國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
16
Chapter Two: Literature Review
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section, “The U.S. Drone Program:
An Evaluation of its Effectiveness and Effects,” reviews literature from both sides of the drone argument. Sources explaining why the drone program needs to change, to stop, or to continue are used in order to understand the problem from every angle. In the second section, “The Legality of the U.S. Drone Program,” the sources explain the legal ramifications of the use of drones in Yemen and Pakistan. The questions of jus in bello (the laws of warfare) and jus ad bellum (the right to engage in warfare) are addressed. Although this study makes no
determination of the legal status of drone strikes, these issues are important to properly
understand the possible biases that people or governments may have against the drone program.
The third section, “Practical and Theoretical Issues with the Program,” reviews the issues of decapitation theory, U.S. grand strategy, propaganda, and the types of “blowback” from the drone program. The final section, “Methodology and Approach,” uses the theory of military coercion by Robert A. Pape as the primary theory to evaluate the drone program.
2.1 The U.S. Drone Program: An Evaluation of its Effectiveness and Effects
In “Those costs and consequences of drone warfare,” Michael J. Boyle (2013) explains how the U.S. drone program negatively affects counterterrorism policy around the globe. He argues against the beliefs that the use of drones to fight terrorism is both efficient and effective.
The prevalence of drones in U.S. policy favors short term goals over long term strategy and gains.
Depending on the source used, the number of strikes conducted and the number of militants or civilians killed differs greatly. Boyle (2013) cites NAF and TBIJ as the most reliable sources, and he argues that the U.S. government’s definition of “militant” artificially inflates the accuracy
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
17 of a strike. Drones now attack people with very loose associations with terrorists, which angers the civilian population and increases anti-American sentiment and terrorist recruitment for the purposes of revenge.1 “Drones are only ‘effective’ if they contribute to achieving US strategic goals in a region, a fact which is often lost in analyses that point only to body counts as a
measure of their worthiness. More generally, arguments in favour of drones tend to present only one side of the ledger, measuring the losses for groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban without considering how many new recruits they gain as a result of the escalation of the drone strikes.”2 The programs in Pakistan and Yemen undermine the authority and credibility of the national governments because they show their inability to fight their own wars. These attitudes directly contradict the U.S. long term goal of building up the capacity of governments to deal with terrorists on their own. In addition, Boyle (2013) examines the psychological and international effects that the drone program has on individuals and the international system, respectively.
Drone strikes create an atmosphere of distrust between neighbors as well as an atmosphere of fear of carrying out everyday necessities.3 These stresses create an environment in which terrorist organizations successfully portray the U.S. as the enemy. The wide use of drones creates the future problem of international use of drones. There are currently no international legal guidelines for the use and implementation of drone strikes. This technology has the ability to interrupt currently accepted norms and practices of the international system. Other countries will most likely imitate the U.S. by targeting individuals indiscriminately.4 Without formal guidelines, the current U.S. drone program will continue to diminish its counterterrorism goals and create an uncertain future for the use of this technology.
1 Boyle, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” 1-11.
2 Ibid, 13.
3 Ibid, 15-21.
4 Ibid, 24-26.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
18 Brian Glyn Williams (2010) uses many of the same sources as Boyle (2013), but he focuses on the history of the drone program and its effects on the ground in Pakistan. He evaluates whether or not drone strikes in Pakistan will help to win “arguably one of the greatest battles of the War on Terror, the battle for the hearts and minds of 160 million Pakistanis.”5 This program evolved from surveillance to the use of armed drones. The first armed drone was used on June 18, 2004 to kill Taliban commander Nek Muhammad; the U.S. only used armed drones to kill high value targets from 2004 to 2007 after which the program expanded its targeting methods to all levels of al Qaeda and the Taliban. The expansion may have occurred sooner if not for a strike that killed 18 civilians—the U.S. halted drone strikes for 8 months to let anti-American sentiment cool down.6 In 2007, the JSOC started conducting its own drone program in addition to the CIA’s causing an increase in the number of strikes conducted in Pakistan’s FATA region. The drone program is the most effective and efficient means to kill terrorists in
Pakistan’s hard-to-reach areas, and these strikes have greatly destabilized the terrorist
organizations operating in those areas. The militants are now isolated from civilians due to fear of an attack, hunt down potential spies, fear new recruits, and cannot remain in one place for long.7 However, drone strikes undermine the authority of the Pakistani government for many reasons. The local newspapers publish exaggerated civilian casualty numbers to promote their anti-American agenda, and the deaths of civilians from a strike further push neutral Pakistanis to hate the U.S.8 The civilian deaths prevent the U.S. from winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Furthermore, the strikes show civilians that their own government is not powerful enough to fight terrorism or to force the U.S. to stop the strikes. Despite these
5 Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” 872.
