the U.S. acts in an unethical manner, and,. ‧. therefore, until the U.S. becomes more transparent with its drone program, it should cease all operations to stop causing more harm than good.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. On the other hand, Andrew C. Orr (2011) argues in favor of the overall legality of the U.S. drone program in Pakistan. He evaluates the legality of jus ad bellum, or the initial reason. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. for starting the strikes, and jus in bello, or the legality for individual strikes.31 Using many. engchi. different standards, treaties, and conventions, Orr (2011) concludes that the initiation of the program is legal in general because it did not violate the sovereignty of Pakistan and the U.S. acted in self-defense when starting the program. Pakistan cannot and does not attempt to remove al Qaeda from its borders—allowing the U.S. to intervene lawfully without violating its. Enemark, “Drones over Pakistan,” 227-230. Ibid, 230. 29 Ibid, 230-232. 30 Ibid, 233. 31 Orr, “Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved,” 733-752. 27 28. 25.

(37) sovereignty.32 Also, the U.S. has acted in self-defense against a continuing threat, and until the U.N. acts in a way to stop the threat, the U.S. may continue its operations legally because “selfdefence may continue until the [Security Council] has taken effective action rendering armed force by the victim unnecessary.”33 Furthermore, the drone program passes the Boskoski Test which lays out the framework for an armed conflict against a non-state actor, and the Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights do not apply.34 However, he cannot conclusively determine the legality of individual strikes because they rely on. 治政大each strike, these criteria are Until the U.S. government releases more information regarding 立. the same three criteria that Enemark (2011) uses: proportionality, discrimination, and benefits.. speculative at best. Generally speaking, the strikes have grown more and more proportionate. ‧ 國. 學. with the development of more accurate technology. The issue of discrimination is difficult to. ‧. analyze due to the covert nature of terrorist organizations, but as long as the U.S. attempts to target combatants and avoid noncombatant casualties, the requirement is generally fulfilled. Orr. y. Nat. er. io. sit. (2011) adds another criterion to his jus in bello analysis: human shielding. Law prevents the targeting of involuntary human shields, but it is unclear when addressing voluntary human. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. shielding (the author concludes that voluntary ones should be considered as combatants). In the. engchi. end, overall, the program is generally legal, but the legality of individual strikes is murky due to little available data.35 The U.S. must develop a public framework for strikes and declassify data that allows the public to understand and to test the legality of the U.S. drone program. Laurie R. Blank (2012) takes the same criteria that Orr (2011) and Enemark (2011) use in determining the legality of U.S. drone strikes (discrimination, proportionality, and necessity) and. Orr, “Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved,” 736. Ibid, 737. 34 Ibid, 742-746. 35 Ibid, 746-750. 32 33. 26.

(38) concludes that the program meets all of the necessary thresholds of legality. The article focuses on jus ad bellum and does not address jus in bello. Enemark (2011) argued that each prong did not have enough evidence for a proper conclusion, and Orr (2011) agreed with Enemark (2011) but argued that there was enough for a more solid conclusion. Blank (2012) does not hesitate in her arguments on the legality of these three points. The drone as a weapon meets the necessary standards required by the U.N. to be a legal weapon because the missiles are used by other vehicles, are able to be discriminate, and can minimize harm. Anticipation of misuse of a drone. 治政 powered cameras allows for operators to distinguish between大 combatants and noncombatants. 立. does not make it unlawful. Furthermore, the fact that drones can fly for hours on end using high-. These features meet the legal requirement of discrimination. The ability to fly long hours also. ‧ 國. 學. plays a role in the proportionality of a drone strike. The “anticipated military advantage” must. ‧. outweigh the “expected loss of civilian life or damage.” These issues are determined before the strike occurs, not after. Proportionality focuses on the protection of civilians, but does not. y. Nat. io. sit. prohibit the death of civilians as long as damage is not considered excessive. Finally, the issue. n. al. er. of necessity relates to the number of precautions taken before a strike occurs. A drone’s ability. Ch. i n U. v. to fly for an extended period of time allows for the pilot to survey the area, identify the target and. engchi. collateral damage, and determine the proper moment to strike. The number of hours clocked before each strike meets the requirements for necessity/precaution.36 Drone strikes, no matter where they occur in the world, are legal under the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law, but with improved technology, the standards may become too strict in regards to civilian deaths. The standard could easily change from accepting the possibility of civilian casualties to forbidding them due to increased precision in cameras and targeting capabilities. This change will harm civilians more than benefit them because pilots will ignore the 36. Blank, “After ‘Top Gun,’” 683-702.. 27.

