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Chapter Five: Conclusion
The U.S. has engaged in drone warfare since 2002, and with the current geo-political situation in the Middle East and South Asia, it will most likely continue indefinitely. If the U.S.
manages to successfully eliminate al Qaeda or one of its affiliates, then that absence creates a new opportunity for another organization to grow and flourish. Drone warfare is equivalent to applying a small bandage to a serious wound: its ability to solve the problem is very limited in scope, and the problem will only continue unless something more is done to fix it. If drone strikes are ever successful in one particular region, al Qaeda, or any terrorist organization for that matter, will simply re-emerge elsewhere where its ideology can take root and spread. Air power alone cannot solve the problem of terrorism, so the U.S. must reform its counterterrorism
policies and strategy in order to truly have an impact in the never-ending War on Terrorism.
5.1 Recommendations for U.S. Drone Programs
This study concludes that the current tactical use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the U.S.
in Pakistan and Yemen cannot defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates largely because these drone programs do not successfully meet any of the counterterrorism goals espoused by the Obama administration in 2011. Because drone warfare does not achieve any of these goals, al Qaeda and its affiliates remain a serious threat to U.S. national security and interests. They do not prevent the organization from orchestrating large scale attacks, and they do not prevent it from controlling large swaths of territory. Suicide attacks, such as the one that occurred in Lahore, Pakistan on March 27, 2016 conducted by Jamaat-ul Ahrar (an al Qaeda affiliate),1 demonstrate that drone strikes in Pakistan do not weaken al Qaeda and its affiliates. The opposite may even
1 “Lahore attack: Pakistan PM Sharif demands swift action on terror,” BBC News, March 28, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35910124.
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be true in regards to controlling territory and gaining sympathy from the local populations due to the tribal traditions of the FATA and Yemen. In 2014, al Qaeda had control of more territory in the Middle East and South Asia than ever before in its history (about 400 miles).2 In early 2016, Afghan officials warned that al Qaeda re-emerged as a major threat to the country’s security:“They are really very active. They are working in quiet and reorganizing themselves and preparing themselves for bigger attacks. . . They are working behind other networks, giving them support and the experience they had in different places. And double their resources and recruitment and other things. That is how -- they are not talking too much. They are not making press statements. It is a big threat.”3 Although this warning comes from Afghanistan not
Pakistan, the open border between western Afghanistan and Pakistan’s FATA allows for easy movement between the two. It is entirely possible that the drone program in Pakistan succeeded in pushing al Qaeda back into Afghanistan because this reemergence has close ties to an al Qaeda branch known as al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. Table 5.1 summarizes the final conclusions for the four counterterrorism goals evaluated in this study.
Table 5.1: Summary of U.S. Counterterrorism Goals in Pakistan and Yemen
Counterterrorism Goals Pakistan Yemen
Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al Qaeda and its
Affiliates and Adherents X X
Eliminate Safe Havens ? X
Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and
Capabilities X X
Counter al Qaeda ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish
the Specific Drivers of violence that al Qaeda Exploits X X
Source: Barack Obama, “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” June 2011, 8-10; evaluated by author
2 Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland, “Al Qaeda controls more territory than ever in Middle East,” CNN.com, January 8, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/07/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-terrority-gains/.
3 Nick Paton Walsh, “Al Qaeda ‘very active’ in Afghanistan: U.S. Commander,” CNN.com, April 13, 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/13/middleeast/afghanistan-al-qaeda/.
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76 These conclusions point to the inability of drone strikes to meet their desired goals. The civil war in Yemen and the local ties of AQAP members make the situation in Yemen much worse than the one in Pakistan. Pakistan has a functioning government and military, which increases any chance of success to defeat al Qaeda. The Pakistan drone program has room for growth with increased cooperation between governments and the further development of the Pakistani
military, while no growth or success is possible in Yemen given its current circumstances.
Instead of meeting the above goals, drone strikes fuel al Qaeda by increasing local sympathies and by continuing to provide examples of U.S. imperialism. These strikes prove to the local populations that their governments either cannot fight al Qaeda on their own or they have no interest in doing so. Either option does not bode well for building enduring counterterrorism partnerships with Yemen and Pakistan.
In November 2015, four former drone pilots wrote an open letter to President Obama, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and CIA Director John Brennan decrying U.S. drone programs throughout the world. Their letter discusses the negative effects that such strikes have on communities and on the drone pilots themselves:
We are former Air Force service members. We joined the Air Force to protect American lives and to protect our Constitution. We came to the realization that the innocent
civilians we were killing only fueled the feelings of hatred that ignited terrorism and groups like ISIS, while also serving as a fundamental recruitment tool similar to Guantanamo Bay. This administration and its predecessors have built a drone program that is one of the most devastating driving forces for terrorism and destabilization around the world.
When the guilt of our roles in facilitating this systematic loss of innocent life became too much, all of us succumbed to PTSD. We were cut loose by the same government we gave so much to – sent out in the world without adequate medical care, reliable public health services, or necessary benefits. Some of us are now homeless. Others of us barely make it.
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77 We witnessed gross waste, mismanagement, abuses of power, and our country’s leaders lying publicly about the effectiveness of the drone program. We cannot sit silently by and witness tragedies like the attacks in Paris, knowing the devastating effects that the drone program has overseas and at home. Such silence would violate the very oaths we took to support and defend the Constitution.4
These men witnessed the effects of the drone program on the world. It even broaches a topic rarely discussed due to the secrecy of the program: the mental state of the drone pilots. This letter contains elements that directly contradict the U.S. Counterterrorism Overarching Goals that this study focuses on. The lives of these men are forever damaged by the actions of this program.