6 Ibid, 874-876.
7 Ibid, 879-880.
8 Ibid, 881.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
19 sentiments, as of 2009, Pakistani public opinion has begun to shift in favor of drone strikes to kill terrorists. Several surveys across the country have shown that noncombatants in the FATA are more pro-U.S. and pro-drone than civilians outside of the area. These people understand the benefits of the attacks, and as terrorists push deeper into Pakistan, the rest of the population will witness the carnage that accompanies them.9 While Pakistanis keep their anti-American
sentiments, they understand the necessary evil of drone strikes to eliminate these threats. As the Pakistani government and military develop and purchase armed drones and can conduct their own strikes, the public opinion may shift even further in support of drone strikes.
Mahmood Ahmad (2014) argues that the U.S. drone program has caused more damage to counterterrorism in Pakistan than it has produced positive outcomes. Citing NAF and TBIJ to demonstrate the inconsistencies with available data for the number of casualties caused by the program, Ahmad (2014) verifies many of Boyle (2013)’s claims about the lack of effectiveness and efficiency of the current drone program. Since 2004, drone strikes have only killed 49 high value targets, or 2% of all casualties; the other 98% are either civilians or low-to-mid level militants. While the strikes have caused terrorist organizations to constantly move around Pakistan, many of them flee the country to fight elsewhere. Instead of restricting the damage caused by these groups, drone strikes have actually scattered members—further amplifying the problem to other parts of the Middle East and South Asia. Furthermore, drone strikes undermine the Pakistani government’s ability to sway the people away from terrorist organizations. The drone program directly contradicts U.S. counterterrorism policy in this respect: instead of building up the capacity and strength of the government, these strikes undermine these governments’ authority and weaken them. With 90% of the population unhappy with
government policies, the Pakistani—and U.S.—government cannot afford to further alienate the
9 Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” 884-886.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
20 people.10 “The foremost strategic objective of U.S. counterterrorism should have been to prevent local militants abroad from aligning themselves with Al-Qaeda that threaten the interest of United States.”11 It appears that the drone program has done the opposite—attracting more recruits than the U.S. would ever have liked.
While Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter (2014) condemn the drone program, they take a very different approach by chastising the “dronification of state violence,” the “individualization of state violence,” and the bureaucratic nature of the program. This article traces the history of the drone program and argues that it is the natural progressive use of technology by the U.S.
military.12 The Obama administration shifted from Bush’s policy of territorial gains to targeting specific individuals in order to sidestep issues of sovereignty. The U.S. does not attack a nation or seek to make territorial gains, but it does target dangerous individuals.13 The path to the current drone program was first initiated by President Clinton in 1998 when he signed a Memorandum of Notification allowing the CIA to capture terrorists, and in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), President Bush “formally expanded the CIA’s power to include the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists when engaging in global
counterterrorism activities.”14 He enabled the CIA and military to hunt down militants anywhere in the world based on their life patterns, not their identity. In addition, Shaw and Akhter (2014) argue that there is a mutually constitutive relationship between the drone program and
bureaucracy. Bureaucracy allowed for the creation of the drone program along with the
development of new technology, but the drone program has created a new form of bureaucracy
10 Mahmood Ahmad, “The United States Use of Drones in Pakistan: A Politico-Strategic Analysis,” Asian Affairs:
An American Review, no. 41 (2014): 22-26.
11 Ibid, 23.
12 Shaw and Akhter, “The Dronification of State Violence,” 222.
13 Ibid, 213.
14 Ibid, 221.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
21 that has expanded the program from a temporary one to an indefinite one. Several U.S. officials have stated that the program is so ingrained that it is impossible to stop.15 Shaw and Akhter (2014) accept the notion that the drone program cannot and will not end due to its embedded bureaucratic nature which further limits individual accountability. In an article written one year earlier, Ian G.R. Shaw (2013) wrote a very similar article with almost the exact conclusion, but instead labelled the issue of the increase in drone strikes the “Predator Empire.” He focuses on the increased use of drones domestically, the alienation of Pakistanis due to civilian deaths from drones creating a possibly permanent war, and the violation of state sovereignty.16
In “The Foreign Policy Essay: Is this How to Win the “War on Terrorism?” Audrey Kurth Cronin (2014) follows a similar path as Boyle (2013) and Williams (2010), but focuses on the overall war, not just the drone program. The original goal of preventing another 9/11-like terror attack in the U.S. has been replaced by the goal of the elimination of terrorism. Also, she compares the War on Terrorism to Fred Ikle’s statement on the perils of the Vietnam War:
“More absorbing than the final outcome are the perfection of the tools and the mastery of the components and maneuvers that form part of the undertaking.”17 In addition, Anthony H.