(39) unreasonable new standards or no longer engage in strikes—endangering the civilians in a different way.37 While previous articles focused solely on the legality of the U.S. drone program in Pakistan, M.W. Aslam (2011) expands the conversation to include both legitimacy and prudence. He addresses the issue of so-called great power responsibility, but does not make any major conclusions regarding whether the drone program is in line with this thinking—that great powers are expected “to act as guardians of international society.”38 The issues of consent or self-. 治政大 or preventative, he argues Pakistani consent to the strikes and whether the strikes are preemptive 立 defense are the keys to determine the legality of drone strikes. With little available evidence for. that the program’s legality is dubious at best. Consensus, or approval from the international. ‧ 國. 學. community, regulates the legitimacy of strikes. While the notion of preemption is gaining more. ‧. consensus as the threat of terrorism increases around the world, the U.S. does not have a positive consensus supporting its actions in Pakistan. Neither NATO allies nor the United Kingdom have. y. Nat. er. io. sit. openly spoken about it, and one German official has supported Pakistani opposition.39 It is not prudent for strikes to continue for many reasons. A drone strike that kills civilians pushes. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. surviving family members to join militant groups due to the custom of badal, which demands. engchi. family members kill those who killed their deceased relatives. The program damages the very fabric of the FATA by sowing distrust and starting witch hunts for spies. The U.S. undermining of Pakistani public opposition helps to push people into supporting the militants, increasing regional Pashtun nationalism, uniting formerly divided militant groups, and causing revenge. Blank, “After ‘Top Gun,’” 713-715. M.W. Aslam, “A critical evaluation of American predator strikes in Pakistan: Legality, legitimacy, and prudence,” Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 4, no. 3 (2011): 2. 39 Ibid, 5-10. 37 38. 28.

(40) strikes against both U.S. and Pakistani interests.40 The U.S. drone program’s legality is once again considered inconclusive; it has no legitimacy at the international level; and it causes greater damage to overall grand strategy in fighting terrorism in Pakistan by destabilizing the area and radicalizing the affected population.*. 2.3 Practical and Theoretical Issues with the Program Jenna Jordan (2014) provides statistical evidence supporting Enemark (2011)’s claim regarding the lack of effectiveness in the decapitation tactic of targeting al Qaeda leaders. She. 政治大 organizations: bureaucracy and 立 public support. When information is unavailable for these two. uses two variables to gauge whether or not the tactic has a long term negative effect on terrorist. ‧ 國. 學. variables, age and size substitute for bureaucracy, and organization type substitutes for public support.41 The logic behind age and size is that as an organization gets older, policies and rules. ‧. become more ingrained into the organization, and it has more members to replace the deceased. sit. y. Nat. ones. Organization type refers to whether the group is religious, ideological, or separatist in. io. al. er. nature, with religious and separatist-oriented ones getting more widespread support from the. iv n C decapitation strikes: 25 years of activity,hlarge i U goals. Documents taken from e nsize, g candhreligious n. people than ideological ones.42 Al Qaeda and its affiliates have the elements in place to survive. various al Qaeda headquarters demonstrate the embedded bureaucratic nature of the organization: rosters, accounting sheets, meeting minutes, by-laws, etc. Public opinion polls show a general decline in support for al Qaeda in some areas, but an increase in other places mainly to due to the introduction of public services to sway people’s opinions. The organization has both religious Aslam, “A critical evaluation of American predator strikes in Pakistan,” 10-12. *Other studies that address the legality of the drone programs are “United States of America: ‘Targeted Killing’ Policies Violate the Right to Life” (Amnesty International, 2012), “Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications” (Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School, 2011), and “Counting Drone Strike Deaths” (Human Rights Clinic, Columbia Law School, 2012). 41 Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” 38. 42 Ibid, 11-20. 40. 29.

(41) goals (Islamic) as well as political goals (anti-Western occupation) giving al Qaeda the support of the public.43 Jordan (2014) concludes that “the figures above do not indicate significant degradation of organizational capacity or a marked disruption in al Qaida’s activities.”44 The U.S. tactic of decapitation has more negative effects than positives ones given this conclusion: possibility of revenge attacks, sympathy of the public, drop in public opinion of U.S., and radicalization of new leaders.45 With al Qaeda’s high levels of bureaucracy and public support, decapitation strikes result in the survival of the organization along with short and long term. 政治大. retaliation.46 This study proves that decapitation attempts are not an effective mechanism to fight al Qaeda.. 立. In “U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism,” Cronin (2012) outlines the failures of. ‧ 國. 學. U.S. tactics and strategy in the fight against al Qaeda. The U.S. has no achievable goal in sight,. ‧. and current tactics have evolved into a feckless strategy. Al Qaeda has succeeded in its strategy of provocation (forcing an unreasonable reaction by the targeted state) and mobilization. y. Nat. er. io. sit. (garnering support from the masses).47 However, recently, public opinion for al Qaeda has declined sharply due to its targeting of Muslim civilians. If al Qaeda were to push harder by. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. demonstrating the unreasonable nature of U.S. drone strikes (provocation), it could get even. engchi. more recruits. Also, Cronin (2012) argues that eliminating particular leaders is detrimental to U.S. interests or a waste of resources.48 The killing of bin Laden did not have much of an effect on al Qaeda’s operations, but had a large personal impact in the U.S. Al Qaeda uses U.S. attacks as a much better public relations tool than the U.S. does for al Qaeda attacks, and it continues to. Jordan, “Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark,” 22-25. Ibid, 32. 45 Ibid, 35-38. 46 Ibid, 21. 47 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “U.S. Grand Strategy and Counterterrorism,” Orbis (2012): 5-9. 48 Ibid, 11; 14. 43 44. 30.