Moreover, retired U.S. General Stanley McChrystal made a similar argument in 2013: “What scares me about drone strikes is how they are perceived around the world. . . . The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes … is much greater than the average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level, even by people who’ve never seen one or seen the effects of one.”5 As evidence in this study has shown, local populations are not in favor of foreign (re: American) drone strikes in their own country. It demonstrates a fundamental lack of resources or ability on the part of their governments. These governments cannot do anything to stop the U.S. from conducting drone strikes. The use of drones by the U.S. has a much larger ripple than it is willing to admit either in public or private.
Despite the problems and failures of the drone programs in Yemen and Pakistan, they can be fixed by going back to the root of the desired counterterrorism goals and by following the theory of the military coercion. The way in which the current drone programs operate favors short term successes and goals over long term ones. In some respects, drone strikes actually act against U.S. counterterrorism goals. Killing one HVT is viewed more highly than letting him
4 Brandon Bryant, Cian Westmoreland, Stephen Lewis, Michael Haas, “Letter to President Barak Obama,” 2015, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2515596/final-drone-letter.pdf.
5 David Alexander, “Retired general cautions against overuse of ‘hated’ drones,” Reuters-Thompson, January 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-mcchrystal-idUSBRE90608O20130107. [italics added]
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78 live to avoid killing civilians. In Pakistan, 4.39 to 5.43 civilians died for every HVT killed from 2004 to 2015. In Yemen, 2.49 to 2.66 civilians died for every HVT killed from 2002 to 2015.
These ratios do not favor long term goals of winning over civilians. Therefore, this study recommends the following policy and tactical changes to the U.S. programs in Pakistan and Yemen.
Overall Recommendations:
1. Adopt greater transparency with drone strikes conducted in any country by taking responsibility for civilian casualties and by releasing pertinent documents
Greater transparency by releasing documents that outline targeting procedures, the decision-making process, and casualty numbers would demonstrate to the public that the military and government is fixing the weaker areas of the program. Admitting that mistakes have occurred, which President Obama did in April 2016 when he said, “[The drone program] wasn’t as precise as it should have been, and there’s no doubt civilians were killed that shouldn’t have been. . . . We have to take responsibility where we’re not acting appropriately, or just made mistakes,”6 is the first step towards reforming a flawed tactic.
2. Re-evaluate 2011 counterterrorism goals and the role that drones can play in fulfilling them This study finds that the drone programs fail to achieve these counterterrorism goals. Their broad language and vague terminology make them almost impossible to achieve. Creating succinct, achievable goals, no matter how basic, will make fighting the War on Terrorism easier for all government agencies and military branches. As George Orwell warned, these objectives lose their worth when language becomes meaningless: “The inflated style itself is a kind of euphemism. A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outline and
6 Nicole Gaouette, “Obama: ‘No doubt’ U.S. drones have killed civilians,” CNN.com, April 2, 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/01/politics/obama-isis-drone-strikes-iran/.
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79 covering up all the details. The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish spurting out ink.”7 There is clearly a gap between “real” and
“declared” counterterrorism goals, and the U.S. government must rectify them to make future goals achievable.
3. Allow “host countries” to play a greater role in the fight against al Qaeda
Several sources have pointed out that one of the biggest problems with drone strikes is that the U.S. conducts them, not the targeted country. The U.S. needs to take a step back and make these countries work out some of their internal problems on their own. Getting involved only provides al Qaeda with another recruitment tool.
4. Create a new restricted targeting tactic that limits the number of strikes in order to lessen civilian casualties
Less is more when it comes to drone strikes. Limiting the appropriate targets to HVTs will reduce civilian casualties, but it will not lead to al Qaeda’s demise. When comparing Yemen to Pakistan, it becomes clear that fewer drone strikes causes fewer civilian casualties. The only instances in which drone strikes should be conducted in large numbers are before ground troops enter the area. The decapitation and pattern of life tactics have not worked, so the U.S.
government must develop a new targeting method.
7 George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” 1946, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/orwell46.htm.
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80 Case Specific Recommendations:
1. Abide by the theory of military coercion and the hammer and anvil tactic by integrating air and land power, where Pakistan plays a greater and more direct role
The U.S. cannot defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan without the direct involvement of the Pakistani government and military. Currently, Pakistan takes a backseat in its own affairs when it comes to fighting al Qaeda. To achieve this objective, the U.S. must better train and equip Pakistani forces. It must take ownership of the fact that a terrorist organization has taken root within its borders. In the short term, U.S. drones should receive intelligence and support from local Pakistani forces, and in the long term, Pakistan should conduct its own drone strikes.
2. Repair damaged relations with FATA tribes by making peace with militant tribes and by emphasizing the innocent victims that al Qaeda kills in-country
Perhaps the greatest deterrent against al Qaeda in Pakistan is the local tribes themselves. If they resist al Qaeda and do not grant them safe haven, then members will have to move elsewhere.
The Pakistani government does not have the best relationship with tribes in this area, but there is room for both of them to work together against al Qaeda.
3. Stop all drone strikes until civil unrest in Yemen ends and a functioning government forms The hammer and anvil tactic cannot work without a government and military to provide the land support for the drones. Yemen is currently a failed state, and the first priority for the U.S. should be to end the civil war and create a government that works for all of the factions within the country. Al Qaeda feeds off of this unrest by providing social services and stability. Drone strikes will do nothing but make the problem worse. Nothing is more important for Yemen right now than ending the bloodshed, and no further recommendations should be made until the unrest is resolved.
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81 Following these recommendations will help to reform the tactical use of unmanned aerial vehicles and lead to the eventual defeat of al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan and Yemen.