Cordesman (2006) expands these points in “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism:’ The Need for a Fundamentally Different Strategy,” which emphasizes the need for the use of local Islamic forces to fight against terrorist organizations.18 While Cronin (2014) and Cordesman (2006) focus on the big picture of the War on Terrorism, two articles by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann (2010 & 2011), “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in
15 Shaw and Akhter, “The Dronification of State Violence,” 222-228.
16 Shaw, “Predator Empire,” 17-18.
17 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The Foreign Policy Essay: Is this How to Win the “War on Terrorism?” Lawfare Blog, (September 14, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-fail.
18 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism:’ The Need for a Fundamentally Different Strategy,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, (September 18, 2006), 2-3; 6.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
22 Pakistan” and “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010,” focus specifically on how drones in Pakistan negatively affect the U.S. effort to defeat al Qaeda. In the first article, they argue that only one in seven strikes kill an HVT, while the rest kill low-to-mid level members or civilians. These strikes are ineffective and have led to an increase in violence in the country (150 attacks in 2004 to 1,916 in 2009).19 Their second article is the primary source used by most scholars conducting research on drone strikes. It makes the same conclusions as their previous article, but provides the statistics that they calculated with NAF.
On the other side of the argument, Daniel L. Byman (2013) makes the case for the continuation of the U.S. drone program. Drone strikes have a cheap cost and a high level of safety. Using data from NAF, he argues that 3,000 militants have been killed in Pakistan and Yemen since 2008, including more than 50 HVTs. Killing HVTs helps to destabilize the organization because newer, less experienced members who rise through the ranks due to HVT deaths will not be as effective in leading the organization. Osama bin Laden once warned of “the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders.”20 Conversely, others do not appreciate the importance of low level members with special skills that are hard to replace.
A drone strike is much safer than sending U.S. ground forces to capture or eliminate a target.
The physical presence of U.S. soldiers can lead to unwanted U.S. casualties, but drones remove that risk. State sovereignty is protected more under drone strikes than by sending in forces or conducting an air strike. There is greater potential for collateral damage (civilian death) from an
19 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2011-07-01/washingtons-phantom-war.
20 Daniel L. Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Brookings (July/August 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
23 air strike than a drone strike. There are other options available to eliminate terrorists, but drones are the best option when faced with difficult-to-reach and unsafe places in both Pakistan and Yemen.21
In “Drop the pilot,” (2013) the unnamed author discusses an interesting phenomenon:
civilians living in the FATA are generally in favor of drone strikes. While no residents in the area would reveal their names due to fear of reprisal, one civilian said, “No one dares tell the real picture . . . Drone attacks are killing the militants who are killing innocent people.”22 Residents in the area prefer a focused, limited drone strike to inaccurate artillery bombardments by the Pakistani military. The strikes do not cause them as much harm, and they believe that the strikes kill the correct individuals. Some people actually wrote and signed the “Peshawar Declaration”
showing their support for drone strikes in FATA, but the signatories had to flee Pakistan for some time afterwards.23 Similarly, in “The Drone Blowback Fallacy,” Christopher Swift (2012c) explains how during a trip to Yemen he interviewed 40 Yemeni men, very few of which believed that drone strikes helped al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the al Qaeda affiliate in Yemen. Swift (2012c) says that his subjects were older, religious, conservative, and from the rural provinces of Yemen (i.e. those most affected by the drone strikes). Only five of the 40 questioned truly believed that drones aided AQAP in recruitment; the main factor is economic.
AQAP lifts poor men out of poverty and provides social services to the very poor parts of the country. “Those who fight do so because of the injustice in this country . . . A few in the north are driven by ideology, but in the south it is mostly about poverty and corruption.”24 The interviewees understood the importance of drone strikes in defeating al Qaeda; the problem that
21 Byman, “Why Drones Work,”
22 “Drop the pilot,” The Economist, October 9, 2013.
23 Ibid.
24 Christopher Swift, “The Drone Blowback Fallacy,” Foreign Affairs (July 1, 2012), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2012-07-01/drone-blowback-fallacy.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
24 most people in Yemen have with these strikes is that they kill civilians and that they are
conducted by a foreign state. They would not have problems with drone strikes conducted by the Yemeni government because “drones remind us that we don’t have the ability to solve our
problems by ourselves.”25 These two articles show that people living in the areas directly affected by drone strikes and terrorism are generally in favor of the strikes because they see the positive impact that they have in defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates.